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ABSTRACT 
 
This dissertation frames the1994 genocide perpetrated against the Tutsi in Rwanda, which 
took over a million people’s lives as a result of the contextual factors emerging from 
Rwandan history. Given the destruction of social cohesion after the 1994 genocide, this study 
employs a realist evaluation approach proposed by Pawson and Tilley (1997; 2004) to 
develop a theological understanding and definition of reconciliation, which incorporates the 
need to truly address the context of modern Rwanda. A realist approach includes 
interrogating the context of interventions in order to understand how and why mechanisms 
can trigger particular outcomes. In conducting this realist evaluation of the history leading up 
to the 1994 genocide, ethnic ideology is identified as the main factor creating division. This 
ideology was a phenomenon artificially created and introduced by policies of colonialists and 
missionaries, exploited by the “Hutu power” movement after independence, and reinforced 
by the sectarian policies of the Rwandan government. This ideology sought to categorize the 
Hutu, Tutsi and Twa communities as ethnically and racially distinct, despite the fact that they 
all share one ethnicity, one language and a common heritage as Banyarwanda. Taking this 
understanding of ethnic ideology as a description of the underlying problem in Rwanda, this 
dissertation seeks to apply theological resources for understanding reconciliation in a way 
that can undo the effects of ethnic ideology. This new vision of reconciliation will be used to 
evaluate how the ministry of the Presbyterian Church in Rwanda (PCR) also referred to by its 
French name, l’ Eglise Prebytérienne au Rwanda (EPR), addresses ethnic ideology and 
responds to the effects and consequences of the 1994 genocide perpetrated against the Tutsi. 
A closer look at the development of ethnic ideology through Rwandan national and church 
history, as well as consideration of the various government-led attempts at reconciliation will 
inform this evaluation. It was found that the EPR has shown significant achievements in the 
process of reconciliation, but that ethnic ideology still persists. This finding highlights the 
need for the EPR to provide a clear theology of a shared identity versus one national ethnic 
identity “Ndi Umunyaranda” (I am a Rwandan) provided by the government in post-genocide 
Rwanda, which will help church members and other Rwandans to overcome divisions  
related to ethnicity.
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OPSOMMING 
 
Hierdie verhandeling omvat die 1994-volkslagting van die Tutsi’s in Rwanda waar meer as ŉ 
miljoen mense uitgemoor is, ŉ direkte gevolg van die kontekstuele faktore wat uit die 
Rwandese geskiedenis verrys het. In ag genome die verwoesting van sosiale samehang ná die 
1994-slagting, implementeer hierdie studie ŉ realistiese evalueringsbenadering voorgehou 
deur Pawson en Tilley (1997: 2004). Deur middel van hierdie evalueringsbenadering word ŉ 
teologiese begrip en definisie van versoening te ontwikkel waarby die behoefte geïnkorporeer 
word om die konteks van moderne Rwanda werklik te ondersoek. ŉ Realistiese benadering 
behels ŉ beoordeling van die konteks van intervensies ten einde te verstaan hoe en waarom 
meganismes sekere uitkomste kan sneller. In die uitvoer van hierdie realistiese evaluering van 
die geskiedenis wat die 1994-volkslagting voorafgegaan het, word etniese ideologie as die 
hooffaktor in die ontstaan van verdeeldheid geïdentifiseer. Hierdie ideologie is as kunsmatige 
verskynsel deur die beleide van kolonialiste en sendelinge geskep en ingevoer, deur die 
“Hutu-mag” uitgebuit en deur die sektariese beleide van die Rwandese owerheid versterk. 
Die ideologie was daarop gerig om die Hutu-, Tutsi- en Twa-gemeenskappe op grond van 
etniesiteit en ras van mekaar te onderskei, ondanks die feit dat hulle een etnisiteit, een taal en 
ŉ gemeenskaplike nalatenskap as Banjarwanda gedeel het. Deur die implementering van 
hierdie definisie van etniese ideologie as ŉ beskrywing van die onderliggende probleem in 
Rwanda, soek die navorser na teologiese hulpmiddels om versoening op ŉ manier te verstaan 
wat die gevolge van etniese ideologie ongedaan kan maak. Hierdie nuwe siening van 
versoening sal gebruik word om die wyse te evalueer waarop die leraars van die 
Presbiteriaanse Kerk in Rwanda (PKR, in Frans le Eglise Prebytérienne au Rwanda, of EPR) 
etniese ideologie hanteer en op die uitwerking en gevolge van die 1994-volksmoord op die 
Tutsi reageer. ŉ Nader beskouing van die ontwikkeling van etniese ideologie deur die loop 
van Rwandese nasionale en kerkgeskiedenis, sowel as die oorweging van verskeie 
regeringsgeleide pogings vir versoening, sal hierdie evaluering onderlê. In hierdie tesis word 
daar bevind dat die EPR merkwaardige sukses in die versoeningsproses bereik het, maar dat 
etniese ideologie steeds bestaan. Hierdie analise beklemtoon die behoefte aan die daarstelling 
van ŉ duidelike teologie van ŉ gedeelde identiteit deur die EPR tenoor een nasionale etniese 
identiteit “Ndi Umunyaranda” (Ek is ŉ Rwandees) wat deur die owerheid in die post-
volkslagting Rwanda verskaf is. Sodoende sal kerklidmate en ander Rwandese in staat gestel 
word om etnies gebaseerde verdeeldheid te bowe te kom. 
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1 
CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Background of the study 
 
The beginning of the twenty-first century has been marked by significant turbulence 
fuelled by brutal violence, wars and genocide in many countries across the globe. This 
justifies why Schreiter (2005:74) suggests that reconciliation and healing provides a 
new paradigm for mission theology. As such, reconciliation has come to the fore in 
many different contexts and has caught the imagination of people both inside and 
outside the church (Isaak, 2011:331). Reconciliation is needed for the sake of 
peaceful coexistence not only between neighbouring countries but also within one’s 
own borders, as much conflict today takes place within one’s own country. After the 
successful conclusion of a peace settlement following a civil war, former enemies, 
perpetrators and survivors must return to living side-by-side just as they did before the 
violent atrocities were committed. Since peaceful coexistence is necessary and should 
be lasting, the need for reconciliation is profound (Brounéus, 2008:9). However, 
attitudes and behaviours seldom, if ever, change from genocidal to collegial at the 
moment peace is declared. Reconciliation, therefore, must address the attitudes that 
facilitated the violence in the first place. This study seeks to understand the specific 
conditions that led to the 1994 genocide
1
 in Rwanda, and theologically understand 
what reconciliation should look like in this context. Finally, this study will assess the 
reconciliation efforts of the Presbyterian Church in Rwanda. 
                                                          
1
The word ‘genocide’ was coined by a Polish lawyer, Raphael Lemkin, who fled the German 
occupation and lost his family during the Jewish Holocaust of the Second World War. Lemkin derived 
the word from the Greek genos, race, or tribe and ‘cide’, from the Latin caedere, ‘to kill’. Genocide is 
intended to signify a co-ordinated plan of different actions, Lemkin wrote, aiming at the destruction of 
essential foundations of the life of national groups, with the aim of annihilating the groups themselves.’ 
Genocide is directed against individuals, not in their individual capacity, but as members of a group. 
Lemkin’s definition of genocide was published in 1994 and used in the Genocide Convention that was 
unanimously accepted by the UN General Assembly, in 1948 (cited in Melvern, 2000:249).  
According to the latter convention, Genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to 
destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such: (a) killing members 
of the group;(b) causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;(c) deliberately 
inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or 
in part;(d) imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;(e) forcibly transferring 
children of the group to another group (Dawson & Boynton,2008:243). The term genocide is used in 
this study to connote the intention to destroy and kill a group.  
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2 
As such, the realist approach proposed by Pawson and Tilley (1997; 2004) with its 
context–mechanisms–outcomes (CMO) descriptive and explanatory method will be 
used in this study as an appropriate way to deal with the complexity and dynamism of 
the condition (context). The CMO method also helps us to deconstruct ideas, beliefs, 
practices and their negative consequences in order to propose and construct 
alternatives or expand on positive developments of reconciliation. 
 
Reconciliation will be explored from an interdisciplinary approach based on a 
theological perspective, but informed by a sociological perspective. The researcher 
refers to Robert Montgomery (2012:289) who defines missiology as “an 
interdisciplinary field that draws on a variety of areas of study, including the social 
sciences. The social sciences, just as the natural sciences, are useful tools for 
increasing knowledge and benefiting humanity”. Thus, the role of missiologists is to 
integrate the social sciences with their theological understanding of the missio Dei, 
especially in the field of missiology (Montgomery, 2012:289). 
 
In this study, it is argued that the root cause and influencing factors that contributed to 
the 1994 Rwandan genocide lie in the complex and multiple realities of the political 
and ethnic ideologies
2
 that had been invented, constructed and were put in place by 
the former colonial administration and policies of the missionaries
3
. According to the 
Rwandan missiologist Gatwa, this ideology, in the post-colonial period, had been 
exploited by the “Hutu power” hard-liners of the regime of President Juvenal 
Habyarimana who ruled Rwanda from 1973 to 6
th
 April 1994(Gatwa, 1999:347). 
Furthermore, it will be shown that the genocide against the Tutsi, which happened in 
1994, was not an unplanned event. It was, rather, “the consequence of ethnicity-based 
ideologies leading to increased exclusion and discrimination that were 
                                                          
2
Ideologies can be regarded as ‘systems of thought’, ‘systems of belief’ or a ‘symbolic system’ which 
pertain to social action or political practice. Ideology is present in every political program and is a 
feature of every organised political movement (Thompson, 1990:5).The word “ideology” will be used 
in this study to refer to a system of ideas and values socially constructed to provide a false picture and 
false consciousness regarding social differences (Gatwa, 1999).Another Rwandan, Mafeza (2013), who 
wrote on ‘The role of education in combating genocide ideology in the post-genocide’ defines 
‘genocide ideology’ as “a set of organized thoughts and beliefs centered on ethnic identity that drives 
competition for power and dignity using hatred, conflict and violence in order to attain its objectives” 
(Mafeza, 2013:2). 
3
 Ethnic ideology planted by colonialists and missionaries will be discussed in detail in chapter 3 
(section 3.4 and 3.10.2) and chapter 4 (section 4.3.) 
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institutionalised by successive powers” (Shyaka, 2005:35).In fact, a prolonged period 
of successive corrupt regimes from 1960 to 1994 saw the entrenchment of ‘divide and 
rule’ as the principle of governing in Rwanda. Inevitably, this oppressive culture led 
to massive human rights violations, which culminated in the 1994 genocide that saw 
over one million Rwandans perish. The speed and ferocity with which the genocide 
was executed left the country almost entirely destroyed. Over a million people were 
killed and many were left unburied; innumerable were orphaned, widowed and 
handicapped, leaving a very vulnerable population severely traumatized (Mutamba & 
Izabiliza, 2005:10). The economy was completely destroyed and there were no 
functioning state institutions remaining. This resulted in various efforts to reconcile 
the people of Rwanda in the wake of the genocide. In turn, reconciliation has become 
a priority for both government and non-government organisations (NGO’s) including 
faith-based organisation (FBO’s) and churches — these have all, to some extent, tried 
to ensure reconciliation.  
 
Therefore, there is a need to explore how and whether the ministry of reconciliation 
can address ethnic ideology as it responds to the effects and consequences of the 1994 
genocide. This dissertation will assess the efforts made towards reconciliation since 
1994, particularly by the Presbyterian Church of Rwanda, and propose new 
possibilities for a theological approach to deconstructing ethnic ideology. 
 
The current introductory chapter provides a background to the study, as well as 
introduces the methodology and literature review that provides the theoretical 
framework for the study. The background focuses on two core concepts: First, it 
briefly outlines the historical context of Rwanda before and during the colonial 
period. This historical context reveals that the development of the ethnic ideology in 
Rwanda was already arbitrarily created during the period of colonisation. Along with 
the colonial authorities, the missionaries propelled the hardening of the social 
structure of ethnicity and aggravated the social problems inherent between the two 
ethnic groups (Hutu and Tutsi) that resulted in the 1994 genocide. Second, it points 
out that the ministry of reconciliation requires the healing of broken relations and 
trauma caused by the 1994 genocide. In the Rwandan context, reconciliation must 
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become a mechanism to deconstruct the ethnic ideology and respond to the effects 
and consequences of genocide.  
In Rwanda, the nature of the Hutu-Tutsi-Twa
4
 identities in the pre-colonial era has 
been hotly debated since the genocide, e.g. the mere fact of the existence of 
distinctive Hutu/Tutsi/Twa identities. Check (2008:249) maintains that the concept of 
ethnic
5
 differences was foreign to pre-colonial Africa. Indeed, Wielenga (2011b) has 
argued that part of the discussion of what the terms ‘Hutu’ and ‘Tutsi’ stand for has to 
do with whether these groups are of different origins or not. For those who perceive 
the Hutu, Tutsi and Twa to be unique groups with distinctive origins, it is assumed 
that the Twa, being pygmoid, were the earliest inhabitants of Rwanda; the Hutu, of 
Bantu origin, travelled upwards from the south perhaps some two thousand years ago 
and the Tutsi were possibly a southern Ethiopian tribe who immigrated to Rwanda 
around the fifteenth century or even several centuries before that. This argument is 
based on the work of early European anthropologists, bringing with them their 
Eurocentric racial perspectives, believing that the Tutsi were the descendants of 
Ham,
6
 a race closer to Europeans than the Bantu Hutus. With their stereotypical tall, 
thin features—as opposed to the ‘short and stocky’ Hutu—Tutsi were seen by the 
Europeans as being a superior race (Wielenga, 2011b:2). However, this view, which 
shows that the three ethnic groups are different based on their origins and perception 
that the Tutsi are descendants of the ‘Hamitic’ race, is rejected by some researchers, 
especially in the post-genocide Rwanda where the focus is more on “unity of 
Rwandans prior to the arrival of the Europeans and have contended that ethnic 
identity was purely a colonial creation” (Longman, 2004:31).  
                                                          
4
The Twa is a very small group that does not feature either as victims or perpetrators in the genocide. 
Although the Twa will not be mentioned often in this study, the implications and reconfiguration of 
ethnic ideology should be understood as applying to them as well. Before the 1994 genocide, the Hutu 
constituted the majority with 85% of the population, whereas the Tutsi made up 14% and the Twa 6% 
(Gatwa, 2005:xvi). Interestingly, all three of the ethnic groups are known as one nation called 
“Banyarwanda”. They share the same culture and speak the same language called “Ikinyarwanda”. 
They all live together in the same location. However, for the purpose of this study on genocide, only 
the Hutu and Tutsi will be mentioned because of the long-standing history of conflict between them 
and the development of an ethnic ideology that led to genocide against the Tutsi, as shall be discussed 
in this study.  
5
The term ethnic group is generally understood in anthropological literature to designate a population 
which is: biologically self-perpetuating; shares fundamental cultural values, is overtly uniform in 
cultural forms; makes up a field of communication and interaction; has a membership which identifies 
itself and is identified by others as constituting a category distinguishable from other categories of the 
same order. “Ethnicity” is defined as “a people’s collective consciousness of who and what they are, 
their social identity, common memories and interests, and so on” Aboagye-Mensah (1994:21). 
6
Ham was one of Noah’s three sons (cf. the Book of Genesis).  
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Contemporary scholars on the Rwandan situation and officials of the current 
government have argued that it is this ‘Hamite myth’ that has played a significant role 
in the cause of this ethnic division, even contributing to the genocide (Wielenga, 
2011b:2). They argue that these ethnic categories did not exist prior to the arrival of 
the Europeans and that Rwandan identity was unified on a national level, though 
differences according to clan and region did exist (Bazuin, 2013:41). In my view, I 
rather agree with the proponents who argue that the existence of a common language 
and shared culture used by all three groups points toward Rwandans having a shared 
single identity before the advent of colonialism in the region. 
 
According to Bruce (2001:17), in pre-colonial Rwanda, the terms Hutu and Tutsi 
referred to “a complex set of social relations that had some of the elements of class 
and social status. Hutu and Tutsi as classes were not fixed categories but fluid ones”. 
These two categories “varied through time and location depending on factors such as 
wealth, military prowess, family and control over precious commodities or occupation 
of prestigious social positions” (Bruce, 2001:17). When the German colonial 
administration arrived in Rwanda (in the 1920s, the Belgian colonisers took over the 
country’s administration), they “encountered an organised state with well-established 
institutions such as the military, a judicial system, and an elaborate administration that 
dated from the fifteenth century. Rwandan society existed in harmony before the 
colonial era. The Banyarwanda, whether Tutsi, Hutu or Twa, shared the same culture, 
religion, spoke the same language, intermarried and lived side by side on the same 
hillsides” (Uma Shankar & Yahad, 2003:28). In fact, Rwandan people lived in 
peaceful coexistence, the demarcations between the Tutsi and Hutu were not deep and 
the division was more economic than cultural (Anthea, 1999:12). The point is not 
whether the society was just or equitable but that it was not organised according to 
ethnic lines; thus one’s membership to a particular group may change, and that is 
what happened. 
 
Of significance then, the labels ‘Hutu’ and ‘Tutsi’ were not ethnically based. There 
was mobility among the “classes,” i.e. Hutu could become Tutsi through the 
ownership of cattle, and vice versa. However, during the colonial era, these labels 
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were changed from descriptions of status and economic activity to fixed, 
institutionalized racial categories (Clark, 2010:142). Firstly, the colonialists 
introduced the racial theory that emphasized the archetypal differences in height and 
physiognomy between Tutsi and Hutu. In this view, the Tutsis were “black 
Caucasians” who had immigrated to Rwanda and conquered the local Hutu Bantu 
people. This theory claims the supremacy of the Tutsi over the Hutu, who are 
identified as an inferior and uncivilized Bantu people, subjugated by superior Hamitic 
Tutsis on their arrival in Rwanda (Carney, 2016:192; Ferdinando, 2009:52). 
Secondly, they introduced the identity card in order to maintain the fluid classes to 
fixed classes and to identify individuals according to the label on their identity cards 
(Clark, 2010:142). For Ian Linden (1997:43), the transformation of a complex 
“feudal” society with social mobility into a bureaucratic colonial state hardened social 
and economic differences into ethnic differences and finally resulted in “tribal” 
conflict.  
 
However, the change in the meaning of Hutu and Tutsi from economical to ethnic 
categories was not only due to colonial powers and administration. Check (2008) 
echoes the above viewpoint when he quotes Lemarchand (1999), who notes that 
studies conducted by missionaries and European explorers concerning the traditional 
African cultural and socio-political setting ‘invented’ a particular form of tradition 
and ethnicity. Furthermore, tracing back the root cause of the 1994 genocide, he 
explains that the propaganda of ethnic conflict during that time bore all the hallmarks 
of invented theories of ethnic superiority (Check, 2008:249). In the same way, the 
current president of Rwanda Paul Kagame, affirms that the colonial powers in the 
Great Lakes region sowed the seeds of antagonism and conflict (cf. Uma Shankar & 
Yahad, 2003:28).  
 
In this study, it is fundamental to understand that the 1994 genocide was fuelled by an 
ethnic ideology that emphasized the division and hatred between the Hutu and the 
Tutsi. However, Longman (2004:29) reminds us that the “genocide was a complex 
and catastrophic event that cannot be explained with simplistic accounts”. 
Consequently, this study argues that in order to understand the genocide—why it 
happened and how—“one must have a thorough understanding of Rwanda’s historical 
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background and the social, economic, and political developments that took place in 
the decades prior to the violence” (Longman, 2004:30). In other words, to understand 
the genocide in Rwanda, it is essential to place the events of 1994 within a broader 
context (Longman, 2004:30).  
 
Given the fact that the Hutu and Tutsi once lived harmoniously, the pressing question 
is, “How did this ethnic hatred come about?” This gives rise to further questions, 
“What caused the separation between the Hutu and Tutsi? “What were the motivating 
and influencing factors that led to the kind of hatred and distrust necessary to cause 
the 1994 genocide?” Many scholars have conducted research on the Rwandan 
genocide and have discussed the complex and multiple realities of the causal and 
influential factors that contributed to this ethnic ideology. These scholars can be 
categorized according to different schools of thought. Three such theoretical schools 
have generally come to dominate studies of the Rwandan genocide. These are: 
 
The first theory, the primordial or essentialist school of thought, argues that ethnic 
conflict generally arises in Africa because Africans are inherently tribal, and this 
cannot change. This view regards ethnicity as something that is deeply embedded in 
the self and can be the root cause of conflict, especially in highly ethnically-diverse 
regions such as Africa (Doornbs, 1991:19). Primordialism argues that ethnic conflict 
stems from ‘ancient hatreds’ between ethnic groups and that frustration comes with 
differences in 'natural ties' that derive from religious, racial, or regional connections. 
7
 
For primordialists, conflict between two ethnic groups is inevitable because of 
unchanging, essential characteristics of the members of these categories. Therefore, 
ethnic violence results from antipathies and antagonisms that are enduring properties 
of ethnic groups (Fearon & Laitin, 2000:849).  In this respect, Weir (2012:1) states, 
“What we have witnessed in Rwanda is a historical product, not a biological fatality 
or ‘spontaneous’ bestial outburst. Tutsi and Hutu have not been created by God as 
cats and dogs, predestined from all eternity to disembowel each other. The massacres 
in Rwanda are not the result of a deep-rooted and ancient hatred between two ethnic 
groups”. Therefore, Primordialism inadequately answers the question regarding the 
                                                          
7
Viewed from: 
http://www.academia.edu/1526597/Primordialism_Constructivism_Instrumentalism_and_Rwanda. 
[Date accessed: 16 May 2014]. 
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explanation of ethnic conflicts such as the Rwandan genocide. Hence, one must look 
beyond biological ties to find motives for these killings. This brings one to the notion 
that ethnic conflicts are driven by the aims of political leaders (Weir, 2012:1). 
 
The second theory, the instrumentalist school, views political manipulation and the 
behaviour of elites as the cause of conflict. This analysis takes a fuller account of the 
complex causes of genocide. Unlike primordialists, instrumentalists see ethnicity 
itself as ever-changing. However, ethnicity is perceived as a tool used by elites. As 
such, ethnicity does not cause conflict simply because it exists; ethnicity is able to 
cause conflict because of manipulation by elites. Since time immemorial elites have 
accentuated ethnic differences in an attempt to leverage political gains. Understood 
this way, instrumentalists argue that ethnicity has been used to create a class system in 
Africa. By emphasizing ethnic differences, elites belonging to a certain ethnic 
community have been able to transfer hostilities resulting from political and economic 
inequalities within their communities to other ethnic groups (Brown, 2010:413). 
Instrumentalism is based upon the notion that ethnic conflict is driven by either the 
relationship between economic wants—greed and grievance—or the active 
manipulation by political leaders based on their rational decision to encourage or 
incite ethnic conflict for their political gain (Weir, 2012:1, 4). At first glance, the 
example of the Rwandan genocide clearly seems to support the instrumentalist school 
that views political leaders’ manipulation and the behaviour of elites as the cause of 
conflict. This is because Hutu elites used ethnicity as a political weapon to prevent 
power-sharing and to reassert their social, economic and political dominance; 
incitement to ethnic hatred and violence was used as a method of power 
consolidation. This analysis is an improvement upon the primordialist view, as it 
places the dimensions of identity as well as political and economic factors in 
historical context, highlighting the intervention of external forces (Kimonyo, 
2001:30). 
 
A third theory, constructivism, argues that ethnic conflict is a product of historical 
processes over time that result in divergent ethnic identities and created hostility 
between them (Weir, 2012:1). The constructivist school of thought aims to combine 
influences from both essentialism and instrumentalism. In doing so, it seeks to show 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
  
 
 
9 
the processes through which ethnic groups have emerged and become socially 
significant (Hempel, 2004:413). Constructivists will agree with primordialists that 
ethnicity is an inheritance, but they do not agree that it is unchanging. Constructivists 
tend to criticize the idea that ethnicity should be equated with a common culture. 
Instead, they argue that ethnicity arises out of the construction of “social boundaries”. 
These social boundaries come to exist because of self-ascription and ascription by 
others (Lentz, 1995:306). Unlike primordialists, constructivists believe that our 
identities can be reshaped (Brown and Langer, 2010:413).  
 
Unlike instrumentalists, constructivists do not see ethnicity as simply a product of 
elitist manipulation. For them, social settings and norms are the forces that change the 
role of ethnicity, rather than elite power. Both of these theories can accept that the 
genocide in Rwanda was in some respect orchestrated by elites in order to retain 
political power. The difference, however, is that the instrumentalists accept that two 
distinct ethnic identities exist in Rwanda, awaiting manipulation by elites. Though, 
the constructivists question the very origin of these ethnic identities. They allow for 
the possibility that “ethnicity” in the Rwandan context is actually an arbitrary creation 
of the colonial era, which has hardened as a result of political conflict.  
 
Regardless of the precise mechanisms by which ethnic ideology arose, the point is 
that, for both the instrumentalist and the constructivist theories, some combination of 
elite manipulation and the social and historical processes factors reinforced the 
arbitrary ethnic divisions that were exploited in the genocide. In order to understand 
how ethnic identity was manipulated, as well as how it was constructed in the 
Rwandan society, it is necessary to take a closer look at the history of Hutu/Tutsi 
relations and the legacy of colonialism in the country, this will be explored further in 
chapter 3. 
 
According to Gourevitch (1998:133), the Rwandan genocide “was the most efficient 
mass killings since the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.” On average, 
the perpetrators terminated five and a half lives per minute. While there are numerous 
and often interlocking consequences of the 1994 genocide, the major consequence is 
the rending of the Rwandan social fabric, producing much anger, hatred, resentment, 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
  
 
 
10 
the need for retaliation, and feelings of mistrust. In addition, the genocide has resulted 
in fractured families, business partnerships, government coalitions, neighbourhoods, 
civic organizations, churches, friendships, and even marriages. The survivors of this 
brutal treatment have been physically and psychologically affected (Lowe, 2008:6). 
For Sarkin (1999:782), Rwandans are “living in a state of fear”. How can Rwandan 
people who have experienced such tumultuous situations once again live in harmony 
and peace, trust one another in their daily occupations, and rid themselves of 
memories of the past? How can reconciliation heal Rwanda in such a way that it 
prevents recurring, reciprocal violence? How can we avoid another genocide in the 
future? All of these questions require an understanding of the ideology that caused the 
genocide in the first place.  
 
If it is the case that Rwanda was an essentially harmonious and ethnically united 
country before European colonisers introduced their racial ideology, then the ultimate 
source of the genocide was not a longstanding Hutu-Tutsi division, but rather the 
colonial imposition of a false consciousness, which created that division. The goal of 
reconciliation within the church must parallel the present goal of government policy, 
which is to re-establish the pristine ethnic unity of the pre-colonial Banyarwanda 
(Ferdinando, 2009:53).This will be discussed further in chapter five (5.4.1.2). 
However, for the church to be faithful to its mission, the logic of this reconciliation 
must be theologically constructed. Despite the efforts of many FBOs, little has been 
done to theologically evaluate the ministry of reconciliation in a way that addresses 
the problem of ethnic ideology. This is one of the shortcomings this study wishes to 
address. 
 
1.2 Motivation and contribution of the research 
 
The motivation for this research comes, firstly, from my personal background as a 
Rwandan minister dealing with the aftermath of the 1994 genocide. I was challenged 
by the fact that my congregation was composed of both victims/survivors and 
perpetrators. Moreover, many genocide survivors, mostly Tutsi, were fearful and 
understandably, mistrusted almost everyone. They could no longer live normal lives. 
Many survivors perceived all Hutu as perpetrators. Feelings of anger, blame and 
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revenge were overwhelmingly strong in victims. The families of perpetrators who 
were imprisoned harboured similar feelings of anger due to their relatives’ 
imprisonment (Mukabera, 2012:111). After the 1994 genocide, fear and mistrust were 
prevalent amongst relevant parties. My involvement in pastoral ministry missiological 
studies made me realise the urgency to carry out studies on reconciliation to help 
Rwanda towards normalcy, as well as overcome past alienation, enmity, hatred and 
mistrust. 
 
A second motivation to carry out this research is a conviction that I share with Isaak, 
namely:  
 
Reconciliation also is vitally important because the possibility of reconciliation 
is one of, if not the most compelling way of expressing the meaning of the 
gospel today. In the midst of violence, pain and indelible scars on people’s 
memory, the church as God's minister of reconciliation proclaims that in Jesus 
Christ and in his community, healing is possible. To put it differently, the church 
must be in the thick of the process of reconciliation (Isaak, 2011:324).  
 
Establishing reconciliation is no easy task. It is not something that can be achieved in 
a simple way or over a short period of time, as it is a multidimensional process. 
Moreover, it is not only the work of the church but also the work of an entire society 
aided by different approaches. My hope is that this study will provide information and 
insight that will help raise the church’s awareness of its mission of reconciliation, as 
well as enable other researchers to discover the best way to contribute towards the 
ministry of reconciliation.    
 
The third motivation for this study is a theological one. An understanding of the 
ethnic ideology and genocide, as well as a theological evaluation of it is crucial to the 
field of missiology. That the church in Rwanda could be implicated in ethnic ideology 
and genocide is sufficient reason to challenge the church worldwide to examine its 
theology of reconciliation. The effectiveness of the future ministry of the Presbyterian 
Church in Rwanda depends in part on its ability to develop a theology of 
reconciliation which can first be of use to Rwandans given their own history, and then 
to be a testimony to other nations finding themselves in similar situations of violence, 
mistrust and fear. 
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The fourth motivation is my involvement in theological education and participation in 
the ministry of reconciliation, which prompted me to do research for my MTh studies 
at Tumaini University Makumira (TUMA) in Tanzania. The title of my thesis was, 
‘The contribution of the Presbyterian Church in Rwanda towards mission of 
reconciliation after the 1994 genocide against the Tutsi: A case study of Remera 
parish (2002-2012)’.After that experience, I saw the need to further explore how the 
ministry of reconciliation addresses ethnic ideology and responds to the effects and 
consequences of the 1994 genocide, while theologically evaluating the role played by 
the Presbyterian Church in Rwanda as a whole, and beyond the confines of only one 
parish.  
 
The final motivation concerns the missiological contribution and closing some of the 
gaps in the literature. This study wishes to apply missiological and theological 
perspectives of reconciliation by focusing on how and why practices and processes 
have not worked, and what can and should be done in a specific context, i.e. Rwanda. 
At the same time, this study adds to the theological understanding of reconciliation, as 
it introduces the ‘realistic approach,’ a sociological method of reading literature from 
the perspective of practices and processes in theological and missiological studies.  
 
1.3 Research problem  
 
In 1994, over a million Tutsi and moderate Hutu were brutally killed in Rwanda 
during a three-month long genocide. Since then, the world has sought to understand 
what happened. Due to the fact that the cause of the 1994 genocide seems to centre on 
ethnic ideology, one effort to understand what happened has been to explore 
Rwanda’s identity politics. Thus, the first problem this study will explore is how 
ethnic ideology was constructed by colonialists, missionaries, and Rwandan leaders, 
and how ethnic ideology impacted the formation of Hutu and Tutsi identities and 
divisions that led to the 1994 genocide (Wielenga, 2011:1-2). It will be argued that 
the roots
8
 of the 1994 genocide may be found in (A) an ethnicity-based ideology 
leading to (B) exclusion and discrimination, which has been institutionalized by 
                                                          
8
A detailed discussion of the causal and influential factors of the 1994 genocide will be given in 
chapter 3. 
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successive powers, and (C) as a result, massive human rights violations have swept 
across the country devastating rural social structures. The Rwandan genocide 
challenges the mission and ministries of reconciliation in all churches. Therefore, this 
research also needs to attend to the following problems: How have efforts at 
reconciliation succeeded or failed to adequately address the roots of ethnic ideology? 
This question relates to how and why the Presbyterian Church has used its work as a 
mechanism within the Rwandan context to achieve the outcome of reconciliation. 
Furthermore, how can the ministry of reconciliation in the Presbyterian Church 
address the root problem of ethnic ideology?   
 
1.4 Key research questions 
 
In light of the above, the primary research question for this study is formulated as 
follows: “On theological grounds, and in light of the link that exists between ethnic 
ideology and genocide, what has the Presbyterian Church in Rwanda done, is 
currently doing, and is expected to do with regards to the challenges created in the 
Rwandan society by the legacy of genocide?” 
 
To answer this question the following sub-questions will be addressed:  
 
1) What are the contextual, ‘causal’ and influential factors that contributed to the 
1994 genocide?  
2) How did the Rwandan Church contribute to the construction of the ethnic 
ideology that led to the 1994 genocide? 
3) What are the post-genocide effects and consequences in the Rwandan society? 
Moreover, how does reconciliation address ethnic ideology and respond to 
these effects?   
4) Which theology of reconciliation has informed the current practices and 
processes of the Church in Rwanda to undo ethnic ideology? 
5) To what extent is the Presbyterian Church in Rwanda involved in the ministry 
of reconciliation in the country? If this involvement exists, is it effective and 
what theological guidelines inform or may inform its involvement? 
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6) Is the Presbyterian Church in Rwanda an ‘effective’ body and instrument to 
address ethnic ideology and respond to the effects of genocide and promote 
reconciliation in Rwanda? 
7) The problem statement and research questions are related to three key 
interrelated concepts of this study, as indicated in Figure 1 below:  
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. The three key interrelated concepts of the study. 
 
1.5 Research aim and objectives 
 
The aim of this research is to investigate and realistically evaluate how and whether 
the ministry of reconciliation in Rwanda addresses ethnic ideology and responds to 
the effects and consequences of the 1994 genocide by theologically evaluating the 
role played by the Presbyterian Church in Rwanda. This aim will be achieved through 
the following related objectives: 
 
1) To identify the contextual and influential factors that contributed to the 1994 
genocide in Rwanda and the post-genocide effects thereof, and in particular, to 
investigate the role played by the Rwandan Church. 
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2) To identify the various existing processes of reconciliation in Rwanda, 
whether organised by the government or the churches, and to reflect on these 
actions and practices theologically.  
3) To evaluate how and whether the ministry of reconciliation, specifically in the 
Presbyterian Church, has addressed ethnic ideology and responded to the 
challenges and consequences of the 1994 genocide. 
 
1.6 Research design and methodology 
 
The study takes the form of a literature study. Because this research is conceptual in 
nature, it relies on existing literature. As such, it refers to a variety of forms of 
literature on reconciliation in the context of ethnic ideology and genocide. Books, 
theses, journal articles, government reports, reports by NURC and NGOs as well as 
newspaper articles will be used in this research. Secondary data such as speeches of 
political and religious actors and reports on the testimonies of victims will be used 
and, of course, academic papers dealing with the topic. Here, the primary focus is on 
the theological literature (especially within the theological disciplines of practical 
theology and missiology and, to a lesser extent, biblical science), but sources from 
other disciplines, i.e. psychology, anthropology, history, political science and 
sociology are also referred to, making this an interdisciplinary study.  
 
Given the fact that this study is partly focused on the Presbyterian Church in Rwanda, 
the input of Glenn A. Bowen is important, as he examines the place and function of 
documents in qualitative research. According to Bowen (2009:29-30), documents can 
serve a variety of purposes in a research undertaking by providing a background and 
context. Accordingly, I will analyse documents that are found in the Presbyterian 
Church archives for a realistic evaluation as part of this study. These documents 
include:  agendas, minutes of church meetings, letters and institutional reports, church 
newspapers, synodal statements and declarations, messages and teachings from events 
commemorating the genocide, as well as policies, statements and institutional reports. 
The focus of this analysis will primarily be based on the theology and ministry of 
reconciliation as described in these documents. The above-mentioned documents will 
mainly serve in the analysis and discussion in chapter six of this study. 
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It is important to be reminded that this dissertation evaluates the reconciliation efforts 
achieved by the Presbyterian Church in Rwanda. However, due to the fact that it is 
not an empirical study, it is difficult to evaluate whether the programme of 
reconciliation had any significant impact or outcome. Therefore, the empirical study 
conducted in the Remera Presbyterian congregation during my master’s research (see 
section 6.5) will serve as an example to show the impact and outcome of 
reconciliation activities amongst people in local communities. Words and content 
from their narratives will also be analysed in more detail.  
 
Writing from a practical theological perspective, Osmer (2011:3) proposes the models 
of cross-disciplinary work, which is the task of bringing two or more fields into 
conversation with one another. It includes the selection of dialogue partners and the 
way in which they are related to theology. With regards to the subject of 
reconciliation in the context of ethnic ideology and genocide, much has been written. 
In this respect, a variety of scholars (theological as well as those from other 
disciplines) are referred to and all make valuable contributions to the theme of this 
study. This literature will be approached historically within the realistic approach and 
from the perspective of context–mechanisms–(identity responses)–outcomes (CMO), 
as described by Pawson and Tilley (1997; 2004). This is a descriptive and explanatory 
method for analysis and interpretation of cause–effect responses, outcomes and 
consequences.  
 
Babbie and Mouton (2011:74) define a research design as “a plan or a blueprint of 
how you intend conducting the research”. The research design of this study is aligned 
with the research problem and questions with regards to the theological and 
sociological dimensions of reconciliation in the Rwandan context. For this reason, the 
study is an interdisciplinary missiological research that falls under the qualitative 
research category. The research design of this study is, therefore, a qualitative, 
epistemological stand of critical realism applied to missiology (Yip, 2013:1). Wan 
describes qualitative research as a broad methodological category which encompasses 
a variety of approaches to interpretive research (Wan, 2003:4). Qualitative research 
methods aim to answer questions concerning the ‘what,’ ‘how’ or ‘why’ of a 
phenomenon (Brikci and Green, 2007:2-3). The importance of qualitative assessment 
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in this research lies in the fact that it deals with the assessment of attitudes, opinions 
and behaviour in a literary study (Kothari, 2004), related to how and why the 
Presbyterian Church has responded to ethnic ideology, as stated in the research 
question (see section 1.4).  
 
As mentioned above, the theme of reconciliation will be explored from an 
interdisciplinary approach. As such, the whole of the study will be carried out from a 
theological perspective, informed by sociological perspectives. It is thus clear that I 
am in agreement with Montgomery (2012:289), who maintains that missiology, by 
definition, is an interdisciplinary field that draws on a variety of areas of study, 
including the social sciences. Missiologists have the task of incorporating the social 
sciences within their theological understanding of the missio Dei. 
 
1.6.1 A realist evaluation methodology 
In his paper, ‘Rethinking missiological research methodology: exploring a new 
direction,’ Enoch Wan (2003) explores various categories of missiological research 
and suggests that the theory and methodology of integrative
9
 missiological research 
has recently become relevant to the discipline of missiology. He argues that, in the 
theological world, the convergence of social theory and theological methodologies is 
becoming a necessity (Wan, 2003:9). Furthermore, he maintains that interdisciplinary 
and integrative research will be the direction of missiological methodology leading 
into the new millennium. In agreement with the argument above, this study will 
follow Wan’s integrative missiological research approach, drawing on the work of 
social scientists (Wan, 2003:3). 
 
The main approach of this study is a “realist evaluation,” as described by Pawson and 
Tilley (1997; 2004). Tilley outlines three investigative areas that need to be addressed 
when evaluating the impact, inputs and resources of a program within any given 
                                                          
9
To support his argument, Wan (2003) uses the example provided in David Bosch’s (1991) 
Transforming Mission: Paradigm Shifts in Theology of Mission. Bosch used a model from the 
philosophy of science—particularly Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific Revolutions and Hans Kung’s 
Paradigm shifts in the history of Christianity—to understand the development of a theology of mission. 
This enabled Bosch to conclude that, with regards to mission, a new paradigm is emerging: the 
ecumenical missionary paradigm (Bosch, 1991:368). 
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context: 1) Mechanism: what is it about a measure that may lead it to have a particular 
outcome pattern in a given context? 2) Context: what conditions are needed for a 
measure to trigger mechanisms to produce particular outcome patterns? 3) Outcome 
patterns: what are the practical effects produced by causal mechanisms being 
triggered in a given context? (Tilley, 2000:7).The model involves developing “context 
mechanism, outcome pattern configurations” (CMOCs) that allow a researcher to 
understand “what works for whom in what circumstances” (Tilley, 2000:7). 
 
Pawson and Tilley (1997) explain how the CMO model/approach yields three main 
investigative areas, which are as follows: First, is the “context” which the system is 
expected to impact. This refers to the conditions needed to trigger mechanisms to 
produce particular outcome patterns. Second, there are the “mechanisms” through 
which the system might achieve its impact. This relates to what it is about the 
measure that might lead it to produce a particular result in a certain context. Finally, 
the “outcome” of introducing the measure is explored. This relates to the observed 
result of introducing the measure, that is, what impact it has had. Pawson and Tilley 
suggest that the three elements of context, mechanism and outcome should be related 
in the form of a pseudo equation — Context + Mechanism = Outcome — that they 
term a CMO configuration. This can then be tested by gathering appropriate data for 
each of the three elements. The main strength of the realistic approach is its attempt to 
link specific contexts to mechanisms in a way that has perhaps not been considered 
quite so thoroughly before. This approach differs from previous evaluation 
methodologies, which have tended to focus primarily on the outcome of an evaluation 
to the detriment of the mechanism and context aspects. In short, the CMO is a strategy 
to identify and explain the ‘cause-effect’ from the perspective of contexts, 
responses/mechanisms and outcomes. These three features can be woven together to 
form a fundamental explanatory strategy for social research, as Pawson (1995:14) 
explains: 
 
The basic task of sociological inquiry is to explain interesting, puzzling, socially 
significant outcome patterns (O) between events or happenings or social 
properties. Explanation takes the form of positing some underlying mechanism 
(M) which generates these outcomes and thus consists of propositions about how 
the interplay between agency and structure has constituted these outcomes. 
Explanatory closure requires that, within the same investigation, there is also an 
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examination of how the workings of such mechanisms is contingent and 
conditional, and thus are only fired in particular historical or institutional 
contexts (C).  
 
In their article, ‘Critical realism as emancipatory action: the case for realistic 
evaluation in practice development,’ Wilson and McCormack (2006) discuss the 
relevance of a realistic evaluation approach by using Pawson & Tilley’s (1997) 
argument. The strength of the approach lies in the mechanism–context–outcome 
connections, which has the potential to offer researchers a more complete picture of 
what is happening and why it is happening. In reference to Pawson & Tilley (1997), 
Wilson and McCormack (2006:50-51) argue that evaluations of social programs take 
place in environments that are rapidly changing and in which the setting is just as 
important as the intervention being evaluated. Realist evaluation sets out to 
understand why a program works, for whom it works, and in what circumstances it 
works. Realist evaluation takes into account both the process and context of change. 
This results in exploration of not only the outcomes but also the conditions that were 
present to enable those outcomes to occur. 
 
Realist inquiry can be located in every social science discipline (Pawson & Tilley, 
2004:10). In this study, the CMO configuration approach will be used as a 
methodology to explore the ‘cause-effect’ of the contextual, identity and influential 
factors that contributed to the 1994 genocide in Rwanda and the post-genocide effects 
thereof, and in particular, to investigate the role played by the Rwandan Church. 
Realist evaluations do not ask, ‘what works?’ or, ‘does this program work?’ but 
instead asks, ‘what works for whom in what circumstances and in what respects, and 
how?’ (Pawson & Tilley, 2004:2). Therefore, the CMO is also employed to evaluate 
how and whether the ministry of reconciliation in the Presbyterian Church has 
addressed the ethnic ideology and responded to the challenges and consequences of 
the 1994 genocide. Figure 2 below illustrates how CMO is used in the literature. 
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Figure 2. Schematic diagram indicating how ethnic ideology led to the Rwandan genocide using 
the CMO model. 
 
1.6.2 Practical and missiological methodology 
This study evaluates how the ministry of reconciliation is fostered and achieved in the 
Presbyterian Church in the post-genocide Rwandan context. Furthermore, it will be 
informed by Kritzinger’s (2008) description of mission as a so-called praxis cycle. 
The pastoral circle (or praxis cycle) originated in activist circles and its original 
purpose is to serve as a mobilising tool for action groups working towards 
transformation in a particular context (Kritzinger, 2008:773). 
 
Kritzinger (2008:772) suggests an interactive theological-practical method that 
focuses not only on the other, but also on who we are, what the context is, and what 
happens when we meet other people of other faiths. What happens in the encounter 
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between us and others? For this, missiology needs an approach that integrates all the 
significant factors shaping the dynamics of interreligious encounter or intergroup 
contacts. Such an approach takes us beyond “othering” into an ethos of “one-
anothering”. Kritzinger discusses seven dimensions of praxis, which include: personal 
agency, context analysis, ecclesial analysis, theological reflection, spirituality, 
practical projects and reflexivity. This study should be understood as contributing to 
one of these seven dimensions, namely, the analysis of the Rwandan context. 
 
Context analysis as part of a praxis cycle focuses on the historical and structural 
factors that have given shape to a society and continue to influence how people within 
that society relate to each other. Factors such as gender and cultural identity, racist 
societal structures, poverty and privilege, nationalism, etc., have a decided effect on 
interfaith relations and intergroup relations (Kritzinger, 2008:776). Furthermore, 
power relations (or perceived power relations) in a society affect attitudes between 
people of different faiths. This context analysis will prove useful in informing how 
the future praxis of the Presbyterian Church must take into account factors that have 
shaped Rwandan society, namely, the history of ethnic ideology. These considerations 
will be addressed in chapter 7, where suggestions will be made for future forms of the 
ministry of reconciliation in the Presbyterian Church. 
 
Additionally, the fact that Allport (1954) argues that intergroup contact (see section 
2.7.2) facilitates learning about the outgroup, and that this new knowledge leads to 
prejudice reduction is equated to what Kritzinger (2008:781) calls “mutual witness”. 
By mutual witness, Kritzinger means that if a creative interaction leads to deep 
listening, the partners will not merely repeat the orthodox doctrines of their traditions 
but attempt to reformulate their beliefs in terms of the questions asked by the other 
religious tradition or ethnic group. To this, Neudfelt (2011:350) adds that deep and 
genuine encounters produce profound relationships that suggest communion between 
people. The outcome of positive perceptions and opinions, and positive relationships 
amongst participants are achieved as they develop greater compassion, empathy and 
trust through sharing personal stories, Christian insights, and by directly engaging in 
spiritual practices such as praying together. 
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Applied to Rwanda, intergroup contact theory is a useful starting point for 
reconciliation. In an interview conducted by Benda (2012), one church leader 
describes how it is hard to listen in Rwanda, given the depth of people’s pain and 
guilt. However, he describes how a program that provided structural encounters 
between genocide survivors and perpetrators made it safe for people to really sit down 
and listen to each other. He said the forgiveness and reconciliation that emerges from 
these encounters is real and honest (Benda, 2012:200).  
 
Figure 3 below gives a clear picture of how this model can be applied in the Rwandan 
context.  
 
 
Figure 3. Encounter-Intergroup Contact theory. 
 
In addition to Kritzinger’s praxis model, this study will also follow the methodology 
proposed by Richard Osmer (2008). It consists of four tasks of practical theological 
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interpretation as “a constructive theoretical framework for practical theology”. Osmer 
emphasises that in order to understand and be able to explain why some patterns and 
dynamics in the field of research occur the way they do, one needs to draw on theories 
from the arts and social sciences (Osmer, 2008:4). He identifies the four core tasks of 
practical theological interpretation as follows: The descriptive-empirical task, the 
interpretative task, the normative task and the pragmatic task.  
 
In reference to a paradigm of reflective practice as suggested by Osmer (2011), the 
researcher starts with the descriptive empirical task, which seeks to answer the 
question: what is going on in a particular Rwandan social context? The descriptive-
empirical task pays special attention to gathering information that helps one discern 
patterns and dynamics in particular episodes, situations, or contexts. Then, I will 
continue with the interpretive task. According to Osmer, this task means placing 
findings in an explanatory framework, thereby addressing the question: Why are these 
things going on? Simultaneously, entering into a dialogue with the social sciences to 
interpret and explain why certain actions and patterns are taking place (Osmer, 
2011:2). In this regard, this study will describe and interpret how ethnic ideology has 
affected the relationships and interaction between individuals and groups from the 
same and different ethnic groups in the Rwandan society in general, and in the 
congregations and presbyteries in particular. The normative task addresses the 
question: What ought to be going on? Thus, normative questions are raised from the 
perspectives of theology, ethics and other fields. While the pragmatic task seeks to 
answer: How might we respond? Forming an action plan and partaking in specific 
responses that seek to shape the episode, situation or context in a desirable direction 
(Osmer, 2011:2).  
 
Considering the above, it is important to be reminded of the necessity to use a number 
of different methodologies such as the realistic approach, Osmer’s reflective practice 
and the interactive theological–practical method proposed by Kritzinger. These 
methodologies do not contradict each other but aim at describing, explaining and 
analysing the context in which reconciliation must occur. However, the realistic 
evaluation method has been used as the main method throughout this study, as it is 
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considered an appropriate strategy to identify and explain the “cause-effect” from the 
viewpoint of contexts, mechanisms and outcomes.  
 
1.7 Procedural framework and structure of the study 
 
This study intends to contribute to the existing academic literature in the field of 
practical theology and missiology. However, the framework and the structure of this 
dissertation will not be limited to these fields, but will move freely across a range of 
social science disciplines. This study comprises seven chapters, each focusing on 
specific interrelated questions:  
 
Chapter one highlights what this study is about. As such, it provides the contours of 
the study. In addition, in this chapter the motivation and background are presented; 
key questions are formulated; the research design and methodology used to carry out 
the research is outlined; and lastly, the problem statement is identified. 
 
Chapter two addresses the question: “Which theology of reconciliation should 
inform the practices and processes of the Church in Rwanda in order to undo ethnic 
ideology?” As such, it offers an analysis of social theories on reconciliation in order 
to inform a theology of reconciliation from a biblical-missiological perspective. The 
chapter focuses on how and why the ministry of reconciliation constitutes part of the 
missio Dei and mission ecclesiae. It also conceptualises reconciliation as praxis and 
process in a new paradigm of mission and constructs the theological framework of 
reconciliation by exploring the missio Dei model of reconciliation based on two 
biblical texts, Genesis 50:15-21 and 2 Corinthians 5:17-21.  
 
The focus in chapter three shifts to the specific context of this study. It offers a 
detailed answer to the question, “What are the contextual, identity and influential 
factors which contributed to the 1994 genocide?” The chapter provides a scholarly 
survey on the subject of genocide. It describes the development of the Rwandan crisis 
before and after independence and shows the genesis of the social construction of 
ethnic ideology that led to genocide in 1994. It also suggests some historical, social-
political and economic issues in which ethnic ideology has been manifest. The chapter 
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will also discuss the various facets of ethnic ideology, from identity based-conflict to 
Hamitic theory and racial myth making. 
 
Chapter four focuses on Christian mission and ethnic ideology in the Rwandan 
Church, taking into account how missionaries contributed by planting a seed of ethnic 
ideology among Rwandans, which was later adopted by Rwandan churches. The 
chapter focuses on missionary–state relationships. It also examines the involvement 
and complicity of the Rwandan churches in the post-missionary period. 
 
In chapter five, the leading question is what are the post-genocide effects and 
consequences in Rwandan society and how does reconciliation address ethnic 
ideology and respond to these effects? The chapter explores a variety of approaches 
that Rwanda has used to deal with its past, including: the International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), a traditional dispute resolution mechanism in the form 
of Gacaca trials, the creation of a National Unity and Reconciliation Commission 
(NURC) and various responses from Rwandan churches. 
 
The problem of ethnic ideology and the task of reconciliation will be brought together 
in chapter six, which investigates the ways in which the Presbyterian Church in 
Rwanda has participated in the reconciliation process. The chapter answers the 
following questions: “How does the Presbyterian Church address ethnic ideology and 
respond to the effects of genocide and promote reconciliation in Rwanda?” “To what 
extent is the Presbyterian Church in Rwanda involved in the ministry of reconciliation 
in the country and, if this involvement exists, is it effective and what theological 
guidelines inform or may inform its involvement?” It also asks how and whether the 
reconciliation efforts resulted in significant impacts as well as brought about any 
changes in the attitudes and behaviours of individuals and groups. 
 
Finally, in chapter seven, the study finishes with some concluding remarks, 
recommendations and suggestions for further research. Having laid the foundation for 
the dissertation, I now turn to the next chapter, which deals with the theoretical 
perspective of reconciliation. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK OF RECONCILIATION 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter reviews existing literature on the main themes of reconciliation from a 
wide variety of contexts and offers a conceptual analysis of reconciliation. However, 
the focus here will be on different understandings of reconciliation from a variety of 
perspectives. As such, this chapter adds an important interdisciplinary perspective to 
the study, which will inform theological reflections on reconciliation. Simultaneously, 
this chapter seeks to find an operational definition of reconciliation that will be 
brought into conversation with a biblical and theological reflection on reconciliation. 
Chapter 2 presents reconciliation as a mechanism to address ethnic ideology and 
respond to the effects and consequences of the 1994 genocide, specifically the broken 
relations and trauma of the past in the Rwandan context, as will be described in 
chapters 5 and 6.  
 
To the above ends, this chapter is divided into three main parts. The first part provides 
a theological reflection on reconciliation from a biblical-missiological perspective 
(section 2.2 and 2.3). The chapter focuses on how and why the ministry of 
reconciliation constitutes part of the missio Dei and mission ecclesiae. It also 
conceptualises reconciliation as praxis and process in a new paradigm of mission. 
This section also constructs a theological framework of reconciliation by exploring 
the missio Dei model of reconciliation based on two biblical texts, namely, Genesis 
50:15-21 and 2 Corinthians 5:17-21.
10
 
 
The second part of this chapter provides the conceptualization of reconciliation 
(section 2.4). Reconciliation is conceptualized as the process by which relationships 
between alienated individuals are restored through engagement with one another. This 
process requires groups who were former enemies to work together and dialogue with 
one another for their mutual benefit and for the sake of a peaceful future. Thereafter, 
                                                          
10
All biblical references in this study are taken from King James Version of the Bible (KJV), unless 
otherwise stipulated.  
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the second part of the chapter culminates in a four-dimensional definition of 
reconciliation as relationship-building, truth telling, forgiveness and healing (section 
2.5). This in turn provides the foundation for the theological evaluation of 
reconciliation in the Presbyterian Church in Rwanda, as will be discussed in chapter 
6. 
 
The third part of the chapter focuses on the social phenomenon of reconciliation and 
highlights some social theories on reconciliation studies (section 2.6 and 2.7). These 
social theories should be understood as tools, which help us understand how to apply 
a theological definition of reconciliation to the reality of contemporary Rwandan life. 
As we shall see, the concrete tasks of reconciliation will always have to be cognizant 
of the influence of ethnic ideology, and so reconciliation cannot help but bring us 
back to deconstructing the conditions that fostered the 1994 genocide in the first 
place.    
 
2.2 Some theological perspectives on reconciliation 
 
This section considers some of the various theological reflections on reconciliation. 
The main argument here is as follows: reconciliation is at the centre of theology of 
mission and rooted in Christian doctrine. It is the work of God through Christ, while 
human beings are the agents of God’s mission. The theological reflection on the 
ministry of reconciliation in this research is based in the missio Dei, that is, God’s 
love and commitment to the world, as will be seen in the writings of theologians like 
Schreiter (1992, 2005), de Gruchy (2002), Okure (2006), Livingston (1989), and 
Bosch (1988; 1991). 
 
According to Langmead (2008:6), “Reconciliation lies at the heart of a theology of 
mission. It is a central to mission because it is an integrating metaphor that helps to 
understand both the essence of mission and the way in which the Church is called to 
engage with the world”. The term ‘reconciliation’ has been one of the guiding 
concepts in Christian discourse in the South African context, at least since the 
publication of the famous Message to the People of South Africa in 1968. In the 1980s 
the term was used in conflicting ways in the Belhar Confession, the Kairos Document 
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and the National Initiative for Reconciliation. The contribution of the Christian 
Church has been remarkable; it played a leading role in the preparation for, and 
proceedings of, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) in the 1990s. Since 
then, reconciliation has often been used to offer theological reflection on social 
conflict in South Africa and elsewhere in the world (Conradie, 2013:13). To this, 
Trimikliniotis (2012:248-9) asserts that the contemporary understanding of 
reconciliation has its roots in Christian religious and ethical origins. Roman Catholic 
traditions of reconciliation emerged as a kind of post-liberation theology, particularly 
in Central and South America. Manickman (2007:328-9) also adds that reconciliation 
which springs largely from a religious context, has gained political attention. 
Furthermore, this New Testament word came out of a secular usage, namely, ‘making 
peace after a time of war’.  
 
Many theologians believe that reconciliation cannot be reduced to the work of a 
human being; it is divine work that is at the core of a theology of reconciliation. 
Livingston, for example, stresses how reconciliation is the work of God through 
Christ and that human beings are agents of God’s mission. Livingston (1989:422) 
states: “Reconciliation is not a human possibility but a divine gift. Reconciliation is 
ultimately the work of God himself. In one sense reconciliation is the work of God’s 
ambassadors, as they build bridges with the gospel of Christ to all those around 
them”. 
 
Livingston’s point of view is very important as it refers to the centrality of the work 
of God through Jesus Christ as an essential aspect in trying to understand 
reconciliation theologically. To emphasize that reconciliation is divine work, 
Livingston (1989:422) cites Bosch (1988): “Christians are not so much bridge-
builders as bridge-crossers. The bridge is already there; it is our Lord, who in his own 
body of flesh and blood has broken down the enmity which stood like a dividing wall 
between us. He is the Bridge over which we cross to each other, again and again”. De 
Gruchy (2002:26) also suggests that theological reconciliation refers to reconciliation 
between God and humanity. This implies that the doctrine of reconciliation is the 
inspiration and focus of all doctrines of the Christian faith. Therefore, “The doctrine 
of the reconciliation of humanity with God, or of God with humanity, is the centre of 
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every religion” (Gunton, 2003:26). Along this same line of thought, Hay in his book 
titled Ukubuyisana: Reconciliation in South Africa states that in Christianity, the 
notion of reconciliation is key to understanding the ministry and mission of Jesus, and 
therefore, the ministry of the church (Hay, 1998:119). He also notes that 
reconciliation is not simply being rid of sin, or being forgiven, but of becoming one 
with God and with others (Hay, 1998:92-93). 
 
Scholars such as Schreiter (1992, 2005) and Okure (2006) use the biblical text of 2 
Corinthians 5:17-21 to explain the theology of reconciliation. Indeed, these scholars 
shed more light on how the Bible as a resource has triggered an understanding of the 
theology of reconciliation. Upon close inspection of the Scriptures, Schreiter 
(1992:59-62; 2005) outlines five key points of a theology of reconciliation, with 
reference to the Pauline writings, particularly 2 Cor. 5:17-21. These are briefly 
explained below: 
 
First, Schreiter (2005:2) states “God is the author of all genuine reconciliation. We 
but participate in God’s reconciling work. We are, in Paul’s words, ‘ambassadors in 
the name of Christ’ (2 Cor. 5:20)”. Thus, Christians hold to the idea that it is God who 
brings about reconciliation through Jesus Christ, rather than ourselves. We are but 
agents of God’s activity—“ambassadors for Christ’s sake”—in the words of Paul (2 
Cor. 5:20).That implies that mission of reconciliation is rooted in the missio Dei 
(Schreiter, 2005:2). 
 
Second, according to Schreiter (1992:60), reconciliation is “…more spiritual than 
strategic. Reconciliation is largely discovered rather than achieved. We experience 
God’s justifying and reconciling activity in our own lives and in our own 
communities and it is from this experience that we are able to go forth in the ministry 
of reconciliation. Thus, through a relationship with God, reconciliation happens. 
Reconciliation becomes a way of life, not just a set of discrete tasks to be performed 
and completed”. 
 
Third, “reconciliation makes both the victim and oppressor a new creation. 
Reconciliation connotes restoration; it brings to a place where they have not been 
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before” (Schreiter, 1992:60). It is more than having the burden of the past lifted. It is 
the making of a “new creation,” as referred to by Paul in 2 Cor. 5:17. It is this vision 
in the heart of the healed victim that provides the surest guide to the reconstruction of 
a society after conflict. This new creation of both victim and wrongdoer is a sign of 
God‘s presence and also indicates the restoration of humanity. It includes the painful 
experience of violence, but also the rediscovery of one’s identity, and thus, his/her 
transformation toward a new end. 
 
Fourth, Schreiter (1992:61) maintains, “The new narrative that overcomes the 
narrative of the lie is the story of the passion, death and resurrection of Jesus Christ. 
The death of Jesus Christ is an act of deep solidarity with suffering humanity; only by 
going into the throes of suffering, violence, and death can these be overcome”. It is 
the belief in the power of the resurrection; a power that is antithetical to death, a 
power that comes from the living God that makes the suffering more than the 
destruction of an individual person in society. For the Christian working towards 
reconciliation, the placement of one’s own suffering in such a framework can help 
give meaning to an otherwise meaningless suffering. The resurrection confirms and 
manifests God’s power over evil and the manifestation of God’s power for healing 
and forgiveness. 
 
Fifth, according to Schreiter (1992:61-62), reconciliation is “…a multidimensional 
reality. Reconciliation involves not just God’s reconciling activity. It involves coming 
to terms with the otherness and the alienation that situations of violence and 
oppression have created. It involves lament and the healing of memories”. 
 
Like Schreiter, Okure takes the view that the theology of reconciliation underlines 
God’s initiative. In her article, ‘The Ministry of Reconciliation (2 Corinthians 5:14–
21): Paul’s Key to the Problem of ‘the other’ in Corinth,’ Okure (2006) considers 
reconciliation as a theological key to deal with the complex reality of our world, 
specifically the issues related to “the other”. According to Okure (2006:107), “The 
ministry of reconciliation as described by Paul in 2 Cor. 5:18 is the key response to 
the issue related with “the other””. This implies that what Paul did in his Corinthian 
context may shed light on how we too can proclaim this same gospel in our diverse 
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contexts. In other words, Paul’s approach should help us to respond and answer the 
issue of the other in our own diverse multi-cultural, religious, political, and economic 
contexts. Okure, therefore, considers the issue of “the other” to be a challenge to the 
church and society today. This is why she offers a way forward that requires each 
missiologist to take “the ministry of reconciliation (diakonian tès katallagès; 5:18–19) 
as the key to the problem of the other” (Okure, 2006:116). Thus, the ministry of 
reconciliation is key to relating to “the other,” not only in the Corinthian context, but 
also in any other community. Such reconciliation leaves no room for engaging in any 
type of divisive activity or nourishing a prejudiced attitude towards others (Okure, 
2006:116). 
 
To this end, de Gruchy (2002:51-52) offers a way forward by summarizing the 
relation of divine activity and human participation in reconciliation: “Reconciliation 
has to do with the way in which God relates to us, the human ‘other’, and in turn with 
our relationship to ‘the other’, whether understood as an individual person or a group 
of people. It has to do with the process of overcoming alienation through 
identification and solidarity with ‘the other’, thus making peace and restoring 
relationships”.  
 
This is related to what Schreiter (2013:13) refers to as the “vertical” and “horizontal” 
dimensions of reconciliation. For Schreiter, the vertical dimension—what God has 
done for humanity through Jesus Christ—is the foundation of all Christian discourse 
on reconciliation. What is receiving increasing attention, however, is the horizontal 
dimension of reconciliation; that is, reconciliation between humans—both individuals 
and groups, as described in Paul’s teachings (2 Cor. 5:17-20; Eph. 2:12-20). 
 
Bosch (1991) supports the argument that reconciliation is God’s work when he states 
that the cross stands for reconciliation between estranged individuals and groups, 
between oppressors and the oppressed. Mission, according to Bosch (1991:512), is 
“the missio Dei, which seeks to reveal itself in the missiones ecclesiae, the missionary 
programs of the church. It is not the church which “undertakes” mission; it is the 
missio Dei which constitutes the church”. Livingston (1989:422) summarises Bosch’s 
theology of reconciliation as follows: First, Bosch sees “the process of reconciliation 
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and the demand of obedience as an urgent call to the church”. True reconciliation, 
says Bosch, “is really a challenge to us as the church, not the world outside. If there is 
no reconciliation, it is because we have not been the church. It is as simple as that”. 
Second, Bosch’s understanding of reconciliation, according to Livingston (1989:422), 
lays the foundations for his practical ministry within South Africa. In particular, it 
defines and shapes his response to the policies of his own denomination, the Dutch 
Reformed Church (DRC). Bosch attacks the DRC’s tacit support of apartheid because 
it undermines the true identity of the church. For Bosch, the church is called to be a 
community of reconciliation. 
 
2.2.1 Reconciliation: A new paradigm for mission 
In the post-violence context, reconciliation has recently been recognised as a 
necessary component to heal and reconstruct broken relations. Based on the writings 
of theologians and missiologists like Schreiter (2005) and Bosch (1991), this section 
argues that in the missio Dei, the mission of the church is located within the mission 
of God, which is the church’s participation in God’s work and its contribution to the 
common good of the world. This means that reconciliation should currently be the 
focus of our theological and missionary activities.  
 
In this respect, Schreiter (2005:81-82) articulates, “Christians today are witnessing an 
emerging paradigm
11
 of reconciling mission and mission as reconciliation. Recent 
years have witnessed a discussion about reconciliation and healing as providing a new 
paradigm for mission. From a Christian and theological standpoint, reconciliation and 
healing constitutes a paradigm for mission”. For this reason, like other missiological 
paradigms, reconciliation has become a main concern in the transformation of our 
societies today. Schreiter further presents reconciliation as a new paradigm for 
                                                          
11
In his book Transforming Mission: Paradigm Shifts in Theology of Mission, Bosch (1991) used a 
model from the philosophy of science—in particular, Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific Revolutions 
and Hans Kung’s paradigm shifts in the history of Christianity—to understand the development of a 
theology of mission. This enabled Bosch to conclude that a new paradigm is emerging: the ecumenical 
missionary paradigm (Bosch 1991:368).Bosch (2011:185) also identified six historical paradigms of 
mission beginning with the apocalyptic paradigm of the church and concluding with the emerging 
ecumenical paradigm. Each of the paradigms reflected a broader sense of how the church viewed 
mission or missions in the missionary process. To this, Schreiter (2005:74) adds that since the work on 
paradigms in the history of science developed by Thomas Kuhn, and the path-breaking work of 
missiologist David Bosch that adapted Kuhn's approach, it has become more common in missiological 
circles to consider the history of mission as a series of paradigms.   
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mission by saying that the need for reconciliation is indispensable for humanity in a 
broken world. The ministry of reconciliation, as Schreiter (2005:3) puts it, is “[…] 
about participating in God’s healing of societies that have been wounded deeply and 
broken by oppression, injustice, discrimination, war, and wanton destruction”.  
 
Of paramount importance, the idea of reconciliation is well captured in the Athens
12
 
document, “Mission as Ministry of Reconciliation,” which states: 
 
Since the late 1980s new aspects emerged and mission has been increasingly 
connected with reconciliation and healing. The language of reconciliation has to 
come to the fore in many different contexts and catches the imagination of 
people inside and outside the churches. In this situation we have come to discern 
anew that reconciliation is at the heart of Christian faith (cited by Schreiter & 
Jorgesen, 2013:184).  
 
In the light of the church’s mission, some African scholars like Munachi Ezeogu 
(2009) relates reconciliation as an emerging paradigm directly to a shift in the 
priorities of African missions. Ezeogu (2009:250), in his writing entitled, ‘From 
Evangelisation to Reconciliation, Justice and Peace: Towards a Paradigm Shift in 
African Mission Priorities’, insightfully states that the “reconciliation of people in 
situations of conflict and tension, such as those in which many Africans live today, is 
therefore an essential part of the Church’s mission”. He quotes Pope John Paul II, 
who acknowledged the role played by the African Church in promoting peace and 
reconciliation in African countries by stating that: “I feel it my duty to express 
heartfelt thanks to the Church in Africa for the role which it has played over the years 
as a promoter of peace and reconciliation in many situations of conflict, political 
turmoil and civil war” (Ezeogu, 2009:250). 
 
To work for reconciliation is as much a part of the mission of the church as 
evangelism. It is another way of proclaiming the good news of the Gospel. Ezeogu 
(2009:251) further describes, “Commitment to reconciliation and peace is actually 
commitment to evangelisation. In other words, a better understanding of 
evangelisation is commitment to reconciliation, justice and peace, which are tangible 
                                                          
12
CC's Athens 2005 World Conference on Evangelism and Mission, see Preparatory Paper no. 
10: Mission as Ministry of Reconciliation (May 10, 2005). 
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signs of the presence of God among His people”. Barton (2012:230) also proposes, 
“The mission of God fundamentally seeks communion between former enemies. This 
implies that reconciliation—more than social progress, economic development, or 
church growth —is primary criteria for determining whether reports of missionary 
success are legitimate”. 
 
2.2.2 Reconciliation: A process and praxis 
This section indicates the framework of reconciliation in this study, which focuses on 
reconciliation as both a process and praxis. By process, this study maintains that 
reconciliation is a long-term endeavour that cannot be achieved in a short period of 
time. As a process, it is assumed that one’s understanding of reconciliation will 
inevitably influence the praxis of mission, including its methods and application. 
Reconciliation as praxis, therefore, entails theological reflection and concrete actions 
aimed at the transformation of human beings. In other words, transformation means 
that mission is to be understood as an activity that purposively transforms reality 
(Bosch, 2011:523). This reconciliation model falls within the transformative 
perspective of the conceptual framework in a post-genocide Rwandan context. For 
this reason, reconciliation forms the central focus of mission in the Presbyterian 
Church in Rwanda, as will be discussed further in chapter 6. 
 
As noted earlier, reconciliation is a complex term, and there is little agreement among 
experts regarding its definition. This is mainly because reconciliation is both a goal 
and a process. A source of complexity is that the process of reconciliation happens in 
many contexts. The process of reconciliation, according to Bloomfield (2003:13), 
entails: “Finding a way to live that permits a vision of the future; the (re)building of 
relationships; coming to terms with past acts and enemies; a society-wide, long-term 
process of deep change; a process of acknowledging, remembering; and a voluntary 
process that cannot be imposed”. 
 
On the one hand, reconciliation is often described as “a goal or end-state, something 
to be achieved”. On the other hand, reconciliation is both a process and a goal, and as 
such, it is uncertain, uneven and often unfinished (Trimikliniotis, 2012:245).This 
implies that elements such as mutual acceptance, respect, trust, or even love, are 
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essentially aimed at the restoration and building of relationship between individuals, 
or groups, and societies (Bar-Tal and Bennink, 2004:14-22). For example, Daly and 
Sarkin (2007:258) assert, “Reconciliation is never achieved but is an ongoing process 
that nurtures itself”. These and other authors rightly stress the importance of 
promoting reconciliation as a long-term, evolutionary process (Sasaki, 2012:12-3). In 
the same vein, Kubai (2007a:61) understands reconciliation as “…a process that has 
to take time and move at its own pace. For her, reconciliation cannot be accelerated. It 
must be inclusive—all sectors of society, not only the victims and the perpetrators, 
must be included in the process because violence has certain ramifications for the 
whole society”.  
 
In light of the above argument, Huyse (2003) claims that reconciliation is both a goal 
and a process. To better understand reconciliation as a process, what Huyse (2003:2-
3) observes may be helpful here because he identifies and summarises five profound 
notes concerning this process:  
 
i. Reconciliation is a long-term process because it involves a range of stages.  
ii. Reconciliation is a broad and extensive process. It involves individuals and 
communities. The approach to it must be both top-down and bottom-up. 
iii. Lasting reconciliation must be home-grown. It cannot be imported from the 
outside. Each post-conflict situation has its particular context. 
iv. There is no one road to reconciliation. Reconciliation includes: healing 
programs, truth-telling, punitive and restorative justice, and reparation.  No 
single tool will solve the whole problem. Depending on the context, different 
instruments need to be used.  
v. Reconciliation is only one of the many challenges in a post-conflict situation. 
The end of a violent conflict creates a complex agenda such as stabilizing a 
delicate peace accord, rebuilding the political machinery and the civil service.  
 
In their book titled, Reconciling All Things: A Christian Vision for Justice, Peace and 
Healing, Katongole and Rice (2010:156-162) use the word ‘journey’ instead of 
‘process’ Interestingly, they conclude with ten theses of reconciliation. They write: 
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Reconciliation is not a theory, achievement, technique, or event. It is a journey. 
The end toward which the journey of reconciliation leads is the shalom of God’s 
new creation—a future not yet fully realized, but holistic in its transformation of 
the personal, social, and structural dimensions of life. Reconciliation is always a 
journey of transformation toward a new future of friendship with God and 
people.  
 
It is important to note that reconciliation is a journey towards a new transformation. 
Reconciliation is journey from the painful past caused by injustice into the peaceful 
and just future, a journey from enmity to friendship and communion. In this case, we 
can conclude that the outcome of reconciliation aims at transforming the lives of 
people (Katongole & Rice, 2010:35, 37).  
 
Reconciliation, as an on-going process, should combine a variety of aims. It should be 
comprehensive, reshaping relationships towards acceptance and mutual trust. This 
will involve a range of initiatives. Witnessing, telling the truth, exposing lies, healing 
memories, justice and forgiveness—these are all necessary for the journey of 
reconciliation. 
 
With regards to the praxis of reconciliation, de Gruchy (2002:21) indicates, 
“Reconciliation is, indeed, an action, praxis and movement before it became a theory 
or dogma”. Both words and deeds are necessary in the process of reconciliation. 
Furthermore, Isaak (2011:223) maintains, “The model of God’s mission as praxis for 
reconciliation means to bring the good news to the oppressed”. By oppressed, Isaak 
includes not only the poor and marginalized but also the victims of injustices. 
 
If mission become a praxis, Isaak (2011:223) is correct when he posits, “The church 
remains both a place of studying and pursuing theology, mission, ministry and 
diaconal service (diakonia). It is a place of continual accompaniment that reflects the 
interaction between context, theology and practice, while proclaiming and teaching 
the good news to the oikoumene, the whole inhabited earth”. In other words, it is 
about the “missional church and its missionary praxis, or what God in Jesus Christ 
together with the Holy Spirit is doing in the world to bring about healing, 
reconciliation, wholeness, liberation and salvation” (Isaak, 2011:223). This implies 
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that Christian mission today is to be a healing community, realizing an “emerging 
paradigm of reconciling mission and mission as reconciliation” (Isaak, 2011:223). 
 
From the same viewpoint of missions as praxis, Karecki (2009) in her article, 
‘Contemplative Encounter and Mission Praxis’ credits Klippies Kritzinger for making 
a profound contribution to the discipline of missiology, capturing the essence of 
mission praxis as God’s mission. In his argument for transforming encounter, he uses 
Kritzinger’s words saying: 
 
Mission as praxis is about concrete transformation; it is specifically about 
transformative encounters: among people, and between the living God and 
people, leading to people being called, sent, healed, and empowered. It is about 
the Reign of God that has entered into this broken world as a transformative 
power in Jesus; that continues to be manifested transformatively in our midst by 
the work of the Holy Spirit; that takes hold of our lives and transforms us so that 
we may encounter other people, thus creating the church as the community of 
the kingdom, working for and waiting for the coming Reign of God. God’s 
mission, the arriving of the Reign of God, is about transformative encounters. 
That is why missiology – which critically reflects on mission – is 
“encounterology”, the scholarly study of such transformative encounters (cited 
by Karecki, 2009:33). 
 
It is with regards to this that one may say that reconciliation as praxis of mission 
entails concrete transformation of God’s people. Reconciliation is a key task of 
diakonia, as noted by the Lutheran World Federation: “Reconciliation first of all 
refers to God‘s action, through which human beings get their relation to God restored. 
At the same time restoration implies being transformed and empowered for the 
ministry’ (Greek: diakonia) of reconciliation as part of its mission to the world. 2 
Corinthians 5: 18” (cited by Arulnathan, 2013:48). 
 
Diakonia is an act of liberation and an act of reconciliation, healing, caring for and 
empathizing with those most marginalized as well as bringing empowerment and 
dignity. Diaconal care brings people towards reconciliation through its spiritual and 
practical actions, meeting people in vulnerable situations where reconciliation can 
seem impossible or indeed hopeless. Diaconal care can also give people a sense of 
hope that reconciliation is possible and that it is accessible to all (Arulnathan, 
2013:43, 48).  
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Reconciliation is a common ground for witness, diakonia, and koinonia. The 
proclamation of the Word of God articulates the reconciliation event in a particular 
situation and time, awakening a new hope for God’s reign. Though it is a concrete act, 
diakonia reconciles the separated to each other, empowering the lives of the 
marginalized and advocating that the abandoned receive new life in God’s 
reconciliation (Chung, 2008:24). Indeed, Schreiter (2013:18) also believes that 
reconciliation is an act of healing the past and building the future. Based on the missio 
Dei itself, he further argues that it is these concrete manifestations of reconciliation in 
the practice of ministry that should form our model of mission. If reconciliation, then, 
is the model and form of praxis for mission, the next section inquires about how to 
give this model a biblical foundation. 
 
2.3 Biblical-missiological perspective of reconciliation 
 
A theological account of reconciliation must be responsive to the witness of Scripture. 
This section will explore the understanding of reconciliation present in the Old and 
New Testaments. This section also constructs the theological framework of 
reconciliation by exploring the missio Dei model of reconciliation based on two 
biblical texts, namely, Genesis 50:15-21 and 2 Corinthians 5:17-21.  
 
The Old Testament text of Genesis 50:15-21 is considered to be the most relevant to 
the process of reconciliation in the post-genocide Rwandan context. According to 
Bazuin (2013:143), religious explanations of suffering have been a comfort to many 
Rwandan people. The hermeneutical meaning and interpretation of this text is also 
relevant to the Rwandan context, as it recalls what happened in the narrative of Joseph 
and his brothers. Thus, due to how people speak about the text and identify 
themselves with the conversation and reconciliation that took place, the relevance of 
this text is clearly noted.  
 
The relevance of the New Testament text of 2 Corinthians 5:17-21, among the many 
other texts that mention reconciliation in the Bible, is due to the unanimity of many 
scholars (cf. Schreiter, 1992, 2005; Okure, 2006) that this text clearly describes the 
doctrine of reconciliation; hence, it is the key text for reconciliation as a new 
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paradigm of mission. Another reason behind the choice of these above-mentioned 
biblical texts is that they were considered to be key theological and missiological 
resources in the Presbyterian Church in Rwanda (EPR) in its reconciliation program, 
as will be discussed further in chapter 6. 
 
2.3.1 Reconciliation in Genesis 50:15-21 
Despite the fact that the word ‘reconciliation’ does not occur as such in the Old 
Testament, and appears only fourteen times in the New Testament, the Bible shows us 
that there are numerous examples of reconciliation, for example, between Esau and 
Jacob, between Joseph and his brothers, as well as the story of the Prodigal Son found 
in the parables (Schreiter, 2005:1). In their own way, these stories reveal the struggle 
to achieve reconciliation. 
 
In the Old Testament, to sin is first to break the covenant between God and humanity, 
but also includes the breaking of fellowship between human beings. Reconciliation 
restores the union between God and humans. Reconciliation carries the idea of 
appeasing God’s anger, first by expiation on the part of sinful humans, concretised by 
a specific rite (cf. the Book of Leviticus). Expiation as a condition for reconciliation 
has a whole history in the Old Testament. Primitively, expiation means appeasing 
God’s anger through punishing the guilty party or by enacting a ritual act that is 
agreeable to God. These acts include purification through the merits of the purifying 
blood of a sacrificed victim
13
 (Leviticus 8:14ff; 16:14ff).  
 
Prophetic action spiritualises the process of reconciliation. God is perceived less as a 
sovereign power whose anger must be appeased than as a God who reconciles. 
Therefore, reconciliation does not bring about a change in God, but only in sinful 
humans, who returns to God and is welcomed by him. In this return to God, sacrifice 
plays an important role, signifying the change in the human whose faults are expiated.  
 
At the same time, reconciliation with God in the Old Testament is inseparable from 
reconciliation with one’s neighbour. Genesis 50:15-21 will serve as an example of 
                                                          
13
Viewed from:www.Classic.net.bible.org/word=reconciliation. [Date accessed: 20
th
 June 2014]. 
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reconciliation in this sense. By choosing this text, I assume that the story of 
reconciliation between Joseph and his brothers would be relevant in the Rwandan 
context. Therefore, to deal with the issues raised in this section, I shall first do the 
exegesis of the mentioned text in the light of reconciliation. Second, I shall highlight 
the meanings and relevancy of Genesis 50:15-21 for reconciliation in Rwanda.   
 
2.3.1.1 The Reconciliation between Joseph and his Brothers (Gen. 50:15-21) 
Before Jacob died, he left instruction to his family. Joseph’s reconciliation with his 
brothers is based on putting this instruction into practice: 
 
“And when Joseph’s brethren saw that their father was dead, they said, it may be that 
Joseph will hate us, and will full requite us all the evil which we did unto him” (Gen. 
50:15). 
 
In this verse the brothers express apprehension about how Joseph will treat them now 
that their father has died, fearing that he may decide to seek retribution. Given the 
lack of resolution in chapter 45, this is understandable. Moreover, in the face of death 
of a common parent, particularly a parent of such influence and renown, typical 
patterns of behaviour may no longer continue. Life among the siblings has to be 
renegotiated. 
 
According to Walter (1982:370), the brothers are not yet rid of their guilt (vv. 15-17). 
Although chapter 45:1-5 has already given assurances on this score, the brothers do 
not know whether this will hold. Now that Jacob is dead, perhaps Joseph will now 
unleash his long restrained resentment. The brothers face a new circumstance 
requiring new assurances. The enduring power of guilt and its resultant fear is 
something every family knows. These brothers know that the only one who can break 
the cycle and banish the guilt is the wronged party, the one whom they most fear. 
Their suspicion is that Joseph will hate and loathe them. 
 
“And they sent a message unto Joseph, saying, thy father did command before he 
died, saying” (Gen. 50: 16). 
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Rather than face Joseph directly, the brothers send a message to him. This is an 
attempt to avoid direct confrontation with one’s adversary. Hamilton (1995:703) 
retains that the brothers adroitly refer to Jacob as ‘your father.’ Their choice abika 
(your father), rather than abinu (our father), is deliberate. They wanted to make their 
case as strongly as possible by suggesting to Joseph: ‘Joseph, it was your very own 
father who….’ They prioritise their concerns in terms of their father’s deathbed wish, 
rather than a direct personal request. The upshot of Jacob’s request was that the 
brothers be reconciled, more specifically, that Joseph should forgive them for the 
crime they committed (Hamilton, 1995:703). In this regard, ‘your’ father rather than 
‘our’ father refers to categorisation and identity.  
 
“So shall ye say unto Joseph, forgive, I pray thee now, the transgression of thy 
brethren, and their sin, for that they did unto thee evil…” (Gen. 50:17). 
 
The theme of forgiveness occurs twice in this verse, first in Jacob’s request, then 
again in the brothers’ request. The words for “sin” and “evil” are used four times in 
these two requests. Their high degree of consciousness about their crime suggests that 
the encounter in chapter 45 did not resolve the matter for the brothers. Even with the 
assurances given to them by Joseph, they still live with the guilt of what they have 
done. 
 
“And his brethren also went and fell down before his face; and they said, behold, we 
be thy servants” (Gen. 50:18).  
 
The brothers turn from referring to themselves as “servants of your father’s God” to 
simply “your slaves”. The former expression suggests that these men share an equal 
status with Joseph. They are all children of the same God. The latter expression 
suggests subordination, something they had advocated earlier (Gen. 44:9). Having 
sent a message to Joseph (vv. 15-17), the brothers now follow up with a personal 
appearance before their brother (v. 18). The latter follows so closely upon the former 
that Joseph has no time to respond to their message before they are in his presence 
(Hamilton, 1995:704). 
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“And Joseph said unto them, Fear not; for am I in the place of God? I will nourish 
you…” (Gen. 50: 19-21).  
 
The words “fear not” enclose Joseph’s response. This signals an oracle of comfort and 
assurance. Joseph gives three reasons to ease their fears. Firstly, he responds in a tone 
that both rebukes and reassures: ‘am I in the place of God?’ The question portrays a 
profound judgment in this matter, not a humble declaration of non-competence. It 
probably has a double reference to their request for forgiveness and to their offer to 
become slaves.  
 
i. Joseph is not God, thus they can be assured that he will not behave as a 
Pharaoh to them. He remains subject to God as the brothers are; they stand 
together under the authority of a divine other who works purposefully on 
behalf of them all. 
ii. Regarding forgiveness, Joseph seems to reject a guilt/forgiveness approach (as 
in Gen. 45:3-8). Instead, he leaves it up to God. At the same time, his words 
and deeds reveal a conciliatory spirit. 
 
By naming their evil (Gen. 44:4-5), Joseph assures his brothers that their actions have 
been drawn into God’s larger purpose. God’s goodness has prevailed. So, in verse 21, 
Joseph comforts them and speaks kindly to them, assuring them that he will provide 
for them, giving special attention to their children, and hence, their future (Gen. 
45:10-11; 47:12). This involves not just words, but concrete practical realities.  
 
2.3.1.2 Perspectives of Gen. 50:15-21 in the process of reconciliation in Rwanda 
Joseph’s reconciliation with his brothers can serve as a biblical perspective in the 
Rwandan context. Joseph, as the victim of his brothers’ evil intentions, serves as a 
parallel to the survivors of the 1994 genocide. The similarity is clear: the Hutu, Tutsi 
and Twa have traditionally been understood as belonging to the same father, 
Kanyarwanda. Joseph’s reconciliation with his brothers who perpetrated evil against 
him is a relevant biblical model of reconciliation for present-day Rwanda. 
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As mentioned previously, the reconciliation that took place between Joseph and his 
brothers did not come from their repentance, or from the guilt of what they bestowed 
on him, but was because of Jacob’s instructions before he died. In the case of 
Rwanda, reconciliation was mainly initiated by the government through the NURC 
and other organisations like African Evangelism Enterprise (AEE) and Prisons 
Fellowship, and not because the people who participated in the killings during the 
genocide wanted to reconcile. 
 
In verse 20, Joseph says, “God meant it for good….”This means that God did not 
intend Joseph to suffer. Despite all the injustice he has suffered, Joseph could see 
God’s hand at work in the outcome of the events that took place. Joseph’s confidence 
in God’s purpose is mirrored in the words of many genocide survivors: most of them 
respond, “It is God’s hand which protects us”. In other words, by ‘God meant it for 
good,’ Joseph does not mean that God approved or justified the evil actions, but that 
Joseph witnessed God’s protective power over him.  
 
Although the brothers first sent Joseph a message, they quickly came to face their 
victim. And they said unto Joseph, “Forgive us the crime…. then Joseph wept”. Both 
of these elements remind us of how the survivors of genocide in Rwanda wept when 
they came together with the perpetrators during the Gacaca
14
courts, hearing how their 
relatives were killed. As Joseph said unto them, “Am I in the place of God?” Like 
Joseph, most victims, as well as other Tutsi, were ready to forgive and not seek 
revenge. 
 
2.3.2 Perspective of Reconciliation in 2 Corinthians 5: 17-21 
The concept of reconciliation appears in New Testament theology, especially the 
theology of the Apostle Paul. Though many texts are referred to, this section focuses 
on 2 Corinthians 5:17-21, because it shows how Paul understood reconciliation as 
both “a restoration of a broken relationship between God and humanity and a ministry 
of reconciliation that attempted to bring human enemies together and create a state of 
real peace” (Volf, 2000:166). Christian reconciliation is therefore “based on the fact 
                                                          
14
Gacaca is a traditional way of judgment and reconciliation adapted in Rwanda after the 1994 
genocide (see section: 5.3.2). 
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that God reconciled us to Himself in Christ. Christ suffered our iniquity on the cross, 
restored us to the fellowship with God and with each other, and involves us in God’s 
act of reconciliation by the power of the Spirit” (Nurmberger & Tooke, 1988:84). 
 
All the words directly related to the doctrine of reconciliation come from the same 
root. Probably the most important is καταλλάσσω, found twice in the active voice (2 
Cor. 5:18, 19) and four times in the passive voice (Rom. 5:10 (twice); 2 Cor. 5:20). It 
is defined simply as “to reconcile” or in the passive “to become reconciled”. It is 
ordinarily used to describe the relationship effected by God in which humanity is 
reconciled to Himself. In every reference where God is spoken of as reconciling 
humanity, that is, in five out of six instances, humanity is spoken of as reconciled to 
God rather than God as being reconciled to humanity. In keeping with the preliminary 
definition, this usage would indicate that reconciliation is effected by God in His 
transformation of humans. 
 
The second Greek word is καταλλαγή, a noun form of the preceding word. Its 
definition is the same as the verb, and in all four instances (Rom. 11:15; 2 Cor. 5:18, 
19; as well as in Rom. 5:11 where the Authorized Version translates it as atonement) 
the work of reconciliation is spoken of as originating in God and effective toward 
humankind. 
 
A third Greek word is ἀποκαταλλάσσω, which is found three times in the New 
Testament (Eph. 2:16; Col. 1:20, 21). This word does not occur in any previous Greek 
literature, and some feel Paul coined it to express the completeness of reconciliation. 
It means to reconcile completely. In this definition, reconciliation is viewed as dealing 
with humanity’s position with enmity in their sinful state and the resultant work wipes 
out that enmity and transforms the individual into a new creature, making their eternal 
fellowship with God possible.
15
 
 
Indeed, Manickman (2007:329) maintains, “Paul is the principal resource for the 
concept of reconciliation. Some form of ‘katallassein’ or ‘katallage’ derived from the 
                                                          
15
Viewed from: www.Classic.net.bible.org/word=reconciliation. [Date accessed: 20
th
 June 2014]. 
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word allaso, which means ‘exchange, alter change’. Paul uses the word in three ways: 
first, the restoration of relationships between human beings and God (Rom. 5:11; 2 
Cor. 5:18-19); second, reconciliation between two estranged groups, the Jews and the 
Gentiles (Eph. 2:11-20), and third, cosmic restoration (Col. 1:15-22) or the 
eschatological consummation when God will reconcile all things through Christ”.  
 
Reconciliation is so important between persons in the New Testament that it even 
takes precedence over other forms of religious activity. In the words of the prophet 
Amos, “How can two walk together unless they be agreed?” (Amos 3:3). Jesus agreed 
with this principle in his Sermon on the Mount when he said, “So if you are offering 
your gift at the altar and there remember that your brother has something against you, 
leave your gift there before the altar and go. First, be reconciled to your brother and 
then come and offer your gift” (Matthew 5:23-24). Here, reconciliation between 
estranged brothers takes priority over even the worship of God. This text illustrates 
the importance of the social meaning of the concept reconciliation.
16
 
 
Reconciliation between two persons takes place when the parties in a conflict are 
willing to confess and redress wrongs they have inflicted upon each other, forgive 
each other and restore full fellowship between each other. To confess, redress and 
forgive wrongs assumes suffering; this suffering can be interpreted as participation in 
the cross of Christ (Nurnberger & Tooke, 1988:85). 
 
On the one hand, it is clear that something is required on the part of the offender 
before he/she can be the recipient of forgiveness. “If thy brother turns again to thee 
saying I repent” (Lk 17:3-4, Matt.18:15-17).This is the condition: there must be the 
consciousness of sin, recognition of wrongdoing and a turning away from it. On the 
other hand, “Jesus did not wait until those who were nailing him to the cross had 
asked for forgiveness. He was ready, as they drove in the nails, to pray to his Father to 
forgive them” (Tutu, 1999:271). Jesus’ example of forgiveness concurs with 
Desmond Tutu’s argument, who clearly claims that, “If the victim could forgive only 
when the culprit confessed, then the victim would be locked into the culprit’s whim, 
locked into victimhood, whatever her own attitude or intention” (Tutu, 1999:271). 
                                                          
16
Viewed from:www.Classic.net.bible.org/word=reconciliation. [Date accessed: 20
th
 June 2014].  
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Against this background, it is essential to conclude that the biblical foundation of 
reconciliation as a model for mission helps us to set out a theology for missionary 
praxis today. Consequently, “Such a theological elaboration makes possible a bigger 
framework in which to examine the challenges for bringing about reconciliation in the 
world as well as seeing how the distinctive characteristics of the Christians 
understanding of reconciliation respond to those challenges” (Schreiter, 2013:14).  
 
2.4 Conceptualizing reconciliation 
 
According to Trimikliniotis (2012:251), conceptualizing ‘reconciliation’ means, 
“…trying to capture multiple processes, ideas and practices, official, semi-official and 
unofficial, state-sponsored or sanctioned, or anti-state or non-state sanctioned that 
lead to very diverse, often contradictory societal processes”. Consequently, defining 
reconciliation is an inherently interdisciplinary project. There are numerous 
definitions of reconciliation, depending on the field in which it is implemented. 
Scholars from diverse approaches and backgrounds have attempted to define the 
concept reconciliation. Schreiter (1998:13), for example, makes it clear that “there is 
no single understanding of reconciliation”. Mukherjee also suggests that in the post-
conflict context, the term reconciliation is “understood differently by different 
stakeholders. However, every culture and language has concepts of who needs to be 
involved in reconciliation and how it should be accomplished” (Mukherjee, 
2011:333).  
 
According to Desmond Tutu (cited in Komesaroff, 2008), reconciliation will always 
be a long and complex process. It will require on-going study and reflection and 
different approaches to practice. But, it is of crucial importance because it provides 
inspiration and hope that a peaceful and harmonious future is possible. Moreover, Piet 
Meiring (2005:4), a minister in this field of reconciliation and missiologist views 
reconciliation as not only a complex phenomenon but also an unavoidable feature of a 
contemporary society. For this reason, his hope is that:  
 
Leaders in fields of philosophy and linguistics may help analyse the history and 
meaning of the concept of reconciliation. Sociologists and psychologists need to 
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define the context as well as the process of reconciliation and theologians are 
challenged to develop a theology of reconciliation. 
 
Having briefly explored the concept reconciliation and the complexity of trying to 
define this term, we have to ask ourselves then: “What is reconciliation?” The word 
reconciliation means reconstructing new relationships between the two parties 
involved in a conflict aiming to live together. Reconciliation has been conceptualized 
as “the process of reestablishing relations between opposing ethnic groups, the 
cessation of active conflict, and the transformation of previously conflictive issues 
into a more compatible relationship” (Mukherjee, 2011:333). Reconciliation can also 
mean, “Transforming a previously hostile relationship between warring parties to one 
where there are peaceful relations in the present as well as the likelihood of continued 
peace in the future” (Mukherjee, 2011:333). This definition clearly shows that the 
rebuilding of relationships between individuals or groups is a key concept in the 
reconciliation process. 
 
In his paper, ‘Reconciliation – Theory and Practice for Development Cooperation,’ 
Brounéus (2008:12) defines reconciliation as follows: “Reconciliation is a societal 
process involving mutual acknowledgment of past suffering and the changing of 
destructive attitudes and behavior into constructive relationships toward sustainable 
peace”. 
 
Brounéus (2008:12) further conceptualizes that “reconciliation involves changes in 
emotion (mutual acknowledgment of suffering), attitude, and behavior”. He 
emphasizes, “Reconciliation is a societal process after armed conflict, and thus 
involves changes within and between former enemy groups after the war has ended”. 
Finally, he highlights that “reconciliation is a process, not a specific state at a 
particular moment in time”. 
 
Staub (2014), in his research article, ‘The Challenging Road to Reconciliation in 
Rwanda: Societal Processes, Interventions and their Evaluation, defined reconciliation 
in the Rwandan context as follows: 
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Reconciliation in Rwanda requires mutual acceptance, acknowledgment by each 
group of its past harmful actions; humanising each group in the eyes of the other 
and increased trust; as well as constructive vision/ideology is necessary to bring 
people together. Lastly, moving toward a shared or inclusive history of past 
events in place of conflicting histories will lead to reconciliation. Understanding 
the roots and impact of violence can contribute to more positive attitudes by 
members of the two groups toward each other, and empower people to resist the 
influences that lead to violence and engage in reconciliatory activities (Staub, 
2014:515). 
 
From the contextual reality of Rwanda, reconciliation can mean a process in which 
“victims and perpetrators, or members of hostile groups, do not see the past as 
defining the future. It means that they come to see the humanity of one another, 
accept each other, and see the possibility of restoring a damaged relationship” (Staub, 
2006:868). The above definition of reconciliation sheds lights on the view that 
reconciliation in Rwanda needs to be institutionally facilitated on a larger scale. This 
is justified by the fact that reconciliation in the Rwandan context applies not only to 
the victims, but also to the perpetrators, and therefore requires institutionally 
implemented interventions to help both groups reflect on the way they see their pasts 
differently and how they will transform their futures. 
 
2.5 Dimensional approach to reconciliation 
 
Reconciliation is a complex, multidimensional phenomenon. It encompasses 
processes as well as particular aspects of the relationship between two or more 
persons or collectivities (Kriesberg, 2007:251). In his book Building Peace: 
Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies, Lederach (1997:28) establishes four 
essential elements of reconciliation, namely, truth, mercy, justice and peace. These 
four elements are taken from two lines in Psalm 85, which read: “Truth and mercy 
have met together; peace and justice have kissed”. For Lederach, even though the four 
elements may seem to be contradictory, they are interconnected. He argues that truth 
without justice is impossible, especially for victims who faced brutal violence. 
Without justice, they fear future recurrences of violence. At the same time, justice 
without truth is difficult because it ignores the memories of those who suffered, 
consequently, it may create future conflicts. In addition to truth and justice, mercy is 
needed. However, mercy does not promote the culture of impunity, but rather 
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recognizes that perpetrators are still responsible for their deeds even after the act of 
mercy. Finally, peace is useful for the people to build their new relations (cf. 
Molenaar, 2005:34-35). 
 
According to Lederach (1997), these four elements, are proposed as a framework in 
which reconciliation, if people desire and work for it, can be realized. For the process 
of reconciliation to be successful, he suggests that all four categories need to be 
balanced. It is important, however, to acknowledge that particular contexts may 
require an emphasis on one pillar over the others. He further argues that different 
pillars of the model may come into effect at different times in the reconciliation 
process. Trimikliniotis (2012:245) also clearly emphasises that “there is no 
universally accepted mode of reconciliation”. In addition, Schreiter (2008:7) 
rightfully supports this view by stating, “There is no formula or strategy for 
reconciliation that will be applicable in every instance”. The above arguments testify 
that the concept of reconciliation has been and is often used in different ways for 
various purposes, and in particular situations. 
 
In order to apply Lederach’s insights to the Rwandan context, I have re-
conceptualized reconciliation as having four essential dimensions: (1) relationship-
building, (2) truth telling, (3) forgiveness, and (4) healing. The choice of these 
dimensions is not arbitrary; rather it is based on the priorities of the National Unity 
and Reconciliation Commission (NURC) in Rwanda. For the NURC, the guiding 
principles for unity and reconciliation is “to mutually strive to heal one another’s 
physical and psychological wounds while building future interpersonal trust based on 
truth telling, repentance and forgiveness” (NURC, 2007:10). Figure 4 below 
summarizes the four dimensional approach of reconciliation and shows how the 
elements are interconnected to each other. 
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Figure 4. Four dimensions of reconciliation. 
 
These four dimensions will serve as a model of reconciliation, which will guide my 
analysis of reconciliation in the Rwandan context. These are examined in closer detail 
below. 
 
2.5.1 Relationship building dimension 
Some scholars like Assefa (1996), Kriesberg (2007), Schreiter (2005) and Isaak 
(2011) consider relationship building as an essential element or factor in the 
reconciliation process. Assefa (1996:46), for instance, posits that reconciliation 
denotes “the act by which people that have been apart and removed from one another 
begin to re-establish their connection. It means the restoration of broken relationships 
or the coming together of those who have been alienated and separated from each 
other by conflict, to create a community again”. 
 
With regards to reconciliation as relationship building, a Lutheran theologian from 
Namibia, Paul Isaak, asserts that the ministry of reconciliation refers more generally 
to the process of bringing different parties into relationships of mutual benefit and 
enrichment. This implies that healing broken relationships and restoring new 
relationships is important for reconciliation to happen (Isaak, 2011:335). 
Nevertheless, for relationship building to happen, healing of memories for the victims 
is needed to free them from the pains of the past. It means that the perpetrator must 
repent and acknowledge his/her wrong deeds and apologize to the victim in order 
make amends (Schreiter, 2005:4).  
 
Relationship building remains the key term among many scholars who seek to define 
the concept of reconciliation. Kriesberg (2007), for example, suggests that: 
Relationship building  Forgiveness 
Truth- telling  Healing 
Reconciliation 
model 
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“Reconciliation refers to the process by which parties that have experienced an 
oppressive relationship or a destructive conflict with each other move to attain or to 
restore a relationship that they believe to be minimally acceptable”. 
 
Molenaar (2005) provides three profound meanings of the above definition of 
reconciliation, as proposed by Kriesberg. Firstly, reconciliation is seen as a “process” 
since it takes time to heal the wounds of the past and to build new relationships. 
Secondly, Molenaar maintains that when Kriesberg talks about “parties that have 
experienced an oppressive relationship or a destructive conflict,” it means that this 
negative situation presents the starting point for any reconciliation process. There is a 
broken relationship between a perpetrator and a victim. Thirdly, there is a “move to 
attain or to restore a relationship,” which refers to the ultimate goal of reconciliation. 
This goal has to be pursued together (Molenaar, 2005:32). 
 
2.5.2 Truth-telling dimension 
Reconciliation is about the present and the future, which somehow requires managing 
past differences, divisions and polarisations around which violence was historically 
organised (Trimikliniotis, 2012:245). Reconciliation is also seen as breaking the 
silence about the past via the recognition of ‘the truth;’ acknowledging the 
wrongdoing is as much about the future as it is about memory (Trimikliniotis, 
2012:247). 
 
In order for relationships to be restored, it is important to tell the truth about what 
caused the rupture in the relationship. Isaak (2011:335) argues, “Truth-telling is a 
medicine that has healing power. It creates safe and sacred spaces where people can 
gather to remember while grieving”. Likewise, Schreiter (2005:3) accurately claims 
“…truth-telling means overcoming and correcting the lies and distortions that bring 
unearned shame on the innocent and isolate people from one another so as to exercise 
hegemony over society. Truth-telling has to be a constant effort to tell the whole truth, 
both for victims and wrongdoers”.Schreiter (2005:3) notes that the practice of truth-
telling must comprise the following four points:  
 It must be a truth that resonates with my experience of events.  
 It must be in a language I can understand. 
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 It must conform to my understanding of truthfulness. 
 It must come from someone I can trust. 
 
Again, Schreiter (1992:71) emphasizes that the best approach in any process of 
reconciliation is to consider the following elements:  
 
Victims of violence and suffering must tell their story over and over again in 
order to escape the narrative of the lie. As they recount their own narrative, little 
by little they begin to construct a new narrative of truth that can include the 
experiences of suffering and violence without allowing those experiences to 
overwhelm it. This includes, in the first stage, establishing a kind of geography 
of violence and suffering; that is, bounding it so as to tame its savage power. The 
more that the violence is so bounded, the less formidable it becomes. Without 
such boundedness, it roams at will in the life of the victim devouring, like the 
roaming lion in 1 Peter 5:8, whomever it will. The ministry of reconciliation at 
this stage is the ministry of listening. 
 
We can therefore assert that reconciliation is about the ministry of listening. Romocea 
(2004:161) asserts, “In the absence of a willingness on the part of the antagonistic 
groups involved in the conflict to re-narrate history from the perspective of those 
who were its agents and its victims, there will be little opportunity for bringing social 
reconciliation and the restoration of a moral society”. Romocea (2004:162) further 
adds, “An important element in the process of reconciliation is the re-narration of the 
history of enmity that will allow the victims to gain a new memory of the past”. At 
the same time, Romocea (2004:162) cautions about the danger of re-narrating history, 
by saying that “it may generate new tales of historical glory and plausible 
explanations for past failures, so that hope for reconciliation is again lost”. Despite the 
necessity of truth-telling in the process of reconciliation, Bloomfield (2003:14) states, 
“Truth in itself will not bring reconciliation. Truth-seeking is a key ingredient, but 
only one ingredient, in reconciliation”.  
 
In exploring truth-telling from the Christian perspective, we are reminded of the 
following by de Gruchy (2002:23): 
 
Truth-telling is more than relating facts in a credible manner. It also involves 
God, who is the author of all truth. It is truth-telling at this deep, theological 
level that is the basis for healing a broken society. What that means on a 
practical level is that the Church must endeavour to create safe, hospitable 
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spaces where truth can be spoken and heard, where the silence can be broken 
and where pernicious lies can be laid bare and overcome. Truth in the biblical 
sense is communicated primarily through remembering and retelling past events 
in ways that relate to present issues and struggles (de Gruchy, 2002:23).  
 
Writing from the South African context, Meiring (2013:7) maintains that, 
“Reconciliation and truth go hand in hand”. He adds, “Searching for truth can be 
painful and difficult, even hazardous. It can disrupt the journey towards 
reconciliation. But in the long run, it is the only way to go. Reconciliation is about 
uncovering the truth, not about amnesia”. Meiring (2013:7) also suggests that it is not 
“only the victims and the perpetrators that needed the truth-telling, the nation needed 
it as well – to listen to the truth, to be confronted by the truth, to be shamed by the 
truth, to struggle with the truth and finally to be liberated by the truth”. To emphasize 
the importance of truth-telling, he uses the words of Ellen Kuzwayo,
17
a celebrated 
South African author: “Africa is a place of storytelling. We need more stories, never 
mind how painful the exercise may be. This is how we will learn to love one another. 
Stories help us to understand, to forgive and to see things through someone else’s 
eyes” (cited by Meiring, 2013:8). 
 
Brounéus (2008:15) notes, “Truth-telling has come to play a pivotal role in 
reconciliation processes around the world”. It has been indicated that truth-telling 
contributes to “any of the following…truth, assisting victims, reconciliation, healing, 
interracial unity, reconstruction, public deliberation, rule of law, justice, 
accountability, and institutional reform” (Brounéus, 2008:15). In fact, in the Rwandan 
context, truth-telling is a key element in the process of reconciliation. There is a 
Rwandan saying: “Ukuri kurakiza,” which means, “The Truth Saves”. In post-
genocide Rwanda, “The Truth Saves” has become the popular slogan among people 
who promote reconciliation. 
 
In the light of the above discussion, it can be affirmed that truth-telling is an essential 
element of the reconciliation process. However, it does entail some risks. Brounéus 
(2008:15) highlights three such findings within recent psychological research: First, 
there were reports in South Africa indicating a risk of re-traumatization for victims 
                                                          
17
Meiring (2013) quoted Ellen Kuzwayo from Van Vught& Cloete, Reconciliation, p. 196. 
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when they gave testimony to the TRC. Second, there are recommendations that the 
practice of one-session debriefing, an early psychological intervention after trauma, 
should cease as it may increase the risk of posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and 
depression. A single session of debriefing and testifying in a reconciliation court both 
involve short and intensive trauma exposure. Third, there are novel theoretical 
explanations in cognitive behavioural therapy (CBT) and neuro-psychology for why 
short durations of trauma exposure may lead to re-traumatization (Brounéus, 2008:15-
16). In the case of Rwanda, Brounéus investigates the risks related to truth-telling 
among the genocide survivors. He states that witnesses in the Gacaca traditional 
courts suffered from significantly higher levels of depression and PTSD than non-
witnesses. The results of his study strongly challenge the claim that truth-telling is 
healing, suggesting instead that there are risks for the individuals on whom the truth-
telling processes depend (Brounéus, 2008:15). 
 
2.5.3 Forgiveness dimension 
This section looks at forgiveness as a crucial component in the process of 
reconciliation. Here, forgiveness is considered as an obligation and mandatory 
(Bosch, 1988) as it opens a new beginning for the future (Tutu, 1999). While 
forgiveness can contribute to reconciliation in significant ways; it is argued that 
forgiveness will not produce the expected positive changes in all contexts. This is due 
to the fact that forgiveness is also difficult as it can be seen as a betrayal of the past 
(Schreiter, 1989) and as being unpleasant, especially in the post-genocide context 
(Molenaar, 2005).  
 
In his book, No Future without Forgiveness, Tutu (1999) describes his experience of 
addressing a rally in the Kigali stadium after the Rwandan genocide. He made a 
passionate plea for forgiveness and reconciliation, in spite of everything that had 
happened in the past, arguing that without these there would be no future for Rwanda 
and its people. Tutu (1999:220) stressed the following: 
 
In the act of forgiveness we are declaring our faith in the future of a relationship 
and in the capacity of wrongdoer to make a new beginning on a course that will 
be different from the one that caused us the wrong. We are saying here is a 
chance to make a new beginning. It is an act of faith that wrongdoer can change. 
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For Tutu (1999:270), true reconciliation does not come cheaply. Forgiveness cost God 
the death of His only begotten Son. Forgiving and being reconciled are not about 
pretending that things are other than they are. It is not about patting one another on 
the back and turning a blind eye to the wrongs committed. True reconciliation 
exposes the awfulness, the abuse, the pain, the degradation—the truth. It could even 
sometimes make things worse. It is a risky undertaking but in the long-run it is 
worthwhile because dealing with the real issues helps to bring about healing. Spurious 
reconciliation can only bring spurious healing. 
 
In his twelve theses of reconciliation in ‘Processes of Reconciliation and Demand of 
Obedience: Twelve theses,’ Bosch (1988:110-111) emphasises that forgiveness is not 
optional but mandatory. He clearly affirms that we cannot expect the unconditional 
pardon of God when we have a radically different attitude towards our neighbour, an 
attitude that is restricted and conditional upon whether the neighbour properly 
repents. For Livingston (1989:420-421), “To refuse to repent, forgive and be 
reconciled is tantamount to declaring that what Christ did on the cross was of no 
consequence. To refuse to act on the divine mandate for interpersonal reconciliation is 
a denial of the Lord, because true reconciliation with God necessarily involves being 
reconciled with those around us”. 
 
Although Bosch claims forgiveness to be mandatory, I find that what Schreiter 
(1989:55) observes is more relevant, especially when he points out that forgiveness 
seems to be impossible in situations where the wrongdoer does not acknowledge what 
has been done. On the one hand, Schreiter affirms that forgiveness is one of the 
thorny parts of the reconciliation process. Forgiving can be seen as a betrayal of the 
past, and especially a betrayal of the dead. To forgive seems to wipe out the memory 
of what has happened. Forgiving can feel like negating a past that has changed the 
present and the future irrevocably. Simply to forgive is to pretend that all the pain 
never happened. Forgiving seems to be a way of punishing the victim once again, this 
time by erasing a memory.  
 
In post-genocide Rwanda, forgiveness is possible on the one hand, but at the same 
time, impossible on the other. In an interview conducted by Molenaar (2003) on the 
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subject of forgiving, one survivor named Priscilla, who had lost her husband and two 
children among others, stated the following:  
 
It is incomprehensible what they did. Although they had not any tug of war 
before, they [the perpetrators] were hunting my husband as if he was an animal. 
And when they caught him over there in the valley, they were hitting him with a 
machete as if he was a banana tree. I saw it! And now they want me to forgive 
them while back then they didn’t show any mercy. How can they expect me to 
forgive? (Molenaar, 2005:40). 
 
Like Pricilla, many survivors of genocide see forgiveness as an unpleasant duty and 
moral obligation; hence, for them, forgiveness is impossible. On the other hand, some 
survivors see forgiveness as an essential component in the reconciliation process.  
  
Mrs. Adela Sefuku
18
, for example, is a resident of Rwamagana district in the Eastern 
Province where I live; she has a unique story of repentance and forgiveness. She is a 
widow of the genocide whose husband, a former pastor in the Seventh Day Adventist 
Church, was killed in 1994. Three of her children were also killed. A group of 
Interahamwe attacked her home and threatened to kill her. One of the killers, Kagabo, 
was from the neighbourhood. Adela asked Kagabo to have mercy on her since there 
was no grudge between them. Instead of giving her mercy, Kagabo ruthlessly cut her 
on the head, on the back of her neck and on her thighs and legs, and then pushed a 
long knife through the top of her head. She lost consciousness and fell into a coma. 
Adela describes her spiritual experience in the following words: 
 
While I was in coma two men dressed in white appeared to me in a form of a 
dream. In the dream I saw many dead bodies and the two men told me that ‘these 
are God’s children whom He loves very much. They did not die because God 
hated them. You will one day meet these people in Heaven’ the two men told 
Adela ‘but only on condition that she did not in any way take revenge on those 
that killed her husband, children, relatives and friends and instead forgive them’.  
 
Later on, Adela regained consciousness and is alive today. Like other Rwandan 
women after the genocide, Adela went through many hardships and traumatizing 
experiences. She started a ministry of preaching in prisons so that those who are 
                                                          
18
The story of Adela when she forgave Kagabo is found in the NURC document, ‘The Role of Women 
in Reconciliation and Peacebuilding in Rwanda: Ten Years after Genocide1994-2004: Contribution, 
Challenges and Way Forward,’ written by Mutamba & Izabiliza (2005:44). 
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imprisoned can repent of the crimes they have committed and seek forgiveness. Adela 
once preached in a local prison known as Ntsinda, in the Eastern Province of 
Kibungo. When she began to speak about repentance, something unusual happened. A 
young prisoner stood up, and said:  
 
After listening to the message I have decided to tell you the truth. ‘You will 
forgive me I did something terribly bad to you. I am the one who cut you with a 
machete and I killed your husband and children’.  
 
This young man was Kagabo, her attacker. He went ahead to confess before a 
gathering of prisoners and visitors. This was received well by Adela, who made the 
following declaration:  
 
You killed my husband whom I loved so much that it is impossible for a human 
being to forgive but I have forgiven you because God has enabled me. From now 
on, you will be my ‘son’ and you will be staying with me. I will build a house 
for you where my last-born was supposed to build his own house.  
 
This made many prisoners burst into tears. Thereafter, Adela used to carry food and 
other items to Kagabo when he was still in prison. When Kagabo was later released 
from prison after confessing to the crimes, he joined Adela at her residence after 
staying for one day in his own home. Adela received Kagabo with joy and genuine 
love. She has since then built a house for him in her own compound and set up a small 
chicken-rearing project for him. 
 
The relatives and neighbours of both Adela and Kagabo find this strange. They were 
suspicious at first. Over time, some are now amazed, while others remain opposed to 
this arrangement. This kind of extraordinary forgiveness is rare, but possible. Rwanda 
is filled with similar examples of radical forgiveness, which creates the possibility of 
reconciliation (Mutamba& Izabiliza, 2005:44).  
 
2.5.4 Healing dimension 
Some scholars of reconciliation look at healing as another dimension of 
reconciliation. Proponents of this dimension view healing as any strategy, process or 
activity that improves the psychological health of individuals following extensive 
violent conflict. As such, healing is not only about assisting individuals to address 
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their psychological health needs in an isolated way, but is dependent upon and 
integrally linked to repairing and rebuilding communities and the social context. This 
implies restoring a normalized everyday life that can recreate and confirm people’s 
sense of being and belonging (Hamber, 2003:77). 
 
Hamber (2003) outlines some of the healing strategies that have been used in different 
contexts, and discusses how they can be useful sources of inspiration and guidance 
when building a healing program. However, he reminds us to keep the following in 
mind: (a) all strategies should ideally grow out of the local context; and (b) most 
contexts demand that multiple strategies be undertaken simultaneously. Healing-
oriented programs which might be relevant in a post-conflict situation include: 
psychosocial programs; individual counselling and support interventions; training of 
local communities with psychosocial support skills; self-help support groups; and 
symbolic forms of healing (Hamber, 2003:82).  
 
However, Hamber (2003) reminds us that there is no magical solution when it comes 
to dealing with the impact of extensive violence. Truth commissions, criminal trials, 
or even extensive counselling and support will not miraculously deal with the legacy 
of violence in any society. For him, healing is inevitably a lengthy and culturally 
bound process. He is also strongly convinced that there is often no clear starting point 
and there will be few markers along the way—indeed, it is rare for the psychological 
impact of the past ever to be completely dealt with. Yet, he argues that this does not 
mean that programs in pursuit of healing are a waste of time—it is quite the contrary. 
Assistance with healing can be invaluable for individuals and their communities. 
 
With regards to healing memories, Schreiter (2008:13) asks, “What does ‘healing’ 
actually entail?” He maintains, “Some healing can take place with the passage of 
time. As one generation leaves the scene and is replaced by the subsequent one, the 
burden of the past is necessarily shifted. Healing of memories takes more than a 
generation to accomplish”.Schreiter (2008:13) proposes three stages through which 
the process often moves. These are: 1) acknowledging loss, (2) making connections, 
and (3) taking new action. He also explains that acknowledging loss does not mean 
abandoning the past, but rather means, a new relationship to it. 
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Staub stresses the necessity of healing in the process of reconciliation. He asserts that 
healing strengthens the self, moderates the perception of the world as dangerous, and 
makes it more likely that positive changes in the other group are perceived (Staub, 
2006:873). As a psychological researcher, Ervin Staub is also involved in 
reconciliation programs and interventions in Rwanda aimed at healing its citizens. 
Considering how genocide affected huge numbers of people, Staub (2006:874) 
promotes healing by providing information about the impact of traumatizing events 
on people through radio drama known as “Musekeweya”. The purpose of this is to 
help people understand changes in themselves and in others around them as a natural, 
normal consequence of extreme, and in their case, horrendous events. The radio 
programs seek to educate the community by means of informational programs and 
radio dramas, whereby the stories of the characters help people to support each other 
through empathic listening. 
 
Understanding reconciliation from the biblical-theological perspective, the missio Dei 
demands that we talk about reconciliation holistically. It requires acknowledging that 
reconciliation is multi-dimensional. The four dimensions of reconciliation presented 
in this chapter are relevant in the Rwandan context, but require additional tools in 
order to be implemented. A closer look at the social mechanisms involved in human 
interaction can provide us with tools to pursue the actual work of reconciliation. The 
next section will turn to various social theories that provide methods and strategies for 
achieving the theological goal of reconciliation. 
 
2.6 Reconciliation: asocial phenomenon 
 
The previous section focused on the theological and biblical perspectives of 
reconciliation. It was stated that reconciliation lies at the heart of mission, as 
reconciliation is God’s work. A four dimensional approach to reconciliation was 
suggested as a model for reconciliation, namely: Relationship-building, truth-telling, 
forgiveness and healing. The current section will now focus on the sociological 
perspective of reconciliation, as it enriches our understanding of the social dynamics, 
which must be taken into account as we pursue reconciliation. In this respect, our 
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theological understanding of reconciliation is informed by the social understanding of 
reconciliation because reconciliation is both a spiritual and social phenomenon. 
 
In his article, ‘Can Missiology Incorporate More of the Social Sciences,’ Montgomery 
(2012) accurately affirms that the social sciences, when used responsibly and 
critically, are useful instruments for missiology. He stresses that missionaries working 
in larger, more socially complex countries sometimes appeal to sociology to help 
them understand the situations in which they work (Montgomery, 2012:285). De 
Gruchy (2002:26) makes an insightful narration of reconciliation from a social 
perspective when he says that social reconciliation refers to reconciliation between 
alienated communities and groups at a local level, such as the healing of race relations 
in a housing estate or at school, especially in the wake of an outbreak of violence. 
Furthermore, Hay (1998:121) asserts that social reconciliation involves not just the 
individual but also the whole community or society. Additionally, Schreiter 
(1998:112) clearly describes social reconciliation as the process of reconstructing the 
moral order of a society. It also refers to changing the structures in society that 
provoked, promoted and sustained the violence. Furthermore, Romocea (2004:160) 
refers to Volf’s (1996) idea of “theology of embrace” when he says that social 
reconciliation in an ethnic conflict is a process that involves both parties working 
towards resolution. 
 
As we come to a better understanding of reconciliation from a sociological 
perspective, we find that there is no doubt that the concept of reconciliation, as it is 
used in social and political discourse, has its roots in the language of Christian 
proclamation. In the post-genocide Rwandan context, for example, the term 
reconciliation refers to a wide range of processes that aim at helping groups of people 
to move from a state of conflict to one of peace and harmonious coexistence. This 
framework must provide a comprehensive approach to the transformation of conflict 
that addresses structural issues, social dynamics of relationship building, and the 
development of a supportive infrastructure for peace (Benda, 2012:217). 
 
From these ideas we learn that although reconciliation primarily involves individuals, 
groups and communities, it has to be viewed within a social context. Reconciliation 
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cannot be isolated from the social context and should therefore not be comprehended 
exclusively from a theological perspective, but rather be regarded as a socio-
theological phenomenon. 
 
2.7 Social theories and models used in reconciliation studies 
 
Having explored some theological definitions of reconciliation and examined its 
social meaning as they appear in scholarly discourse, I now turn to some theories and 
models of reconciliation, which have been developed in order to apply reconciliation 
to the lives of people. In this section, the following three theories that have been 
applied by some scholars in reconciliation studies are described further: the needs-
based model, social identity theory and intergroup contact theory.  
 
2.7.1 A needs-based model 
Nadler and Shnabel (2008:116) have developed a needs-based model of reconciliation 
that posits that being a victim is associated with a threat to one’s status and power, 
whereas being a perpetrator threatens one’s image as moral and socially acceptable. 
To counter these threats, victims must restore their sense of power, whereas 
perpetrators must restore their public moral image. The needs-based model of 
reconciliation is predicated on the idea that following an episode in which one side 
has been victimised by another, both the victim and the perpetrator are deprived of 
certain unique psychological resources. For Nadler & Shnabel (2008:116-117), “This 
deprivation brings about different emotional needs in victims and perpetrators, and 
until these needs are satisfied, they serve as barriers to reconciliation. Reconciliation 
is facilitated when victims and perpetrators receive emotional ‘commodities’ through 
post conflict interactions”. 
 
Nadler & Shnabel (2008:117) maintain, “When a successful social exchange takes 
place between victim and perpetrator, both sides satisfy their emotional needs and 
cease to feel weaker than, or morally inferior to, their counterpart. This generates a 
process of symbolic erasure of the roles of victim and perpetrator, which places the 
involved parties on a more equal footing and thus leads to a greater willingness to 
reconcile”.The needs-based model of reconciliation with my own emphasis of the 
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adoption of the CMO logic configuration model (adapted from Nadler and Shnabel, 
2008:117) is summarised in Figure5 below: 
 
 
Figure 5. Merged CMO and Needs-Based model. 
Source: adapted from Nadler and Shnabel (2008:117). 
 
As the researcher seeks to understand how and why the Presbyterian Church examines 
the reality of reconciliation in its mission, the needs-based model together with the 
CMO logic framework have been used in Figure 5 above to shape a realistic 
evaluation of the context, what triggered the event and how people understand and 
respond to it.  
 
2.7.2 Intergroup contact theory 
Intergroup contact theory is a sociological theory that was first proposed by Gordon 
Allport (1954). Allport’s theory stipulates that contact between groups lead to reduced 
intergroup prejudice and, in turn, may foster a positive change in attitudes towards 
members of the ‘other’ group if certain conditions of the contact are met. There is 
extensive evidence that positive interaction between antagonistic groups can lead to 
reductions in prejudice and hostility (Allport, 1954; Pettigrew, 1998), and that contact 
is considered one of the most effective strategies for reducing intergroup conflict. If 
contact between groups in post-conflict societies is intense and deep, it can promote 
reconciliation and the prevention of renewed violence in a society. This is because 
intergroup cooperation may contribute to the development of a new, shared identity 
among previously hostile groups (Tobias & Boudreaux, 2010:218). 
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Allport (1954) suggests that positive effects of intergroup contact occur in contact 
situations characterised by four key conditions: equal status, intergroup cooperation, 
common goals, and support by social and institutional authorities. According to 
Allport (1954), it is essential that the contact situation exhibit these factors to some 
degree. Indeed, these factors do appear to be important in reducing prejudice, as 
exemplified by the unique importance of cross-group friendships in reducing 
prejudice (Pettigrew, 1998). Multiple mechanisms have been proposed to explain how 
contact reduces prejudice. In particular, the following four processes of change have 
been proposed: 
 
1) Learning about the outgroup: When new learning corrects negative views of 
the outgroup, contact should reduce prejudice. 
2) Changing behaviour: Behavioural changes are often the precursor of changes 
in attitude. New situations require conforming to new expectations. If these 
expectations include acceptance of outgroup members, this behaviour has the 
potential to produce attitude change.  
3) Generating effective ties: Emotion is critical in intergroup contact. Anxiety is 
common in initial encounters between groups, and it can spark negative 
reactions. Such anxious, negative encounters can occur even without 
intergroup prejudice. Continued contact generally reduces anxiety, though bad 
experiences can increase it.  
4) In-group reappraisal: Optimal intergroup contact provides insight about in-
groups as well as outgroups. In-group norms and customs turn out not to be 
the only ways to manage the social world. This new perspective can reshape 
your view of the in-group and lead to a less biased view of outgroups 
(Pettigrew, 1998).  
 
Likewise, Pettigrew and Tropp (2008) supported Allport’s contact theory by 
specifically examining mediating mechanisms in contact, and found that contact 
situations which promote positive effects and reduce negative effects are most likely 
to succeed in conflict reduction. Pettigrew (1998) provides a comprehensive review of 
the contact hypothesis and its derivatives. He suggests that an optimal sequence of 
contact between antagonistic groups would be to first attempt to de-categorise the 
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intergroup encounters. Pettigrew (1998) also mentions a second stage in which 
subgroup identities are allowed to regain some salience in order to facilitate the 
generalisation process. Finally, to capitalise on the benefits of a common in-group 
identification, he proposes that policies that re-categorise the subgroups into 
meaningful superordinate units may be an optimal, if not always achieved, end stage 
of the sequence (cf. Brown, 2000:765). 
 
2.7.2.1 The application of intergroup contact theory 
A number of psychological processes have been hypothesised to explain how and 
why intergroup contact is able to reduce prejudice and improve intergroup relations. 
Firstly, Allport (1954) argues that intergroup contact facilitates learning about the 
outgroup, and in turn, this new knowledge leads to prejudice reduction. Secondly, 
intergroup contact is believed to reduce the fear and anxiety people have when 
interacting with the outgroup, reducing their negative evaluations of the outgroup. 
Thirdly, intergroup contact is hypothesised to increase people’s ability to take the 
perspective of the outgroup into account and thereby empathise with their concerns 
(Stephan & Finlay, 1999). Staub (2006) also argues that contact between groups can 
promote reconciliation and the prevention of renewed violence in a society. This is 
because intergroup cooperation may contribute to the development of a new, shared 
identity among previously hostile groups. 
 
In their article, ‘Entrepreneurship and Conflict Reduction in the Post-Genocide 
Rwandan Coffee Industry,’ Tobias & Bourdreaux (2010) present the applicability of 
intergroup contact theory in a post-conflict Rwandan context. These scholars 
particularly evaluate the differential effect of the government’s coffee sector 
liberalization efforts on the Hutu and Tutsi and their intergroup relations. Tobias and 
Boudreaux (2010:221) convincingly argue that the application of intergroup contact 
theory to the newly created coffee enterprises may be linked with positive changes in 
attitudes between Hutu and Tutsi coffee workers in Rwanda. This also implies that 
contact and collaboration may mediate the relationship between 
institutional/industrial changes and conflict resolution. 
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Similarly, Staub (2007:278) demonstrates that contact theory is also relevant amongst 
students in post-genocide Rwanda. He explains that approximately 3,000 Rwandan 
pre-university students undergo ingando camps each year organised by the NURC. 
Staub agrees that these camps create opportunities for contact that is indispensable for 
reconciliation to take place. He maintains, “Real contact is important for the 
beginning of a positive connection” (Staub, 2007:278).  
 
Having discussed the intergroup contact theory and its applicability, the question to be 
asked now is: “How and why can the intergroup contact theory be applied in the 
Presbyterian Church’s ministry of reconciliation?” The researcher’s view is that 
intergroup contact theory is a useful theory for two reasons. Firstly, in the case of 
Rwanda, both the victims and perpetrators of the genocide go to the same church. 
They spend time together in training, seminars, worship, Bible studies, sharing meals, 
prayer meetings, Holy Communion, and so forth. Interaction between the two groups 
(Hutu and Tutsi) helps them to reduce their fear and anxiety, which in turn reduces 
their negative attitudes towards each other. In other words, the contact model leads 
the two parties to a restoration of friendly relations between them. 
 
Secondly, as already noted, reconciliation is both a spiritual and social phenomenon. 
For this reason, intergroup contact theory, as one of the models of reconciliation in 
the social sciences, is proposed in this study as a supplement to the missiological 
model of encounter, as suggested by Kritzinger (2008). Put differently, I propose that 
the intergroup contact theory is brought in relation to what Kritzinger’s model calls 
the encounter of “us” to the “other” or “face-to-face” contact. 
 
In short, the intergroup contact hypothesis has been used by many intervention 
programs aimed at improving relationships between individuals and groups formerly 
in conflict, believing that increased contact between former enemies leads to mutual 
understanding and dialogue that over time decreases prejudice and increases goodwill.  
 
2.7.2.2 The role of social and identity change in reconciliation 
In the previous section, I explored intergroup contact theory and its relevancy in the 
post conflict society. This section discusses how the reduction of prejudices and fear 
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among the groups lead to social and identity change. For Bar-Tal (2000) 
reconciliation requires a change in societal attitudes. Reconciliation, as social change, 
is important because individuals move from a conflictive to a peaceful attitude. At the 
personal level, Bazuin adopts Shapiro’s (2005) argument, which suggests that 
individuals can develop new knowledge or find new ways of framing a situation 
through emotional change. They might also gain emotional control over their previous 
trauma or develop a better understanding of their emotions after having experienced a 
traumatic event. They can focus on changing their behaviour, and learn and rehearse 
new ways of solving problems and doing things. They might also prioritize changing 
relationships, as learning about their former enemies will re-humanize them (Bazuin, 
2013:28). On the social level, peaceful change can happen through appeals to 
rationality, convincing leaders and their followers that it is in their best interest to 
pursue peace and reconciliation. Peace builders can try to change the norms of society 
through education and other means by trying to reduce the acceptability of violence 
and increase the desire for peace in the society and culture (Bazuin, 2013:28). 
 
In Sasaki’s (2012:19) view, deep-rooted conflicts in the world are between identity 
groups. Thus, issues of identity are central to the process of building relationships 
between social groups that have developed deep-seated fear and animosity toward 
each other. Citing Staub (2001), Sasaki observes that after decades of violent 
exchange, each group involved in the conflict defines its identity in terms of enmity 
towards the other: ‘the other is our enemy, and we are the enemy of the other’. 
Similarly, the identity of each group may be defined around victimhood: ‘we are the 
victim of the other group, and they are our victimisers, not victims’. The negation of 
the other group’s identity as victims or the narrative of their victimhood is deeply 
entrenched in each group’s own victim identity or their own narrative of victimhood.  
 
In response to identity issues that lie at the heart of intractable conflicts, Sasaki (2012) 
takes note of Kelman’s (2004) conception of reconciliation, which focuses on identity 
change. Kelman describes reconciliation as a process of identity change through 
which each party revises its own identity just enough to accommodate the identity of 
the other. For him, reconciliation as identity change is the process of disassociating 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
  
 
 
67 
one’s own identity from the negation of the other’s identity. Kelman (2004) defines 
reconciliation as follows:  
 
Changing one’s collective identity by removing the negation of the other from it 
implies a degree of acceptance of the other’s identity-at least in these sense of 
acknowledging the legitimacy of the other’s narrative without necessarily fully 
agreeing with that narrative. The change in each party’s identity may go further 
by moving toward the development of a common, transcendent identity- not in 
lieu of, but alongside of each group’s particularistic identity (cited by Sasaki, 
2012:20).  
 
Reconciliation as identity change is a very deep process, which must take place in the 
psyche of each identity group who has a stake in post-violence peacebuilding (Sasaki, 
2012: 20-21).  
 
2.7.3 Social identity theory 
Social identity theory is one of the reconciliation theories that some scholars have 
applied when explaining and analysing the phenomenon of reconciliation in a post-
violence context. Social identity theory (SIT) starts with the assumption that social 
identity is primarily derived from group membership. It further proposes that people 
strive to achieve or maintain a positive social identity, thus boosting their self-esteem, 
and that this positive identity is largely derived from favourable comparisons that can 
be made between the in-group and relevant outgroups. In reference to Tajfel and 
Turner (1986), Brown (2000:747) notes that there are three classes of variables that 
might influence intergroup differentiation: people must be subjectively identified with 
their group; the situation should permit evaluative intergroup comparisons; and the 
outgroup must be sufficiently comparable to the in-group. 
 
In the words of Tajfel and Turner (1979), Tobias and Bourdeaux (2010:222) explain 
that through SIT, we derive part of our personal identity from our social identity. This 
occurs primarily through a process of categorisation, namely, we naturally categorise 
ourselves into our own “in-group”. Examples include the social category that we 
identify with, and how we categorise others into different “outgroups” due to their 
different skin colour, religion, and so forth. We fundamentally strive for positive self-
esteem, and we often do this through a favourable comparison of our social identity or 
in-group, with relevant yet different outgroups. By comparing our own group to 
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another in a positive light, we aim to become positively distinct from this outgroup, 
and in this way enhance our socially derived self-esteem (Tobias and Boudreaux, 
2010:222). 
 
Holding a stereotypical, prejudiced image of outgroup members is the result of a 
competitive social categorisation of one’s own in-group in relation to a particular 
outgroup, and it is one of the main predictors of committing violent acts toward the 
outgroup. Consequently, in-group bias and outgroup prejudice are a major 
impediment to overcoming social categories based on group differences. However, 
the above-mentioned dynamic nature of social categorisation and identity creation 
implies that no socially created group category is ever fixed in time, and hence, it is 
possible to reverse destructive intergroup categorical perceptions over time and 
change environments. Social re-categorisation makes intergroup contact more 
effective if these participants will replace the ‘us’ versus ‘them’ ideology with a more 
socially inclusive and overarching identity (Tobias and Boudreaux, 2010:222). 
 
SIT has provided three approaches aimed at improving intergroup attitudes. The first 
is the de-categorisation model. Brewer and Miller (1984) believe that the best way of 
reducing intergroup differentiation was to make those categories less useful as 
psychological tools. This implies personalising the intergroup situation or finding 
additional categorical dimensions that cut across the original categories, which should 
‘de-categorise’ the operational categories in the current situation and thereby make 
the occurrence of in-group bias less likely. 
 
A second approach seeks to redraw the boundaries of the category so that any 
outgroup becomes subsumed into a new and larger superordinate category. Because 
in-group and (former) outgroup members now share a ‘common in-group identity,’ 
they should be drawn closer together and intergroup discrimination should be 
reduced. Both the de-categorisation and common in-group identity models involve the 
dissolution of category boundaries, and hence, the abandonment of subgroup 
identities. In the case of Rwanda, this de-categorisation and common in-group identity 
model is reflected in the so called “Ndi Umunyarwanda” (I am a Rwandan) concept, 
instead of Hutu or Tutsi ethnic categorizations (see heading 5.3.1.1).  
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The third approach argues that some subgroup salience was retained while also 
optimizing contact conditions (Brown, 2000:752).Social identity theory points out 
that we must interrogate the origin of the identities that define us. While intergroup 
contact is a useful starting point for diminishing fear in order to open up a space for 
reconciliation, true reconciliation requires de-categorisation that leads to a renewed 
identity. This insight will inform the turn towards the history and context of the 
Rwandan genocide, as the origin of the identities that define the Hutu and Tutsi as 
distinct groups will be explored further in chapter 3. 
 
2.8 Conclusion 
 
This chapter provided the theoretical perspective for reconciliation. Here, the term 
“reconciliation” was explored from a biblical-missiological, theological, and socio-
missiological perspective. To summarize, the chapter discussed various definitions of 
reconciliation in theology and praxis. It also showed that from a Christian and 
theological perspective, reconciliation constitutes a new paradigm for mission. This 
means that mission of reconciliation is based on the missio Dei and reconciliation has 
become an essential part of the church’s mission (missio ecclesiae). This implies that 
it is God who initiates reconciliation. Reconciliation is first and foremost the work of 
God. Thus, Christians hold the notion that it is God who through Jesus Christ brings 
about reconciliation, not ourselves. We are merely agents of God’s activity. 
 
Based on the available literature, this chapter constructed a four-dimensional model of 
reconciliation (section 2.5). These dimensions include: relationship-building, truth 
telling, forgiveness and healing—a key model for theological reconciliation. These 
dimensions will guide the analysis part of the study, which will examine how and 
whether the Presbyterian Church in Rwanda has fostered a ministry of reconciliation, 
which will be further discussed in chapter 6. Given the destructive ethnic ideology 
that culminated in the 1994 genocide, the study now turns to review the broad 
historical context, with the aim of answering the following questions: What are the 
contextual and identity factors that contributed to the 1994 genocide in Rwanda and 
how did colonial authorities in collaboration with Rwandan elites construct an ethnic 
ideology that resulted in genocide? (This will be elaborated on in chapter 3). Why and 
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how did the Rwandan church and people respond to ethnic ideology and participate in 
the genocide? (See chapter 4). Chapter 5 and 6 will then seek to answer the question: 
How does reconciliation address the problem of ethnic ideology and the effects of 
genocide? Should the church respond, and thereby contribute to addressing this 
problem? And if so, how should it respond? 
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CHAPTER THREE 
CAUSAL FACTORS OF THE 1994 GENOCIDE IN THE 
HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF RWANDA 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter aims to explore ethnic ideology in colonial and post-colonial Rwanda by 
seeking to understand the history of the relations between the Hutu and Tutsi. This 
chapter begins with a survey of scholarly literature on the phenomenon of genocide. 
Different theories will be considered that offer a general background to which the 
Rwandan context can be compared (section 3.2). This chapter will then turn to survey 
the history of Rwanda, offering a detailed presentation of the background to the 1994 
genocide over three phases, including the pre-colonial (section 3.3), colonial and post-
colonial context. This will be covered in depth, since the specifics of names and 
events are important contextual elements for understanding the genocide. These 
details will allow an analysis of the origins and history of the development of the 
Rwandan crisis during the colonial period (section 3.4) and after independence 
(section 3.5), as well as highlight the stages (section 3.6), genesis and preparation 
(section 3.7) of the social construction of ethnic ideology that led to genocide in 1994 
(section 3.8). The plan and preparation of genocide leads to the next section (3.9), 
which maintains that the spread of ethnic ideology among Rwandans resulted in the 
mass participation of Hutu civilians in the 1994 genocide against the Tutsi. The 
chapter also suggests some historical, social-political and economic factors that are 
central to the Rwandan genocide. In light of Rwanda’s history of conflicts, violence, 
ethnic massacres and crimes related to ethnic ideologies, five “causal” and influential 
factors (section 3.10) related to ideology will be identified as contributing to the 1994 
genocide: (1) the identity based-conflict, (2) colonial ideology based on Hamitic 
theory, (3) myth making ideology, (4) political ideology, and (5) economic 
constraints.  
 
Bearing in mind that this missiological study is a realist evaluation, the intention is to 
further understand the context of reconciliation. Considering the CMO model 
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described in section 1.6, the goal is to define the context (C) so that that the 
mechanisms (M) for reconciliation used by the Presbyterian Church can be 
appropriately evaluated and directed towards the desired outcomes (O). 
 
The chapter argues that it will not be possible to understand the historical context of 
the 1994 genocide unless we consider how the rigid dichotomy between the Hutu and 
Tutsi was constructed by colonial and missionary authorities in collaboration with 
Rwandan elites and later hardened as a result of multiple, recurring genocides. The 
role played by missionaries and the Rwandan church in planting a seed of ethnic 
ideology will be discussed in chapter 4. First, however, chapter 3 will give a general 
description and explanation of the factors that have contributed to the social 
construction of ethic ideology in historical Rwanda.  
 
3.2 Causes of genocide: A survey of scholarship 
 
This section considers the broad range of scholarly views regarding the causes of the 
phenomenon of genocide at various times and places. The goal, however, is not to 
discuss the causes of genocide at length, but rather to show that genocide is extremely 
complicated, and that many complex factors need to be considered. The theoretical 
debate in this section therefore offers a point of comparison and contrast for 
understanding the specific causes of the 1994 genocide in Rwanda. As the scholarship 
on genocide has developed from one generation to another, there has been an 
increasing emphasis on the contextual and historical factors leading to organised 
violence.
19
 This emphasis will help us to consider Rwandan history in greater detail. 
At the same time, however, even contemporary, second-generation theories of 
genocide tend to focus on the decisions of elites who orchestrated acts of violence for 
political or economic reasons. This aspect of the scholarship on genocide contrasts 
sharply with the Rwandan situation, where the more pressing questions concern the 
broader factors that facilitated the mass participation in 1994. This discussion of 
                                                          
19
This section discusses the causes of genocide in reference to Scott Straus’ (2006) writings entitled 
“New Directions in Comparative Research on Genocide”. Straus, whose primary research interests 
include the study of genocide, political violence, human rights, and African politics, classifies scholars 
of genocide as first and second generation genocide scholarship. The second generation in this paper 
includes Valentino (2004), Weitz (2003), Midlarsky (2005), Mann (2005), Sémelin (2005), and Levene 
(2005). 
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genocide from a theoretical perspective will thus highlight two issues for further 
consideration: firstly, in what way did Rwandan history create the conditions for 
1994?And secondly, in what way did this history create the conditions for the unique 
factors of the Rwandan genocide, namely, the widespread mass participation in 
violence? 
 
The idea that genocide emerged from “deep divisions” between groups in a country 
was a foundational concept for the first generation of theorists in the comparative 
study of genocide. Citing Israel Charny (1982), Straus (2006) for example, focuses on 
intergroup dehumanisation as the key mechanism leading to genocide. For Staub 
(1989), according to Evin Staub as quoted by Straus (2006a:6), the “difficult life 
conditions, but argues that, aggression arising from them is funnelled through 
prejudice dominant in a particular society. These claims are also among the most 
well-known outside the academy: racism, prejudice, dehumanisation, ancient hatreds, 
and anti-Semitism (in the case of the Holocaust) are often the first ideas that spring to 
mind when the causes of genocide are considered”. 
 
However, the second generation of genocide scholarship challenged these claims or 
sought to move beyond the idea that genocide has a single cause. According to Straus 
(2006a), the unusually deep, pre-existing social cleavages are neither sufficient nor 
universally necessary conditions for mass killing. There are several elements to this 
argument. First, deep divisions, prejudice, and discrimination occur more frequently 
than genocide (Straus, 2006a:6). Many societies are fractured ethnically, racially, 
culturally, and religiously, but genocide occurs only rarely. Second, cultural 
explanations cannot explain the timing of genocide. Deep divisions, prejudice, and 
discrimination are fairly constant; genocide is not. Third, evidence from several cases 
suggests that divisions, prejudice and discrimination do not necessarily predate the 
violence. Rwanda and Bosnia were fairly integrated ethnically, for example, with 
much intermarriage across ethnic groups. Fourth, authors cite social psychology 
experiments and studies of perpetrators showing that individuals do not necessarily 
commit violence because of ethnic or religious hatred (Straus, 2006a:7).  
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The second-generation scholarship also consistently rejects arguments about a link 
between authoritarian regimes and genocide. This hypothesis appears to be prominent 
in the first-generation scholarship on genocide. For example, Irving Louis Horowitz 
(1994) argued that genocide is the “operational handmaiden of a particular social 
system, the totalitarian system” (cited by Straus, 2006a:7). For the second generation 
of scholarship, however, authoritarian regimes are more common than genocide, and 
an argument about authoritarianism cannot explain the timing of when genocide 
happens. Among first-generation genocide theorists, Staub (1989) argues that during 
difficult periods of social stress, such as economic depression or loss after wars, 
individuals seek to blame others or scapegoat outgroups to increase their own feelings 
of self-worth. Scapegoating is then channelled through dominant cultural frames and 
prejudices, for example, anti-Semitism in the German case. However, the second 
generation of genocide scholarship challenges a link between deprivation and social 
stress, on the one hand, and genocide, on the other (Straus, 2006:8). For these reasons, 
the scholars tend to look elsewhere to explain why and when genocide occurs. 
 
Again, Straus (2006) cites Weitz (2003) who argues that genocide happens when 
leaders attempt to engineer a “society bereft of difference and marked by a 
homogenous population”. Weitz points out that race and nation are the organising 
principles around which such perfections are attempted. For Weitz, according to 
Straus (2006:9), genocide “is rooted in modernity; it is top-down; it emerges from 
revolutionary attempts to change societies; and above all it has ideological origins. 
Genocide is more likely to occur under particular conditions. Genocides tend to 
happen after targeted groups experience discrimination and exclusion”. 
 
Like Weitz (2003), Sémelin (2005) argues that major social upheavals and war 
matter. Furthermore, in the midst of unrest, Sémelin (2005) maintains, “Leaders seek 
to redefine who belongs to a community and who does not. Leaders in turn use 
ideology to unify in-groups and to transform any anxiety they experience into fear of 
an identifiable enemy. When leaders seek the total unity of their own groups that 
quest leads to efforts to create purity, which in turn leads to the desire to get rid of 
out-groups” (cited in Straus, 2006a:12). Moreover, in war, when security is 
threatened, leaders advocate the use of violence for self-protection (Straus, 2006a:12). 
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Valentino’s (2004) analysis is that genocide and mass killings emerge from the 
“strategic” calculations of leaders. Genocide and mass killings are calculated, 
instrumental, and deliberate policies that leaders choose in order to accomplish certain 
goals. Like Weitz and Sémelin, Valentino’s argument is top-down, but he pushes the 
argument one step further. Valentino (2004) argues, “Genocide is the outcome of 
decisions and actions that a relatively small group of leaders make. The mass public is 
largely inconsequential to the outcome. Genocide and mass killing happen with the 
passive acceptance of the rest of society” (cited in Straus, 2006a:13). 
 
Like Valentino, Midlarsky (2005) focuses on leaders’ decision-making. Midlarsky 
(2005) locates “the origins of genocide in leaders’ attempts to manage threats and to 
defend states, what he terms realpolitik” (cited in Straus, 2006a:15). Midlarsky turns 
to “prospect theory” to argue that genocide occurs in the context of loss. By loss, 
Midlarsky means the transfer of territory or the authority over a population from one 
state to another; large numbers killed in war; and significant socioeconomic 
contraction. Loss creates vulnerability, anger, and a desire for revenge, and over time 
increases the probability that leaders will choose genocide as an “imprudent” method 
for safeguarding their states (cited in Straus, 2006a:16).  
 
Whereas Valentino (2004) and Midlarsky (2005) focus primarily on proximate 
conditions—the strategic calculations of leaders and loss in war gives rise to 
“imprudent realpolitik”— Mann (2005) situates genocide in the broad historical 
development of modern states and modern political ideologies. Mann argues, 
“Murderous ethnic cleansing” is a perversion of a democratic ideal of rule by the 
people. Cleansing can occur when “the people” (the “demos” of democracy) is 
defined as an ethnic group (an “ethnos”), to the exclusion of other ethnic groups that 
share the same territory” (cited in Straus, 2006:18). Mann (2005) also analyses and 
disaggregates perpetrators into three main categories: radical elites running states, 
violent paramilitary bands and core constituencies. All three provide mass (if not 
majority) support and are essential for murderous cleansing to ensue (cited in Straus, 
2006a:18). Mann (2005) suggests, “Ethnic nationalism is the negative by-product of a 
democratic ideal, but other factors might also explain the rise of organicist ideologies. 
Similarly, almost all the cleansing campaigns occurred during transitions, but not 
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necessarily democratic ones. Rwanda fits that bill, as does the former Yugoslavia, 
arguably” (cited in Straus, 2006a:18). 
 
Like Mann, Levene (2005) argues, “Genocide is not so much a series of isolated, 
aberrant, and essentially unconnected events but is at the very heart of modern 
historical development” (cited in Straus, 2006a:20). Levene’s argument is two-fold. 
On the one hand, he highlights long-term, slow-moving, global processes, in 
particular the rise of the West, modernity, and the nation-state. Genocide, he argues, 
is embedded in the very international system of nation-states dominant in the world 
today. Like Mann, Levene sees a greater likelihood for genocide among late 
developers, which seek to manufacture social cohesion using state power in order to 
catch up with early developers. On the other hand, Levene focuses on short-term 
factors. He argues that genocide is a contingent outcome, not the inevitable result of 
the world historical developments he emphasises. The following factors are of 
significance: Firstly, Levene points to what he calls a “perpetrator-victim dynamic”. 
Secondly, genocide crystallises in acute crises, usually wars. Thirdly, there is an 
element of phobia. Levene argues that people make genocide possible and leaders 
must have popular support to succeed (cited in Straus, 2006a:20). 
 
In summary, for first-generation scholars, both difficult life conditions and intergroup 
dehumanisation are the key mechanisms leading to genocide. Second-generation 
scholarship, however, moves beyond the idea that genocide has a single cause. For 
these reasons, these scholars look elsewhere to explain why and when genocide 
occurs. When we examine the complex factors in the Rwandan context, we find that 
genocide arose from a popular ideology, which developed from the racial 
mythmaking that originated during the colonial era. In this regard, the researcher 
agrees here with Levene’s argument that genocide is related to historical 
developments and cannot be blamed on elites alone but also arises from popular 
ideology. Valentino’s (2004) ideas, as described by Straus (2006a), further calls our 
attention to the fact that genocide and mass killing are calculated, instrumental, and 
deliberate policies that leaders choose in order to accomplish certain goals. While this 
is true of the immediate causes of the events of 1994, the deeper underlying root 
cause is the widespread ethnic ideology, which prepared the populace to be 
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manipulated by elite propaganda. The line of argument in this dissertation is that one 
must understand the contextual origin of the distrust between the Hutu and Tutsi in 
order to understand why such a large percentage of the Hutu population participated 
in the 1994 genocide. According to Waheed (2011:2), many academics have reached 
a consensus that “…the central cause of the genocide is clear: it was the result of an 
over-powerful government and regional elite attempting to maintain their hold on 
power by creating ethnic tensions”. Although this factor is important as an 
explanation, it was also preceded by an ethnic ideology, which created tension long 
before 1994. Issues related to ideology will be explored in this chapter, including 
identity-based ideology, colonial and missionary ideology, the Hamitic race 
mythology, and political and economic ideology.  
 
3.3 Pre-colonial Rwandan context 
 
In order to understand why the genocide happened in Rwanda, it is essential to 
understand the historical background of the labels “Hutu” and “Tutsi.” These words 
do not describe separate tribes or ethnic groups but, as we shall see, were class 
constructs abused by the colonisers to create artificial ethnic divisions. In order to 
understand how these descriptions could harden into a genocidal ethnic ideology, it is 
important to understand the social, economic, and political history of Rwanda even 
prior to the colonial era.  
 
In his article, ‘From Categorization to Communion Ethnic Identity and Catholic 
Reconciliation in Post-Genocide Rwanda,’ Carney (2016:191) maintains that the 
history and understanding of “Hutu” and “Tutsi” are indeed complicated. This is 
because, for different scholars, the terms Hutu and Tutsi are used in varied and even 
contradictory ways. For some, these labels refer to racial categories, for others, they 
refer to categories of class, and for still others, they refer to social categories. Despite 
the complexity of these categories, this study supports the view of scholars who assert 
that in the pre-colonial era, Hutu-Tutsi relations were largely complementary and 
harmonious. The problems came with European colonizers and missionaries who 
ethnicized and racialized these formerly fluid lines, thereby hardening the division 
between the Rwandan people (Carney, 2016:192).  
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Before the arrival of the European colonialists, Rwandan society was organized as a 
monarchy ruled by a supreme king, or Umwami. This pre-colonial society had its own 
institutions and culture that united people of different social categories. The king 
ensured the cohesion of the people by performing social functions and was considered 
as “Umwami wa rubanda,” meaning the “king of the people”. The monarch was 
considered to be the owner of all lands and cattle, the supreme chief of armies, and a 
guarantor of the land’s fertility. The monarch emerged from a consensus between the 
different social groups. Rwandans acknowledged the phrase, “Umwami nta bwoko 
yagiraga, yari Umwami wa Rubanda rwose,” meaning the king did not belong to any 
distinct social group, he was a king of all “Banyarwanda”. This society shared a 
common language, Kinyarwanda, and a single culture with values that promoted 
harmony, stability and peace. This is illustrated by the fact that there is no history of 
killings and genocide between the social groups of Banyarwanda. Values such as 
patriotism, integrity, heroism, excellence, protection of those in need and who seek 
protection from imminent danger, preservation of life and certain taboos like killing 
children and women were inscribed in the Rwandan culture. All these cultural values 
were eroded with the advent of Western culture, colonial rule and the policies of post-
independence regimes (Mutamba and Izabiliza, 2005:8). 
 
Kiminyo recalls that, historically, Rwanda’s three ethnic groups have been identified 
in relation to distinct aspects of the economy: the Tutsi were cattle keepers, the Hutu 
were farmers, and the Twa lived in the forests. The monarchy served as an important 
unifying symbol, representing the interest of all three ethnic groups. Hutu and Tutsi 
were also linked together throughout much of the territory in a system of cattle 
vassalage, in which Tutsi patrons provided cattle to Hutu clients. During the pre-
colonial era, there was remarkable social mobility and intermarriage between the 
Tutsi and Hutu (Kiminyo, 2001:30). These connections were an important element of 
social cohesion. At that time, as described by Shyaka, the point of reference for the 
Rwandan identity was first the clan. When a person was required to disclose his/her 
identity, he/she would mention his/her clan without ambiguity. Furthermore, the 
myths related to the origin of the Banyarwanda tie the Hutu, the Tutsi and the Twa, to 
the same ancestral father, called Kanyarwanda (Shyaka, 2005:5). In addition, Shyaka 
(2005) explains that “Tutsiness” and “Hutuness” did not refer to an unchanging 
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identity. The mechanisms of social promotion to “Tutsification” for the Hutus and the 
Twas were characterized by the gain of an important herd of cows, which could be the 
result of three fundamental acts: the King’s decision, marriage with an “important 
Tutsi,” or adoption by a Tutsi. The reverse phenomenon, “Hutufication,” a kind of 
social deterioration, was also true for the Tutsis who could find themselves deprived 
of their herds. These facts clearly show that in the pre-colonial period, “Tutsiness” 
and “Hutuness” did not have, in the concerned person’s mind, a genetic dimension 
contrary to clan belongingness (Shyaka, 2005:5-6).In pre-colonial Rwanda, the labels 
referred to wealth and social status; they were not static, and social mobility was 
possible by marriage and changes in economic circumstances. 
 
Those who were called ‘Tutsi’ were mainly living on cow breeding; a Tutsi who had 
no more cows, and who was then living on agriculture, was counted among the Hutus. 
Those who were called ‘Hutu’ were mainly living on agriculture. A Hutu who had 
many cows and who was mainly living on cow breeding was counted among the 
Tutsis. The Twas were mainly living on pottery and hunting animals in the forest. 
They were kept away by other Rwandans, while some were made Tutsi such as 
Busyete and others (Buckley-Zistel, 2009:34). 
 
Before the arrival of the colonisers, the various ethnicities did not exist, all people 
equally considered themselves to be Rwandan. Hutu-Tutsi antagonism occasionally 
emerged as efforts were made to structure society around the differing needs of 
agriculture and cattle breeding. However, this conflict over resources drew on distant 
notions of identity that had little significance otherwise in the highly integrated 
society of central Rwanda. Relationships were based on conviviality making it 
impossible to categorise the Hutu, Tutsi and Twa as ethnic groups.   
 
3.4 Colonial Rwanda Context 
 
As noted in the previous section, the terms Hutu and Tutsi had no significant ethnic 
meaning in pre-colonial Rwanda but denoted fluid social or professional categories. 
However, the Europeans colonizers saw the social differences among the Rwandans 
in exclusively ethnic terms, struck by the imposing appearance of the Tutsi. This 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
  
 
 
80 
study considers ethnic identity to be a purely colonial creation which re-shaped social 
classes transforming them into ethnic groups. It is argued that colonizers created 
pseudo-racial ethnic identities to deliberately divide Rwandans against each another.  
As a result, the evil of genocide is traced directly back to these European colonial 
divide-and-rule strategies and the racial ideology they imported (Hintjens, 2008:15). 
This section, therefore, describes how the colonial construction of ethnic identity 
impacted the formation of Hutu and Tutsi identities and divisions among Rwandans, 
later developing into the ethnic ideology that led to the 1994 genocide. The role 
played by the colonizers (see also section 3.10.2) in planting a seed of ethnic ideology 
can be classified into three main categories: 
 
1) Racial theory initiated and propagated by the Belgian colonialism, which 
constructed Hutu as indigenous Bantu and Tutsi as alien Hamites (Mamdani, 
2001:16). 
2) Introduction of the identity card in order to maintain the fluid classes to fixed 
classes and to identify individuals is according to the label on their identity 
cards (Clark, 2010:142).  
3) Theory of origin, which portrays Tutsi as foreign invaders. According to 
Ferdinando (2009:51), “The notion that the Tutsi were relative latecomers, 
even if they had come some hundreds of years earlier, had immense ethnic 
significance in the context of bitter economic and political rivalry, and in 
1994, it was used to justify their annihilation and the repatriation of their 
corpses”. 
 
First, we must understand the racial theory presented by the colonial authorities. 
Bruce traces the historical roots of conflict by saying that the German explorers and 
early colonial representatives were the first exponents in Rwanda of an 
anthropological/social argument known as the Hamitic thesis. This thesis became the 
first seed of genocide because it argued that the Hamites, a race of people that 
included the Egyptians, had spread through parts of Africa, carrying with them their 
greater sophistication than the Negroid races of equatorial Africa. The Germans first 
experience of Rwanda was of a sophisticated kingdom inhabited by people with a 
developed court system, including a rich language specific to its functions. Seeming 
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to dominate this system were a tall, light-skinned people—the Tutsi—who appeared 
to rule over a shorter, darker people—the Hutu. In the imagination of the colonialists, 
here was “graphic evidence of the truth of the Hamitic thesis: these tall, light-skinned 
people had migrated to Rwanda from the north and imposed their dominance on the 
lesser, Negroid Hutu” (Bruce, 2001:17-18).  
 
After gaining control of the area from the Germans, the Belgians chose to rule at a 
distance through the established power structure of the local Tutsi chiefs. Influenced 
by the Hamitic theory, the Belgians “tended to view the Tutsi as racially similar to 
themselves, as ‘Europeans under a black skin’” (Destexhe, 1995:38). Thus, “The Hutu 
were identified as an inferior and uncivilized Bantu people who had been subjugated 
by the racially and indeed militarily superior Hamitic Tutsis on their arrival in 
Rwanda” (Ferdinando, 2009:52). As a result, Belgian colonial authorities conferred 
political and social privileges on the Tutsi minority whom they closely associated 
with their administration (Ferdinando, 2009:52). Under the influence of the Hamitic 
ideology, the Europeans saw the Tutsi as “born rulers” on account of their presumed 
‘Hamitic’ descendancy (Baur, 1994:455).  
 
Thus, the Hamitic theory, as propagated by John Henning Speke, was one of the first 
theories to justify the stratification that informed colonial policies in Rwanda, and in 
turn, propagating a powerful myth: that “the tall Tutsi had immigrated into Rwanda 
some centuries earlier, bringing with them their long-horned cattle and imposing their 
‘natural’ superiority over the Hutu peoples” (Bruce, 2001:18). Wielenga (2011b:3) 
adds to this, 
 
Finding in Rwanda a well-advanced, complex state structure, colonialists 
concluded that the reigning Tutsi monarchy could not be Bantu. From this came 
the further conclusion that in the hierarchy of superiority, Tutsi would rank just 
under the Europeans themselves, followed by the Hutu and under them the Twa. 
Along with this hypothesis was the implied racial separateness of Hutu and 
Tutsi. Although Hutu and Tutsi shared the same culture, language and religion, it 
was concluded that Tutsi must have infiltrated Rwanda from the north and 
subjugated the Hutu. 
 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
  
 
 
82 
Such assertions became myths that gained considerable ground in colonial Rwanda 
and later played a major role in the interplay of ethnic relations in post-colonial 
Rwanda. 
 
According to Prunier (1995:6), “The Belgian colonisers viewed the Hutu as ignorant, 
vile, as slaves by nature with no ambition. Hutu features were ‘ugly’ and indicative of 
the ‘inferior Negro’”. A 1925 colonial report cited by Prunier (1995:6) describes the 
Hutu as follows: “The Bahutu display very typical Bantu features. […] They are 
generally short and thick-set with a big head, a jovial expression, a wide nose, and 
enormous lips. They are extroverts who like to laugh and lead a simple life”. 
 
As for the Twa, they were described as being the most primitive of the three groups. 
“Member of a worn out and quickly disappearing race… the Mutwa presents a 
number of well-defined somatic characteristics: he is small, chunky, muscular, and 
very hairy; particularly on the chest. With a monkey-like flat and a huge nose, he is 
quite similar to the apes whom he chases in the forest” (Prunier, 1995:6). 
 
In contrast to the “intrinsically inferior” Hutu and Twa, The Tutsi received much 
praise from their Belgian colonisers. The colonial minister in Rwanda in 1925 is 
quoted as saying:  
 
The Mututsi of good race has nothing of the Negro, apart from his colour. He is 
very tall, 1,80m at least, at least 1, 90 m or more. He is very thin, a characteristic 
which tends to be even more noticeable as he gets older. His features are very 
fine: high brown, thin nose and fine lips framing beautiful shining teeth. Batutsi 
women are usually lighter skinned than their husbands, very slender and pretty 
in their youth, although they tend to thicken with age…Gifted with vicious 
intelligence, the Tutsi displays a refinement of feelings which is rare among 
primitive people. He is natural born leader, capable of extreme self-control and 
calculated goodwill (cited by Prunier, 1995:6).  
 
This implies that the myth of the superiority of the Tutsi over the Hutu and Twa was 
created and supported by colonialists and extended into a policy of Hutu suppression. 
These distinctions emphasised by the Belgians became engrained in the Hutu belief 
system and developed into ethnic ideology and jealousy toward the Tutsi that 
transformed into rage in 1959 and 1994. 
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This superiority was emphasised when the colonial authorities introduced identity 
cards in Rwanda (Clark, 2010:142). By issuing identity cards, colonialists privileged 
the Tutsis. They were to maintain control of both the army and the country’s cattle 
supply (Hintjens, 1999:251). Over time, identity cards were used: 
 
To identify Tutsis so that they gain acceptance into secondary schools, attend 
universities and seminaries, or secure posts within the government which 
accounted for the vast majority of paid employment. In 1994, however, they 
were used as gruesome winnowers for the wholesale slaughter of Tutsis. These 
cards are a record of how an entire society became so consumed by the fear of a 
Tutsi invasion that the only viable option seemed to be the complete annihilation 
of every Tutsi and sympathizing Hutu in Rwanda (Horner, 2014:1-2). 
 
As shall be seen in chapter 4, these cards also “stand for a church that was not only 
powerless to stop the genocide, but had a disturbing role in formulating the ideology 
that eventually convinced so many Hutu to participate in the genocide” (Horner, 
2014:2). 
 
These initiatives by the colonisers changed what it means to be a Hutu or a Tutsi. 
Instead of being an indicator of class or economic status, these labels now specifically 
denote separate races. The meaning of Tutsi and Hutu quickly changed from fluid to 
fixed, and the connection between race and power was created (Clark, 2010:142). 
Kroslak, with reference to Prunier (1995) argues, “The Belgians, from a mixture of 
expediency and pseudo-scientific racial fascination, reconstructed a neo-traditionalist 
Rwanda, which by 1945 had become more real than the Rwanda on which Count Von 
Gotzen first laid eyes in 1894” (Kroslak, 2007:30). The interesting thing is that the 
Hutu ‘democratic revolution’ of 1959 did not change the main traits of that 
ideological construct, but merely inverted its sign. Consequently, in post-colonial 
Rwanda, “Tutsi were still regarded as ‘foreign invaders’ who had come from afar, but 
now this meant that they could not really be considered as citizens” (Kroslak, 
2007:30). European colonisers largely exaggerated differences between the two 
ethnicities, and had only “theories” of where each group originated (Hintjens, 
1999:251). This became a key ideological ingredient of the emerging Hutu revolution, 
which believed that Rwanda had been overrun by Tutsi invaders who had enslaved 
the Hutu. 
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Competition between the Hutu and Tutsi intensified as pressure for democratic 
change mounted in Rwanda. The acme of ethnic tension in pre-independence Rwanda 
began when emergent Hutu elites, who had been given increased access to education 
provided by the Catholic Church, and thus higher social status, began to react against 
the dominance of the Tutsi. They used this Tutsi dominance as a focal point for 
generating political support. For instance, Bruce (2001:19) asserts, “Political leaders 
used ethnic identification to generate political mobilisation against competing elites. 
The crucible of political competition forged a new, combative set of relations between 
Tutsi and Hutu elites that ultimately became violent”. 
 
In the late 1950s, Rwanda’s first political parties were created and were established 
along ethnic lines. The Parti du Mouvement de l’émancipation de Hutu 
(PARMEHUTU) was a Hutu party, a movement of educated Hutu elites who 
circulated manifestos calling for Hutu freedom, not only from Belgian colonisation 
but also from Tutsi overlordship. The opposition party, created on 3 September 1959, 
was mainly a Tutsi party, The Union National Rwandaise (UNAR), which was pro-
monarchist and anti-Belgian. Another party was the Rassenbement Democratique 
Rwandais (RADER), founded by two moderate Tutsis, with the objective of economic 
and cultural development for both Tutsi and Hutu (Melvern, 2000:13). 
 
On 24 July 1959, Rwanda’s forty-six year-old Tutsi King Mutara III Rudahigwa died 
under suspicious circumstances. Some Tutsi elite were convinced that the king had 
been killed by the Belgians, with the Hutu in on the plot. In the royal court, an 
extremist group sought to destroy the Hutu leadership and there were brutal political 
assassinations. Political tension increased but the fuse was said to have been lit on the 
1
st
 of November 1959 when a group of young UNAR militants attacked the 
PARMEHUTU leader Dominique Mbonyumutwa. Violence spread like wildfire from 
hill to hill. The Hutu started to attack the Tutsi authorities, burning Tutsi homes, and 
large numbers of Tutsi fled the country. Guy Logiest, a Belgian colonel, immediately 
began to replace Tutsi chiefs with Hutu and announced to Belgian administrators that 
in the future, the Hutu would be favoured within the administration (Melvern, 
2000:13-14). The government together with the Belgian authorities were to blame for 
the rising racism, which bordered on ‘Nazism against the Tutsi minorities’. 
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Dismissive of this accusation, the Belgians removed half the Tutsi serving as local 
authorities and replaced them with Hutu. This opened the door for even more overt 
racism against the Tutsi (Melvern, 2004:7).  
 
In January 1961, Logiest and the Hutu party leaders met in Gitarama. A newly 
appointed Hutu official announced an end to ‘feudalism’ and to the monarchy, and 
Rwanda was declared a republic. Mbonyumutwa was declared president, and 
Kayibanda, the PARMEHUTU leader, was named prime minister (later that year he 
became president). The announcements sealed Rwanda’s political transformation 
from a Tutsi-dominated monarchy to a republic founded on Hutu rule, though formal 
independence was not granted until July 1962 and limited violence continued until 
then. The revolution became a “Hutu revolution”. The Belgians’ critical role in the 
events of the period thus further consolidated the political relevance of ethnicity 
(Straus, 2006:182-183).  
 
During this process, Hutu leaders exonerated Belgium and the Catholic Church for 
their thirty years of systematic ethnic discrimination, choosing instead to blame Tutsi 
nobles and Tutsis as a whole for the oppressive colonial policy. The Hutu counter-
elite internalised the colonial racial vision and violence accompanied both the struggle 
for independence (by Tutsi elite) and the struggle for democracy (by the Hutu 
counter-elite). Ordinary Tutsi, including women and children, became the victims. 
From November 1959 to September 1961, killings and insecurity threatened tens of 
thousands of Tutsis and also a number of Hutus who left their homes and took refuge 
outside the country or in the resettlement sites within the country. This period serves 
as a prelude no only to the genocide of 1994 (Kimonyo, 2001:31), but also to the 
decades of violence and instability that followed independence.  
 
The role of colonialists is expressed in President Paul Kagame’s speech during the 
commemorations of the tenth anniversary of the genocide in 2004: 
 
Our history over the past century is a complex product of the interaction between 
Rwanda’s culture and external influences. In many ways, the genocide in 
Rwanda stems from the colonial period, when the colonialists and those who 
called themselves evangelists [the catholic missionaries] sowed the seeds of hate 
and division. This is evident from the 1959 massacres and subsequent ones, 
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which had become the order of the day in Rwanda and in which the international 
community had become habitual bystanders. These massacres culminated in the 
1994 genocide (cited by Buckley-Zistel, 2009:39). 
 
In short, ethnicity ideology was socially constructed and intensified through the 
policies of the colonizers (Buit, 2011:108). The colonizers privileged the Tutsi 
minority and discriminated against the Hutu majority. This led to different forms of 
structural violence, discrimination and exclusion of Hutu. As Waheed (2011:2-3) puts 
it, “These tensions of ethnic divide and colonial domination resulted in the 1959 Hutu 
revolution where power was taken by those of a Hutu ethnicity, followed by killings 
of many Tutsi’s, which provoked a mass flow of Tutsi refugees to neighbouring 
countries”. After the Hutu revolution in 1959, the tables were turned and the myths 
about history and ethnicity were used against the Tutsi. For decades, the structural 
violence against Tutsi only turned into direct violence in times of political turbulence 
(Buit, 2011:108). Therefore, the description of the colonial history in this study serves 
as the introduction and foundation of the ethnic ideology that resulted in the 1994 
genocide. In other words, as a result of the colonial manipulation between 1900 and 
1960, categories and tensions between the Hutu-Tutsi were created, becoming the 
ethnic ideological roots of post-colonial Rwanda (Carney, 2012:173). 
 
3.5 Post-colonial Rwanda 
 
The aim of this section is to explain how Rwandan elites, during the post-colonial era, 
inherited and spread the ethnic ideology that had been constructed during the colonial 
era. For Carney (2012:172), “The resulting racialist interpretation of Hutu and Tutsi 
categories poisoned Rwandan society and laid the groundwork for postcolonial ethnic 
violence”. Although the details of the Hamitic race theory were no longer accepted in 
academic circles by the 1960’s, in the post-colonial era it remained influential in 
radical Hutu Power discourse until the eve of the 1994 genocide itself (Carney, 
2016:191).  
 
Hintjens correctly posits that in the post-colonial Rwandan context, elites were able to 
use ethnicity to foster hatred and fear. She argues, “Such hatred and fear were 
sometimes latent, and could be manipulated, but more commonly were deliberately 
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created in the context of well-prepared massacres” (Hintjens, 1999:248). According to 
Waheed (2011:2), “The history of Rwanda’s over-powerful government highlights a 
pattern; in normal times ethnic awareness was simply maintained to justify a 
concentration of power”. In times of crisis, however, perceived ethnic differences 
were intensified and used for scapegoating. 
 
In the next section, I argue that throughout the history of post-colonial Rwanda, ethnic 
ideology began to spread across Rwandan society. At the time of Rwandan 
independence, this ideology primarily belonged to Hutu extremists, but by 1994 it 
was taken as fact by a much larger portion of the Hutu population. This section will 
consider three moments in the history of ethnic violence between 1962 and 1994. The 
details of these ethnic massacres do not only demonstrate the escalating tension 
between the Hutu and Tutsi, but also the way in which numerous Hutus began to 
participate in violence and discrimination against the Tutsi. Their participation signals 
that ethnic ideology, under the influence of elite manipulation, was spreading within 
the Hutu population. One of the difficulties facing reconciliation efforts post-1994 is 
the fact that a significant portion of the Hutu population participated in the violence. 
Addressing this issue requires understanding the history and context of their 
willingness to use violence against their neighbours, fuelled by ethnic hatred. Prior to 
1994, there had been repeated events in Rwandan history where thousands of Tutsi 
were killed in violent ways. As ethnic ideology spread from the elites to the masses, 
more and more people began to participate in the ethnic massacres of Tutsi that 
occurred in different contexts and times, as will be described below: 
 
3.5.1 Ethnic Massacres: 1962-1964 
‘Ethnic massacres’ here refers to “the large-scale killing of civilians—men, women, 
and children who were targeted on the basis of their categorical identity, because they 
were Tutsi” (Straus, 2006b:184). The genocide that happened in 1994 was not “the 
first massacre of Tutsis at the hands of Hutu extremists. Indeed, the Republic of 
Rwanda was founded on systematic violence directed against the Tutsis as Hutu 
Power emerged in the late 1950s. This pattern of violence had its roots in colonial rule 
and the postcolonial process” (Brannigan & Jones, 2009:193). 
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Rwanda began to transition out of colonialism during the 1950’s. After World War II, 
Tutsi leaders, like many others in Africa, sought independence for their country. 
Fearful of losing control, Belgium responded to these demands by supporting a 
violent coup waged by a Hutu opposition group. Thus, in 1957, Tutsi domination 
came to an end. The pent-up anger of aggrieved Hutus, encouraged by the country’s 
new Hutu leadership, led to mob violence and tens of thousands of Tutsi deaths. 
Hundreds of thousands fled across the borders into Uganda, Burundi and Tanzania 
(Salem, 2000:11). The Hutu elite rejected the Tutsi movement of cultural nationalism 
as “Hamitization”. Later they went as far as calling the Tutsi “colonialists of the 
Ethiopian race” and inviting them to go home to “their fathers in Abyssinia” (Baur, 
1994:457). Consequently, the Hutu turned the “Hamitic theory” against the Tutsi, 
who were recast as “Hamitic invaders” and “colonialists” (Salzman, 1997:17-19). 
Hutu ethno-nationalism remained an important ideology in Rwanda and was used to 
assert that the Tutsi were not ‘true Rwandans.’ 
 
In the period between 1962 to 1964, massacres and killings of Tutsis took place under 
a discriminatory, genocidal regime led by the Hutu elite President Grégoire 
Kayibanda, a new ally of Belgium whom they transferred power to on the 1
st
of July 
1962. By the time of the proclamation of independence, it was estimated that 300,000 
to whom Tutsi had already been displaced, of which 120,000 were outside the 
country. The majority of these refugees were peasants who had left the country with 
the hope of returning soon. Abroad, the leaders of the exiled Rwandans organised a 
diplomatic offensive, especially at the United Nations headquarters. Some of the 
leaders of the exiled refugee groups launched a number of attacks against Rwanda. 
Between March 1961 and November 1966 there were a dozen significant strikes, 
generally aimed at officials along the borders. Reprisals followed targeting Tutsis in 
these areas (Kimonyo, 2001:31). 
 
As early as 1961, UNAR leaders (Tutsi) in exile began developing plans for armed 
opposition. They launched small scattered attacks in February and March 1962 in 
northern Rwanda, in Byumba. The March 1962 raids triggered an ethnic massacre. 
The violence began a day after the UNAR raid and lasted for two days.It claimed the 
lives of one to two thousand Tutsi civilians (Straus, 2006:184). On 21 December 1963 
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a band of Rwandan Tutsi exiles armed with bows, arrows, and home-made rifles 
invaded Rwanda from Burundi at Nemba. With local Tutsi joining their ranks, and 
reaching about 600 in number, they attacked a military camp at Gako; taking weapons 
and vehicles, they drove towards Kigali. Some miles from the capital, they were 
intercepted and at Kanzenze Bridge on the river Nyabarongo they were decimated by 
units of the Gendarme National Rwandaise, who were commanded by Belgian 
officers and armed with semi-automatic weapons and mortars. The invaders were 
overwhelmed by the superior fire-power (Melvern, 2000:17). 
 
Kayibanda immediately reacted to the invasion with the elimination of the internal 
opposition and the murder of the most prominent political opponents. The murders 
would mark the end of the role of Tutsi in public life. Three days later, an organized 
slaughter of Tutsi began. Kayibanda organized ‘self-defence’ groups. Kigali Radio 
repeatedly broadcast emergency warnings that the Tutsi were coming back to enslave 
the Hutu. The killings began on the 23
rd
 of December in Gikongoro, where the Prefect 
Laurent Bucyibaruta was said to have understood that the Tutsi must be killed before 
they killed the Hutu. Armed with spears and clubs, a group of Hutu started to kill 
every Tutsi in sight—men, women and children alike. This region had a high 
concentration of internally displaced Tutsi. Hutu militia killed between 5,000 and 
14,000 Tutsi while thousands more took refuge at local Catholic missions in Kaduha 
and Cyanika. There was also violence against Tutsi civilians in Bugesera, Kibungo 
and Cyangugu, though on a much smaller scale (Melvern, 2000:17; Carney, 
2011:361).  
 
The 1963 massacre can be understood as an ominous precursor of what was to come 
in 1994. Melvern (2000:17) notes the similarity when she explains that the people 
who died during the massacres were killed under the most atrocious and cruel 
circumstances by the local population, using whatever arms were available, mostly 
hoes and pangas, the long knife for cutting grass. The Hutu carried out the most 
hideous mutilations on their Tutsi neighbours. The element of planned annihilation 
links the killings in 1963 to the genocide in 1994. The planning and methods used, 
some thirty years apart, are eerily similar. 
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A Catholic missionary publication cited by Straus (2006b:188) describes how the 
violence in 1963 closely resembles the 1994 genocide as follows:  
 
The entire Hutu population, Christians and pagans, catechists and catechumens, 
attacked the unfortunate Tutsi, in bands of about a hundred people, led by Party 
“propagandists” and with the authorities’ blessing. This time, the objective was 
not loot, but to kill, to exterminate all who had the name “Tutsi.” …The 
massacre was horrifying: except for a few notables or Party propagandists who 
carried guns, the mass of killers only had large knives and indigenous billhooks. 
The families who did not want to leave their huts were barricaded inside and 
burned alive. Some had their necks or limbs slashed on the spot and were left to 
suffer for days…. They call it “to wage war: niintambara!” 
 
The British philosopher, Bertrand Russell (cited by Melvern, 2004:9) claims, “The 
1963 killing had been the most horrible and systematic extermination of the people 
since the Nazi extermination of the Jews. Most Europeans living in Rwanda were 
indifferent, considering the massacres to be the result of the ‘savagery of the negro’”. 
The massacre at Gikongoro serves as the first example of widespread participation in 
ethnic violence, although in a much more localized way than what happened in 1994. 
 
3.5.2 Ethnic massacre: 1973 
In January 1973, another outbreak of violence against Tutsi resurged in Rwanda. This 
violence coincided with the increasingly systematic popularization of ethnic ideology. 
At the same time the violence broke out, an extensive campaign within the 
educational system began to promote ethnic ideology. Beginning in 1973, the link 
between ethnic ideology and mass participation in violence became increasingly clear. 
 
After a failed coup against the Tutsi-led government of Burundi, which led to a 
massacre of Burundian Hutus, the Hutu President of Rwanda, Grégoire Kayibanda, 
used these tragic events to conduct a further crackdown against the Tutsi in Rwanda. 
Pointing to the violence against Hutus in Burundi, he started a campaign to “purify” 
Rwanda of the supposedly “foreign” influence of Tutsis (Melvern, 2004:9). The 
revolution and the republic were depicted as a victory for the Hutu majority over their 
feudal oppressors, the Tutsi. In terms of this propaganda, ethnic antagonism was 
logical and necessary. 
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A movement was organised at the level of secondary schools and by university 
students, aimed at reducing or totally eliminating the presence of Tutsi in schools and 
the private sector. Tutsi were reproached for having historically monopolised these 
two areas. The private sector had been an economic refuge for Tutsi faced with 
exclusion from public services by the quota system. Lists of Tutsi were posted at 
workplace entrances forbidding them to report to work. The movement that began in 
the towns spread to the countryside within a month. In some areas the 1959 scenario 
was repeated with the burning of huts and Tutsi being hunted down and killed. 
Settling of old scores ensued as people took the law into their own hands. Assailants 
attacked not only the Tutsi but also the rich Hutu. Estimates of the death toll varied 
from 500 to 1000.  
 
In addition to the killings of Tutsi, 190 students were forced out of the National 
University of Rwanda (UNR) on the evening of February 15-16, 1973. After students 
divided along ethnic lines at Nyundo’s St. Pius X minor seminary on February 25, 
twelve major seminarians and an equal number of Tutsi professors fled the seminary 
for the Congolese border. Meanwhile, the violence spread to banks, commercial 
centres, and other Rwandan civil institutions seen as havens of Tutsi influence 
(Carney, 2011:382). 
 
In charge of the nationwide anti-Tutsi campaign was the army chief, Major Juvénal 
Habyarimana, a northern Hutu. For years, northern Hutu had been complaining that 
the southern-led government was not doing enough to subject the Tutsi. Melvern 
(2000:22) observes, “It was Habyarimana who, in July 1973, ousted Kayibanda in a 
coup and declared himself president. Twenty-one years later Habayarimana would be 
ousted too, and in more dramatic circumstances”.  
 
3.5.3 Ethnic massacres: 1990-1994 
With an entire generation of Rwandans now schooled in ethnic ideology, it is no 
surprise that between 1990 and 1994, ethnic killings became more wide spread. The 
planning behind these served as a preview to the systematic methods of extermination 
used in 1994. The violence of this era virtually mirrored the 1994 genocide, although 
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it involved somewhat less participation of the Hutu population compared to the events 
of 1994.  
 
On 1 October 1990, an army of Tutsi refugees, the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), 
invaded from across the Ugandan border. For Melvern, (2000:13), the RPF requested: 
“An end to the ethnic divide and the system of compulsory identity cards, a self-
sustaining economy, a stop to the misuse of public offices, the establishment of social 
services, democratisation of the security force, and the elimination of a system that 
generated refugees”. In response to the RPF attack, President Juvénal Habyarimana 
planned to use the “invasion” as a way to carry Hutu favour and support for his 
fledgling regime against the Tutsis. The army acted with extreme brutality. Some 
Tutsi were tortured to death and others that were brought to the camp died of 
starvation (Melvern, 2000:14). 
 
On 5 October, the following day, Habayrimana blamed the RPF for the shooting, 
claiming that the rebels had infiltrated the capital. The RPF and their “accomplices” 
posed a risk, the president said. Mass arrests followed. Between 6,000 and 13,000 
civilians were arrested; most of them were Tutsi, but the group also included Hutu 
opponents of the regime (Des Forges, 1999:49). Ten days after the invasion, meetings 
of local officials were called. They mobilised Hutu people to kill the “inyenzi” 
(cockroaches), referring to the Tutsi, and to burn their houses, because the Tutsi were 
coming to exterminate the Hutu. At least 348 people were killed in forty-eight hours 
and 550 houses were burned (Melvern, 2000:15). 
 
On the night of 22 January 1991, RPF guerrillas attacked Rwanda’s most notorious 
prison in the northern prefecture of Ruhengeri. The RPF held Ruhengeri for a day and 
then withdrew before reinforcements arrived. The regime reacted brutally. An 
organised campaign to kill the Bagogwe—pastoralists said to be of Tutsi descent, 
followed in the wake of the attack. In one commune, buses were sent to collect the 
victims, in another case, a lorry. The Bagogwe were killed with spears, batons and 
even guns, and their houses were looted and destroyed. In Kinigi the order went out to 
“cut them to pieces”. In some cases, the killings were carried out to eradicate 
“enemies”. In the prefecture of Gisenyi, Bagogwe people disappeared into several 
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army camps and were never seen again. A genocide of the Bagogwe (Tutsi) 
happened, as some people were calling it. The victims were killed for belonging to 
one particular ethnic group, and the intention had been to destroy them as a group 
(Melvern, 2000:16, 18).  
 
In November 1991, Tutsi were killed in the commune Murambi. The organised killing 
of Tutsi became more evident in March 1992 in Bugesera where there was a higher 
percentage of Tutsi than anywhere else. An estimated 300 people died in Bugesera. 
People were thrown in the rivers or were burned in their homes. The killing in 
Bugesera bore all the hallmarks of the genocide to come. It lasted from the 4
th
until the 
9
th
 of March. After Bugesera, similar incidents occurred in the Kigali prefecture, as 
well as Kibuye, Cyangugu and Gisenyi. The government explained the killings in 
Bugesera as self-defence (Melvern, 2000:45-46).  
 
On 22 November 1992, a ferocious anti-Tutsi campaign was launched. Melvern 
(2000) recalls the racist speech of Leon Mugesera, the vice-president of the MNRD in 
the northern stronghold of Gisenyi and a political science professor, who addressed a 
party of militants in a rabble-rousing, sensitizing the murder of Tutsi: 
 
…what about those accomplices here who are sending their children to the 
RPF… we have to take responsibility in our own hands… the fatal mistake we 
made in 1959 was to let them [the Tutsi] get out…they belong in Ethiopia and 
we are going to find them a shortcut to get there by throwing them into 
Nyabarongo river. We have to act. Wipe them all out (cited in Melvern, 
2000:47). 
 
Straus is right when he points out that the 1994 genocide was “by far the most 
intensive episode of violence in Rwanda’s recent history, but it is not the first” 
(Straus, 2006:175). For him, “Violence broke out in 1959, in the early 1960s, in 1973, 
and at several points in the early 1990s. In each case, the violence had a similar 
character to the 1994 genocide. In each case, civilians almost always Tutsi civilians 
were attacked and on some occasions, massacred” (Straus, 2006:175). Though, again, 
the episodes were considerably less intense than the 1994 genocide. What does this 
imply? My viewpoint is that all these enumerated massacres were actually untold acts 
of genocide against the Tutsi. In their own ways, these smaller genocides against the 
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Tutsi were manifestations of the spread and influence of ethnic ideologies. In fact, the 
ethnic ideology in Rwanda is rooted in the colonial era. It was enforced and spread 
during the First and Second Republic regime lead by Hutu ideologue President 
Grégoire Kayibanda and President Juvénal Habyirimana. This ideology,according to 
Mafeza (2013:2): 
 
Has been characterized to encourage discrimination against Tutsi, leading to 
their exclusion them from key power spheres. The stronghold of discrimination 
against Tutsi was present in all key sectors of national life, such as the army, 
education and administration. Under these regimes, ethnic ideology was 
essentially anti-Tutsi. Hutu were considered to be the only Rwandan people. 
This ideology was taught in all social spheres (families, schools, surrounding, 
work places, political parties, and mass media) and resulted in the polarization of 
Hutu against Tutsi. 
 
3.6 Stages of Genocide 
 
What follows is a shift in focus from the historical context of Rwanda to a more 
careful description of the mechanisms of the 1994 genocide itself. As we shall see, the 
plans and procedures for carrying out the extermination of the Tutsi all made use of 
the existing ethnic ideology in Rwanda. Gregory H. Stanton (2004), in his article 
titled, ‘Could the Rwandan genocide have been prevented? identifies eight stages of 
genocide, with each stage having distinctive warning signs. He argues that at each 
stage there are specific strategies to prevent and stop the genocidal process. The hope 
is that a better understanding of the genocidal process will help policy-makers prevent 
future genocides. According to Stanton, each of the eight stages manifested in 
Rwanda. In this section, these eight stages will be briefly summarized, highlighting 
that in the case of Rwanda, each of these stages were constructed on top of the current 
ethnic ideology. The aim here is to demonstrate the connection between ethnic 
ideology and the mechanisms of genocide before considering in greater detail the 
events leading up to April 1994. 
 
Stanton’s first stage of genocide is classification. At this stage, social groups are 
classified into “us versus them”. They are sometimes categorized in cultural, racial, 
ethnic or religious groups. As this dissertation argues, in pre-colonial Rwanda the 
concepts ‘Hutu’ and ‘Tutsi’ referred to a social class that varied over time. However, 
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during the colonial period, the differences between the Hutu and Tutsi were 
interpreted in racial terms by the European colonizers. The racist ideology based on 
the Hamitic theory of the colonial era attributed superiority to the Tutsi over the 
inferior Hutu race. Tutsi were privileged in education, the church, the economy, and 
government services. Colonial rulers thus exacerbated these divisions of 
classification. In the post-colonial period, the Hutu regimes adopted these same 
theories, in order to portray Tutsis as foreign invaders who had dispossessed Hutus of 
their rightful control of Rwanda (Stanton, 2004:213). This categorization of Hutu and 
Tutsi is considered to be the first stage in a genocidal process because it classified 
them into ethnic groups. 
 
The second stage, according to Stanton, is symbolisation.At this stage, the 
classifications are symbolised. Groups are given names and other symbols, and are 
required to wear them either by cultural tradition or laws. In Rwanda, the Belgian 
colonial government began to issue identity cards (IDs) around 1926 and required 
them in the 1933 census. The identity cards included each individual’s group 
identity—Tutsi, Hutu, or Twa, thereby refining the group identity for each person, 
and making changes from one group to another much more difficult. During the 
genocide, ID cards became facilitators of killing, because they permitted the killers to 
quickly determine who was Tutsi. 
 
Dehumanisation is the third stage of genocide; this is where the death spiral of 
genocide begins. The victim group is dehumanised. It is called the names of animals 
or likened to a disease: vermin or rats, cancer or plague, or in Rwanda, “inyenzi”—
cockroaches. The reason this stage is necessary is that it gives ideological justification 
to the “genocidaires,” who claim they are purifying the society. It overcomes the 
normal human revulsion against murder. If the other group is not human, then killing 
them is not murder. In Rwanda, the dehumanisation of Tutsis was already a feature of 
genocidal massacres that took place in 1959, 1962, and 1972. Cartoons and articles in 
Kangura referred to Tutsis as cockroaches and snakes, and regularly expounded the 
myth that they had invaded from Ethiopia. Tutsis were “devils” who ate the vital 
organs of Hutus. In the Rwandan context, Huyse (2003:71) accurately asserts that the 
use of such dehumanizing language is a well-known technique that can turn ordinary 
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citizens into violators of human rights. In connection to Boraine’s (2000) argument, 
Huyse (2003:71) clearly affirms that “[t]he moment one designates a person as sub-
human, one can act against them as an object with very little feeling. After all, if they 
are not quite human, then they don’t feel as we do, they don’t hurt as we do, and in a 
sense they don’t bleed as we do”. 
 
Indeed, the first three stages clearly indicate how ethnic ideology was introduced and 
spread, preparing the way for the 1994 genocide. Symbols and language, which 
dehumanised the Tutsi, were powerful resources that resulted in the hatred and 
killings described in stage 4, 5 and 6. 
 
As we shall see in the next section (3.7), there could be no genocide without a plan. 
This view brings us to the next stage referred as organisation. All genocides are 
organised and prepared by individuals. At this stage, hate groups are organised, 
militias are trained and armed, and the armed forces are purged of members of the 
intended victim group as well as officers and others who might oppose genocide. 
Propaganda institutions, such as newspapers and radio stations, are also strengthened. 
However, it was the organisation of extremist militias that marked the turn toward 
genocide. In Rwanda, as we shall see, every means were put in place to prepare for 
the ‘final solution’ to kill every Tutsi.  
 
Stanton lists polarisation as the fifth stage of genocide. At this stage, hate propaganda 
emphasises the “us versus them” nature of the situation. There is no middle ground. 
Moderates who attempt to negotiate peace are denounced as traitors and even targeted 
or assassinated. Rwandan moderates had formed several opposition parties and had 
won seats in the National Assembly. On April 6, 1992, Agathe Uwilingiyimana, a 
moderate Hutu, was named Minister of Education. When she proposed ending the 
quota system that restricted Tutsi access to higher education, she was attacked in her 
home by twenty armed men. In November 1993, after she had been named Prime 
Minister in the government formed after the signing of the Arusha Accords, Radio 
(Radio Télévision Libre des Mille Colline ‘RTLM’) publicly called for her 
assassination. She was one of the first officials to be murdered after the genocide 
commenced on April 7, 1994.  
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During the preparation stage, plans are made for the genocide. Death lists are 
compiled. Trial massacres are conducted, both as training for the genocidaires, and to 
test whether there will be any response such as arrests, international denunciations, or 
sanctions. If the murderers get away with their crimes, if there is impunity, it is a 
green light to finish the genocide. The trial massacres began in Rwanda soon after the 
RPF invaded in 1990 (Stanton, 2004:215). 
 
The seventh stage is extermination. At this stage, the killing that is legally defined as 
genocide begins. Those who do it often enough, think they are “purifying” their 
society by “exterminating” those who are less than human and are a threat to them 
(Stanton, 2004:217). The fact that the mass murders began within hours after the 
crash of President Habyaramana’s French plane20 on April 6, 1994 reveals how the 
organizers of the genocide were prepared for the extermination of the Tutsi groups. 
 
The last stage is denial. During and after genocide, the perpetrators deny that they 
committed any crimes. They portray their murders as justified killings during war or 
repression of terrorism. They dig up and dispose of the bodies and try to minimise the 
number of victims. They try to blame the victims, often claiming that the victims’ 
own behaviour brought on the killing. They portray the murders as spontaneous 
outbreaks in response to the victims’ depredations, or as the actions of rogue army 
commanders, rather than as an intentional government policy. They challenge the 
veracity of eye-witnesses and assassinate the character of their accusers. The 
perpetrators claim to have been powerless to prevent the killings by others, and even 
have the audacity to claim they assisted their victims. All of these strategies of denial 
operated during and after the Rwandan genocide (Stanton, 2004). More important, 
however, is the way ethnic ideology persists among some people, even twenty-two 
years after the genocide (see section 5.4). Deniers even include scholars with ties to 
the genocidal regime, politicians, activists with malicious intent, and perpetrators 
themselves. They continue to deny the genocide perpetrated against the Tutsi by 
                                                          
20
On 6 April 1994, a regional summit of heads of states had been summoned in Dar es Salaam during 
which it appears President Habyarimana finally yielded to the implementation of the Arusha Peace 
Agreement (also referred to as the Arusha Accords) with the RPF. On his way back to Kigali, the 
presidential plane was hit by two missiles near Kigali airport. No final proof has yet been produced to 
identify the perpetrators of the crime.   
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claiming that the killings took place in self-defence and under the conditions of civil 
war. 
 
The act of denying that the violence of 1994 constituted genocide requires us to take a 
closer look at the specific plans for genocide put into place immediately prior to the 
start of the violence. These mechanisms for mass killing not only point out the 
obvious genocidal intent of the extremist Hutu government but also reveal how these 
planners made use of the categories of ethnic ideology to encourage mass 
participation in the violence. The next section will consider the immediate 
mechanisms put in place to make the overwhelming ethnic violence of 1994 possible. 
 
3.7 Preparation and propaganda of the 1994 genocide against the Tutsi 
 
Much has been said about the development of the ethnic ideology that led to the 1994 
genocide during the colonial and post-colonial period. In this section of the study the 
planning and preparation for genocide in the years before 1994 will be described. This 
planning capitalized on the existing ideology of ethnic hatred that dated back to the 
colonial era. It was this ideology that created the conditions for many people to 
participate in genocide. The propaganda, organization of militias, and arranging of 
death lists was all orchestrated in a way that emphasized the artificial ethnic hatred 
between Hutu and Tutsi.  
 
Scholars do not agree on the exact time the “final solution” to kill every Tutsi in 
Rwanda was introduced. For example, Prunier (1999:169) dates it at 1992, when 
Habyarimana began negotiating with the RPF. Melvern, on the other hand, connects it 
to the invasion of the RPF in 1990. By all accounts, the idea that the genocide of the 
Tutsi would solve all of Rwanda’s problems was being discussed at a series of secret 
meetings towards the end of 1990 just after the RPF invasion (Melvern, 2004:19). 
Already by the spring of 1992, the Belgian ambassador in Kigali had warned his 
government that the Akazu (Habyarimana circle) was planning the extermination of 
the Tutsi (Melvern, 2000:43; Buit, 2011:62). 
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Furthermore, Pottier (2002:30-31) argues, “Preparation for genocide had started some 
two years before the actual slaughter when every nyumba kumi (every ten houses)—
every cell, the smallest administrative unit—received a gun from the national army. 
The availability of about 150,000 guns meant that the state authorities could mobilise 
every prefecture, commune, sector and nyumba kumi in a matter of hours”.  
 
Another factor showing the preparation of the genocide was the recruitment and 
mobilization of militias who would be trained in order to put genocide into practice. It 
was clear to the planners that they would require many more people than just police 
and army personnel. The idea of mass mobilisation was not new—there had been 
“self-defence” groups organized as early as the 1963 genocide—but in 1994, the 
mobilisation was larger and more systematic than ever before. The national army, the 
Forces Armees Rwandaise (FAR), trained death squads whose recruits came mainly 
from among the landless and unemployed youth. These deadly militias were known as 
interahamwe. The interahamwe, “those who attack together,” and the 
impuzamugambi, “those with a single purpose,” were trained to kill 1,000 human 
beings every twenty minutes. Local administrators organised the disposal of bodies in 
garbage trucks (Melvern, 2004:5). Training camps were set-up to indoctrinate men 
with hatred against the Tutsi minority and equip them for mass murder. Provisional 
lists of massacre sites were distributed. There were more than six sites in the towns of 
Gitarama and Cyangugu. At Nyundo, three septic tanks had been used to try to get rid 
of 300 people. Throughout the country, tools for killing were bought and distributed. 
These tools include half a million machetes, hundreds and thousands of hoes, axes, 
hammers, and razor blades. The purchase of weapons by the regime began two years 
prior to the genocide (Melvern, 2000:227). 
 
Carroll (2000:170) relays the words of a Special Rapporteur to the United Nations 
Commission on Human Rights and an independent Commission of Experts who, in 
1994, concluded that the mass atrocities were “concerted, planned, and systematic” 
for a number of reasons. First, using radio broadcasts, the government orchestrated a 
campaign of incitement to ethnic hatred and violence. Second, the government 
distributed arms to the militias and civilian population. Third, lists of names of people 
to be executed were discovered. Finally, the speed with which the systematic 
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massacres were carried out after the April 1994 plane crash supported the conclusion 
that the government had been planning these acts of violence prior to April 1994.  
 
Although the interahamwe was attractive to jobless young men looking for an 
affiliation that promised identity and power, it is necessary to be reminded that 
disenfranchisement alone cannot explain the participation of young militias in such 
senseless killings. Instead, it was the widespread ethnic ideology that spread among 
the young men that persuaded them the Tutsi were enemies to be eliminated. The 
militias used symbols of wealth and power to attract the youth and initiate them into 
the practices of terror. Gourevitch (1998:93) vividly captures the development of the 
militia as follows:   
 
Hutu Power youth leaders, jetting around on motorbikes and sporting pop 
hairstyles, dark glasses, and flamboyantly colored pajama suits and robes, 
preached ethnic solidarity and civil defense to increasingly packed rallies, where 
alcohol usually flowed freely, giant banners splashed with hagiographic portraits 
of Habyarimana flapped in the breeze, and paramilitary drills were conducted 
like the latest hot dance moves.  The President and his wife often turned out to 
be cheered at these spectacles, while in private the members of the interahamwe 
were organised into small neighborhood bands, drew up lists of Tutsis, and went 
on retreats to practice burning houses, tossing grenades, and hacking dummies 
up with machetes. 
 
Stephen Smith, a writer for the French paper Liberation, reported how the 
Habyarimana regime had hardened its stance in the early 1990s before developing its 
‘tropical Nazism’.  The theoretic of Hutu Power ideologues adopted the vocabulary of 
German Nazism. Smith (1994) wrote: 
 
Where Nazis spoke of ‘vermin’, the anti-Hamitic ideologues call the RPF 
fighters inyenzi-‘cockroaches’.  Radio Mille Collines propagates in 
Kinyarwanda, the collective murder of Tutsi are made with greater and greater 
urgency. ‘Come on, get out, I need to warm myself!’ urges the sibylline voice of 
the broadcaster. Then, following news of some local assaults and killings, the 
incitation to violence becomes more explicit and general: ‘The tomb is only half 
full. Who will help us fill it?’ We thus move on to the project of extermination 
(cited by Pottier, 2002:32).  
 
This dehumanised language broadcasts on radio emphasised how ethnic ideology was 
used as resource to organize and prepare the 1994 genocide.  
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The use of propaganda was a key resource in the government’s plot and also reveals 
its close ties and immediate connection with the spread of the ethnic ideology that led 
to the genocide. The earlier forms of media propaganda were in 1990 through a 
newspaper such as Kangura (a local newspaper; it literally means “wake it up”). The 
editor of this newspaper was Hassan Ngeze, who was from Gisenyi, the same region 
where president Habyarimana was from (Waheed, 2011:3). Kangura disseminated 
hate-propaganda about Tutsi who ‘owned a disproportionate amount of wealth,’ and 
its editorials promised ‘the defence of the majority of the people’. In December 1990, 
Kangura published the famous “Hutu Ten Commandments,” which were instructions 
to mistreat and discriminate against Tutsi. Copies of Kangura were read aloud at 
public meetings (Melvern, 2000:70-72). 
 
The Hutu Ten Commandments provided an outlet for Hutu rage, which advocated the 
killing of Tutsis. Ndahiro (2014:5) indicates that the last three ‘Commandments’ are 
particularly significant. The eighth Commandment said that the “Bahutu should stop 
having mercy on the Batutsi,” while the ninth read: “The Bahutu, wherever they are, 
must have unity, solidarity and be preoccupied by the fate of their Hutu brothers; the 
Hutu, both inside and outside Rwanda, must constantly look for friends and allies for 
the Hutu cause, starting with our Bantu brothers; they must constantly counteract the 
Tutsi propaganda. The Hutu must be firm and vigilant against their common enemy 
who are the Batutsi”. Ndahiro (2014:5-6) explains that the tenth Commandment went 
back to the roots: “The 1959 social revolution, the 1961 referendum and the Hutu 
ideology must be taught to every Hutu and at all levels. Every Hutu must spread 
widely this ideology. We shall consider a traitor any Hutu who will persecute his 
Hutu brother for having read, spread and taught this ideology”. 
 
In addition to the Kangura newspaper, a new radio station called RTLM began 
broadcasting in Rwanda. It started one month before the signing ceremony for the 
Arusha
21
 Accords on 8July 1993. The purpose of this new radio station was to:  
                                                          
21
The Arusha Accords installed a United Nations Peacekeeping force and the core of the agreement 
was a compromise which would involve five cabinet seats, eleven transitional national assembly seats, 
forty percent of the army, and fifty percent of officer corps consisting of RPF members (Lemarchand, 
1995; Waheed, 2011). The demonization of the RPF was a crucial tool in undermining the Arusha 
Peace Accords, as growing ethnic hatred would eliminate any basis for cooperation (Newsbury, 1995). 
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…prepare the people of Rwanda for genocide. A propaganda weapon unlike any 
other, its campaign was to demonise the Tutsi, and to circumvent key clauses in 
the Arusha Accords that barred both sides from incitement to violence and hate. 
The pro-Hutu message of RTLM was anti-Arusha and anti-Tutsi. RTLM would 
eventually broadcast the names of certain government opponents, individuals 
who ‘deserved to die’. Its announcers told the people that all supporters of the 
Tutsi RPF were traitors, the Tutsi were lazy foreign invaders who refused to 
work the land (Melvern, 2000:71-72). 
 
To this, Wallis (2006:6) adds: “Hutu hate radio RTLM warned listeners that 
Rwanda’s troubles had begun by letting children and pregnant women survive the 
anti-Tutsi pogroms of the early 1960s”. Thus, during the 1994, the laughing DJs 
demanded that no Tutsi should be allowed to survive. Wallis (2006:133), therefore, 
affirms that, “RTLM was more responsible than anything else for fixing in the minds 
of ordinary Rwandans, the need to take an active role in the genocide for the ‘good’ of 
the nation”. 
 
Waheed (2011:3) refers to RTLM as the most crucial propaganda tool of the 
government, able to reach even rural areas of the country. He further argues that 
before, during, and soon after the genocide, RTLM played a significant role by 
creating and spreading the ethnic ideology that fuelled the killings. For example, in 
1994, it claimed that the RPF’s ideology was “ethnic purification” and mentioned 
names of Tutsi and moderate Hutu who were to be killed.  
 
In reference to Des Forges, Kroslak (2007) argues that the hate propaganda dispersed 
through the RTLM and other radio stations in Rwanda, provoked fear and incited, 
even commended, its listeners to kill. Detailed instructions were given to the 
population as follows: 
 
I would ask that each neighbourhood try to organise itself to do communal work 
(umuganda) to clear the bush, to search houses, beginning with those that are 
abandoned, to search the marches of the area to be sure that no inyenzi 
(cockroaches)have slipped in to hide themselves there (cited by Kroslak, 
2007:49). 
 
On 20 June 1994, a Rwandan radio announcer, Kantano Habimana (RTLM), called 
upon his listeners to join him in singing a song, praising genocide by saying:  
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Friends, let us rejoice…All Inkotanyi have perished…Friends, let us rejoice-God 
is fair.”  On 2 July, the same announcer was not only praising genocide, but also 
using God’s name to justify it.  “Let us rejoice: the ‘Inkotanyi’ have been 
exterminated!  Oh dear friends, let us rejoice, God is equitable… The God Lord 
is really equitable.  These evildoers, these terrorists, these people with suicidal 
tendencies will end up being exterminated… In any case, let us stand firm and 
exterminate them, so that our children and grandchildren do not hear the word 
‘Inkotanyi’ ever again (Ndahiro, 2014:11-12).  
 
These ideas portrayed how the propagandists of ethnic ideology could use religious 
messages to condone their action of killing. With this idea in mind, their participation 
in the killingswas justified.  
 
Throughout the genocide the announcers of RTLM spread hate messages of ethnic 
ideology:  
 
The inherent differences between Hutu and Tutsi, the numerical superiority of 
the Hutu —the rubanda nyamwinshi, the majority people, —the cleverness of 
the Tutsi infiltration, their cruelty, their cohesiveness, their intention to restore 
past repression, the risk they posed to the gains of the 1959 revolution, and, 
above all, their plan to exterminate the Hutu. Such messages concluded with 
calls to action, like the following by Kantano Habimana: “Fight them with the 
weapons that you have at hand, you have arrows, you have spears...go after those 
inkotanyi, blood flows in their veins as it does in yours”...One RTLM announcer 
promised that a “shining day” would dawn when there would be not a single 
Inyenzi left in the country and the word could be forgotten (Des Forges, 
1999:364-5). 
 
The RTLM rebuked those who failed to participate enthusiastically in the hunt by 
saying: “All who try to protect themselves by sympathizing with both sides, they are 
traitors. It is they who tell a lot to the Inyenzi-Inkotanyi. It is they whom we call 
accomplices (ibyitso). They will pay for what they have done” (Des Forges, 
1999:366). 
 
At the same time, the RTLM announcers warned, “Those who refused to search could 
expect sanctions and they cautioned that those who deserted the barriers could expect 
severe punishment, just as did soldiers who deserted the battlefront” (Des Forges, 
1999:366). 
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Indeed, the media created the hatred and fear that was needed to spread the ethnic 
ideology and carry out the genocide against the Tutsi. Gallimore (2008:249) observes, 
“The Rwandan genocide stands alone for the way its organizers aimed to mobilize 
mass participation in murder. The planners of genocide advertised their goal of 
exterminating the Tutsi citizens of Rwanda in song and chant, through the press and 
over the radio”. They mobilized and exhorted the Hutu to join the killing campaign, 
insisting that it “concerned everyone”. In reality, the media propaganda is considered 
to be “the cause” of the 1994 genocide. By means of “fear mongering and hate 
propaganda, RTLM and Kangura paved the way for genocide in Rwanda, whipping 
the Hutu population into a killing frenzy” (Gallimore, 2008:249).  
 
3.8 The 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi 
 
The idea or ideology of genocide begins with the process of identification and 
stigmatization of the ‘other,’ that is, labelling the ‘other’ and eventually separating the 
‘other’ from the rest of ‘us’. The cumulative process of segregating the ‘other’ is 
initiated by the political leadership and disseminated through various means. The 
‘other’ is presented by ‘us’ as dangerous, unreliable, and like a dangerous virus, must 
be destroyed (Odora, 2007:4).Mafeza (2013:1) describes the genocide perpetrated 
against the Tutsi as resulting “from an ethnic ideology and hatred, whereby Rwandans 
were posited to be different from one another”. More specifically, the Tutsi 
population was segregated, stigmatized and perceived as an enemy of the Rwandan 
Hutu political regime. In this section, the events of the genocide itself will be 
considered in more detail as well as the way in which the killings manifested ethnic 
ideology as its motivating principle. 
 
Prunier (1995:238) maintains that in Rwanda, the word ‘genocide’ is used “not only 
because of the magnitude of the killings, but because of their organised and selective 
nature and because there was an attempt to carry them to the point where populations 
would be completely annihilated”. A few hours after the plane of President 
Habyaramana was brought down, the Presidential Guard set up roadblocks. Carrying 
nominative lists, they began executing the leaders of the opposition parties at their 
residences. Following this series of massacres, a transitional civil government was 
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formed on 9 April 1994 composed of MRND members and leaders of the factions. 
The government organised, supported and actively encouraged the implementation of 
genocide. The first days were devoted to killing intellectuals, human rights activists, 
journalists, as well as prominent members of the Tutsi community. Once the selective 
phase was completed, Tutsi all over the country were targeted and systematically 
massacred under the supervision of the government forces. Between April and the 
beginning of July 1994—less than a hundred days—an estimated one million Tutsi 
were massacred (Kimonyo, 2001:38-39). 
 
Ethnic ideology was so embedded in people’s minds that murder quickly became 
commonplace. Wallis (2006:6) vividly explains: 
 
The killings became a daily ritual throughout the country. Hundreds of 
thousands either took part or quietly looked on as their neighbours were 
murdered. For the ‘workers’ it became as typical as getting in the harvest, using 
the same equipment-machetes, hoes and axes, but this time cutting down limbs 
and lives instead of sorghum, banana and mango.  For some interahamwe, there 
was great joy to be had in literally cutting proud Tutsis down in size; tall Tutsi 
women sometimes had their legs hacked off before being left to die as a way of 
‘teaching them a lesson’ for their alleged superior size and manner. Yet, despite 
the numbers involved, the killing in each commune was systematic, precise and 
structured. Transport was laid on for the murderers to travel swiftly to their place 
of ‘work’, and they were rewarded with food and endless drink. Husbands killed 
their Tutsi wives and in-laws.  
 
At an individual level, the evolution of violence is well illustrated in a case discussed 
by Zarembo (1997). He interviewed a farmer named Innocent Nsengiyumva 
imprisoned for killing two children. His story demonstrates how murder can simply 
become part of a day’s work: 
 
Killing was a job. The local Hutu official had a list of victims, and each morning 
the peasants gathered with their weapons—machetes for most, a homemade 
wooden club spiked with nails for Innocent. For the first week he only watched, 
he says, ‘like a child watching something his father is doing’. The killers drank 
at the bars they passed, went home for lunch, and resumed in the afternoons.  
His turn came when the crowd spotted the two children. They didn’t try to 
escape, he says, and didn’t scream until he sunk the nails into the side of one of 
their heads (Zarembo, 1997:70). 
 
Like so many perpetrators before him, Innocent claimed that he was following the 
dictates of the government. Local officials told him that he was fighting for his 
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country, and he believed them. After Zarembo asked what might have happened had 
Innocent refused to kill, Innocent replied: “Nobody refused” (Zarembo, 1997:70). 
Consequently, the people of Rwanda lost their humanity. Mamdani (2001:6) outlines 
the different ways in which the killings took place. He claims that about forty-eight 
methods of torture were used countrywide. These ranged from burying people alive in 
graves they had dug themselves, to cutting and opening the wombs of pregnant 
mothers. People were quartered, impaled and/or roasted to death. On many occasions, 
death was the consequence of the ablation of an organ, such as the heart, from people 
who were still alive. In some cases, victims had to pay astronomical amounts to their 
killers for a quick death. 
 
Kubai (2007a:54) provides a new perspective on the genocide. She argues, “The 
genocide that shocked the world and left the country so deeply traumatised has been 
described as unique because it was not just Hutu killing Tutsi, but husbands killing 
their wives, uncles killing their nephews, and mothers killing their children”. Kaggwa 
(2003:1) graphically describes it as follows: “The fighting was hand to hand, intimate 
and unspeakable, a kind of blood lust that left those who managed to escape hollow 
eyed and mute”. People who knew one another well carried it out: neighbours killed 
their neighbours and teachers killed their students, while colleagues killed their 
colleagues at places of work, including hospitals and church premises. 
 
Melvern (2004) further describes how difficult it is to understand the genocide. She 
recalls Tito Rutamara’s experience—one of the first on the scene to investigate in 
detail what had happened. He documented fifty-six common ways in which the militia 
killed people using machetes, screwdrivers, clubs with nails and other implements 
including hammers. Rutaremara thought that the more he studied the genocide, the 
more he might understand it. In the end, he decided that it was beyond his 
understanding. He said, “There was one woman who pulled out another’s uterus”. The 
aggressor was a thirty-five-year old from Murambi, and when Rutaremara went to the 
prison to see what she looked like, she appeared to be quite ‘normal’ to him: 
“‘Rwanda destroyed its humanity,’ he said. Our generation is lost. The people are 
going to have to slowly come to realise they must not kill” (Rutaremara, cited in 
Melvern, 2004:251). 
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According to Kroslak (2007:45), “The Rwandan genocide has often been classified as 
a third clear case of genocide in the 20
th
 century. Although it possessed certain 
comparable traits with the Holocaust or the Armenian genocide, it remains, of course, 
a unique atrocity”. One million victims were slaughtered within three months. 
Kroslak (2007:45) quotes Prunier (1995) who declared, “this is a speed of killing not 
even achieved by the Nazis: ‘the daily killing rate was at least five times that of the 
Nazi death camps’”. But the reality is, the genocide was not a spontaneous outburst of 
ancient hatred. This brings the discussion to the following section, which argues that 
the spread of ethnic ideology became popular and lead to mass participation in the 
genocide.  
 
3.9 Mass participation in the Rwandan genocide 
 
The genocide, as Mamdani (2001:7) puts it, was the result of both planning and 
participation. Mamdani (2001:6) further argues, “The Rwandan genocide was not just 
a small group that killed and moved, because the genocide was so extensive, there 
were killers in every locality— from ministers to peasant— for it to happen in so 
short time on such a large scale”. Adding to this, Odora (2007:13) notes, “The level at 
which the individual perpetrators participate is significant to the extent that crimes of 
genocide never develop from the ‘bottom up’ but are always ‘top down’ affairs. On 
the other hand, without the “bottom” the plans of genocide articulated by those at the 
‘top’ cannot be implemented”. 
 
The genocide was planned by a small elite, but the level of participation was 
extremely high. Genocide, as Gourevitch (1998:95) ironically observes, is after all an 
act of community building. According to Mamdani (2001:7), the 1994 genocide poses 
a set of deeply troubling questions, for instance: “Why did hundreds of thousands, 
those who had never before killed, take part in mass slaughter? Why did such a 
disproportionate number of the educated— not just members of the political elite but, 
civic leaders such as doctors, nurses, judges, human rights activists, and so on- play a 
leading role in the genocide?” This study argues that the mass participation was due 
to the dissemination and indoctrination of ethnic ideology in schools, which spread 
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throughout Rwanda. The ethnic ideology propagated during the colonial period 
became a widely held truth.  
 
In his article, ‘Ethnic Norms and Interethnic Violence: Accounting for Mass 
Participation in the Rwandan Genocide,’ Bhavnani (2006) outlines a number of 
reasons for the mass participation in the 1994 genocide. Bhavnani connects his idea of 
mass participation to Straus’ (2004) theory about mass participation, delineating the 
following seven categories: (1) abnormality, deviancy, and dispositional theories; (2) 
frustration aggression and deprivation theories; (3) intercommunal enmity and 
identity theories; (4) collective behavioural theories; (5) ordinary evil, social 
influence, and obedience theories; (6) security fears and dilemmas; and (7) theories of 
material opportunism. With regards to mass participation, Straus (2004a) suggests 
that the motivation to participate is likely to have been heterogeneous, and that 
several theories are probably right (cited in Bhavnani, 2006:653). What is of 
significance here is that some of the above theories are applicable to the Rwandan 
context. Several explanations relate to mass participation in Rwanda are given: 
 
First, the deeply ingrained ethnic identity, which divided Hutu and Tutsi, has been one 
common explanation for mass participation in the genocide.  
 
Second, one variant of the identity-based explanation emphasises the particularity of 
the Rwandan culture, arguing that a culture of conformity and unquestioning 
obedience to authority existed amongst the Hutu, facilitating mass participation in the 
genocide (Bhavnani, 2006:654). Prunier (1995:142) agrees with this view of 
unconditional obedience to authority and demonstrates how it played a key role in the 
mass killings. He argues that most people were illiterate. Given their authoritarian 
tradition they tended to believe what the authorities told them. And what they were 
told was quite radical. The RPF Tutsi fighters were pictured as creatures from another 
world, with tails, horns, hooves, pointed ears and red eyes that shone in the dark. 
Anybody who could be his or her accomplice (ibyitso) was bound to be a very evil 
creature. However, the culture of obedience to authority is found in many African 
countries, which do not experience genocide. Why should Rwanda be unique? Rather, 
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this study maintains that ethnic ideology was the root cause and was used as a 
mechanism by the elites to manipulate the ordinary people to be partakers.  
 
The third explanation highlights structural violence including discontent driven by 
relative deprivation. Exclusion, oppression, land and resource scarcity, and difficult 
life conditions all encourage a culture of animosity, generating violence (Staub, 
1989:13, Prunier, 1995:142). Mamdani (2001:231) goes so far as to say that mass 
participation by hundreds of thousands of Hutu who had never killed before or been 
previously affected by ethnic violence can be explained by a desire to both maintain 
and expand the ranks of the Hutu middle class.  
 
Fourth, psychological explanations suggest that ‘deviant’ individuals may be 
predisposed to engage in violent behaviour, or that social psychological forces bring 
out latent group identities which are conditioned by early childhood experiences and 
hateful representations of rivals (Kakar, 1996). The result is that fear, anxiety, and 
panic all serve to heighten the salience of group identity, making the crowd more 
susceptible to manipulation. Rumours, propaganda, and a catalyst can then set the 
crowd off, resulting in ‘collective bloodlust’ (Scherrer, 2002:113).  
 
The fifth explanation of mass participation is related to specific triggering events such 
as the Tutsi-led RPF invasion and subsequent assassination of Hutu President 
Habyarimana, which culminated in a situation of collective psychosis and begins to 
explain the mass Hutu participation in the violence. However, this explanation is 
challenged by the argument indicated in this study, which states that the preparation 
of genocide was in place two years before the 1994 genocide; hence, the assassination 
of Habyarimana on 6 April 1994 was only the trigger that set the whole strategy in 
motion. 
 
Furthermore, Des Forges (1999:231) reports, “Executing an extermination campaign 
rapidly required the mobilisation of hundreds of thousands of ordinary people, tens of 
thousands to actually slaughter and others to spy, search, guard, burn and pillage. In 
some situations, crowds were needed immediately and for only a few days to 
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participate in a massacre; in others, a reliable supply of long-term ‘workers’ was 
required to do patrols, man the barriers and track survivors”. 
 
Of significance, however, is that not all Hutu were willing to participate in the 
killings. In fact, Bhavnani (2006:657) claims, “Mass participation by Rwanda’s Hutu 
population was essential for the genocide. Yet, it is important to note that behavioural 
conformity among the Hutu was by no means assured. Rather, conformity was 
cultivated through compulsion over the course of the genocide”. 
 
In the broader scope of this study, the phenomenon of mass participation creates both 
the need and the greatest obstacle to reconciliation. Mass participation of Hutu 
civilians presents a two-fold dilemma: (1) to understand the 1994 genocide, and (2) 
for reconciliation (Mamdani, 2001:266). How can a victim continue living next door 
to someone who was a participant in the genocide? The ethnic ideology that became 
so deeply entrenched in the minds of the people, creating the conditions for mass 
participation, did not immediately disappear once the violence ended. This theme will 
be discussed further in chapter 5, when I consider the various ways in which the new 
RPF-led government and the churches attempted to address the need for 
reconciliation. As will become evident, given the deep-seated presence of ethnic 
ideology up to the present day, any attempt at reconciliation will need to deconstruct 
the foundations of this mind-set inherited from the colonial era. 
 
3.10 Contextual, ‘causal’ and influential factors that contributed to the 1994 
genocide in Rwanda 
 
Twenty years after the genocide, McGarty (2014) analysed the role of psychology in 
the reconciliation and reconstruction process in Rwanda. He (2014:376) also stressed 
that, “instances of mass violence and genocide cannot be understood at a single point 
of time without an accompanying close consideration of the causes and 
consequences”. For this reason, he suggests that the reality of the genocide is complex 
and includes multiple causes.  
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In this regard, the pressing problem in the aftermath of 1994 was to identify a causal 
explanation for the tragedy that had occurred. What could explain this genocide and 
mass participation in the killings? Any event as sudden and widespread as this one 
will be complex. However, returning to the aim of this chapter—exploring Rwanda’s 
historical context—the argument of this study is that the 1994 genocide was firmly 
entrenched in ideology. This ideology includes various aspects, which will be 
examined in this section, but in all respects it is related to the colonial construction of 
“Hutu” and “Tutsi” as ethnic categories. As will become clear further below, over the 
course of Rwandan history this ethnic ideology incorporated the following aspects: 
identity-based conflict, the historical colonial ideology which includes Hamitic theory 
and mythmaking ideology, political and economic ideology, and the social context of 
Rwanda. All these ideological factors emphasise how ethnic ideology became the 
fault line that split Rwanda apart, and became the seed that culminated in the 1994 
Rwandan genocide.  
 
3.10.1 Identity-based conflict ideology 
On January 28, 2005, the NURC presented its research on the origins of the Rwanda 
conflict. This included an analysis of its nature, its root causes, and the challenges and 
opportunities faced by Rwandan society. This research was conducted under the 
guidance of Dr. Anastase Shyaka, a professor at the National University of Rwanda 
(NUR) and researcher at the Centre for Conflict Management (CCM) based at the 
NUR. Currently, Shyaka is the director of Rwanda Governance Board (RGB). 
 
Shyaka (2005:8) maintains, “The conflict which has been devastating Rwanda for 
several decades is “identity-based” and fuelled by fears that one group feels 
threatened by another and thereby perceived as an enemy”. According to (Shyaka, 
2005:25), the identity mechanisms in place in Rwanda between the Hutus and Tutsis 
arose from a complex interweaving of both external and internal factors. By external 
factors, he refers to how colonisation of Rwanda by European oppressors brought a 
foreign ideological conception of the racial heritage and makeup of the Rwandan 
people. The internal factors refer to the efforts to reinforce Hutu identity during the 
post-colonial era, which led Hutu extremists to engage in a pervasive campaign of 
devaluation of the Tutsis. The major problem of Rwanda, according to Shyaka, is not 
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only the dichotomy of “Hutu-Tutsi,” but also the syndrome of “us versus them”. The 
phenomenon of “us versus them” was vested with an “ethnist” flavour.  
 
It is important, however, to discuss how identity became the fault line that split 
Rwanda apart. The dynamics of identity in Rwanda are complex. This is because it 
could be based on history, ideological constructions and political affiliations. Shyaka 
(2005:8-9), therefore, classifies the origin of identity-based conflict ideology into the 
following three phases: First, there was a perfect entity, the sedentary Bantu 
“Hutuness”. Second, there arose a disturbing element, the Nilo-Hamitic invading 
“Tutsiness,” and in the third phase, in order to restore the primitive state, it is up to 
Hutuness to mobilise the whole group in order to destroy the threat of that “deadly” 
otherness namely “Tutsiness”.  
 
As suggested earlier, ethnic categorisation in Rwanda is invented by colonial legacy. 
The colonial discourse of ethnicity had established the Hutu as unequal to the Tutsi. 
Des Forges (1999:3) explains how the identities carried by the Tutsi and Hutu became 
pervasive psychological elements of the genocide, by saying:  
 
The identity used to justify Tutsi domination in the past was used to justify the 
need for their elimination. The Hutu leaders portrayed the nation as vulnerable to 
Tutsi aggression, even claiming that the RPF intended to commit genocide 
against the Hutu-unless the Hutu struck first. Threatened on several fronts—by 
the RPF, militarily, and by opposition parties, politically—they needed to unify 
Hutus against a common enemy. The Hutu extremists differentiated between 
“us” and “them” by dividing their world into faithful Rwandans and 
“accomplices of the enemy”.  
 
The key to the genocide was labelling the Tutsi population as accomplices of the 
RPF; thus, the entire Tutsi population became the enemy that needed to be 
exterminated.  
 
3.10.2. The Hamitic theory: colonial ideological factor 
This section situates Hamitic theory as an essential contributing factor to the 1994 
genocide. The use in genocidal propaganda of a modified “Hamitic theory” has 
become a key feature seeking to explain the 1994 Rwandan genocide (Eltringham, 
2006:425). Shyaka (2005:10) states that the colonial heritage of Rwanda contributed 
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to its many conflicts through the Hamitic myth. Colonial powers passed on to Rwanda 
identity antagonisms brought violence upon Rwanda. The Rwandan conflict, as 
Shyaka (2005:38) put it, “Is neither racial nor ethnic nor caste-based. The Hamitic 
theory and divisionist ideologies which have been derived from it are its main 
leitmotiv”. 
 
By the end of the 18th century, archaeological findings led to the conclusion that 
pharaonic Egypt was black. This conception brought scientists to once again consider 
the idea of the repopulation of Africa by Noah’s descendants, asserting this time that 
the curses called down by Noah were only upon Canaan, the son of Cham, and his 
descendants. The descendants of Canaan were understood to be negroid or “genuine 
negroes”. However, a second, non-cursed line thought to be descended from Canaan’s 
brother encompassed other races, such as the Egyptians, Berbers and Abyssinians 
(Shyaka, 2005:12). This hypothesis allowed Europeans to affirm that among the 
populations in the depths of Africa, there were significant variations. Some of these 
races were thought to be related to the Hamites, and so certain groups of people like 
the Tutsis, the Himas and the Masais were associated with a supposedly superior race. 
For this reason, despite the absence of cultural or linguistic otherness in Rwanda, 
ideological activity around ethnicity has been very prolific (Shyaka, 2005:12).These 
mythical and ideological constructions in the colonial imagination established a 
relation between distant, unrelated communities based on their supposed origins, 
while at the same time disrupting the actual unified roots of communities which had 
lived for a long time together in harmony (Shyaka, 2005:12). 
 
To this Shyaka (2005:14) adds, “Through that “ideological trend,” communities of 
Rwanda went through an ontological rupture unknown during the previous periods” 
(Shyaka, 2005:14). The Hutu, deprived of all political power and materially exploited 
by both whites and Tutsi, were told by everyone that they were an inferior race who 
deserved their fate. They came to believe this lie. As a consequence, they began to 
hate all Tutsi, even those who were just as poor as them, since all Tutsi were members 
of the ‘superior race’ (Prunier, 1995:38-9). The ethnic ideology based on Hamitic 
theory is considered to be the main cause of the genocide, the divisions, and the 
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recurring tragedies, which plunged Rwanda into mourning from 1959 until the1994 
genocide (Gatwa, 2005:29). 
 
3.10.3 The myth making ideology factor 
In his article, ‘Myth and Memory. The Construction and Deconstruction of Ethnic 
Ideology in Post-Colonial Rwanda,’ Check (2008) critically examined the role myth 
and memory played in perpetrating the Hutu and Tutsi divide. In a functional 
approach myths are always explanatory, and in some instances so dominant that any 
other societal function becomes secondary. In Rwanda, myths became the datum 
through which ethnic identity was realised, and as such, myths became a contributing 
factor to the genocide (Check, 2008:250). Check further argues that these myths made 
a Tutsi and a Hutu world more tangible within the social constructs of Rwandan 
identity (Check, 2008:251). 
 
Kaufman (2006:47) believes that “extreme acts of ethnic violence such as genocide 
are caused by “group myths” that justify hostility, fears of group extinction, and 
symbolic politics of chauvinist mobilisation. The hostile myths produce emotion-
laden symbols that makes mass hostility easy for chauvinist elites to provoke and 
make extremist policies popular” (cf. Jean, 2006:2). Symbolists support the idea of a 
“myth-symbol complex” that identifies elements of shared culture and an 
interpretation of history binds the group and distinguishes it from others. Myths have 
deep roots in history and culture that cannot be easily ignored (Kaufman, 2006:50, cf. 
Jean, 2006:2).  
 
Kaufman (2006:50), the most prominent advocate for the symbolic political theory, 
notes that Rwanda’s genocide “…must have been motivated by an exceptionally 
hostile, eliminationist Hutu mythology aimed against the Tutsi. Extreme mass 
hostility against Tutsi, and chauvinist mobilisation based on manipulating ethnic 
symbols—all resulting in a predation-driven security dilemma”. The importance of 
myths and their effect on relations between groups is vital to the symbolist argument. 
The creation myth of the Tutsi, Hutu and Twa has many variations, but the same 
outcome on the hierarchy of Rwandan society. Kaufman believes, “The Story of the 
Origins” [below] is the foundation of the Hutu hostility toward Tutsi. Kaufman states: 
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…There was Kigwa, who fell from heaven and has three sons: Gatwa, Gahutu, 
and Gatutsi. When he decided to choose his successor, he entrusted each of the 
three sons a pot of milk to watch over during the night. At daybreak, Gatwa had 
drunk the milk; Gahutu had fallen asleep and in the carelessness of the sleep, had 
spilt the milk; and only Gatutsi had kept watch throughout the night, and only 
his milk pot was safe. So it was clear to Kigwa that Gatutsi should be the 
successor and by that fact should be exempt of any menial tasks. Gahutu was to 
be his servant. The utter unreliability of Gatwa was to make him only a clown in 
society. As a result, Gatutsi received cattle and command whereas Gahutu would 
acquire cattle only through the services to Gatutsi, and Gatwa was condemned to 
hunger and gluttony and would not acquire cattle (Kaufman, 2006, cited by Jean, 
2006:3). 
 
Such myths were common knowledge in Rwanda and used to justify the Tutsi 
minority rule over the Hutu majority and the marginal Twa. Rwandan myths also 
suggested that Tutsi were natural leaders. These myths were supported by the 
European colonisers and extended to fit the Eurocentric idea of superiority (Jean, 
2006:4). In Kaufman’s (2006) words, Jean (2006:5) affirms the following:  
 
Myths and their incorporation in all areas of the Rwandan society planted early 
seeds of angst of the Hutu toward the Tutsi. After the 1959 Rwandan 
independent revolution, there was a great increase in hate driven sentiment 
towards the Tutsi by the Hutu, who had gained political control of the country 
after independence. Based on the myth of origins, the Tutsi were viewed as 
foreigners from northeast Africa with no right to Rwandan land with the 1990 
invasion by the RPF as background, the Hutu elite used the threat of another 
Tutsi invasion as a justification for ethnic cleansing in 1994. The mythology 
surrounding ethnic divides made genocide a fathomable solution. 
 
It is clear that myth making which support the ethnic difference between the Hutu and 
Tutsi played an important role in sowing a seed of ethnic ideology. 
 
3.10.4 Political ideological factor 
Political ideologies are normally bound to and exclude someone or something, such as 
another religion, race, ethnicity, political creed, and so forth (Verdeja, 2012:315). In 
this study, ethnic ideology has been described as a key resource and influential factor 
that contributed to the 1994 genocide. This does not excuse the decisions of political 
elites, but highlights the way the Hutu elite exploited feelings of ethnic identity to 
pursue political or economic goals of their own (Ferdinando, 2009:53).  
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According Longman (1995:20), “The genocide resulted from deliberate choice of a 
modern elite to foster hatred and fear to keep itself in power”. He (1995:20) further 
states, “The 1994 genocide was not a spontaneous expression of public outrage over 
the assassination of a beloved president. Rather, the massacres represented a 
calculated and systematic attempt by embattled elites to reassert their social, 
economic, and political dominance and to eliminate any challenges to their authority”. 
Faced with RPF success on the battlefield and at the negotiating table, these few 
power holders transformed the strategy of ethnic division into genocide (Diamond, 
2005:318). They believed that the extermination campaign would restore the 
solidarity of the Hutu under their leadership and help them win the war. Thus, they 
chose genocide as a strategy to eliminate their opponents and regain popular support 
(Longman, 2001:176). 
 
It is noteworthy here, that political manipulation exploited the underlying ethnic 
ideology. Des Forges (1995:460) indicates that “from the 1960s until 1994, the 
ideology promoted by the Hutu ruling elite was as follows: Tutsi were foreign 
invaders, who could not really be considered citizens. The Hutu had been the ‘native 
peasants’, enslaved by the aristocratic invaders. They were now the only legitimate 
inhabitants of the country”. The RPF thus represented the fear of a return to repressive 
Tutsi rule. Thus, in Rwanda, ethnicity was used as a political weapon to prevent 
power-sharing and democracy; incitement to ethnic hatred and violence was used as a 
method of power consolidation (Carroll, 2000:171). The Rwandan president Paul 
Kagame emphasises, “It is not reference to Hutu/Tutsi terminologies that forms the 
basis of the problem of ethnicity in Rwanda. Rather, it is distortions and prejudices 
that for decades were associated with these terms for political ends” (Kagame, 
2008:xxiii, cited by Clark, 2010:143). 
 
3.10.5 Economic ideological factor 
In addition to political ideology, this section describes how the economic predicament 
of Rwanda was another factor that contributed to the 1994 genocide. Citing Pottier 
(2002) Ferdinando (2009:55) asserts, “The genocide grew out of an explosive struggle 
for resources which embattled politicians ethnicized to their advantage. A crisis 
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rooted in political elite interests was turned into a conflict for which an ethnic 
minority, “the Tutsi,” was held responsible”.  
 
The period from 1974-1984 represented a phase of significant economic growth, the 
causes of which were mainly external. Rwanda enjoyed the financial benefits of 
international aid as well as favourable terms of exchange for its primary export 
products, i.e. tea and coffee.  
 
However, beginning in the 1980s
22
, the external factors that had encouraged economic 
development reversed. Terms of trade deteriorated and external aid decreased. 
Ferdinando (2009:53) adds, “In the early months of 1994, the Habyarimana regime 
faced many challenges and its extremist allies exploited the ethnic issue as the most 
promising strategy for survival”. 
 
Firstly, Rwanda faced a devastating economic decline. This is due to the fact that 
Rwanda had possibilities of exporting its coffee, whose value dropped drastically in 
world markets after 1987.  
 
Secondly, the country’s national debt rose from $189 million to $844 million, and 
according to the U.N, Rwanda became the poorest country in the world.  
 
Thirdly, Rwanda was increasingly overpopulated. From 2 million inhabitants in 1940, 
the population in 1991 had reached 7.15 million (Waller, 1993:47), with a huge 
population of young men under twenty-five with no formal employment prospects 
(Linden, 1997:45). Longman (2001:176) emphasises, “The problem of 
overpopulation, poverty, and gross income disparity created a disaffected population, 
susceptible to manipulation by extremist elements”.  
 
                                                          
22
During the 1980s, power was concentrated in the hands of politicians who originated from Bushiru 
(Gisenyi), especially members of Habyarimana’s wife’s family. The group became known as akazu 
(literally translated as a small house), in reference to the restrictive or narrow circle that surrounded the 
Mwami. The concentration of power among this group and its cohorts gave them control of much of 
the country’s wealth. Towards the end of the 1980s, a state of political delinquency prevailed in 
Rwanda (Kimonyo, 2001:34-36). 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
  
 
 
118 
Fourthly, Rwanda’s aggregated gross domestic product (GDP) decreased from $355 
million in 1983 to $260 million in 1990. With the devaluation of the Rwandan franc 
by 40%, the International Monetary Fund stepped in to provide economic aid. The 
Habyarimana government was incapable of solving the economic woes of the 
country. (Jean, 2006:7).  
 
Fifthly, there were environmental stresses and a crisis of arable land that led the wider 
Hutu population to fear that the return of the RPF to Rwanda would increase the 
scarcity of land (Bruce, 2001:39). 
 
Finally, the country’s major employer was the government. In the late 1980s, the 
central government was employing 7,000 people and the local governments 43,000. 
By law, only nine per cent of these employees could be Tutsi. Eliminating the Tutsi 
would open up 4,500 more government jobs for Hutu. Because the country had no 
social security program, the thousands of unemployed young people who entered the 
job market each year lived on the very margins of survival. Many became easy targets 
for recruitment and manipulation.  
 
The economic crisis created the perfect conditions in which ethnic tensions could be 
exploited (Staub, 1989:13). Difficult life conditions were certainly present in Rwanda 
before the genocide. According to Shyaka (2005:22), extreme poverty, the scarcity of 
resources, an increase in population and high unemployment made living conditions 
particularly difficult for the population, and catalysed crises and identity-based 
conflicts in Rwanda. 
 
What is worth noting, however, is that even the economic inequality in Rwanda was 
framed within the construct of ethnic ideology. Shyaka (2005:23) rightly confirms 
that, “Hutu extremists managed to mobilize the killers by encouraging them to “kill 
the Tutsi so that they could take over their possessions (houses, banana plantations, 
plots, cows…)”. He concludes, “The objective of the Hutu killers in Kibungo 
prefecture, for example, was not simply to kill the Tutsis for what they were, but also 
for what they owned” (Shyaka, 2005:23). Prunier (1995:142) supports the same 
standpoint when he observes that all these people who were about to be killed had 
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land and, in some cases, cattle. In a poor and increasingly overpopulated country, 
Prunier argues, the opportunity to seize resources was not a negligible incentive. 
Indeed, some Hutu believed that mass exterminations of Tutsi were necessary to wipe 
out an excess of the population and bring numbers in line with the available land 
resources.  
 
Poverty was clearly a relevant factor in the 1994 genocide. It created a perception of 
opportunity in violence for participants, both to exclude economic competition (the 
RPF and the Tutsi returnees who would come with them) and to grab land and goods 
from the Tutsi being killed (Bruce, 2001:39-40). Social conditions such as poverty, 
environmental degradation, land and population density and economic collapse are all 
resources that triggered the development that culminated in the 1994 genocide (Bruce, 
2001:45). The argument here, however, is that ethnic ideology was so pervasive in 
Rwanda that all of these significant factors were framed within the artificial divisions 
of “Hutu” and “Tutsi.” 
 
3.11 Conclusion 
 
Chapter three was divided into four main sections: Firstly, it provided a scholarly 
survey on the subject of genocide and its causes. Secondly, the chapter examined the 
historical context of Rwanda before the colonial period. After a detailed analysis of 
this section, the literature revealed that in pre-colonial Rwanda, the terms ‘Hutu’ and 
‘Tutsi’ referred to a complex set of social relations that had some of the elements of 
class, cattle, and social status. These were not fixed categories but fluid ones. They 
varied through time and location depending on such factors as wealth, military 
prowess, family, and control over precious commodities or occupation of prestigious 
social positions. Thirdly, the chapter demonstrated that during the colonial period, the 
social divisions in Rwanda were recast as ethnic divisions. Mythical and ideological 
constructions from colonial inspiration established a relation between the Hutu and 
Tutsi. The colonial authorities propelled the hardening of the social structure of 
ethnicity, aggravating the social problem inherent between the two groups (Hutu and 
Tutsi) that resulted in the 1994 genocide against the Tutsi. Finally, in the post-colonial 
context, Rwanda was also characterised by ethnic ideology, exclusion and 
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discrimination inherited, promoted and propagated by the Hutu ruling elites in order 
to retain their political power.  
 
The 1994 genocide in Rwanda was therefore the culmination of earlier genocides and 
massacres, which occurred in 1959, 1963, 1964, 1973, 1990, 1992 and 1993. These 
killings were driven by factors related to ethnic ideology: discriminatory policies 
pursued by post-independence governments, a culture of impunity and violence 
created by the government, which actively and publicly promoted the killings of Tutsi 
individuals, and suspicion between the Hutu, Tutsi and Twa communities, due to 
divisive policies and a state ideology which sought to categorize these communities as 
ethnically and racially distinct, despite the fact that they all share one ethnicity, one 
language, and a common heritage as Banyarwanda (Nantulya, 2006:51). Ethnic 
ideology thus became the fault line that split Rwanda apart, resulting in ethnic 
massacres, and eventually, the genocide of 1994. Since this dissertation is aimed at a 
missiological understanding of reconciliation, we cannot simply stop with the history 
of politics and ideology, but must press on and ask: “Where were the Christian 
churches in the midst of this ethnic ideology?” This will be discussed further in 
chapter four. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
CHRISTIAN MISSION AND ETHNIC IDEOLOGY IN THE 
RWANDAN CHURCH 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
In chapter 3, it was argued that the ethnic ideology that led to the 1994 genocide was 
artificially constructed by colonial authorities and later hardened by Rwandan elites in 
order to maintain their power. Chapter 4 should be read as a supplement to chapter 3, 
exploring in greater detail the history of Rwanda from the perspective of Christian 
missions and theology. Chapter 4, therefore, attempts to critically examine the role the 
missionaries played in perpetrating the Hutu and Tutsi divide within the context of 
ethnic ideological thinking. 
 
This chapter begins with a brief description of mission theology in Africa, and 
Christian mission and ethnic ideology (section 4.2 and 4.3), as well as the background 
of the mission-state relationship in the colonial era. Thereafter, this chapter will focus 
on ethnic ideology in Rwandan churches, taking into account how missionaries 
contributed to planting the seed of ethnic ideology among Rwandans (section 4.4), 
which post-independence was inherited by Rwandan churches (section 4.5). Section 
4.6 addresses the involvement of Rwandan churches in genocide by asking the 
question: “To what extent can the church be held responsible for its involvement in 
the genocide?” Section 4.7 describes the complicity and failure of churches leading up 
to the genocide. In section 4.8 it is argued that, as in the broader society, the Rwandan 
churches also allowed ethnic ideology to infiltrate their mind-set. Hence, the mission 
of the churches was diminished by their allegiance to oppressive elites, preventing 
them from exercising their prophetic role, as is stated in section 4.8. 
 
In the context of the CMO methodology described in chapter 1, the present chapter 
should be understood as an attempt to further realistically define the context in which 
reconciliation must occur. Drawing on the CMO logic framework, which is a strategy 
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to identify and explain the “cause-effect” from the viewpoint of contexts, mechanisms 
and outcomes, this chapter explores how and why the people of Rwanda and church 
leaders responded to ethnic ideology. The next section will therefore start with the 
bigger picture, by discussing the relation of Christian missions in Africa to ethnic and 
racial ideology. 
 
4.2 Christian modern missions in Africa 
 
As already indicated in the previous chapter, the social and political history of 
Rwanda before 1994 is essential in order to understand the genocide. In the same 
way, it is significant to be reminded that one cannot understand Christian mission and 
ethnic ideology in Rwanda without explaining the historical background of Christian 
missions in Africa. However, it is important to keep in mind that the history of 
Christian missions in Africa is complex.  
 
This complexity hinges on what the missiologist Paul G. Hiebert (2002:24) says, “In 
the past missionaries, as people of their time, sought to both civilise and Christianise 
people around the world”. Chapter 4, as a descriptive and explanatory chapter, 
explains the role of missionaries and their theological and mission orientations, which 
had an influence on their role—before and after—the 1994 genocide. More 
importantly, this section indicates that during the time of the missionaries, Christian 
mission was influenced by European imperialism. In other words, mission concerned 
the expansion of territories and churches. This was done through: (1) colonisation, (2) 
civilisation, and (3) conversion. This is expounded upon below: 
 
Mission as expansion through colonisation. Scholars hold very different views 
regarding how mission and colonialism are intertwined. For example, in her book, 
Christian Mission: How Christianity Became a World Religion, Dana Lee 
Robert(2009:98) states, “From the late fifteenth to the mid nineteenth century, the 
expansion of Europe went hand in hand with much missionary activity. Missionaries 
operated in a larger context of western colonialism and inevitably participated in the 
system”. The missionaries, irrespective of their national origin, became part of the 
colonial state. The missionaries had an important place in the colonial state, for they 
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provided a high proportion of the educational and medical infrastructure. The 
missionaries were the major agents in producing the modern state with a literate 
population and technologically based communications (Walls, 2002:103).  
 
With regards to mission and colonialism, Bosch (1991:306) similarly stresses that 
during the Enlightenment, mission and colonialism were intertwined, hence “to 
colonize is to missionize”. He further points out that since the sixteenth century, if 
one said “mission,” one in a sense also said colonialism (Bosch, 1991:300). From the 
point of view of the colonial government, the missionaries were indeed ideal allies. 
For this reason, missionaries were seen as agents of colonies, as they could help in the 
submission of natives to the colonial government. Colonial expansion could acquire 
religious overtones and also be intimately linked with mission. This is justified by the 
fact that missionaries adhered to their own governments, for instance, British 
missionaries labored in British colonies, French missionaries in French colonies, and 
German missionaries in German colonies, respectively (Bosch, 1991:303-304). Bosch 
further argues, “Whether they liked it or not, the missionaries became pioneers of 
Western imperialist expansion” (Bosch, 1991:304). This clarifies the possibility of 
seeing Christian mission as Western cultural imperialistic expansion. Bosch 
(1991:306) quotes the Catholic missiologist J. Schmidlin, who in 1913 said: 
 
It is the mission that subdues our colonies spiritually and assimilates them 
inwardly. The state may indeed incorporate the protectorates outwardly; it is, 
however, the mission which must assist in securing the deeper aim of colonial 
policy, the inner policy, the inner colonisation. The state can enforce physical 
obedience with the aid of punishment and laws; but it is the mission which 
secures the inward servility and devotion of natives … [Hence] “to colonize is to 
missionize and to missionize is to colonize.”  
 
In addition, Bosch (1991:305) emphasises that missionaries tended to welcome the 
advent of colonial rule since it would be to the advantage of the “natives”. Here, 
Bosch cites John Philip, superintendent of the London Missionary Society at the Cape 
of Good Hope, who wrote:  
 
While our missionaries… are everywhere scattering the seeds of civilization, 
social order, happiness, they are by the most unexceptionable means, extending 
British interest, British influence and British Empire. Wherever the missionary 
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places his standard among a savage tribe, then prejudices against the colonial 
government give way (Philip, 1828a:ixf, cited in Bosch, 1991:305). 
 
And again: 
 
My stations are the most efficient agents which can be employed to promote the 
internal strength of our colonies, and the cheapest and the best military posts that a 
wise government can employ to defend its frontier against the predatory 
incursions of savage tribes (Philip, 1828b:227, cited in Bosch, 1991:305).  
 
The above two quotations led Bosch (1991:306, 310) to conclude that missionaries 
served the interests of the colonizers. The Western missionary enterprise comprises 
complicity in imperialism and colonial expansion. Some missionaries and mission 
societies were very skeptical about an alliance between nation and mission. This 
understanding from the above quotations clearly shows the mind-set of Western 
missionaries towards Africans and their relationship with colonialists. Bujo (1992:36) 
also echoes a similar view when he claims that, “missionaries worked hand in glove 
with the colonial power”. Bujo (1992:36) further indicates, “Missionaries did indeed 
preach the gospel, but they preached it within the framework of a tainted system. 
Christian churches were thus established during the colonial period not simply as 
allies of the government but as important players in the contestation for state power”. 
In fact, during the colonial time in Africa, Manickman (2007:330) notes that “the flag 
followed the cross, implying that the relationship of some missionaries to Africans 
prepared the latter subjugation by the colonial powers; many times the missionaries 
sided with the colonial masters”. He refers to one of the popular African sayings: 
‘Gutiri ngurani ya Mubia Muthungu,’ meaning ‘there is no difference between the 
colonial administrator and the missionary’.  
 
Mission as expansion through civilization. The work of civilisation did not lie in the 
hands of the government alone, but also in the hands of the missionaries, as religious 
teachings and religious institutions were of great importance. The colonial endeavour 
had three arms—government, mission, and commerce—and all had to function 
together. Some missionaries were identified as agents of the colonial interest, since 
they struggled to establish churches of national interest and often failed to resist the 
injustices perpetrated by the colonial administration against the Africans. The 
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administrators, however, were more interested in the social and political impact of 
missionary activities. If the missionaries could teach the Africans to become obedient 
subjects, then even they could receive financial support from the colonial office 
(Bujo, 1992:37, 41). 
 
As described by Bosch (1991:292), under the imperialism motive, Western 
missionaries were interested in propagating their culture. He argues, “Just as the 
West’s religion was predestined to be spread around the globe, the West’s culture was 
to be victorious over all others”. Furthermore, Hiebert (2002:23) adds, “Most 
westerners assume the superiority of Western peoples and western civilization. 
Members of other races might share in their goodness and wisdom, but westerners are 
the leaders, and will remain so for a very long time. This led to the Enlightenment 
agenda that it is the White Man’s burden to educate and civilize the ‘natives’”. In 
Rwanda, the mentality of superiority influenced them to initiate the idea of a ‘superior 
race,’ thus referring to the Tutsi as superior to the Hutu, and hence, creating 
dissension and discrimination. 
 
According to Mugambi (1992:23), Christianity was presented to Africans as the 
religion and culture of Europeans, who at the same time thought of themselves as the 
perfect and highest model for the rest of humanity to emulate. To be Christian meant 
to be “civilised,” to be civilised meant abandoning African life, which was described 
as “primitive” and “savage,” and mirroring the Western European way of life. 
Missionaries considered themselves to have attained the highest possible level of 
civilisation, which the “primitive savages” were expected to copy in order to 
“develop” from “paganism to civilisation”. 
 
This resulted in the negation of indigenous African culture and its replacement by the 
so-called superior Western culture. For this reason, the relationships between Western 
power and missions have drawn multiple critiques. Critics of missions have focused 
largely on missionary paternalism. It was clear that the nonwestern people saw 
mission as another aspect of Western oppression. Missions have been condemned for 
introducing social or cultural changes, or for being connected to outside global forces 
such as imperialism, colonialism, Western norms, or modernity (Robert, 2009:88, 90).  
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Mission as expansion through conversion. Missionaries arrived in Africa as part of 
the general expansion of European powers abroad, motivated by a desire to spread the 
Gospel (Sanneh, 1991:159).Missionaries in Africa sought to attract converts not 
simply through the power of their message, but also through various material 
incentives. They built schools and hospitals, introduced new crops and farming 
techniques, and began money-making projects to attract new converts (Longman, 
2001:170). At the same time, Hiebert (2002:9) maintains that for “many missionaries, 
conversion was related to alcohol, tobacco and gambling, taking baptism and 
communion and attending church regularly”. In other words, for them, aspects such as 
these provided evidence of being truly converted. 
 
However, this strategy of attracting people is challenged by Hiebert (2002:9) when he 
says that this way of conversion “did not necessary mean that underlying beliefs had 
changed. People could adapt their behaviour to get jobs, win status and gain power 
without abandoning their old beliefs”. Consequently, the nature of missionary work as 
part of the colonial project affected not only the structures of the Christian churches 
established in Africa but also the Christian message (Longman, 2001:182). 
 
In fact, modern missions originated in the context of modern Western colonialism and 
missionaries became pioneers of Western imperialistic expansion. In other words, the 
link between colonialism and mission was complicated, but most certainly 
undeniable. This reflection on mission as the expansion of European power is 
important for the purpose of this study, as it indicates the negative impact the 
relationship between the missionaries and colonizers had on Africans in general, and 
Rwandans in particular. Thus, illuminating their influential role—before and after—
the 1994 genocide. Against this backdrop, the next section focuses on Christian 
mission and ethnic ideology.  
 
4.3. Christian mission and ethnic ideology 
 
This section provides an analysis of Christian mission and racial ideology. It is argued 
that while thinking that they were “civilizing” the people of Africa, the colonizers and 
missionaries managed to strip them of the best part of their values before destroying 
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their cohesion and sowing the seeds of conflict (Shyaka, 2005:11). This is owing to 
the fact that, “during the colonial period, many Europeans had become obsessed with 
race, and this had a negative impact on indigenous people’ lives” (Gatwa, 
2001:128).Due to the limited scope, this study will not be able to cover the topic of 
Christian mission in all African countries. I would therefore prefer to focus on some 
relevant points from the South African context, which I consider of great importance 
for the present discussion. These will serve as examples of Christian mission and 
racial ideology. The Rwandan context will be discussed in section 4.4.  
 
The reason for choosing South Africa as an example in this study is because it 
exemplifies how an African country has been affected by the racial ideology of both 
European colonial administration and missionary policies. However, the intention is 
not to draw a comparison between South Africa and Rwanda, as both countries have 
experienced their own distinct tragedies. Rather, this section begins with a review of 
the relationship between missionaries and colonizers in the South African context in 
order to identify the factors and characteristics of the colonial church that may be 
relevant in Rwanda. As will become evident, the church in Rwanda similarly shares 
complicity in the colonial racial project as the church in South Africa.   
 
In his contribution, ‘Apartheid in South Africa as a sin and heresy: some of its roots 
and fruits,’ Nico Smith (1984), a prominent anti-apartheid activist and theologian, 
traces the historical background of the racial ideology among Westerners. He recalls 
that racial prejudice was characteristic of Western people since the very early history 
of Western civilization. In Africa, Asia, and the Americas, people of color were 
treated by Westerners as inferior, and used as slaves and servants. As early as the 5th 
century AD, the monks started painting images of the devil in black. For Smith 
(1984:145), “The association of black as being evil and bad remained part of Western 
humanity’s conception of Black people, influencing their attitude towards them. At a 
later stage in history, the West came into contact with Blacks. In turn, they were seen 
as the cursed sons of Ham, and it was believed that it was God’s will, or 
predestination, for the White race to have authority over the coloured races”. This 
situation in the South African context echoes the Hamitic race theory, which was 
prevalent in Rwanda. In both cases, the European colonizers sought to explain the 
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organization of society according to fixed racial categories dating back to pre-historic 
origins. 
 
In this respect, Saayman (2008) stresses that the white colonists found any physical 
contact with the indigenous people very difficult. For example, he argues that upon 
their arrival in Cape, the settlers had already formed stereotypes of the black people. 
Even if they are not termed racist, according to Saayman (2008:2), “They certainly 
were strongly ethnocentric, with no doubt about the superiority of white, civilised and 
Christian Europeans over black, uncivilized and pagan indigenes”. As a result of 
contact, the idea of separateness was strongly implemented (Smith, 1984:145). 
Specifically, from the very beginning, the churches of European origin in South 
Africa were challenged with the problem of separation amongst people although more 
in a cultural-economic sense than in a focused racial sense (Naude, 2005:164). The 
connection with the Rwandan context is clear at this point. As we have seen in 
chapter 3, the colonial government in Rwanda was equally interested in 
differentiating indigenous people according to perceived racial characteristics, even if 
this was done for its own political or economic advantage. The South African 
example, however, alerts us to the way that the church might be guilty of participating 
in this differentiation. As we shall see later in this chapter, this concern is relevant to 
the history of the church in Rwanda as well.  
 
The Christian churches played a significant role in the evolution and establishment of 
apartheid. This is justified by the fact that segregation of the population on the basis 
of color officially began when the Dutch Reformed Church (DRC) agreed to allow its 
members to segregate their worship services along racial lines (Ménard, 2015:89). By 
the late 1850s, different church buildings were in place for colored congregants 
gathering to hear the Word and receive the sacraments (Naude, 2005:164).  
 
For many authors, separate worship became the resource for apartheid. Scholars like 
Ménard (2015), for example, suggest that separate worship was the precursor to 
separate development, and was a political strategy that helped promote a racist 
agenda. Ménard (2015) quotes Nico Smith (2004), who convincingly highlights the 
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influence of the Christian churches in the making of an apartheid state. He refers to 
the DRC as the “mother of apartheid” in the following words:  
 
[The] DRC can therefore to some extent be said to be the main instigator of the 
concept of separation between peoples of colour in South Africa and may rightly 
be called ‘the mother of apartheid’, by deciding to follow the will of its white 
members who were demanding that people of colour not be accommodated in 
the church. Instead of guiding its members to change their attitudes, the Synod 
took the church into a deformation of the essential character of the church. How 
different the history of South Africa could have been if the DRC had in 1857 
taken a decision not to allow any separation within the church (Nico Smith, 
2004, cited by Ménard, 2015:98). 
 
It is clear that the question raised by Smith highlights the influence of the Christian 
churches in the making of an apartheid state. Ménard commented on Smith’s 
question, “How different would South Africa be today if the DRC had indeed refused 
to allow separate worship?” He maintains that Smith implied that the apartheid social 
experiment between 1948 and 1994 would have been less successful, perhaps 
impossible, without the passive or, in the case of the DRC, the active support of the 
Christian church (Ménard, 2015:100). Citing Allan Boesak (1981), Villa-Vincencio 
(1983:59) affirms, “Apartheid has been born in the womb of the white NGK (DRC). 
Details of the policy were worked out by that Church and it has provided moral and 
theological justification for apartheid”. 
 
Although the Rwandan context differs on this point, we can nonetheless see the 
general outline of an idea that will be relevant here. In South Africa, the church 
permitted its own conception of mission to be subordinated to the economic well-
being of the Afrikaner-dominated system, which found its origin in the colonial era. 
Similarly, as we shall see in the Rwandan context, the churches became so indebted to 
the colonial economic structure that they began to lose their own sense of mission, 
with the result that there was as much a financial reason to join the church as a 
theological reason. 
 
In addition to supporting the establishment of apartheid policy, the DRC developed a 
contextual theology that justified apartheid. The theological thoughts of Abraham 
Kuyper, an influential Dutch theologian, were the foundation on which the DRC built 
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its theological justification of apartheid. Kuyper’s concept of God’s creation is 
pluriform instead of uniform. Through Kupyer, the policy of apartheid found 
expression in the church. For this reason, the policy of apartheid, as described by 
Smith, may correctly be termed a “church policy” (Smith, 1984:147). The theology of 
the DRC developed within the context of the Afrikaner’s rise to political dominance 
in South Africa. These two civil phenomena—the rise of Afrikaner nationalism and 
apartheid theology—developed in tandem, with the DRC theologically supporting the 
Nationalists plan to segregate the races (Ménard, 2015:83). 
 
Ménard (2015) quotes Professor Nukhet Sandal (2011), the Director of the War & 
Peace Studies Program at the University of Ohio, who observed the effectiveness of 
using biblical references and theological justification as a means of marketing the 
segregationist message. The apartheid system of racial segregation, according to 
Sandal, was inspired by the policies of the DRC. She also emphasizes that the DRC’s 
influence was felt early on in the Afrikaner’s rise to social and political dominance in 
South Africa. Citing Sandal, Ménard (2015) wrote that in 1857, 
 
[…] it was a synod of [the] DRC that had introduced separate services along 
racial lines and this policy had been represented as ‘the will of God’ by using 
various textual references from the Bible pointing to the differences among 
people. Almost all these racist policies were legitimated by references to the 
sacred texts and stories, thereby making their ‘marketing’ to the public much 
easier than secular ideologies. The tower of Babel story (Genesis 11:1–9) 
became a ‘cardinal tenet of Apartheid theology’ – it was normal for people to be 
treated differently because they were different and the difference in treatment 
was the divine will. Apartheid quickly became the prevalent mode of life in 
South Africa, unquestioned by the majority of domestic institutions (Sandal, 
2011, cited by Ménard, 2015:94). 
 
Consequently, the DRC had been quite complicit in the rise of ‘Afrikanerdom’ and its 
racist policies. Based on theological grounds, the DRC openly supported apartheid 
and the Nationalist regime. As described in Ménard (2015), Smith recalls that from 
1857 to 1935, 
 
[…]  The decision of 1857, whatever good intentions the synod might have had, 
had put the DRC on a path that would lead directly towards an ideological 
theological understanding of apartheid. This came about in 1935 when the DRC 
accepted a new mission policy in which the idea of multiple nations instead of 
one united South African nation was introduced, it was said, from a biblical 
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point of view. Racially defined nationalism was thus formulated in ecclesiastical 
terms (Smith, 2011 cited by Ménard, 2015:101). 
 
The 1857 event, as Brunsdon (2015:109) indicated, shows that the link between 
church mission and apartheid was now firmly cemented. Indeed, the seed planted by 
the Synod of 1857 had now come to fruition. In this way, Western ethnocentricity and 
the ethno-superiority of the early settlers developed in the social and missionary 
context into a theologically sub-structured racist superiority in which service to the 
fatherland could be equated to participation in the missio Dei. 
 
The themes of ethno-superiority and racialized segregation will become apparent in 
the history of the Rwandan church as well. Although the Rwandan church never 
implemented segregated worship, as in the case of the South African DRC, it did 
condone and even encourage an apartheid-style economic segregation, which 
disadvantaged the Hutu during the colonial era and disadvantaged the Tutsi after the 
colonial era. Moreover, because the Rwandan church accepted Hamitic race theory as 
a biblically justified account, there was a theological rationale for the Rwandan 
church’s participation in discrimination, just as we see in South Africa. 
 
The theology that justified apartheid, however, has been challenged. In June 1982, 
during the National Conference, the SACC explicitly declared that apartheid was 
sinful, and its moral and theological justification, a heresy. Two months later, the 
WARC at its international meeting in Ottawa agreed with the declaration of heresy 
and suspended the powerful and influential DRC for theologically supporting 
apartheid (Borer, 1998:105). For Villa-Vicencio (1983:60), “If apartheid is a policy 
which safeguards the political and economic privileges of the Whites at the cost of 
blacks it is both ‘sinful and heretical’”. In what sense, then, is apartheid a heresy?  
 
De Gruchy maintains that it is in the first instance, an anthropological heresy. It is 
based on a false view of humanity. This, in turn, leads to a false doctrine of the church 
and reconciliation, which was achieved in the death and resurrection of Jesus (de 
Gruchy, 1983:82). De Gruchy critically challenges this kind of theology, which he 
considered as a theology that had become ideologically captive to the prevailing 
political ideas within the Christian churches’ context. According to de Gruchy (cited 
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in Ménard, 2015:90), “The Christian church is called to bear witness to the reign of 
God and to confront oppressive policy and law-makers with the Gospel. But any 
church that serves the politics of its context could not necessarily serve God as well”. 
Therefore, de Gruchy (1983:75) asserts, “It became necessary not only to recognize 
apartheid as a sinful policy, but also to reject it as heresy that divided the Church and 
compromised its proclamation of the gospel of Jesus Christ”. Tutu also adds that 
apartheid is a heresy and evil because it denied the central act of reconciliation 
achieved by God trough Jesus Christ. Therefore, it deserved to be condemned as 
morally reprehensible because it has caused so much human suffering (Tutu, 1983:40, 
46). 
 
In these examples, we see that in the South African context, the theological 
justification for discrimination was opposed by a prophetic theological critique, which 
called the church back to its mission. This critique not only came from outside the 
DRC, but also emerged from some voices within Afrikanerdom who cried out against 
apartheid. In the Rwandan context, however, it is difficult to find prophetic voices 
that were willing to turn against the interests of their own group. For example, there 
were no critical theologians from within the Hutu-dominated church in the 1960’s and 
70’s who were willing to critique the discrimination of their era. Although the church 
has made much effort since 1994 to rectify its complicity in ethnic ideology, the 
purpose of this dissertation is to continue a theological critique of the church’s efforts, 
with the hope of bringing the church into the service of God rather than ideology. 
 
In summary, from the very beginning of this section, the history of Christian mission 
in Africa is complex. The relationship between Western power and mission has drawn 
multiple critiques. Critics of missions have focused largely on missionary 
paternalism. Missions, as Robert (2009:88; 90) puts it, “have been condemned for 
introducing social or cultural changes, or for being connected to outside global forces 
such as imperialism, colonialism, western norms, or modernity”. The nature of 
missionary work as part of the colonial project affected not only the structures of the 
Christian churches established in Africa but also the Christian message (Longman, 
2001:182). In South Africa, for example, racial prejudice among White Afrikaners 
influenced their attitudes towards Black people, which led to the establishment of 
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apartheid supported by the DRC’s theological justification. As Tutu (1983:44-5) 
explains, “Apartheid says the most important fact about us is our ethnicity, some 
biological attribute that is really an irrelevance in determining our human worth. It 
exalts a particular biological characteristic to a universal principal, determining what 
it means to be human. Skin colour and race became salvation principles, since in 
many cases they determine which people can participate in which church services”. In 
fact, the Whites saw themselves as a superior race over the inferior Black race. In 
Rwanda, this mentality of categorizing people according to categories of superiority 
influenced both missionaries and colonists. This idea will be elaborated on in the next 
section. But before I get there, it is important to explore the specific history of 
Christian mission in Rwanda, which provides a background and the foundation of 
ethnic ideology, as introduced by the European missionaries. 
 
4.4 Christian mission in Rwanda before independence 
 
Considering the problem of mass participation in the 1994 genocide, particularly the 
problem of Christian participation, it is important to understand the history of the 
Christian missionaries in Rwanda. The nature of the early European missions created 
political and economic incentives for people to convert to Christianity apart from any 
real commitment to the faith. As will be made clear, European missionaries sought to 
convert the masses by converting the king, which put into place class distinctions, 
which also became ethnic distinctions, while simultaneously permitting people to 
identify with the church without surrendering anything of their localised interests. 
 
Before the arrival of the missionaries in 1900, Rwandans were God worshippers and 
knew that God was almighty. This was clearly visible in the way they gave their 
children theophoric names, such as Hakizimana (God saves), Harerimana (God 
raises), Ntakirutima (nothing greater than God). Even their proverbs show that they 
were believers. These are some examples “Imana iruta Imanga,”which means God is 
transcendent. Imana yirirwa ahandi igataha i Rwanda (God spends a day in another 
place and spends a night in Rwanda), which means that Rwanda is God’s home. God 
was called Rurema, which means creator of everything. Rwandan greetings show that 
they were believers: Gahorana Imana (Be always with God). They knew that “peace 
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and luck” were from God and so used to say: “N’ahimana” (it is up to God), “Nagize 
Imana” (God was with me, meaning that I had a chance) (Gatwa & Karamaga, 
1990:41). 
 
The Roman Catholic Cardinal, Charles Lavigerie,
23
 one of the Missionaries of Africa, 
also known as ‘The White Fathers,’ inaugurated the evangelisation of Rwanda in 
1900. The Protestant missionaries of the German Bethel Mission followed in 1907. 
More missionary societies arrived after the First World War, including, in 
chronological order: the Seventh Day Adventist missionaries from America, the 
Anglicans of the Church Missionary Society, the Rwanda Mission, the Danish 
Baptists, the American Free Methodists, and the Pentecostals from Sweden. From 
then on, Christianity became a major social actor, with more than eighty percent of 
Rwandans claiming to be affiliated to a church (Gatwa, 1999:1; cf. Gatwa and 
Karamaga, 1990). 
 
Léon Classe, the Catholic Vicar Apostolic of Rwanda between 1922 and 1945, 
followed Lavigerie’s top-down vision of evangelization and established the church as 
a close ally of the colonial state and the Tutsi-dominated royal court (Carney, 
2012:174). According to Horner (2014:9), “Converting the king and the ruling elite 
ensured that the rest of the population would follow suit. This approach, however, 
was not always met with enthusiasm from Rwandan chiefs. They tended to see the 
missionaries as threats to their regional power. Rwandan governmental leaders were 
hostile to the European presence”. In the first place, the coveted noble Tutsi, the court 
of Musinga and the queen mother were not interested in embracing the new religion. 
They feared that Christianity would destroy their sacred rites and they opposed 
baptism. (Benda, 2012:59-60). For this reason, top-down Tutsi evangelization did not 
succeed; hence, the first priests in Rwanda, and lay Christians to be converted to 
                                                          
23
Lavigerie was convinced that once the elites were won over to the gospel, their subjects would follow 
suit. The best way to earn the chief’s favor was to trust them, take their power seriously and seduce 
them with gifts before finally introducing them to Christian doctrine. Lavigerie instructed the 
missionaries not to forget to point out to the local political elites that the Christian doctrine was in fact 
their ally because it taught that they were the true representatives of God on earth in secular matters. In 
this case, the ruling elites were the primary targets of the missionaries’ efforts and attention. With 
assiduity, they courted them, keeping the friendliest rapport with them and working ceaselessly for 
their conversion (Benda, 2012:59). 
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Christianity came from lower class Hutu peasants and poor petit Tutsi. At the same 
time, the first Rwandan Christians were referred to as inyangarwanda, literally 
meaning “haters or repudiators of Rwanda” —not exactly the term one would 
associate with top-down evangelization (Carney, 2016:3). 
 
The colonial governors and missionaries were dissatisfied with king Musinga, who 
remained hesitant of the Christian mission. King Musinga had no place in the 
emerging Belgian-Catholic order because he was very committed to traditional 
religion and Rwandan sovereignty (Carney, 2011:62). Consequently, in 1931, the 
colonial governor dared to depose king Musinga for the sake of “material, moral and 
social progress” and had him replaced by his son, the catechumen Rudahirwa, who 
assumed the name Mutara IV. Rudahirwa started his reign as a Christian king and a 
Constantinian wave of conversion followed (Baur, 1994:454). The new cult gave the 
king and nobility a new legitimacy, switching the Mwami (king) from the focus of 
Imana’s divine power to the Christian king as God’s earthly representative. The new 
religion was accepted as a civic cult, and as such was not able to effect any substantial 
change in social behaviour, for in traditional Tutsi life a civic cult does not influence 
morals ((Baur, 1994:454).  
 
In 1935, Classe believed that in order to establish a Christian kingdom in central 
Africa and reach Lavigerie’s dream “the catechumen king and the Christian chiefs are 
great forces for the mission”. Three years later, Classe stated, “Giving confidence to 
our Christian chiefs is the first duty of all of us” (cited in Carney, 2011:66). In the 
Rwandan context, elite opinion was an especially influential resource given a 
hierarchical society in which patrons brought clients with them into the church 
(Carney, 2011:66). 
 
According to the Rwandan historian Paul Rutayisire, in 1943 king Rudahigwa, a 
replacement for his exiled father, was baptised. His baptism was followed by a wave 
of conversions, including those of chiefs and also resulted in the establishment of 
Catholicism as a state religion, especially after king Rudahigwa’s consecration of 
Rwanda to Christ the King (Rutayisire, 1987:321-346). 
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In 1946, Rudahirwa, dedicating Rwanda solemnly to Christ the King, addressed 
himself to the Lord Jesus, saying: 
 
Lord Jesus, it is you who have formed our country. You have given us a long 
line of kings to govern in your place, even though we did not know you. When 
the time fixed by your Providence had arrived. You have been made known. 
You have sent us your apostles; they have opened to us the light…Now that we 
know you, we recognize publicly that you are our Lord and our King (cited by 
Carney, 2011:71). 
 
Rwanda is a remarkable example of Africa’s mass conversions in the 1930s and 
1950s. Baur argues that the factors facilitating this extraordinary event were first (at 
least for Rwanda), the positive example set by the Mwami (king) in whom the creator 
God (Imana) was in a special way present; second, the thirst for education that led to 
power and progress; and third, an almost complete absence of polygamy. There are 
some theological and missiological effects related to mass conversion. According to 
Baur (1994:453), “The effect of the mass conversions was, in the first place, a “mass-
church” in which the priest had no time for pastoral care. The people remained in 
their ancient social old habits and the solutions to social problems were postponed to 
a future time. Secondly, mass conversion created a quasi-established church in which 
bishops enjoyed all the privileges and influenced all sectors of life, especially 
education”.  
 
In addition, Sylvester Kahakwa (2010:79), a theologian, minister and missiologist 
from Tanzania, affirms that the conversion of the kings led to the conversion of the 
people to the king’s religion. Mass positive response to the king’s conversion was 
rooted in the faithfulness of his subjects, who did not want to refuse to follow their 
king. Such a refusal would be as anathema as committing the crime of incest. 
Therefore, Gatwa (2005:90) clearly affirms the conversion to Catholicism of the 
young, new king and ruling class produced a psychological impact on the masses who 
followed his example. 
 
According to Gatwa (2005:90), there was a common perception that the king had 
ordered his subjects to convert to Catholicism. This sudden mass conversion was 
referred to as a “tornado” in the missionary literature. Gatwa (2005:90) argues, “For 
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some scholars, the tornado was considered as the greatest Catholic missionary 
achievement on the continent—a miracle, ‘the hand of God on earth discovered by 
Europeans’. Others described the movement as the spirit blowing a tornado from 
above”. In fact, the conversion of the king of Rwanda (C) caused the people to be 
baptised in the masses (M), and as a result, Rwanda became known as the most 
Christian country in Africa (O).   
 
These conversions, however, were not the result of a profound faith; the missionaries 
were only interested in baptising as many people as possible (Rutayisire, 1987:328-
33). This baptism of the new king marked a milestone when many people turned to 
Catholicism out of mere opportunism, a movement that came to be known as “the 
word of the king”, irivuze Umwami, or simply “toe the line of the leader”. The 
Protestant churches also gained some momentum with the outbreak of the East 
African revival in 1936 that spread from Gahini (from the Anglican Church in 
Rwanda) and reverberated within and far beyond the borders of the country (WCC, 
2004:54).  
 
Like Rutayisire, Niwagila (1991:159), a Tanzanian Lutheran theologian, adds: 
“Where the kings had accepted the Gospel, there was more response to baptism”. 
However, theologically and missiologically speaking, Niwagila is right when he 
exposes the weakness of this model of conversion. Rather than converting out of 
sincere belief, he indicates that many are baptised following the religion of their king 
or the head of the household or any other important person in their society. In such 
cases, conversion leads to a religion that does not necessarily touch the heart of the 
individual but demands obedience to a civic authority (Niwagila, 1991:159). 
Accordingly, Rutayisire (1987) critically comments that in the case of Rwanda, there 
was an increase in the number of geographical centres for disseminating Christianity, 
as well as an increase in church personnel. In these circumstances, the evangelisation 
could not reach the hearts of the people; it was superficial. This quantitative rather 
than qualitative growth became another source of future disaster (Rutayisire, 
1987:333-336; Ndahiro, 2014:2). This superficial Christianity in Rwanda, according 
to Rutayisire, and in my view as well, might be one of the factors that contributed to 
the mass participation of Rwandan Christians in killings during the 1994 
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genocide.Unlike Rutayisire, Longman does not agree with the idea of superficial 
Christianity. For Longman (2010:10), “Christian involvement in the genocide cannot 
reasonably be attributed to insufficient conversion. Rather, something in the nature of 
Christianity in Rwanda made it unable or unwilling to restrain genocide. The 
Christian message received in Rwanda was not one of “love and fellowship,” but one 
of obedience, division, and power”. 
 
As already noted by Hiebert in section 4.2 above, conversion in Africa meant getting 
jobs, obtaining status and gaining power without abandoning any old beliefs. Like 
Hiebert, Longman (2001) also notes that in Rwanda, people joined the church for the 
resources and power gains rather than spiritual enrichment.  
 
Missionaries in Rwanda sought to attract converts not simply through the power of 
their message, but also through various material incentives. Both Catholic and 
Protestant missionaries established schools and health centres, introduced new crops 
and farming techniques, and began money-making projects to attract public interest. 
Hence, from the inception of Christianity in Rwanda, local parishes were much more 
than spiritual centres. Churches possessed substantial independent resources, which 
they distributed in a similar manner as the chiefs, obtaining support from the 
population by providing them with consumer goods, seeds, health care, and other 
amenities (Longman, 2001:170). 
 
Furthermore, Longman (2001:170) points out, “People sought to employment within 
the churches as priests, catechists, teachers, or lay leaders because it brought not only 
social status, but also power in the form of influence over the distribution of resources 
and opportunities”. Consequently, conversion to Christianity became a means of 
material gain. Buit (2011:32) observes, “Unintentionally, missionaries confirmed 
these ideas. Many converts benefited from the fact that mission stations quickly 
became commercial centers”. In reference to Rutayisire, Buit (2011:33) further asserts 
that conversion to Christianity became particularly lucrative for Tutsi. This is because 
“the missionaries provided education for young Tutsi students and helped them to 
gain important positions in the colonial bureaucracy. Many young Tutsi turned to 
Catholicism to get a job within the Belgian administration. The mission schools 
became the key to the conversion of the Tutsi elite”.  
 
Gatwa (2005:98) agrees with this view when he quotes Father Sibomana (1997):  
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The Catholic Church was the first beneficiary of the evolution. Under the 
authority of Mg. Class, it became the first power in the land; the first employer, 
the first landowner, the first purveyor in education and health care; as an 
ecclesiastical institution, it developed in perfect harmony with the colonial 
authority. The church in Rwanda was growing beyond all expectations, in 
comparison with what was happening in other colonies, all because Belgium was 
a Catholic monarchy. 
 
Indeed, “Churches as they developed in colonial Rwanda were centers of political 
contestation where people struggled for influence and access to resources” (Longman, 
2001:170). The next section discusses the role of the missionaries in introducing 
ethnic ideology, which culminated in the 1994 genocide.  
 
4.4.1 Role of missionaries in ethnic ideology 
Given the close relationship of the missionaries to political power in Rwandan 
history, it is no surprise that we would find the missionaries to be complicit in the 
development of ethnic ideology. This section argues that the link between church 
mission and ethnic ideology can be explained according to three factors. These are: 
 
Firstly, like the colonial government the missionaries held two convictions from the 
beginning: on the one hand, the theory of a Hamitic race, and on the other, the need 
for an elite from that Tutsi community that could assist them in promoting Western 
civilisation (Gatwa, 2005:67). The close link between the colonial authorities and the 
missionaries were the result of a formal co-operation through which the colonisers 
enrolled the missionaries in promoting and propagating the idea of a “superior race” 
and other matters (Gatwa, 2005:67).  
 
Secondly, missionaries had been contributors during the colonial period in the 
consolidation of Tutsi power and the replacement of the king. Conversely, after 
independence, as Longman (2001:171) indicated, “They played an important part in 
the consolidation of Hutu power, and the new president was once again a leader hand-
picked by Catholic Church officials. The missionaries changed their dominant loyalty 
from Tutsi to Hutu but continued to engage overtly in ethnic politics”. 
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Finally, missionaries introduced the kind of historical and anthropological study 
popular at the time, which allowed for the construction of ethnic identities where 
previously there had been none. This pseudo-academic work progressively turned into 
ethnic ideology (Ndahiro, 2014). Later, the post-independence churches in Rwanda 
inherited and adopted these views from the missionaries.  
 
In the light of the role of missionaries in ethnic ideology in Rwanda, Longman 
(1997:5) summarises their roles in the following way: 
 
Missionaries played a primary role in creating ethnic myths and interpreting 
Rwandan social organization— not only for colonial administrators, but 
ultimately for the Rwandan population itself. The concepts of ethnicity 
developed by the missionaries served as a basis for the German and Belgian 
colonial policies of indirect rule, which helped to transform relatively flexible 
pre-colonial social categories into clearly defined ethnic groups. Following 
independence, leaders who were trained in church schools relied extensively on 
ethnic ideologies to gain support, thus helping to intensify and solidify ethnic 
divisions. 
 
Carney (2012:173) therefore affirms, “The Catholic missionaries’ racializing of the 
Hutu-Tutsi distinction ensured the long-term division of Rwanda society along a tribal 
axis”. 
 
As indicated in section 3.5, the post-colonial era was marked by different massacres 
against the Tutsi. How did the missionaries respond to this violence? Carney (2011) 
recalls that Mgr.André Perraudin (Mgr or Bishop), a Catholic leader, described the 
1959 and 1962 massacres organized by local Parmehutu as “popular rage” and 
“violent reactions of the population”. The root of the problem in this interpretation lay 
with recalcitrant Tutsis’ failure to embrace the new Parmehutu government. As a 
result, Tutsi victims were blamed for their own suffering. During the Gikongoro 
massacres, for example, Vatican Radio broadcast referred to it as “the most terrible, 
systematic genocide since the genocide of the Jews by Hitler”. To this, Perraudin and 
the White Fathers reacted by sending a message to the Vatican Radio broadcast to 
defend themselves and Kayibanda’s government. Perraudin also sent a protest 
telegram to the Vatican disputing the broadcast’s usage of the term “genocide,” 
explaining that the Gikongoro massacre did not represent a systematic government 
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plot to eliminate the Tutsi. “To speak of genocide without having proof in hand is a 
gravely reckless judgment…The comparison with Hitler is monstrous and gravely 
offensive for the head of a Catholic state” (Carney, 2011:364,365, 367).  
 
Carney commented that throughout history, ethnic ideology has been embedded in the 
mind-set of Catholic leaders. He argues that Perraudin’s basic conceptual paradigms 
from the early 1960s remained in place in the early 1990s, namely, his dualistic and 
racialist vision of Rwandan society, and pro-Hutu analytical partisanship. In April 
1994, when he was in Switzerland, Perraudin offered an unqualified condemnation of 
the massacres, exhorting Rwandans to “stop, stop this escalation of horror! No more 
war between you, nor ever more. Reconcile yourselves, love one another!” Yet while 
denouncing the recent massacres committed by Hutu extremists, Perraudin also 
expressed his empathy for the Hutu killers, “I condemn them but I try to understand. 
They act out of anger and fear. By anger against the death of their president, Juvenal 
Habyarimana…and by fear of returning to slavery” (cited in Carney, 2011:394). 
 
The massacre that happened in the 1959 Hutu Revolution, proved how racial 
categories was an essential factorin the Catholic Church’s thinking (Horner, 
2014:21).Carney (2011:345) indicates, “Most of the White Fathers supported 
Parmehutu because their leaders offered rhetorical commitment to Catholic doctrine 
and social teaching”. Consequently, missionaries were silent in the face of 
Parmehutu’s ethnicist foundations and supporting of political violence.  
 
In his book entitled, The Churches and Ethnic Ideology in Rwandan Crisis 1900-
1994, Gatwa (2005) further explains the role of the churches—Catholic and 
Protestant—in the development of the ethnic ideology that led to the 1994 genocide. 
He also exposes the extremely intimate relationship that existed between the 
ecclesiastical hierarchy and the ruling administration, which ought to have prevented 
the genocide. For Gatwa, the role of the missionaries is clearly seen in the promotion 
of racial ideology through the “Hamite theory,” which made the Tutsi dominant and 
the Hutu dominated. Both Catholic and Protestant churches accepted and promoted 
this theory of racial supremacy. To explain the role of missionaries and their ethnic 
ideologies, it is worthwhile quoting Gatwa (2001:128) once more: 
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The Germans believed that the Tutsi ruling class was a superior racial type who, 
because of its apparent “Hamitic” origins in the Horn of Africa, was more 
“European” than the Hutu. In the independence period, the Rwandan conflict 
developed into Tutsi-Hutu or Hamite-Bantu conflict, entailing exclusion, even 
amongst the members of the Church. The missionaries and Church leaders, 
Catholic as well as Protestants, adopted and followed this ethnically-based 
ideology in their dealings with their subjects. 
 
In addition to the ‘Hamite myth,’ another ethnic ideology introduced by missionaries 
was the philosophy of “rubanda nyamwinshi,” a Kinyarwanda expression meaning 
‘numerous people’ or ‘the unwashed masses,’ which politically came to mean “the 
Hutu majority.” This term, according to Gatwa (1999:362), “Was adopted by ethno-
politicians after independence in order to express the power of the majority. However, 
its use implied the hidden meaning of the power of the Hutu (the majority) and the 
exclusion of the Tutsi (the minority) whose elite had just lost power”.Gatwa (2001) 
further demonstrates how the colonisers and the missionaries, owing to the political 
and cultural developments of the 1950s, changed from promoting the Tutsi supremacy 
into promoting a new master, the Hutu. This counter version of the supremacy 
ideology called for the rule of the majority “rubanda nyamwinshi”. In the same way, 
Ndahiro also indicates that “recurrent genocides in Rwanda since 1959 were meant to 
maintain the “Hutu majority” in power by killing the Tutsi. Distributive justice 
became equivalent to regional and ethnic quotas; and revolution came to mean 
legitimised genocide of the Tutsis. From the late 1950s, some concepts became 
distorted: thus democracy became mere majority rule” (Ndahiro, 2014:2).  
 
During the 1950’s, the missionaries advocated for Hutu majority rule. What caused 
the missionaries to shift from the Tutsi domination to the Hutu rule? (Carney, 
2012:193) Carney (2012) asserts, “Catholic missionaries downplayed anti-Tutsi 
violence not because they hated Tutsi; many of these same missionaries in fact 
welcomed thousands of Tutsi refugees to the grounds of their missions. Rather, 
missionaries feared that the Catholic Church would lose institutional privileges if it 
critiqued the emerging Hutu government’s complicity in the violence”. However, 
Gatwa (1999:357) believes that “…the change of alliance was due rather to a desire 
on the church’s part to anticipate the events from the perspective of inevitable 
political changes which were being strongly advocated in the UN and by the 
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influential Non-Aligned Movement together with the socialist block”. As a result, the 
Catholic Church remained silent while Tutsi who still lived in Rwanda suffered 
massive reprisals. The leadership of the Church did not raise its voice to address the 
structural and direct violence against the Tutsi that prevailed in Rwandan society 
(Buit, 2011:41). 
 
Longman (2001:168) maintains, “Ethnicity was crucial element that affected   
missionary understandings of exactly who should be considered elite, and thus, who 
should be targeted for conversion and education”. Consequently, Longman 
(2001:169) notes, “Missionaries excluded Hutus from political opportunity and 
privileged the Tutsi because they believed in the natural superiority of the Tutsi. 
Churches accepted engagement in ethnic politics and discrimination as legitimate”. 
 
Mafeza (2013:3) adds, “The missionaries used the colonial educational system in the 
country as “a divisive instrument” and stressed differences between Hutu and Tutsi 
pupils, putting them into categories in and out of school”. In a similar vein, Gatwa 
(1999:353) considers missionary schools as “wombs of racial ideology”. For Gatwa 
(1999), “Both missionary schools and the catechumenate have been used to shape a 
model of society based on Hamite supremacy. These schools aimed at preparing a 
local elite to be auxiliaries to the colonial administration”. Gatwa recalls the 1927 
colonial report as follows:  
 
With the Batutsi Christians the missionaries hope to achieve the creation and 
formation of a social elite that is pro-European. Such an elite is needed. 
Christianity will provide it. Cardinal Lavigerie repeated to the missionary 
societies of Africa that it was necessary to give a firm foundation: that 
foundation rests on our civilization, namely Christianity. If this did not happen 
the Negroes would not understand the civilization which is its offspring (cited by 
Gatwa, 1999:353). 
 
To the above ends, the Catholic Church is accused of “not only having been the 
vehicle of the ideology of the genocide but also of having engaged in a revisionist 
process” (Gatwa, 1999:349).  
 
To summarise this section, the role of missionaries in sowing the seed of ethnic 
ideology can be classified into the following four main points: (1) Catholic 
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missionaries transformed relatively flexible pre-colonial social categories of Hutu and 
Tutsi into fixed ethnic groups. (2) Missionaries promoted the racial ideology of the 
“Hamite theory,” which made the Tutsi dominant and the Hutu dominated. (3) During 
independence, the missionaries switched from promoting Tutsi supremacy to 
supporting Hutu rule under the logic of “rubanda nyamwinshi”. This shift in 
missionary support led to the Hutu revolution of 1959. (4) Missionary schools 
promoted and increased the ethnic divisions in Rwanda. Therefore, missionaries and 
the mission of the churches have been criticized because of their visible role in 
introducing and furthering ethnic ideology. This discussion brings us to the next 
section, which focuses on ethnic ideology in the post-independence church.  
 
4.5 Ethnic ideology in the post-independence church 
 
In this section, the study argues that churches in Rwanda inherited and adopted the 
missionaries’ views of ethnic ideology. Churches allied themselves with the Hutu-led 
government, rarely criticizing the government for the many abuses it committed. Even 
Rwandan church leaders adopted and followed this ethnically-based ideology in their 
dealings with their subjects. This section focuses on churches-state relationships in 
Rwanda. After independence, the Rwandan churches also gained autonomy from the 
structures of the mission churches, but the new Rwandan-led churches retained many 
ways of thinking from their colonial-missional heritage. These ways of thinking 
influenced the relations between Rwandan churches and the post-colonial Rwandan 
state. It is argued, “Church involvement in the genocide can be explained in part 
because of this link between church and state and the acceptance of ethnic 
discrimination among church officials” (Longman, 2001:163). Thus, the next section 
focuses on the relationships between the churches and the state in Rwanda. This 
includes exploring how church leaders became prominent public figures closely 
associated with and supportive of the political regime.  
 
4.5.1 Church-state relationship in Rwanda 
It was indicated in section 4.2 that Western missionaries understood the gospel as part 
of Western civilization. In this regard, developing a Christian civilization required a 
close link between the church and state. In this respect, over time, the tight links 
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between the Catholic Church and the colonial powers led to intimate relations 
between the Rwandan church and the post-colonial state (Carney, 2011:90; Buit, 
2011:33, 45). Consequently, church leaders were actively involved in political 
institutions, which later became one of the factors that contributed to the ethnic 
ideology that led to the 1994 genocide (Longman, 2001:166).  
 
Church leaders, according to Longman (2001:164,166), were closely linked with the 
state and involved in battles over state power. The leaders of the Catholic, Anglican, 
Presbyterian and Baptist churches were not only influential in in the political arena 
but they were also close associates of President Habyarimana and his government, 
and local pastors and priests were often closely allied with local burgomasters and 
communal councillors. As a result, church leaders supported the regime and added to 
its legitimacy. 
 
Anne Kubai (2007b) agrees with this view. In her article, ‘Walking a Tightrope: 
Christians and Muslims in Post-Genocide Rwanda,’ she emphasises that “the Catholic 
Church became linked with the highest echelons of the state and completely 
enmeshed in Rwandan society from top to bottom” (Kubai, 2007b:219). Until he was 
forced to resign by the Vatican in 1985, the Catholic archbishop of Kigali, Vincent 
Nsengiyumva, for example, was a member of the Central Committee of the ruling 
party, the Mouvement Revolutionaire Nationale pour le Developpement 
(Revolutionary National Movement for Development, MRND), and he served as the 
personal confessor of Habyarimana’s wife. In the Anglican Church, both the Bishop 
of Kigali and the Bishop of Shyira (later named Archbishop) were vocal in their 
support for the regime (Longman, 2001:171; Linden, 1997:50). 
 
During a 2004 World Council of Churches (WCC) conference in Kigali, church 
leaders from different countries in the world challenged pre-genocide relationship 
between the churches and the state in Rwanda: 
 
[…]The church from the very beginning, particularly the Catholic Church had 
sided with the political regimes. The Roman Catholic Church seemed imbedded 
in the social and political fabric of Rwanda to such an extent that many analysts 
had difficulty dissecting the connections between the two. While the Protestant 
churches adopted a distant position, keeping away from what some missionaries 
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called “worldly matters” like involvement in politics. The end result is that the 
Church has been either too close to the system and has shared its fate, or too 
distant and has become a bystander. The different injustices, the plight of the 
Tutsi refugees in the settlements, the different crimes committed against the 
Tutsi or against the members of the first republic, were all overlooked and never 
challenged (WCC, 2004:54) 
 
The prophetic voice of the church was either silenced by its close proximity to power 
or by keeping too great a distance from political matters. Therefore, the church 
became an accomplice to the whole system of impunity that led to genocide (WCC, 
2004:54).  
 
From a theological and missiological perspective, we can affirm that the church in 
Rwanda became excessively intertwined with the state. The Habyarimana regime felt 
it gained a degree of legitimacy from its association with the church. Consequently, 
the church is rightly criticized for having failed to publicly condemn ethnic ideology, 
discrimination and violence. The latter comment brings us to the next section, namely, 
the role of Rwandan churches in ethnic ideology and genocide. 
 
4.5.2 Role of Rwandan churches in the endorsement of ethnic ideology 
The Rwandan churches after independence not only retained a particular relation to 
political power from their missionary forbearers, but also retained the legacy of ethnic 
ideology. This section describes how ethnic ideology planted by missionaries was 
inherited and spread by the Rwandan church leaders, and thereafter, promoted and 
legitimised political regimes, which supported the racists. 
 
In his contribution, ‘The Church’s Blind Eye to Genocide in Rwanda,’ Tom Ndahiro 
(2014), a former member of the Human Rights Commissioner in Rwanda, argues that 
in Rwanda, the leadership of the Christian churches, especially that of the Catholic 
Church, played a central role in the creation and furtherance of racist ideology. They 
fostered a system which Europeans introduced and encouraged by reconfiguring 
Rwandan society through the manipulation of ethnic identities (Ndahiro, 2014:1-2) 
Ndahiro (2005) then affirms that “there is no doubt that throughout the history of 
Rwanda, church leaders have had ties with political power. The church of Rwanda 
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was also involved in the policy of ethnic division, which degenerated into ethnic 
hatred”24.  
 
To add to the abovementioned discussion, Gerald van’t Spijker, a theologian and 
missionary from the Netherlands who worked in the Presbyterian Church in Rwanda, 
asks whether religion and the influence of the churches and church leaders have, in 
fact, fueled the genocide, or if Christian missionary activity was even the ultimate 
cause of the genocide? Effectively, van’t Spijker answers, it is argued that the 
presence of Christianity, more precisely the activities of the Roman Catholic Church, 
has not only contributed to the possibility of the genocide, but has been at the root of 
the political constellation that led to the genocide, and that during the genocide, 
Church leaders were actively involved in it. In many documents, he says, it is argued 
that the Rwandan genocide would never have taken place if Christian missions, 
particularly those of the Roman Catholic Church, had not been established in Rwanda 
(van’t Spijker, 2014: 340). 
 
Buit (2011), in his thesis, ‘God spends the day elsewhere, but He sleeps in Rwanda: 
About Catholicism, conflict and peace in Rwanda,’ offers an interesting perspective 
on the role of the Catholic Church in ethnic ideology by comparing the involvement 
of the church to the stages of genocide, as described by Stanton (see section 3.6). In 
parallel ways, the church paved the way for genocide. For instance: (1) The church 
had a large share in the formation of the ethnic identity of Hutu and Tutsi. (2) It 
contributed to the classification of Rwanda’s people into Hutu, Tutsi and Twa. (3) 
The Church promoted a history of Rwanda that pictured Tutsi as rulers and Hutu as 
servants. (4) The leadership of the Church supported the state that eventually turned 
into a genocidal power. (5) In the aftermath of the genocide, the leadership of the 
Church denied any responsibility for the massacres (Buit, 2011:112-113). 
 
The analysis of ethnic ideology with special reference to the role of the church is 
reflected in Hugh McCullum (1995)’s book called, The Angels Have Left Us: The 
                                                          
24
 Viewed from: http:www.newsfromafrica.org. [Date accessed: 10
th
 November2014].  
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Rwanda Tragedy and the Churches. McCullum (1995) recalls Aaron Mugemera’s25 
experience.  When asked about the role of the church in the genocide, he accurately 
identified the underlying problem in the following lament: 
 
Why did the message of the gospel not reach the people who were baptized? 
What did we lose? We lost our lives. We lost our credibility. We are ashamed. 
We are weak. But most of all, we lost our prophetic mission. We could not go to 
the president and tell him the truth because we had become sycophants to the 
authorities. We have had killings here since 1959. No one condemned them. 
During the First Republic, they killed slowly, slowly, but no one from the 
churches spoke out. No one spoke on behalf of those killed. During the Second 
Republic there were more killings and more people were tortured and raped and 
disappeared; and we did not speak out because we were afraid, and because we 
were comfortable (cited in McCullum, 1995:75). 
 
Thus, we can hear in Mugemera’s lamentation the echo of another man who suffered 
greatly in his own fight against injustice, Beyers Naudé (1995):  
 
How is it possible that our preaching was so ineffective, that our actions were so 
timid, that we did so little to ease the pain of the victims, to confront the rulers of 
the country, the exponents of the ideology of apartheid?” (Naudé (1995), cited 
by Meiring, 2005:157). 
 
Naudé, like Mugemera, saw his church failing to confront a fundamental ethnic 
ideology, which undergirded the whole of his society. It does seem that Mugemera 
expressed the fear that ran through the church as well as its uncomfortably close 
association with the political power in Rwanda (Horner, 2014:21). He attributes the 
genocide to the ethnic tensions among church leaders. Instead of healing these ethnic 
tensions, the churches rather accommodated them (McCullum, 1995:75, 78). 
 
4.6 The involvement of Rwandan Christians in the genocide 
 
This section analyses the involvement of the Rwandan church in the genocide by 
asking the question: “To what extent can the church be held responsible for its 
involvement in the events of 1994?” In his doctoral research conducted in Rwanda on 
the topic: ‘Religion in the Remaking of Rwanda after genocide,’ Bazuin (2013) 
highlights three reasons that explain the involvement of the Rwandan church in the 
                                                          
25
Aaron Mugemera is a Tutsi Presbyterian Church minister, who watched as his wife and six children 
were slaughtered in front of him. 
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genocide: Firstly, the genocide took place in what has been called the most Christian 
country in Africa, one in which over 90% of the population professed membership in 
a variety of Christian denominations. Secondly, some of the leaders of the genocide 
were also religious leaders, priests, pastors and nuns. Moreover, many of the killings 
were conducted in churches, as these locations had served as sanctuaries during 
periods of past violence. Thirdly, religious institutions and leaders did relatively little 
to use their power to either save people or condemn the genocide (Bazuin, 2013:52). 
Bazuin (2013:53-56) offers a remarkable perspective on church involvement in the 
genocide in the followings points: (1) Christians as killers, (2) churches as sites of 
genocide, and (3) churches failing to prevent genocide.  
 
1) By Christians as killers, Bazuin (2013) indicates that many of the people who 
participated in the genocide were Christian. Although statistics have not been 
collected on the religious affiliation of people who have been accused, the 
religious demographics of Rwanda at the time means that the vast majority of 
those implicated in the genocide were Christian. Some of the most high-
profile participants in the genocide were religious leaders—both ordained 
clergy and lay leaders. The Catholic parish priest of Kaduha, for example, led 
groups of killers to seek out people in hiding throughout parish buildings and 
in the grounds. The priest at Nyange paid a roadwork crew to bulldoze his 
church in order to kill the thousands of people who had taken refuge there 
(Bazuin, 2013:54). As Des Forges (1999:359) pointed out, “Some clergy, 
Rwandan and foreign, turned away Tutsi who sought their protection. Some 
clergy and other religious persons have been accused of having incited 
genocide, delivered victims to the killers or even of having killed themselves”.  
 
It is essential to be reminded that, on the other hand, religious leaders were 
also targets of the killings, and some risked a great deal to shelter all the 
people they could. A small number of people sacrificed their own lives in an 
attempt to protect people who were targeted for death (Bazuin, 2013:54). In 
reference to Gourevitch (1999), Bazuin recalls that religious leaders at the 
Catholic schools at Ndera near Kigali and in Gisenyi who otherwise would 
have been spared were killed because of their attempts to save people. 
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Sometimes this resistance was somewhat more effective, as the priest in 
charge of the Pastoral Center at Saint Paul managed to save many people’s 
lives who had taken shelter in his facility (Bazuin, 2013:55). Lowe (2008:4) 
affirms, “Without a doubt, Rwandan clergy displayed many acts of courage 
and heroism during the 100 days of slaughter”. Despite the silence of many 
clergy, as Des Forge (1999) puts it, some did defend Tutsi, even at the risk of 
their own lives. Bishop Frédéric Rubwejanga went to the local military camp 
to ask for protection for Tutsi attacked at the St. Joseph Centre in Kibungo. A 
Hutu sister, Felicitas Niyitegeka, is well recognized for her courageous action 
to oppose the genocide. At the beginning of the genocide, she gave shelter to 
many Tutsi in Gisenyi, and then helped them across the border to Zaire to get 
refuge. Her brother, Col. Alphonse Nzungize, who commanded the nearby 
Bigogwe military camp, heard that she was threatened with death for her work 
and asked her to give it up. She refused. On April 21 she was taken to a 
cemetery for execution along with forty-three persons, including other 
religious sisters and Tutsi who had sought refuge with them. She refused to 
abandon the others even after thirty prisoners were slain. She was then shot 
and thrown naked with the others into the common grave (Des Forges, 
1999:360). 
 
2) Churches as sites of genocide are another factor that show the involvement of 
the church in genocide. As already noted, many people were killed in religious 
buildings across Rwanda. This is because in the massacres of 1959 and 1960s, 
churches had served as effective places of refuge (Rutayisire, 1995:115). 
Unfortunately, in 1994, the killers did not respect the sanctuary offered by the 
churches. At two sites south of Kigali, Ntarama and Nyamata, the killers 
surrounded the church buildings while people barricaded themselves inside. 
They broke holes into the walls and tossed in grenades, whereupon the people 
inside were hacked to death with machetes (Bazuin, 2013:55-56). At the 
Roman Catholic parish of Cyahinda (Butare), Longman (1997:5) recalls, “The 
burgomaster subsequently personally supervised gendarmes and civilian 
militia who surrounded the parish complex and, over a four-day period, 
systematically slaughtered more than 20,000 people. The church sanctuary, 
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the last building to be attacked, still bears the marks of bullets and grenades 
and the stains of blood and brains on its floors and walls”. These scenes 
repeated themselves at multiple other sites in Rwanda in the Catholic as well 
as Protestant church buildings. 
 
3) The final element regarding the churches’ involvement in genocide is their 
simple failure to prevent the genocide. Apart from active participation, 
religious leaders and institutions either failed to use their considerable power 
to condemn the genocide or else deliberately minimised the violence to the 
benefit of the genocidal regime. Several high ranking clergy, according to 
Bazuin (2013:56), served as effective mouthpieces for the genocidal regime. 
They justified the violence by saying that the government had been attacked 
first, and they completely denied that civilians were being deliberately 
targeted (Bazuin, 2013:56). 
 
Grey (2007:24), in his book To Rwanda and Back: Liberation, Spirituality and 
Reconciliation, also agrees that “the role of the church is visible, traceable and real in 
the making of the genocide”. For Martin (1995:1-3), “There is no escape from the 
truth that the Christian church has been a player in the tragic events in Rwanda which 
have horrified observers throughout the world in 1994. Churches have been the scenes 
of massacres and the church leaders acquiesced to hideous cruelty”. McCullum 
(1995:68) correctly observes that the church in Rwanda could have been used to save 
many people who were killed during the genocide. The church knew of the impending 
disaster and could have stopped it: “Church pulpits could have provided an 
opportunity for almost the entire population to hear a strong message that could have 
prevented the genocide. Instead the leaders remained silent”. In the past, churches 
have been places of refuge for those threatened with violence. Conversely, in 1994, 
churches became chambers of death, and perpetrators of the massacres. People who 
sought sanctuary in church buildings were instead slaughtered there (Rutayisire, 
1995:15-16).  
 
Equally important, Longman (2001:163) echoes the same standpoint by affirming 
that: 
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Christian churches were deeply implicated in the 1994 genocide of ethnic Tutsi 
in Rwanda. Churches were a major site for massacres, and many Christians 
participated in the slaughter, including church personnel and lay leaders. 
Thousands of Tutsi sought refuge in Catholic and Protestant parishes. But death 
squads surrounded the churches and systematically slaughtered the people 
within, tossing grenades through church widows, firings into the crowds with 
rifles, then finishing off the survivors with machetes, pruning hooks, and knives. 
 
In addition, Longman (2001:163) quotes a human rights group who claimed that 
“…more Rwandese citizens died in churches and parishes than anywhere else” 
(African Rights, 1995:865). However, for some Rwandans, “the country’s churches 
stand as reminders of the violence that decimated their families. The image of bodies 
piled at the altar does not easily fade from the minds of those who survived the 
carnage” (Longman, 2001:163-4). Similarly, McCullum (1995:66) also declares that 
it is clear that the genocide shook the very foundations of the churches, because “none 
remained without blood on its hands”. Some people wish to remain Christians; others 
view the old churches as gravesites rather than places of worship.  
 
For that reason, the involvement of Rwandan churches in their ethnic ideology and its 
genocide support did not only affect the social life of the people, but also their 
spiritual life. After the 1994 genocide, many people inside the church and outside the 
country struggled to understand the involvement of Rwanda’s churches in the 
genocide. Martin (1995) asks: “So how is it that a Christian country deeply affected 
by the revival should have perpetrated a holocaust of ethnic purification in the same 
league as the former Yugoslavia?” After the genocide, many people stopped going to 
church, others moved from the mainline churches to new denominations that claimed 
non-involvement in the killings. Many do not trust pastors, priests and the church of 
Rwanda because of their complicity in the genocide.  
 
This has resulted in a missiological challenge as it has affected the mission of the 
Rwandan church. Citing Kubai (2007b), Buit (2011:100) is right when he maintains 
that the religious demography in Rwanda changed after the genocide. Protestants 
churches, for example, surged by nearly twenty percent in half a decade, while the 
number of Catholics declined by nearly eight percent during the same period. Buit 
explains that some left the church because they were disappointed with its leaders. 
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Others were haunted with memories about the things that happened in their local 
churches during the genocide. Karasira Venuste, one of the tens of thousands who left 
the Catholic Church, explained to a reporter: “‘I no longer go to Mass because of 
what I saw and heard’. The killers yelled: ‘Even God has forsaken you’. ‘I no longer 
see the church as a holy place’” (cited by Buit, 2011:100). Longman also reports an 
interview with a Rwandan woman who told him: “I was a Presbyterian before the 
genocide. But I cannot go back to the church now. Not after what happened there. Not 
after what church people did” (Longman, 2001:163). It is, therefore, not surprising 
that many Rwandans turned to new charismatic communities.  
 
Another effect caused by the church’s involvement in the genocide is the fact that the 
leadership of the church lost its credibility; hence, the church lost its identity of being 
‘salt and light’ in the world. It seems as if the 1994 genocide affected Rwandans’ faith 
in God.The most unanswered question asked by the Rwandan people is: “Where was 
God during the genocide, and why did God allow it to happen? They believed: 
“Imana yirirwa ahandi igataha i Rwanda,” which means “God spends the day 
elsewhere, but He sleeps in Rwanda”. However, by that time, many Rwandans 
thought of their ancient saying and whispered that God had been asleep during the 
genocide (Buit, 2011:3). Many people have wondered “how such carnage could have 
taken place in one of Africa’s most Christian countries” (Longman, 2001:164). 
According to Ndahiro (2004:1), for Jean-Pierre Karegeya (1999), the genocide is 
defined as “morally hideous, an evil expressed in forgetting God, and hence, a new 
form of atheism”. Ndahiro repeats Karegeya’s questions as follows: 
 
Christians killing other Christians? How could Rwandan Christians who 
manifested commitment to their faith have acted with such intense cruelty? How 
did ordinary people come to commit extraordinary evil…? Does the sin of 
genocide disturb the relationship between God and the perpetrators in official 
Catholic Church discourse? How can we explain the strange situation of priests 
involved in the crimes of genocide who are still running parishes in Western 
countries? Why are they protected by the Vatican against any legal 
proceedings?” He concludes: “The church’s attitude towards genocide seems to 
suggest that the hierarchy of religious values is not usually in proportion to the 
hierarchy of moral standards (Karegeya, 1999, cited by Ndahiro, 2014:1). 
 
In fact, the Rwandan church is accused of participating in the genocide of 1994. This 
is due to the fact that church leaders were involved in ethnic ideology and failed to 
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prevent or to speak against violence and mass killings. The 1994 genocide against the 
Tutsi was a Rwandan tragedy but a universal failure
26
. It was a failure in the ethics of 
Rwandan society and the Christian community.  
 
4.7 Complicity and failure of the churches in the Rwandan genocide 
 
The previous section highlighted the involvement of the churches by reflecting on the 
involvement of Christians in the killings, the churches being sites of genocide, and 
how churches failed to prevent the genocide. For this reason, this section exposes 
critics of the churches for its complicity and failure by asking questions such as how 
and why did the church remain passive whilst Hutu extremists and the Habyarimana 
regime perpetrated genocide against the Tutsi? What was the church’s role in terms of 
its actions and inaction during the genocide? What are the outcomes of church 
passivity? 
 
According to Ndahiro (2014), the failure of the Rwandan churches is reflected in how 
the church leaders failed to speak out against racial discrimination as well as political 
and social injustices, and for not condemning the first mass killings or those that 
followed. He claims that leaders took the side of political regimes and consequently 
were unable to exercise the church’s prophetic voice. As a result, Longman (2001:166) 
vividly claims: 
 
Most critics have condemned the churches not for their actions but rather for 
their inaction, for not doing more to halt the bloodshed. Churches are accused of 
‘sins of omission’, failing to act in the face of evil, rather than actively 
supporting or facilitating the genocide. Rwanda’s Christian churches were 
implicated in the violence not simply because they failed to prevent it, nor even 
because they legitimised the regime that carried out the genocide. Instead, 
churches helped make genocide possible by making ethnic violence 
understandable and acceptable to the population.  
 
Like Ndahiro and Longman, McCullum (1995:69) also stresses, “Rwanda’s church 
leaders were cautious to the point of missing the prophetic and pastoral calling rooted 
                                                          
26
 As stated by Gatwa Tharcisse (n. d) when he wasthe General Secretary of the Council of Protestant 
Churches in Rwanda. InChurches and Reconciliation in Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and 
Rwanda Delegations of Norwegian Church Aid, Churches of East DRC and the Council of Protestant 
Churches in Rwanda. Viewed from: http://www.cpr-rwanda.org/documents. [Date accessed: 13 April 
2014].  
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
  
 
 
155 
in biblical and church imperatives to speak justice in all seasons”. Additional critiques 
are highlighted by Rutayisire, who faults church leaders for keeping quiet when they 
were supposed to speak, and for speaking out when it would have been better for 
them to remain silent. The Christians who were born again (abarokole) were so 
heavenly minded that they forgot their role and responsibility of being salt and light in 
the world (Rutayisire, 1998:114-115). Prunier (1995:250) also challenges the 
churches in Rwanda for being bystanders. For him, the church leaderships were at 
best useless and at worst accomplices in the genocide. 
 
Both the Roman Catholic and Protestant church leaders remained silent in the face of 
injustice, unwilling to exert the authority of their positions in the moral vacuum 
within Rwandan society in Habyarimana’s last years. Their statements during the 
genocide and in the chaos that followed were inadequate and insignificant. For this 
silent acquiescence and lack of courage, the churches in Rwanda lost their relevancy 
in the society. They will continue to live under a cloud of suspicion for years to come. 
Meanwhile, the church internationally was unable or unwilling to provide anything 
like the unquestioning support and solidarity it gave for more than twenty-five years 
to the victims of apartheid in South Africa (McCullum, 1995:66). Rwanda illustrates 
the ambiguous position of Christianity in African political regimes where prophetic 
voices have been silenced (Gatwa, 2005:138). 
 
In the words of Archbishop Desmond Tutu (1995): 
 
The story of Rwanda shows both sides of our humanity. The churches were 
sometimes quite superb in what they did in the face of intimidation and at great 
cost to themselves. But there were other times when [they] failed dismally and 
seemed to be implicated in ways that have left many disillusioned, disgruntled 
and angry with the churches and their leadership, many have been alienated and 
feel badly betrayed (quoted by McCullum, 1995:ix). 
 
Though Tutu laments the failure and the complicity of the churches in the Rwanda 
genocide, he still believes that the church can be involved in the ministry of healing, 
restoration, forgiveness and costly reconciliation.  
In short, Longman (1997:10) summarizes the complicity of Rwanda’s Christian 
churches in the 1994 genocide by saying that “the churches actively shaped the ethnic 
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and political realities that made genocide possible by acting to define and politicize 
ethnicity, legitimizing authoritarian regimes, and encouraging public obedience to 
political authorities”. Indeed, church leaders firstly failed to use their influence to 
condemn injustice, violence and killings perpetrated against the Tutsi. Secondly, 
churches failed to provide a theological guideline of ethnicity and failed to find a 
Christian common identity in Christ for both Hutu and Tutsi. Thirdly, they sided with 
political regimes, and consequently, were unable to exercise the church’s prophetic 
voice. All of these failures can be attributed to the church’s captivity to ethnic 
ideology. In the next section, we will explore how this ideology was manifested 
through discrimination and exclusion in the church, even prior to 1994. 
 
4.8 Discrimination and exclusion in the Rwandan church 
 
Ethnic ideology within the church after independence is evident in the church’s 
participation in the broader societal discrimination and exclusion of Tutsi. Such 
discrimination, just as one could find outside the church, was also common in the 
Rwandan church. The church was assumed to be the only institution where Tutsi 
could have some sort of a career. But due to structural discrimination, they never 
made it to the most important positions in the community (Buit, 2011:110; Longman, 
1995:19). Tutsi could become pastors and priests, but no leadership position was 
offered to them. In 1994, for example, there was not a single church leader from a 
Tutsi background in the Protestant churches. Within the Catholic Church, on the eve 
of the 1994 tragedy, three diocesan bishops out of nine had a Tutsi background. This 
absence of inclusiveness in the churches might have had political implications, in that 
sympathy with the rulers of a similar group identity could go unchallenged (Gatwa, 
2005:137).  
 
The Rwandan president, Juvénal Habyarimana, who took power in 1973, continued a 
discriminatory system that banned all Tutsis from working in the army, civil service 
and professional jobs (Wallis, 2006:1). He installed the policy known as regional and 
ethnic equilibrium. It established quotas for ethnic groups and regions proportional to 
their representation in the population. This policy affected access to jobs and 
education in the public and private sectors. The Hutu from the north, whom the 
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regime claimed had been historically disfavoured, received the vast majority of 
opportunities. The Tutsi were awarded a quota of 9% in most areas (Melvern, 
2000:22). There were no Tutsi prefects or bourgmestres (mayors), only one Tutsi 
minister, two Tutsi members of parliament out of seventy, and one Tutsi officer in the 
army (Melvern, 2004:12; Prunier, 1995:75). 
 
According to Mafeza (2013:4), in the 1970s, a racial discrimination termed “équilibre 
éthnique et régional” (ethnic and regional equilibrium, a quota system) was 
introduced. It required the educational system to reflect the theoretical ethnic 
composition of the country: 90% for the Hutu, 9% for the Tutsi, and 1% for the Twa 
population. In 1982 to 1983, for example, only 28 of 424 students (6.6%) at the 
National University of Rwanda (NUR) in Butare were Tutsi. This discriminatory 
policy in the educational system intensified division and hatred among Rwandans. 
 
The quota system was advocated by Catholic priests in April 1972. This 
discriminatory policy had long been introduced in the seminaries within the Catholic 
Church. According to Fr. Jean Ndolimana (1994), as quoted by Ndahiro (2014:5), the 
enrolment of Tutsis in the Nyundo diocese was limited to 4%. On the school card, 
every seminarian had to indicate his father’s ethnic group. The Church fully supported 
the quota system, as expressed in the Bishops’ letter of 28 February 1990:  
 
“…One hears, at times, people complain that due to their ethnic origin, 
employment or admission to school has been refused them. They are either 
deprived of an advantage, or justice has not been impartial in its treatment 
towards them…You do not ignore the fact that the law of ethnic balance in 
employment and schools is aiming to correct this inequality that favoured one, to 
the detriment of the other.  It is evident that such policy cannot please 
everybody, and is unable to produce all the results they were hoping to gain 
(Ndahiro, 2014:5). 
 
The above statement shows the mind and attitude of church leaders, and how they 
contributed toa discriminatory policy and taught their church members to accept a 
morally condemnable policy. The church, as Ndahiro (2014:5) puts it, “Regrettably 
took the side of the political regimes, and thereby could not exercise its prophetic 
role. It did not denounce political and social injustices, nor did it condemn the first 
mass killings, nor those which followed”. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
  
 
 
158 
 
In Kranish’s (2010) words, Mafeza (2013:4) argues, “It was not only the structure of 
the education system that reinforced division, but also the content. The teaching of the 
false history of the differences between Hutus and Tutsi inflamed ethnic hatred and 
violence that eventually culminated in the 1994 genocide”. 
 
Ndahiro (2014:8) points out how Bishop Focas Nikwigize of Ruhengeri was 
unequivocal in supporting the ideology of exclusion and genocide. Even after the 
genocide, in reference to the 1990 RPF invasion, Nikwigize (1995) told a Belgian 
newspaper the following: 
 
The Batutsi would like to restore their power and to reduce the Bahutu to slaves! 
Their objective was to take Kigali by force, whatever the cost; not to share 
power, but to govern. In order to fulfil this objective they used two sorts of 
weapons: their guns, which came from Europe, and their women. They gave 
their women to Europeans and so remained in a strong alliance with them. That 
is how bad they are! A Muhutu is simple and right but a Mututsi is cunning and 
hypocritical. They seem fine, polite and charming, but when the time comes, 
they force themselves on you. A Mututsi is deeply bad, not because of her 
education, but because of her nature (Nikwigize (1995), cited in Ndahiro, 
2014:8). 
 
These declarations, as Ndahiro (2014) asserts, bear witness to the racist stereotypes of 
this priest towards the Tutsi. Considering a people as naturally bad is similar to the 
explanation used by the Nazis to justify the extermination of Jews in order to maintain 
the purity of the Aryan race. This justifies the claim made by Rev. Jorg Zimmerman, 
“What I witnessed was a sort of collective psychological repression phenomenon. 
Rwanda has to be re-evangelised and quite differently if we do not want such 
carnages to come back regularly. But unfortunately, the minds are not ripe yet” (cited 
by Prunier, 1995:251). The church, however, chose to remain silent and use slander as 
a defence mechanism.  
 
It is difficult for institutions like the Catholic Church that are known to command 
respect worldwide to admit that they have been party to policies of racial 
discrimination and genocide (Ndahiro, 2014:10). This problem of not accepting the 
failure is reflected in the speech given by Pope John Paul II addressed to the Rwandan 
people in March 1996. He says: “The church cannot be held responsible for the guilt 
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of its members that have acted against the evangelic law; they will be called to render 
account of their own actions. All church members that have sinned during the 
genocide must have the courage to assume the consequences of their deeds they have 
done against God and fellow men” (cited by Ndahiro, 2014:10). 
 
Although Ndahiro concludes that there is no doubt that church leaders have had ties 
with political power throughout the history of Rwanda, he still believes that the 
church in Rwanda has a mission of uniting people and can regain its credibility. In my 
opinion, I think that Ndahiro is right to suggest that the church must now change its 
vision regarding ethnic issues. If all Christians belong to the same family of God 
whose head is Jesus Christ, the message has to prevail that there are no more Hutu, 
Twa, and Tutsi—but simply “Ndi umunyarwanda,” which means “I am a Rwandan” 
(cf. section 5.4.1.2). Ndahiro (2014:12-13) thus emphasises that in order to restore 
church credibility, the church must contribute to the reconciliation process; hence, 
unity can be re-established among Rwandans, in general, and among Christians, in 
particular. It is the only way that the church can be a witness to truth and help the 
state to save Rwanda from future suffering and bloodshed.  
 
4.9 Conclusion 
 
The focus of this chapter was on Christian mission and ethnic ideology in the 
Rwandan church context. The intention of this chapter was not simply to explore the 
involvement of Rwandan churches in the genocide, but rather to critically evaluate 
how and why Christian churches in Rwanda made this involvement possible. The 
following three main arguments were presented in this chapter: 
 
Firstly, European missionaries embraced Hamitic racial ideology, which was imposed 
on Rwandan society together with the artificial hardening of ethnic identities, making 
violent ethnically-based conflict far more likely than it otherwise would have been 
(Gatwa, 1999; 2005; Longman, 2007; Ndahiro, 2014; Bazuin, 2013).Catholic 
missionaries and lay elites, according to Carney (2012:177), propagated the Hamitic 
thesis, which became the foundation for future ethnic violence. Therefore, the 
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Catholic Church has been criticized for sowing the seeds of genocidal discourse in 
colonial Rwanda. 
 
Secondly, the superficial faith of individuals also explains the mass participation of 
Rwandans in ethnic ideology and genocide. It was argued that Christianity, in the 
Rwandan context, became a religion that did not necessarily touch the heart of the 
convert but provided them with social and political motives for conversion (Niwagila, 
1991:159; Rutayisire, 1989). Longman (1997:9) adds, “Despite the high rates of 
conversion and the magnitude of the churches’ presence in Rwanda, they lacked 
“intensive” power, having attracted many members for social and economic reasons 
without significantly shaping their beliefs”. 
 
Thirdly, many scholars attribute the genocide to the church’s embrace of ethnic 
ideology. As a result, the complicity and failure of the church lies in it close tie to the 
political regime and its refusal to speak out against ethnic ideology and racial 
discrimination that led to the 1994 genocide (Linden, 1997; McCullum, 1995; 
Longman, 2001; Gatwa, 2005). 
 
Despite the fact that Rwandan churches have been accused of active complicity in the 
genocide, today Rwandans continue to look toward the same Christian churches for 
guidance during the reconciliation process. This is a huge task considering the extent 
of the genocide Rwanda experienced and the broken relationships, wounds and 
trauma resulting from it. However, to address and deconstruct ethnic ideology would 
be difficult because even the church was ensnared by it. For these reasons the 
churches cannot shy away from their obligation to engage their members and 
communities, and fully participate in the reconciliation process. The next two chapters 
will discuss various efforts of reconciliation in the post-genocide era. Both chapters 
ask: “How can reconciliation efforts address ethnic ideology and the effects of 
genocide?” Chapter five focuses on the government’s initiatives of reconciliation and 
chapter six focuses on the efforts achieved by the Presbyterian Church in Rwanda. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
THE NATIONAL RECONCILIATION PROCESS: 
A RESPONSE TO THE EFFECTS OF GENOCIDE 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
The aim of this chapter is to describe the extent of the genocide’s impact on Rwanda, 
and the various government-organised attempts to bring about reconciliation. The 
chapter is divided into two main parts. The first part analyses the impact the genocide 
had on the Rwandan society. Given that more than twenty years have passed since the 
genocide, we can now divide the consequences of the genocide into two phases: the 
short-term effects and the long-term effects. The short-term effects included the 
physical, psychological and economic devastation Rwanda faced in the immediate 
aftermath of the genocide. The long-term effects include the continuing legacy of 
these problems, as well as the recurring cycle of an ideology of ethnic division 
leading to hatred and the threat of future violence. Section 5.2 provides a brief 
background describing the short-term and long-term effects, which will be addressed 
by means of reconciliation. In the second part of this chapter, sections 5.3 and 5.4, the 
study will examine the Rwandan government’s various attempts to redress the effects 
of genocide, first by seeking justice, then by pursuing reconciliation. 
 
As already noted in chapters 3 and 4, ethnic ideology was a colonial and missionary 
invention. After independence, it was hardened by Hutu political elites and used as an 
instrument to maintain their powers. Thereafter, this construction of ethnic ideology 
resulted in the 1994 genocide that left the Rwandan society fractured and 
relationships shattered. To address the problem of ethnic ideology and respond to the 
effects of the genocide, reconciliation is pivotal in restoring the broken relationships 
and building social cohesion between groups, as well as to prevent the desire for 
revenge.  
 
Similar to the previous chapters, chapter 5 offers a realist review of the literature on 
interventions with the aim of identifying the different mechanisms at work across the 
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range of interventions, and thereby reach a deeper understanding. In this respect, this 
chapter employs the realist approach to explore and interpret the links between the 
contextual factors and mechanisms that contribute to outcomes (CMO). A realist 
approach highlights the importance of the context in which interventions are 
implemented and the different levels at which they operate. The purpose of this 
approach is to understand an intervention’s underlying theory of change by 
postulating mechanisms which are triggered by the interaction of the context and the 
intervention (Spangaro et al., 2015:1, 2). Therefore, using the realist approach to 
evaluate, it is argued that various effects caused by the 1994 genocide (C) triggered 
the Rwandan government and churches to initiate intervention programs for social 
reconciliation (M) with the aim of restoring broken relations and prevent future 
violence (O). 
 
With regards to the abovementioned approach, chapter 5 examines a variety of 
initiatives and interventions that the Rwandan government used to deal with the past 
and promote reconciliation, for instance, the International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda (ICTR) in Tanzania, a traditional dispute resolution mechanism in the form 
of Gacaca (read: ga-cha-cha) trials, and the creation of the National Unity and 
Reconciliation Commission (NURC). Furthermore, this chapter will broadly describe 
the Rwandan church’s response to genocide before looking more closely at the 
Presbyterian Church in chapter 6.  
 
As we shall see in this chapter, the ICTR and the Gacaca courts were useful for 
addressing the short-term effects of the genocide, especially in bringing justice and 
stability, which would make reconciliation possible. The NURC, however, not only 
addressed the short-term effects of trauma but also attempted to address the long-term 
effects of the genocide by reshaping Rwandan identity. The work of Rwandan 
churches has complemented the NURC’s initiatives in this regard. The lessons from 
these attempts at deconstructing ethnic ideology in order to recapture a pre-colonial 
Rwandan identity will be useful in chapter 6 for evaluating the ministry of 
reconciliation within the Presbyterian Church of Rwanda. 
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5.2 The aftermath effects of the 1994 genocide 
 
In July 1994, the invading RPF put an end to the genocide and installed a new 
Government of National Unity. However, due to the numerous effects of the genocide 
this government faced many challenges with few resources. The genocide that 
occurred was devastating, not only for the people of Rwanda, but also for the entire 
population. The purpose of this section is not just to list the effects of the 1994 
genocide, but also to show how these triggered the Rwandan government to initiate 
intervention programs for social reconciliation with the aim of restoring broken 
relations and preventing future violence.  
 
The immediate, short-term effects of the genocide were immense. The most obvious 
sign of the impact of the genocide was the complete absence of people. Furthermore, 
those who survived were severely traumatised. Buit (2011) outlines the effects of the 
1994 genocide on the lives of the people. Of a population of almost 8 million people, 
about 1.1 million lost their lives during the genocide, the majority of whom belonged 
to the Tutsi group. About 2 to 3 million Rwandan refugees, mainly Hutus fearing 
reprisals, eventually fled to the neighbouring countries and followed their leaders into 
exile abroad. Many were taken as hostages by the ex-FAR (former Rwandan 
government forces) and interahamwe (militia who participated in the genocide). Most 
of them have settled in the neighbouring border regions of the Democratic Republic 
of the Congo (DRC), Burundi and Tanzania. In the aftermath of the genocide, about 1 
million people were internally displaced. On the other hand, over half a million Tutsi 
refugees returned to Rwanda after decades of exile (Buit, 2011:77). In addition to the 
devastating effects on families and communities, these returnees were not accepted 
and integrated in the countries of their former refuge, which strengthened their 
identities as Tutsi from Rwanda (Staub et el., 2005:300). 
 
The speed and ferocity with which the genocide was executed left the country almost 
entirely destroyed. Over a million people were brutally murdered, there were 
numerous unburied dead, the economy was completely destroyed, and there were no 
functioning state institutions remaining. Approximately 400,000 children were 
separated from their parents or orphaned. Moreover, the genocide left a legacy of 
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countless widows and widowers, thousands of handicapped people, and a very 
vulnerable population in its aftermath. Furthermore, 150,000 suspects of genocide 
were awaiting trials, and over 120,000 persons were detained in jails with very poor 
legal infrastructure and limited human resources (Mutamba & Izabiliza, 2005:10).  
 
According to Huyse (2003:55), “Genocide causes immense suffering to all people, but 
it also has a different impact on men and women, because victimization is partly 
gender specific”. Rape was used as a weapon of destruction during the genocide. 
More than 250,000 women were raped and between 2,000 and 5,000 pregnancies 
resulted from war rape. Consequently, 66% of women who were raped tested positive 
for HIV and other infectious diseases. This situation had an impact not only on the 
physical well-being of women, but on their mental health as well. Most of the 
survivors of the genocide—the majority of whom happened to be women—
experienced serious economic deprivation. The level of mistrust among the families 
of those who survived the genocide and those whose relatives were suspected of 
having committed genocide was high and deeply rooted. The population was severely 
traumatized and deeply divided. The 1994 genocide had terrible consequences for the 
people of Rwanda and society as a whole. It left the Rwandan cultural and moral 
fabric torn to shreds (Mutamba & Izabiliza, 2005:10, 15).  
 
The distrust that permeated every corner of the Rwandan society predictably followed 
the lines of ethnic ideology. The survivors continued to live next door to perpetrators 
and as a result, obviously lived in extreme terror. Meanwhile, the Hutus, whether they 
were perpetrators or not, feared being denounced and suffering reprisals. Many fled 
the country as the RPF invaded in July 1994. Distrust has since fluctuated all sides as 
a function of the steps and processes related to the reintegration and re-composition of 
communities (Desmarais, 2004:17). 
 
Relationships are superficial and remain largely functional. Children, in particular, 
bear the marks of the violence and traumatic events. The genocide also affected the 
elderly, who lost their traditional family support. Cultural, social and religious values 
have been scorned, undermining the credibility of different symbols and institutions, 
and the scale of values has been shaken (Kimonyo, 2001:39-40). Many survivors have 
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to cope with severe physical disabilities. Many lost hands, arms, legs and/or other 
body parts when they were attacked with machetes. On top of that, they have had to 
deal with the traumatic memories of the violence they witnessed. The Kinyarwanda 
expression Guhahamuka Syndrome describes the psychological aftermath of the 
genocide—the feelings of despair, hopelessness, worthlessness, excessive crying, 
attempted suicide, being easily startled, repeatedly dreaming of bad events, and 
experiencing mental chaos or flashbacks (Boris et el., 2006:584). Indeed, the impact 
of genocide on survivors is enormous. Staub and his colleagues observe that “their 
basic psychological needs are profoundly frustrated—their identity, their way of 
understanding the world, and their spirituality disrupted. These disruptions, along 
with those of interpersonal relationships, and the ability to regulate internal emotional 
states, co–exist with and give rise to intense trauma symptoms” (Staub et el., 
2005:299). 
 
More than twenty years have passed since the Rwandan genocide, and in that time a 
second level of long-term effects have emerged, beyond the immediate problems of 
trauma and devastation. These long-term effects have reinforced the predictable 
pathways of ethnic ideology, which remains entrenched in people’s minds. 
Consequently, Rwandan society carries the continuing effects of sorrow and 
psychological wounds, on-going prejudice, disagreement about the correct 
interpretation of Rwandan history, a lack of trust in society, a loss of ethical and 
cultural values that used to unify Rwandans, and the continued economic difficulties 
of recovery (NURC, 2007:8). 
 
However, what must be realised is that lurking beneath these various problems is still 
the presence of an ethnic ideology that continues to manifest in the minds of 
Rwandans. This ideology poses a serious obstacle to reconciliation and has the 
potential to renew cycles of violence in the future (Tuyisabe et el., 2008:7). The 
pressing question here is, “What can be done about this ideology?” 
 
In his paper presented on 7 April 2016, during the 22
nd
 anniversary of the genocide, 
Dr. Jean Damascene Bizimana, executive secretary of the National Commission for 
Fighting Genocide Ideology (CNLG), explained that ethnic ideology had become 
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deeply entrenched in Rwandans’ consciousness. The mass participation in killings of 
the civilian population, the enormous number of people killed in a relatively short 
period of time, and the terrible cruelty of the methods used are all signs of the 
magnitude and violent nature of genocide ideology.
27
 
 
According to Rusagara (2010:24), the division caused by ethnic ideology took place 
over a span of a hundred years (1894-1994), starting with the arrival of colonialism. It 
implies that three generations of Rwandans lived with the enduring nature of the 
falsehood of ‘racial’ and ‘ethnic’ division through racial indoctrination in the colonial 
and post-colonial periods. 
 
In post-genocide Rwanda, ethnic ideology has manifested in different ways. 
According to the December 2007 report bytheCommission of the Chamber of 
Deputies, 84 out of 637 secondary schools presented elements of genocide ideology. 
Out of 32 secondary schools visited by a parliamentary commission, 26 were 
undermined by this ideology, which emerged through the marginalization of pupils 
who survived the 1994 genocide. To illustrate this point, two secondary schools are 
mentioned as examples. In the Gaseke Secondary School in the Northern Province, a 
text of 10 points was circulated, recalling the 10 commandments of the Hutu 
extremists published by the newspaper Kangura, on account of which the editor-in-
chief was sentenced to 35 years of imprisonment by the ICTR. In the Shyogwe 
Secondary School, tracts were found, which threatened the Tutsis with another mass 
extermination (Tuyisabe et el., 2008:117). 
 
In his writing, ‘Tackling genocide ideology in schools,’ Emanuel Ntirenganya 
(2016:2) notes thatDr Joseph Nkurunziza, the president and co-founder of “Never-
Again Rwanda” (NAR), a human rights and peace-building organisation, affirms that 
“genocide ideology among students is adopted from parents, educators, and those who 
committed the genocide”. In response to genocide ideology among students, in 2002 a 
group of university students initiated ‘Never-Again Rwanda’. According to 
Ntirenganya (2016:2), NAR aims at “promoting sustainable peace and tolerance 
                                                          
27
Bizimana. 2016. ‘Rwanda: Kwibuka22 to Focus on Fighting Genocide Ideology’. New Times 
Newspaper, p.1. Viewed from: www.newtimes.co.rw/section/article/2016-04-07/198748. [Date 
accessed: 2 May 2016]. 
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among the young generation as a means of preventing a reoccurrence of the 
genocide”. 
 
Citing Nkurunziza (2016), Ntirenganya (2016:2) notes, “Never-Again Rwanda equips 
the youth with leadership and mediation skills, adding that there are so far 84 Never-
Again clubs in schools and 20 clubs for the schools graduates to work with 
communities. These clubs have been crucial in uprooting genocide ideology among 
the youth.”28 
 
Odora (2007:10) stresses, “To fight genocide ideology, it is imperative that every 
person must play his or her positive part”. In addition, Tuyisabe et al. (2008:120) 
propose, “In order to fight against ethnic ideology and hatred it is necessary to bet 
once again on solidarity camps for teachers, pupils of secondary schools and students 
of higher education”. Moreover, it would be essential to introduce in the national 
education system a course on the eradication of ethnic and genocide ideologies 
(Tuyisabe et el., 2008:120).  
 
As described in section 3.6, denial of the genocide is another way in which ethnic 
ideology continues to be expressed. According to Rwamucyo (2015:3), “denial is 
always the final stage of genocide whereby statistics are minimized, access to 
evidence and archives are denied, and witnesses are killed or intimidated. The victims 
are mocked and presented as the cause of what befell them. What happened is referred 
to as a civil war and not genocide. Denial is aimed at evading accountability, 
justifying what happened and is a larger part of the continuation of the genocide 
project”.29 
 
In present-day Rwanda, denial is manifested in two ways: First, it intensifies as each 
annual commemoration day draws near, particularly when people question the 
continuing need to remember the events of 1994. In the aftermath of the genocide, 
denial was expressed in the form of an absolute denial of the crime and its 
                                                          
28
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April, p. 2.Viewed from: www.newtimes.co.rw/section/article/2016-04-07/198748. [Date accessed: 2 
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specificities. Subsequently, evidence of the genocide became indisputable and 
received judicial recognition from the ICTR and the United Nations (UN). Since then, 
deniers have adopted new strategies. They have succeeded in winning over the 
sympathy of the judicial institutions of some Western states, NGOs, and international 
organizations using them for political ends.
30
 
 
In response to the immediate and long-term effects of genocide, the Rwandan 
government set out mechanisms and strategies for reconciliation. The next two 
sections will explore these efforts. The government’s long-term focus has shifted to 
fighting the continued presence of ethnic ideology, as we shall see.  
 
5.3 Restorative justice towards reconciliation in the aftermath of genocide 
 
In addition to the trauma experienced by victims, the large numbers of suspects in 
prison after the genocide had a serious impact on the justice and reconciliation 
process, as well as on the national economy and on the survival of their own families. 
For this reason, the international community and the new Rwandan government 
recognized that reconciliation needed to first restore some measure of stability and 
justice. In terms of the four dimensions of reconciliation from section 2.5, truth-telling 
about the events of 1994 became the first step in promoting healing, forgiveness, and 
the restoration of relationships. Uncovering the truth about the events of the genocide 
was a task taken up first by the International Criminal Tribunal of Rwanda, in order to 
bring the leaders and planners of the genocide to justice. However, given the mass 
participation in the genocide, not every perpetrator could be prosecuted. So the task of 
telling the truth in order to reconcile broken communities later became the 
responsibility of the government-initiated Gacaca courts, as will be discussed later in 
this section. Both of these organizations were focused on illuminating and addressing 
the immediate circumstances surrounding the 1994 genocide, but despite this rather 
narrow focus, they were essential in the process of reconciliation. 
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In post-genocide Rwanda, the Government of National Unity was faced with several 
important questions. Carroll (2000:164) highlights some of the questions as follows: 
“How to achieve justice for the victims and survivors, hold individuals accountable 
for serious violations of international humanitarian law, deter future mass atrocities, 
and establish lasting peace”. 
 
 At the same time, the brutality of modern conflict such as genocide has led the 
international community to identify new crimes and find new ways of dealing with 
these issues (Mukherjee, 2011:331). For this reason, justice is pertinent to Rwanda 
post-genocide. According to McCullum (1995:xxiv), justice is the only way Rwanda 
can be healed and reconciled. For McCullum, justice is a means of naming the 
genocide, recognising the root cause of the madness, punishing the perpetrators, and 
perhaps above all, supporting Rwandans in their overwhelming grief. 
 
In his article, ‘Justice as a Tool for Peace-Making: Truth Commission and 
International Criminal Trials’,’ Goldstone (1996) proposes five positive contributions 
that justice can achieve in the reconciliation process. These are: 
 First, exposure of the truth can help to individualise guilt, and thus avoid the 
imposition of collective guilt on a group 
 Second, justice brings public and official acknowledgment to the victims. 
 Third, public exposure of the truth is the only effective way of ensuring that 
history is recorded more accurately.  
 Fourth, there is only one way to curb criminal conduct and that is through 
good policing and the implementation of efficient criminal justice.  
 Fifth, exposure of the nature and extent of human rights violations frequently 
will reveal a systematic and institutional pattern of gross human rights 
violations. It will assist in the identification and dismantling of institutions 
responsible for past violations and deter future recurrences (Goldstone, 
1996:488-490).  
 
Justice, from a theological perspective, is considered a key component of 
reconciliation. Schreiter, for example, asserts that there can be no reconciliation 
without justice. For him, reconciliation without justice leads to new outbreaks of 
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violence and oppression. It is an attempt to establish peace and unity without truth, 
and for that reason is bound to fail (Schreiter, 1992:65). Writing from a South African 
theological perspective, Meiring (2013:8) also acknowledges the relevance of justice 
in the reconciliation process. He describes, “Justice and reconciliation are two sides of 
the same coin”. In the same vein, Kubai (2007:230) believes that, in the post-genocide 
Rwanda, “one cannot demand reconciliation and reconciliation cannot occur in a 
vacuum. Hence, there is a necessity of justice”. 
 
Furthermore, Meiring highlights the importance of both restorative justice and 
retributive justice. He states that in South Africa, justice “brings a number of issues to 
the fore, not only the issue of proper government reparation to the victims of human 
rights abuses to balance the generous granting of amnesty to perpetrators of the 
abuses. It also includes the wider issues involving every South African: 
unemployment, poverty, affirmative action, equal education, restitution, the 
redistribution of land, reparation tax, et cetera” (Meiring, 2013:8-9). Archbishop Tutu 
often made an important distinction between retributive justice and restorative justice. 
In this regard, Meiring refers to Tutu’s argument, explaining that retributive justice 
has as its raison d’être the need to punish the perpetrator. Restorative justice is not 
punitive but restorative and healing (cited by Meiring, 2013:8-9).However, it is 
important to be reminded that this research is carried out in the Rwandan context. 
This explains why restorative justice is underlined, as described in section 5.3.2.   
 
5.3.1. The international criminal tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) 
In collaboration with the Rwanda government, the UN initiated legal procedures for 
prosecuting and punishing those responsible for Rwanda’s genocide. The ICTR was 
set up by the UN in the neighbouring country of Tanzania to prosecute leaders of the 
genocide. In her analysis, Christina M. Carroll (2000) did an ‘Assessment of the Role 
and Effectiveness of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and the 
Rwandan National Justice System in dealing with the Mass Atrocities of 1994’. By 
doing so, she highlights the purpose for the establishment of the international tribunal. 
Carroll (2000:167) puts it clearly as follows: “No one was prosecuted or otherwise 
held accountable for the cycles of violence against Tutsi from 1960 to 1994. Thus, a 
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culture of impunity developed in which citizens did not feel obligated to a rule of law 
and did not fear retribution for their actions”.  
 
At a Security Council meeting concerning the creation of the ICTR, Rwandan 
ambassador to the UN, Manzi Bakuramutsa, stated, “It is impossible to build a state of 
law and arrive at true national reconciliation if we do not eradicate the culture of 
impunity which has characterised our society” (cited by Carroll, 2000:171). 
Therefore, the ICTR was created “to prosecute serious violations of international 
humanitarian law, to establish law and order, and thereby to contribute to the 
restoration and maintenance of peace and national reconciliation in Rwanda” (Carroll, 
2000:171-2).  
 
As Carroll (2000:172) described it, there are various reasons that forced the 
international community to create an “international” criminal tribunal, as opposed to 
relying on the Rwandan national justice system. First, like any other Rwandan 
institution, the Rwandan judicial system was in ruins after the 1994 genocide and had 
no human and financial resources to deal with the massive number of perpetrators. 
For example, out of the 800 lawyers and judges of the national and provincial courts, 
only 40 were alive and in the country after July 1994. Thus, Carroll (2000:172) 
affirms, “An international tribunal was needed to begin prosecuting offenders while 
the Rwandan government rebuilt the domestic judicial system”. Second, an 
international tribunal was needed in order to achieve justice and accountability in 
Rwanda but also to prevent other crimes in other parts of the world (Carroll, 
2000:172-173). Consequently, the tribunal was established not only to restore peace 
and justice in Rwanda, but also to maintain international peace and security as a new 
institution which could pave the way for the prevention of such atrocities in the future 
on a more general level.  
 
In reflecting on the purpose of the ICTR, it is important to bring into the discussion 
the contribution of the ICTR towards reconciliation processes in Rwanda. Scholars 
such as Gallimore (2008:242) maintain that, “The ICTR has been successful in its 
mandate to hold accountable the highest level of perpetrators who organized and 
carried out the genocide in Rwanda”. As noted in chapter 3, numerous massacres of 
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Tutsi civilians have taken place throughout Rwandan history, with no punishment 
being handed down tothose involved. The ICTR, therefore, has challenged the 
historical impunity that existed in Rwanda for government and military officials who 
conducted previous massacres. The primary contribution of the ICTR, as Gallimore 
(2008:259) noted, is “through its holding accountable the main perpetrators of the 
genocide or the planners of genocide. This may have the effect of breaking the 
mimetic cycle of violence and revenge that characterizes the history of impunity in 
Rwanda”. 
 
In her research paper, ‘Hybrid models of justice and Rwanda’s post response,’ Rachel 
Andrew (2014:38) points out that besides its success, “The ICTR has been often 
criticized on the basis that it is bureaucratic, costly, slow, and inaccessible and 
detached from ordinary Rwandans”. Andrew (2014:38) also asserts, “The fact that the 
ICTR was located in Tanzania, and the fact that the proceedings were conducted in 
English and French (only in 2000 did the ICTR also include Kinyarwanda) made it 
difficult for the Rwandan people to attend court proceedings or hear news of it”. 
Furthermore, Andrew (2014), with reference to Bornkamm (2012), asserts that from a 
local and community standpoint, the ICTR has not been considered in a positive 
manner by ordinary Rwandans:  
 
Most of them believe that the form of justice that the tribunal represents has 
nothing to do with them and is simply incapable of helping them to solve their 
problems. Often the ICTR is just associated with scandals… In fact, it actually 
appears that more Rwandans are largely unaware of the ICTR’s work (Andrew, 
2014:39).  
 
According to Andrew (2014:39), the ICTR criticism lies on it geographical location, 
and is thus inaccessible to many Rwandans. Again, the lack of community ownership 
and distance from the post-conflict population limits the effectiveness and reach of 
the ICTR’s contributions. In fact, despite some shortcomings, Andrew believes that 
“the ICTR has successfully achieved its mandate of fairly prosecuting the main 
orchestrators and those most responsible for the Rwandan genocide” (Andrew, 
2014:39).  
 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
  
 
 
173 
However, it must be noted that due to the large numbers of people to be tried and the 
weak national court system, the process of justice was very slow and the system was 
overwhelmed. The Rwandan government thus established a third system of justice 
called the “Gacaca” courts to try to speed up the process and bring justice to the 
people.  
 
5.3.2 The Gacaca: Truth and restorative justice 
As indicated in the previous section, justice is considered an essential precondition for 
reconciliation in Rwanda (Brannigan & Jones, 2009:198). However, Wielenga 
(2011a:43) contends, “There was no judicial system left in place and the government 
had to rebuild the country from scratch, while hundreds of thousands of people 
accused of genocide were crowded into prisons”. Therefore, in order to address the 
genocide crimes within Rwanda and promote coexistence and reconciliation between 
victims and perpetrators, the government turned to a traditional justice system called 
Gacaca. According to Wielenga (2011a:43), the Gacaca involved “holding court 
cases within local communities, outside on the grass, with respected community 
leaders acting as judges. Through this process, thousands of court cases could be held 
across the country simultaneously, and members of the community were directly 
involved in resolving the cases”.  
 
In order to understand the significance of the Gacaca courts for the reconciliation 
process, we must remember that reconciliation cannot be imposed upon a community, 
but must be owned by a community. Citing Desmond Tutu, Bloomfield et al., (2003:i) 
states that “reconciliation cannot be imposed from outside, nor can someone else’s 
map get us to our destination: it must be our own solution”. Furthermore, Huyse 
(2003:23) makes it clear that “societies and communities affected by large-scale 
violence need to own the reconciliation process; it is not something that can be 
imposed from outside or from the top down”. For Huyse (2003:23), “Lasting 
reconciliation must be home-grown, because in the end it is the survivors who assign 
meaning to the term and the process”. 
 
With this mind, the Gacaca courts represented the transfer of ownership over the 
reconciliation process to local communities, encouraging them to become the primary 
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actors. Nantulya (2006:45) has suggested, “Rwanda is one of the few African 
countries that has integrated traditional and modern peace mechanisms practically and 
holistically”. Nantulya argues that in the aftermath of genocide, the designers of 
Rwanda’s peace and reconciliation models studied in significant detail the 
experiences of other countries, but no clear solutions emerged. The rooted patterns of 
ethnic ideology and discrimination, which led to the 1994 genocide, had affected 
Rwanda to such an extent that reconciliation strategies could not be borrowed from 
elsewhere. In an interview with Nantulya (2006:46), Fatuma Ndangiza (2006), the 
former Executive Secretary of the NURC, stated the following: 
 
We had to think of fresh, original and unique models and not just copy others 
blindly. For us, perpetrators and survivors had to continue living side by side. If 
we had resigned ourselves to the conventional way of doing things and forgotten 
our own rich traditions and heritage of dealing with conflicts, we would have 
ended up with a rather formalized, legalistic and elite driven mechanism, with 
little or no relevance at all to the grassroots. That, is not the route we wanted to 
follow (cited by Nantulya, 2006:46). 
 
Mass participation in the 1994 genocide put more than 100,000 prisoners in jail, a 
backlog which would have taken the formal judicial system a century to resolve. In 
order to ease this burden, the Gacaca courts were spread around the country in over 
9,000 communities. In most cases, the courts were convened weekly by elected judges 
and community members were legally required to attend. Accused perpetrators, 
except those categorised as most culpable, were judged in these Gacaca courts 
(Staub, 2014:506-7). Kubai (2007a:57) points out the purpose of Gacaca as follows: 
 
The Gacaca courts were not just a way to deliver justice to the huge number of 
prisoners awaiting trial, but were envisioned as a key restorative mechanism, a 
means to contribute to the national process of social reconstruction. The goal of 
Gacaca was to promote reconciliation by providing a platform for victims to 
express themselves, encouraging acknowledgement and apologies from the 
perpetrators, and facilitating the coming together of victims and perpetrators ‘on 
the grass’. This restorative justice approach was predicated on the assumption 
that in a conflict situation, victims and offenders have all been hurt. It therefore 
emphasises the reconciliation of the parties and the healing of wounds arising 
from the atrocities.  
 
Essentially, the Gacaca courts were “a platform for telling the truth about the 
genocide that claimed a million lives; it is hoped that this will lead to healing for both 
victims and victimisers” (Bloomfield et al., 2003:112). 
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Traditionally, the Gacaca serve four important functions, these are: it brought 
together the offenders and the offended; it sought the truth; it addressed the conflict; it 
reconciled parties (Kubai, 2007a:55). Frank Rusagara (2010:20), writing on ‘Gacaca 
as a Reconciliation and Nation-building strategy in the post-genocide Rwanda,’ 
indicates that Gacaca was a “strategy for conflict management through restorative 
justice, while serving its historical role as the lubricant that ensured unity and 
cohesion in the society” (Rusagara, 2010:20). Gacaca were traditional councils and 
tribunals made up of elders to resolve conflict and administrate justice. Gacaca 
literally means ‘a resting and relaxing green lawn in the Rwandan homestead’ where 
community, family members or neighbours met to exchange views on issues directly 
affecting them, especially issues related to conflicts. The Gacaca’s participatory 
approach derived its impetus and legitimacy from ubumwe bw’ Abanyarwanda (the 
unity of Rwandans); in as much as, it complemented the same unity by being the 
cement that strengthened social relations in the name of justice (Rusagara, 2010:20). 
In this respect, the Gacaca courts not only solved a practical problem in a restorative 
way, but also made a claim on identity, restoring pride in their common traditions and 
providing a way to solve their problems in a uniquely Rwandan way (Zorbas, 2004:3). 
 
In the post-genocide context, Gacaca was a mixture of the traditional and modern 
legal system—a voluntary process set up in all villages across the country for a 
limited period of time. Most of the work was done at the local level where the acts of 
genocide were committed. Nine judges were elected by the population from among 
people of integrity— called Inyangamugayo. They were trained to hear the cases for 
three of the four categories of perpetrators and to pronounce judgment. Prisoners and 
their files were transported from the central prison to communal prisons where they 
had allegedly committed genocide; they were returned to the communal prisons after 
the Gacaca audiences.  The villagers were required to attend the Gacaca once a week 
One day per week was set aside to allow the villagers to attend the Gacaca (Kubai, 
2007a:55).  
 
On the other hand, Andrew contends that despite being an innovative response to the 
1994 genocide and shortcomings of the criminal justice system, the Gacaca courts 
were not without their faults or controversy. The criticisms brought to the Gacaca 
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courts were that “they were overly retributive, hindered by a deep sense of mistrust 
and fear of safety, and created more suspects rather than less” (Andrew, 2014:47). In 
addition, like the ICTR, the Gacaca struggled “to cope with the deep sense of 
mistrust, insecurity, and destruction of social relationships. These feelings diluted the 
quality and quantity of participation, which in turn diminished the powerful potential 
of the Gacaca courts. This is evidenced by the fact that many Rwandans have cited 
fear of exposing themselves to reprisals for participation in the justice system” 
(Andrew, 2014:47-49).  
 
Despite some shortcomings and challenges of the Gacaca, other scholars 
acknowledge its merits. Professor Nick Johnson (2012), Rector of the Institute for 
Legal Practice and Development (ILPD) in Nyanza, Rwanda, in his article titled, 
‘Law, Justice and Reconciliation’ points out that the Gacacas were an extraordinary 
imaginative response to an almost impossible situation. It is difficult to conceive of a 
formal justice system that could have worked as effectively in the post-genocide 
period in Rwanda. Justice is never perfect but in any judicial calculus, the fact that 
Rwandans in every district and cell were able to participate in its processes made a 
decisive impact on reconciliation in Rwanda and the processes of justice. A survey of 
opinion in Rwanda shows general approval of Gacaca. Here is atypical comment 
from a genocide survivor: 
 
In truth if the Gacaca process hadn’t been there, people wouldn’t even have 
asked for water from their fellow Rwandans. We feel that the Gacaca allowed 
the truth about the genocide to come out. It allowed us to exhume and find our 
killed loved ones who had been left in the hills so that we could bury them in the 
memorial sites for genocide victims in sector (Johnson, 2012:50). 
 
The Gacaca finally completed their work in 2011, after attending to nearly 2,000,000 
cases. Many more cases remained unsolved, but it was decided that these would be 
pursued by the national court system of Rwanda (Johnson, 2012:50-51). For the 
Rwandan authorities, Gacaca emerged as a response to an immediate crisis in the 
judiciary, but it also served as a method to achieve reconciliation. Gacaca has 
encouraged a large number of prisoners to confess and request forgiveness.  
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Due to the merits of the Gacaca mechanism, it is an approach that could be 
implemented even in other African countries to solve conflicts. Molenaar (2005:157) 
observes: 
 
Gacaca offers the people on the ground a mechanism to deal with this legacy 
themselves, without too much interference from outsiders. For this reason, 
gacaca has been found to be important to provide lessons too many African 
societies because they share the problems of civil war and its aftermath. 
However, these societies also share these informal, accessible and restorative 
legal traditions that are incorporated in communities and whose main goal is to 
reconcile conflicting parties. For these reasons, gacaca’s relevance goes beyond 
the borders of this small country Rwanda.  
 
In fact, according to Nantulya (2006), the lesson to learn is that “hybrid peace and 
reconciliation models which integrate culture and modern approaches holistically and 
practically can be just as useful as strictly formal mechanisms. Therefore, it is clear 
that Gacaca has been an essential part of the truth and reconciliation strategy”. 
Gacaca was a people-driven authority in search of truth, justice and social 
reconstruction. For the purpose of reconciliation, it was necessary to first uncover the 
truth of what happened, a role well played by the Gacaca. 
 
5.4 Reconciliation and the future of Rwanda 
 
Here I ask, “Is reconciliation even possible after genocide?” “How can it be 
achieved?” Considering these questions, Minow (1998:5) maintains, “No response 
can ever be adequate, where one has to factor in the terrifying existential crisis faced 
by survivors of genocide,” their brush with the attempted annihilation of “not only 
yourself, but also everything that constitutes your world, everything that makes your 
life worth living…your work, your family, your children…all that was on the point of 
being wiped out, too”.  
 
Despite the overwhelming task at hand, I support Zorbas’ (2004:1) viewpoint when 
she correctly argues, “In the case of genocide, inaction is unacceptable because it 
leaves grievances, fears of reprisals, and cultures of impunity to fester, encouraging a 
cyclical outburst of violence by the perpetrators of tomorrow”. For Zorbas (2004:1), 
reconciliation is thus “the only sustainable and genuine form of prevention in 
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societies that have undergone mass violence”. In the Rwandan context, reconciliation 
is extremely important both politically and socially. If Rwanda is to be healed, 
reconciliation is the compelling priority of the contemporary times. While the various 
judicial interventions described in the previous section were a necessary part of the 
reconciliation process, they could not bring about true unity around a new Rwandan 
identity. For this reason, the NURC introduced a wide range of society-level 
interventions to promote reconciliation. The following section discusses the role 
played by the NURC in the reconciliation process.   
 
5.4.1 The National Unity and Reconciliation Commission (NURC) in Rwanda 
In the aftermath of the genocide, the Rwandan government worked to reconstruct 
Rwanda. The reconciliation process in Rwanda focused on reconstructing the 
Rwandan identity, as well as balancing justice, truth and peace and security in the 
country. Different measures have been taken by the Rwandan government to bring 
perpetrators and victims together to live side-by-side in peace. For example, the 
Constitution now states that all Rwandans share equal rights. Laws have been passed 
to fight discrimination and divisive genocide ideology. The government established 
the National Unity and Reconciliation Commission (NURC) in 1999 (Department of 
Public information, 2012). According to Clark (2010:139), the NURC was finally 
established by an Act of Parliament on 12 March 1999.  
 
It is very significant to remember the complexity of the post-genocide reconciliation 
process. The dilemma, as Mamdani (2002) observes, is due to the proximity between 
the perpetrators and the victims. This dilemma of knowing your abuser is what 
complicates a reconciliation process. For this reason, the NURC set a common 
understanding of reconciliation. Thus, NURC defines unity and reconciliation as:  
 
A consensus practice of citizens who have common nationality, who share the 
same culture and have equal rights; citizens characterised by trust, tolerance, 
mutual respect, equality, complementary roles/interdependence, truth, and 
healing of one another’s wounds inflicted by our history, with the objectives of 
laying a foundation for sustainable development (NURC, 2007:6-7).  
 
As it is stated in its mandate, the NURC has organised several meetings, conferences, 
and workshops on the themes of unity and reconciliation. 
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Between October and December 2005, a complete evaluation of the impact of the 
NURC was conducted by Paul Nantulya, an expert from the Institute for Justice and 
Reconciliation in South Africa. He managed the activities of the Institute in the Great 
Lakes region. Nantulya and his team conducted random interviews, focus group 
discussions, beneficiary workshops, stakeholder meetings and field visits to 
communities and NURC projects in all provinces. They also randomly interviewed 
765 respondents in six regions. 
 
As a result of this research, an article titled, ‘African Nation-building and 
Reconstruction: Lessons from Rwanda,’ was published in 2006 by Nantulya in 
collaboration with the NURC. According to Nantulya (2006:47), unlike other post-
war reconciliation commissions, the NURC “is not modeled on a strict mandate with 
a limited time-frame. It is designed to stimulate reconciliation at the grassroots level 
and to gradually transfer ownership of the reconciliation process to communities. It is 
a non-prosecutorial mechanism which complements the Gacaca courts”. Madame 
Aloisie Inyumba, the former Executive Secretary of the NURC, summarized the 
achievements of the commission as follows: 
 
In our experience, we found out that the people had to come first. The only thing 
they need is an enabling environment… and once that is in place… they will 
take up the reconciliation agenda on their own. We wanted to have a structure 
that would evolve from within communities. For a whole year, we carried out 
consultations with communities throughout the country, which were very 
successful. That is when we realized that the people are a resource in 
themselves. We followed suit, and worked hard to set up programmes based on 
those consultations (cited by Nantunya, 2006:47). 
 
It is clear that from the above statement, the programs are based on grassroots 
reconciliation and individuals in the community have to contribute a crucial role, as 
reconciliation is a Rwandan agenda and should not be imposed from the outside.     
 
5.4.1.1 Tools of reconciliation used by the NURC 
The Rwandan government believes that aspects of Rwandan culture and traditional 
practices are valuable to enrich and adapt its development programmes to the 
country’s needs. Consequently, traditional mechanisms continue to play a role in the 
conflict resolution and reconciliation process. The NURC offers tools to culturally 
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integrate reconciliation techniques that honour indigenous knowledge. As described 
by Nantulya (2006:48), the NURC has adopted the following tools in its approach to 
reconciliation. 
 
Ingando  
Ingando, known as a solidarity camp, is taken from the Rwandan verb Kuganda, 
which refers to halting normal activities to find solutions to national challenges. 
Historically, Ingando were first established by the military. Whenever Rwanda 
experienced issues such as disasters, wars, natural calamities, etc., the king of Rwanda 
called and prepared the population through Ingando. These were communal retreats 
where people shared in the decisions on war and peace, and how Rwanda should be 
governed. Currently, the NURC formally adopted Ingando as one of its key 
interventions to bring about community engagement. It entails problem-solving 
retreats for different categories of people. In the beginning, the programme focused 
on refugees and demobilized soldiers. By 2002, the training was extended to informal 
traders, and other social groups including survivors, released prisoners, community 
leaders, women, youth and people with disabilities. Approximately 3,000 students 
undergo Ingando each year. To cope with the intake, a National Ingando Centre was 
built in Nkumba, Ruhengeri, as a permanent facility to house programmes (Nantulya, 
2006:48).  
 
The ingando tool later expanded to include youth and students at secondary and 
tertiary levels. Consequently, the NURC acknowledges that education is a useful tool 
for both promoting reconciliation and preventing future violence. To that end, Mafeza 
(2013:9) reminds us, “Prior to genocide, education was a channel through which 
hatred and ethnic ideology were conveyed. However, after the genocide, the same 
education is now used as a tool to reconcile Rwandans and to combat genocide and its 
ideology”. Emphasis is placed on peace and unity in the primary and secondary 
school curricula to ensure that students learn to coexist free from discrimination and 
exclusion. The goal is to build unity and encourage reconciliation by promoting peace 
and tolerance, which in turn prevents the recurrence of future violence (Mafeza, 
2013:9). The purpose of focusing on Rwanda’s problems and history is to tell the 
truth about what happened in 1994. A deeper understanding of Rwandan history is 
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needed in order to de-construct and de-mythologize ethnic ideology. In addition to 
Ingando, Buckley-Zistel (2009:46) asserts, “The Commission distributes its particular 
narrative about the past through civic education programmes, including song 
competitions; sport events; training materials; youth theatre; poems, cartoons and 
radio broadcasts. NURC is, therefore, an effective vehicle for distributing a particular 
interpretation of Rwanda’s history”. 
 
In fact, Shyaka (2005:37) states, “Solidarity camps, which initially were thought out 
to ease the reintegration of refugees who were mainly coming from DRC, have been 
extended to various categories of population, in order to let them, through discussions 
and open debates, grasp first-hand the unity and reconciliation process, its challenges 
and numerous opportunities”. Indeed, Ingando also constitutes an activity of 
paramount importance for the commission and for the process as well. It is a resource 
in the reconciliation programme fostered by the NURC triggering responses of 
decision-making that leads to the building of coexistence within communities.   
 
Abunzi 
The word Abunzi can be translated as “those who reconcile” or “those who bring 
together” from the verb kunga. According to Nantulya (2006:48), Article 159(4) of 
the Constitution established a Mediation Committee in each sector. The mediation 
committee members, or Abunzi, are responsible for mediating conflicts between 
parties. It is only when the Abunzi fail that disputes can be brought before ordinary 
courts. Each committee comprises 12 residents of every sector who are persons of 
integrity and acknowledged for their mediation skills. The NURC works through 
them as part of its peace-building and conflict management programme. It equips 
them through conflict management courses, technical support and training resources. 
 
Abakangurambaga 
The creation of the Abakangurambaga was an innovative strategy of the NURC. They 
are “peace volunteers” selected from within communities to promote reconciliation 
and build confidence. They also help communities to solve basic problems and 
address wider social conflicts that do not fall within the purview of the Abunzi. There 
are 720 Abakangurambaga countrywide. They work voluntarily for the NURC, which 
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provides them with training manuals, reference material and bicycles to facilitate their 
access to communities. Plans are underway to train more Abakangurambaga as part 
of the NURC’s local peace network. 
 
Ubudehe 
Ubudehe is a tool to encourage communities to become more involved in their own 
welfare. In ancient times, it brought communities together to support one another in 
various activities including farming and harvesting. Currently, it has been adopted by 
formal institutions including the NURC and the Ministry of Local Government to 
place communities at the centre of development planning. The process entails 
community-based consultations and dialogue on specific issues. Ideas are then taken 
up through community development committees, which form the basis for policy 
making. The NURC has integrated this approach in all its interventions. In 1999, 
when it was established, community-based consultations were used to elaborate the 
programmes of the commission. Since then, the community consulting approach has 
been used to evaluate programmes and highlight new or emerging issues (Nantulya, 
2006:48).  
 
Ubusabane 
The NURC supports the community festivals to promote reconciliation in Rwanda 
(ubusabane), with the idea that culture determines the regeneration of these 
conditions. The shared products of our culture, with particular emphasis on theatre 
and art, have responded to the post-genocide circumstances of Rwanda and continue 
to play a meaningful role in the new reconciliatory order (NURC, 2008:23).  
 
The NURC has organised events to try and foster an understanding of the roots of 
genocide, and by extension, to prevent future genocides. To do so, the government 
also introduced socio-economic reforms. For example, twelve years of basic 
education is now free. It eliminated official discrimination based on group identity (as 
Hutu, Tutsi or Twa) in admitting students to schools and universities, as well as in 
employment. Differences in power and privilege are one of the central sources of 
conflict between groups. Equal access is essential to make people feel that they are all 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
  
 
 
183 
Rwandans and that members of each group are able to develop their potential (Staub, 
2014:506). 
 
Although the NURC was established in 1996, from its inception it has focused on 
addressing the long-term causes and effects of genocide, beyond the specific events of 
1994. In summary, the NURC’s project has been less about alleviating the particular 
traumas resulting from the genocide than about creating a new vision for Rwanda. Its 
initiatives have attempted to rebuild the fabric of Rwandan society and restructure 
Rwandan identity around shared, traditional ideas and institutions. In this way, each 
of these initiatives seriously considers the ethnic ideology dividing Rwandans as the 
source of conflict for generations, and must be deconstructed so as to return 
Rwandans to the unity of their pre-colonial identity. In a sense, the NURC began 
working on the future reconciliation of Rwanda, even while the trauma of 1994 was 
still fresh. The main purpose of this dissertation could be described as the attempt to 
draw the Presbyterian Church’s attention to the NURC’s priorities, although from a 
theological perspective. While the Presbyterian Church may have done well in 
addressing the short-term effects of genocide, the next step, as we shall see, is to turn 
its attention to long-term issues by offering a theological deconstruction of ethnic 
ideology. Up to today, this theological deconstruction has been needed but never 
explicitly offered. 
 
5.4.1.2 “Ndi Umunyarwanda” (I am a Rwandan) Program 
The previous section described many tools of reconciliation used by the NURC to 
accomplish its mission of reconciling Rwandans. Even though many things 
concerning reconciliation have been achieved, and despite the fact that the aim of the 
National Policy of Unity and Reconciliation is to resist any form of divisionism and 
discrimination, as well as fight against genocide and its ideology, it is significant to 
highlight here, that twenty years after the genocide, ethnic ideology still persists 
(NURC, 2007:11), Therefore, this section demonstrates that the “Ndi 
Umunyarwanda” (I am a Rwandan) program was founded as a strategy to address the 
current ethnic ideology.  
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During the Senate plenary session of 10 February 2015, the NURC presented its 
2013-2014 annual activity report and its 2014 – 2015 action plan. The commission 
outlined challenges faced by the NURC in carrying out its mission. Chief among 
these challenges was the continued existence of ethnic ideology. This is evident in 
different strata of the Rwandan society, in the presence of some media outlets that still 
spread genocide ideology in churches where members still cling to divisive thoughts, 
practices and behaviours, and in the neighbouring Congo where genocide ideology is 
still well maintained and nurtured by the Forces for Democratic Liberation of Rwanda 
(FDLR) terrorist group. In response to these challenges, the NURC offered “Ndi 
Umunyarwanda” (I am a Rwandan), which is a common Rwandan identity 
programme.
31
 A common identity is needed in order to undo the divisions and ethnic 
ideology of the past. For this reason, the Rwandan government promotes a notion of 
collective identity, which is no longer based on ethnicity but on the civic identity of 
all its citizens. The strategy is centred on an interpretation of Rwanda’s history 
according to which ethnicity did not exist prior to the arrival of the colonialists 
(Buckley-Zistel, 2009:31). 
 
In the year 2013, the NURC initiated the “Ndi Umunyarwanda” (I am a Rwandan) 
program, with the ultimate goal of building a national identity to foster a Rwandan 
community that is based on trust and unity. It was initiated as a way to strengthen the 
solidarity of the people, uphold their moral and spiritual values, as well as make them 
understand their fundamental rights as Rwandans. As already noted, Rwandans spoke 
the same language, practiced the same cultural rituals, and worshiped the same God. 
Only upon the arrival of European colonisers were group divisions exploited as a 
means of securing control. The modern conception of Tutsi and Hutu as distinct 
ethnic groups in no way reflects the pre-colonial relationships between them. The 
“Ndi Umunyarwanda” initiative seeks to address this fact. This programme has 
helped Rwandans understand their origins and the meaning of tribes and clans in pre-
colonial times, before the distortions of the colonial era. With “Ndi Umunyarwada,” 
Rwandans today critically examine their dark history towards shaping a bright future. 
                                                          
31
Rugira, (2015). “Ndi Umunyarwanda” concept: How it will be a therapy and a vaccination.Viewed 
from: www.parliament.gov.rw/yourviews/news-details/? tx_ttnews%5Btt. [Date accessed: 23 
September 2015]. 
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They seek to uphold the moral values of all Rwandans, restore their unity in building 
their country, and eradicate genocide ideology for the sake of prosperity.
32
 
 
Ambassador Amandin Rugira (2015:1) argues that “Ndi Umunyarwanda” is “a tool to 
make an objective audit of different policies put in place from the pre-independence 
period up to 1994. That audit in my opinion is like a cost and benefit analysis of the 
ethnic ideology on which the previous regimes were founded”. 
 
Most important is the way in which reconciliation programmes pivot on the abolition 
of tribal identity: “There would be no talk of Tutsi and Hutu… there are no Hutu and 
Tutsis: “we are all Rwandans,” one Rwandan people “Banya-Rwanda” (Andrew, 
2014:52). This strategy aims against ethnic and racial prejudice (Andrew, 2014:52). 
In reference to Jarvis (2000), Andrew argues that the “Ndi Umunyarwanda” strategy 
“is aimed at what sociologists would term ‘redrawing group boundaries,’ where 
individuals in different social groups come to see themselves as members of a single 
group. This is believed to lead to more positive attitudes towards each other, more 
positive contacts between groups, and reduces intergroup bias further” (Andrew, 
2014:52).  
 
Despite the relevance of this strategy, some scholars disagree with the underlying 
philosophy of “Ndi Umunyarwanda” (I am a Rwandan). This is because the desired 
results have not been achieved in Rwanda, as the identities are firmly entrenched in 
the society. Consequently, Andrew, (2014:53) states, “For some survivors, this may 
feel like a form of re-victimization, as their identity as Tutsi was degraded before the 
genocide and is subsequently stripped away after the genocide”. In addition, even 
though ethnic groups are not referred to as Hutu and Tutsi, Kubai (2007a:54) also 
maintains that “the post-genocide population was roughly divided into three broad 
categories: the returnees, that is, a large proportion that returned from exile; those 
who did not leave the country during the genocide; and the génocidaires, who were 
accused of perpetrating the genocide and are in prison or are yet to be brought to 
justice”.  
 
                                                          
32
Viewed from: www.newtimesco.rw/section article/2015. [Date accessed: 20 February 2016]. 
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In my view, the new categories, as indicated by Kubai, are related to the old ethnic 
ideological categories of Hutu and Tutsi. As much as “returnees” or “génocidaires” 
are relevant categories in contemporary Rwanda, these categories are not entirely 
separate in the minds of the people from “Tutsi” and “Hutu.” This is why this study, 
particularly section 5.4, argues that ethnic ideology is still visible even twenty years 
after genocide. However, even if Rwandan people see themselves as different 
categories this is not a reason to preserve ethnic identities, considering that ethnic 
division between Hutu and Tutsi was artificially constructed by the colonialists and 
missionaries. Therefore, the “Ndi Umunyarwanda” programme is the right strategy in 
the reconciliation process because it addresses and deconstructs ethnic ideology, and 
thus establishes a new national identity based on trust and the unity of one nation as 
found in the pre-colonial period.   
 
As will become clearer in the sections that follow, in order for true reconciliation to 
take place, institutions are needed to facilitate the process. Since 1994, various 
reconciliation efforts initiated by the Rwandan government were launched, including 
the ICTR, the Gacaca restorative justice courts and the NURC. In addition to these 
initiatives, many churches and church organisations took action based on the biblical 
mandate of being given “the ministry of reconciliation” (2 Cor 5:18-19). The 
following section discusses the role of Rwandan churches and church organisations in 
the reconciliation process. 
 
5.4.2 Rwandan churches in the process of reconciliation 
In chapter 4 it was argued that in the aftermath of the genocide the Christian churches 
in Rwanda faced extensive criticism. The church has been accused of active 
complicity in violence through its close relationship with the government. A vital 
question for the mission of the church in Rwanda after the genocide is how to address 
the issues of healing and reconciliation when the church has been accused of 
complicity and a failure to act prophetically.  
 
In his assessment, ‘Peace building initiatives of the Presbyterian Church in the post-
genocide Rwandan society,’ Celestin Nsengimana (2015), a theologian and minister 
of the Presbyterian Church in Rwanda, highlights the role played by Rwandan 
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churches in the process of peace building and reconciliation. He recalls that from 4-6 
March 1997, a workshop organised by the Protestant Council of Rwanda (CPR) 
gathered 50 people from the following churches: the Presbyterian Church in Rwanda 
(EPR), the Anglican Church of Rwanda (EAR), the Union of Baptist churches of 
Rwanda (UEBR), the Association of the Pentecostal Churches of Rwanda (ADEPR), 
the Free Methodist Church of Rwanda (EMLR), and the Catholic Church 
(Nsengimana, 2015:20). 
 
According to Nsengimana (2015), the participants reflected on the topic: ‘The Church 
before, during and after the Genocide’. As the workshop ended, all the churches 
present declared that they needed to take the following actions, as described by 
Nsengimana (2015:20-21): 
 
Recognising their responsibility in the genocide and consequent repentance and 
reparation. 
 
Involvement in the process of reconciliation according to the requirements of the 
Word of God found in 2 Corinthians 5, 19-20 in respect of a tripartite 
requirement of truth, justice, and reparation, creation of spaces of shared speech 
within Christian communities where Church members (victims, perpetrators or 
witnesses) can reconstitute the truth on the past through debate and confession in 
order to heal memories of genocide. 
 
Encouraging repentance and forgiveness without avoiding classic justice for the 
eradication of the culture of impunity. 
 
Breaking the routine and the folklore of rites and stereotyped symbols to engage 
deep change, debate and conception of liturgy and sermons related to the post-
genocide context inspired by the text of Mathew 5, 23-24;32. 
 
Condemning ethnic ideologies, attitudes and speeches of negationism, which are 
obstacles to the process of reconciliation among Rwandans, requesting different 
media, international and ecumenical organisations to cease using ethnic and 
globalising vocabulary which encircle Rwandans in the box of lifeless 
vocabulary of Hutu-Tutsi. 
 
Become a Church of hope, more attentive to human preoccupation and 
challenges of the society to which it should react in an evangelical way. 
 
The above declaration highlights the importance of Paul’s message in 2 Corinthians 
5:19-20. According to the Pauline message in 2 Cor. 5:17–20, Romenceo (2004:16) 
notes, “The church understands itself to be delegated with the ministry of 
reconciliation. Thus it is because of its moral place in society that the church should 
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aid the creation of reconciled communities, particularly in situations of ethnic 
conflict”. This perspective is related to what scholars like Schreiter (1992, 2005) and 
Okure (2006) stated in chapter 2 of this study. This message became the starting point 
for churches in Rwanda to get involved in the process of reconciliation and to address 
ethnic ideologies that are a major obstacle to reconciliation. 
 
However, Schreiter (1992:67) argues, “The church cannot assume automatically that 
it has a mediating role between victims and oppressors. Because the church mirrors 
society, it may find that the lines dividing society run right through the center of the 
church”. Thus, the ministry of reconciliation is not just something the church 
administers, but something that the church needs in its own midst. 
 
Considering Schreiter’s argument, Rutayisire explains that the Rwandan church has 
been led to self-questioning and some church leaders have confessed their failure as a 
representative of the church to prevent and stop the genocide. Some individual 
churches, like the Presbyterians and Anglicans, and the churches collectively, through 
the Rwandan Protestant Churches Council, having recognised their failings and have 
publicly begged for pardon. This recognition of weakness has been an important step 
in helping the victims to regain trust in church leaders and for the church to begin the 
process of healing wounded memories and promoting the reconciliation process 
(Rutayisire, 2012:77-8).  
 
At the ecumenical level, this confession also happened in 1996. A group of twenty-
four Christians from different Rwandan and foreign churches met in Detmold, in 
Germany, and published the “Detmold Confession.”33 They declared themselves as 
Christians from different churches in Rwanda and elsewhere, gathered at 
Detmold/Germany from 7th – 12th December 1996 at the invitation of Dr. Fulgence 
Rubayiza in collaboration with the ecumenical community of Hiddesen, to pray and 
reflect on our common commitment to build a Rwanda where all people can live 
together in harmony. After holding discussions, challenging opinions and much 
                                                          
33
 Brigitte Grosche (1996). Detmold Confession. Viewed from: kirchenkreis-saarost-Butare. [Date 
accessed: 23 August 2015]. See also: Chapso.de/confesson-of-detmold-s200320.html. [Date accessed: 
23 August 2015]. This confession is also found in Gatwa, 2005:231-232.  
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deliberate prayer, the participant made the declaration below, as it is indicated by 
Gatwa (2005:231-2): 
 
I. The Rwandan people will never be reconciled with each other unless each 
party accepts to kneel down before the suffering of the other party, to confess 
their own offense and to humbly ask forgiveness of their victims. 
 
II. Therefore: 
We, Hutu Christians, present at Detmold, recognise that our group has oppressed 
the Tutsi in various ways since 1959. We confess the massacres committed by 
the Hutu against the Tutsi group at different periods of Rwandan history, 
culminating in the genocide of 1994. We are ashamed of the horrors and 
atrocities committed by the Hutu towards the Tutsi: torturing, raping, slitting 
pregnant women open, hacking humans to pieces, burying people alive, hunting 
people with dogs as if they were animals, killing in churches and temples 
(previously recognised as places of refuge), massacring old people, children and 
sick in hospitals, forcing people to kill their own relatives, burning people alive, 
denying burial and thousands of other ways of cynically degrading an mockingly 
putting to death. 
 
We carry the terrible weight of this unspeakable crime and we accept to bear the 
consequences without resentment. We implore our Hutu brothers and sisters not 
to forget this terrible past when they judge the present reality in Rwanda. We 
humbly demand forgiveness of God and our Tutsi brothers and sisters for all the 
evil we have inflicted upon them. We commit ourselves to do whatever we can 
to restore their honour and their dignity and to regain our lost humanity in their 
eyes. 
 
This confession by the Hutu highlights their role in the oppression and massacre of 
Tutsi at different periods in Rwandan history. They call on other Hutu not to forget 
this terrible past. The Tutsi people also repented of their wrongdoing on behalf of 
their group. They recognised that their belief of superiority over the Hutu throughout 
history was wrong. 
 
We, Tutsi Christians, present at Detmold are happy and feel comforted by the 
demand of forgiveness made by the Hutu brothers and sisters. We likewise 
demand God and the Hutu to forgive the repression and blind vengeance which 
members of our group have taken, depassing all claims to legitimate self-
defence. 
 
“Inkoni ikubise makeba uyirenza urugo” (Justifying evil on the pretext that it 
effects a rival, ends up by turning back on the person who justified it). 
 
We also demand God and our Hutu brothers and sisters forgiveness for certain 
arrogant and contemptuous attitudes shown to them throughout our history in the 
name of ridiculous complex of ethnic superiority (cited by Gatwa, 2005:231). 
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Like the Tutsi, Western Christians repented of their sense of superiority and 
involvement in dividing the Rwandan people. They regretted their failure to condemn 
the violence and their inaction during the 1994 killings, as well as silence towards the 
refugees after the genocide. 
 
We, western Christians present at Detmold, grateful for the friendship and trust 
and for the invitation of our Rwandan brothers and sisters to share in their prayer 
and reflexions and to listen to their sufferings and hopes, confess that since the 
arrival of the first Europeans in Rwanda, we have seriously contributed to the 
increase of divisions in the Rwandan people. 
 
We regret that, feeling too sure of our superiority, we discriminated between 
people by generalizing and judging some as good and others as bad. 
 
We regret that our countries have conduced violence by delivering arms to all 
parties. We regret our silence and our neglect of the refugees of the years of the 
Independence. We also regret our silence and our abandon of the Rwandan 
people during the genocide and massacres in 1994. We regret our silence and 
regret when it was question of finding a viable solution to return the refugees 
after the genocide. We regret our failure to listen and to share in the suffering 
experienced by our Rwandan friends. 
 
For all this harm, we demand God and our Rwandan brothers and sisters to 
forgive us for not respecting them as they are and we want to commit ourselves 
with Jesus to a path of listening, respect and solidarity. 
 
Then all together, the Hutu, Tutsi and Western Christians present at Detmold claimed: 
 
We urge all members of Rwandan society and their friends in the International 
Community to feel all equally concerned by each other’s misery. We exhort 
them to work together to comfort and rehabilitate all who have been wounded by 
the Rwandan tragedy: the widows, the orphans, the prisoners, the refugees both 
old and recent, the homeless, and the marginalised Batwa. May everyone find 
recognition and respect in Rwanda and be rooted in the midst of brothers, sisters 
and friends. 
 
We thank the Father, who has given us his Spirit to break our “hearts of stone” 
and to free us from the mistrust and fear which separated us. He has remade us 
brothers and sisters committed to the Way of His Son, who died and rose again 
to reconcile man to God and to one another  
 
The outcome of this confession, firstly, shows the importance of repentance and 
forgiveness in the reconciliation process. Secondly, it creates awareness and teaches 
individuals that reconciliation of the Rwandan people is only possible when its 
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different constituents recognise the suffering of others, confess their own crimes, and 
ask the victims for pardon.  
 
It is also significant to be reminded that the role played by the churches in the 
reconciliation process is not only limited to confession. Furthermore, Rutayisire 
(2012:73, 78) affirms that churches and ecclesiastical organisations have played a 
vital role in the reconciliation process, preaching a message of forgiveness, offering 
pastoral care, as well as providing material and psychological assistance to genocide 
survivors, orphans, widows and other victims of this crisis. Churches have accepted 
that they have a responsibility to rebuild the country by participating fully in the 
Gacaca jurisdictions as part of the reconciliation process. 
 
Campaigns were organised countrywide as well as in prisons by individual churches 
and church-related organisations. These actions contributed to telling the truth, the 
confession of guilt, and asking for forgiveness. A joint workshop organised in 
September 1999 by the Council of Protestant churches welcomed the Gacaca plan 
and helped to prepare church leaders to get involved, so as to resolve the clogged 
legal system. The churches have been teaching the biblical basis of confession, 
repentance and forgiveness, as paths to reconciliation and peace. Different FBOs, 
such as the African Evangelical Enterprise (AEE), Prison Fellowship, or groups like 
the one that formulated the Deltmold Confession, have worked hard to bring about 
confession, repentance and forgiveness.
34
 
 
The 1994 genocide left many traumatised survivors. Starting in 1997, the Council of 
Protestant Churches in Rwanda (CPR) initiated trauma counselling. The CPR and its 
church members have been engaged since 1996/7 to examine the root causes of the 
1994 genocide. For their failure to address the ethnic ideology prior to the genocide 
many different groups, associations and individual churches as well as the CPR itself 
                                                          
34
. As stated by Gatwa Tharcisse (n.d) when he wasthe General Secretary of the Council of Protestant 
Churches in Rwanda. InChurches and Reconciliation in Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and 
Rwanda Delegations of Norwegian Church Aid, Churches of East DRC and the Council of Protestant 
Churches in Rwanda.Viewed from: http://www.cpr-rwanda.org/documents. [Date accessed: 13 April 
2014]. 
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have sought to address the issue by confessing and repenting on behalf of their 
members.  
 
One of the religious values that have become important in post-genocide Rwanda is 
the idea that there are no fundamental differences between people who have different 
family, ethnic, racial, or cultural identities. Rwandan churches teach that all people 
are equal, no matter which group they come from. Reflecting on the government’s 
commitment to erase the ethnic identities that led to the conflict and genocide, 
religious groups have found various theological bases to support this change (Bazuim, 
2013:144). 
 
Indeed, churches have played an important role in post-genocide Rwanda. People who 
participate in religious programming more frequently demonstrate higher levels of 
forgiveness and reconciliation than people who participate less frequently. People use 
religion to make sense of what happened to them and to explain the changes they see 
in Rwanda after the genocide. Religious beliefs help people find meaning in their 
suffering, and participating in religious activities makes them feel less lonely. 
Religious friendships provide comfort and solace. Religious organisations teach, and 
provide resources and the context for important interpersonal encounters to occur 
(Bazuim, 2013:139, 172). 
 
5.5 Conclusion 
 
This chapter set out to answer how reconciliation addresses ethnic ideology and 
responds to the effects and consequences of genocide on Rwandan society. Based on 
the literature discussed in this chapter, it was found that the 1994 genocide created 
many devastating short-term consequences. It did not only affect the people but also 
destroyed their properties. The loss of livestock had an impact on economic and social 
life. Many people lost their trust; Rwandan children in particular witnessed extreme 
forms of brutality and lost all hope for their future. On the one hand, the survivors 
bear the brunt of the 1994 genocide. On the other hand, the perpetrators suffer guilt 
because of their wrongdoings. This chapter also indicated that genocide caused 
immense suffering for all. However, it had a different impact on men and women 
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because victimization is partly gender specific. Rape was systematic and used as a 
weapon by the perpetrators of the massacres. War rape continues to have 
consequences for the victims, including social isolation. Female rape survivors said 
that they had lost their dignity, respect and identity, and because of the social stigma 
attached to rape, many hid their status. 
 
The task of restoring justice, peace and stability to Rwanda in the 1990’s was so 
overwhelming that it had the potential to distract from long-term, recurring issues 
arising out of Rwandan history. These long-term consequences of genocide not only 
include the on-going effects of trauma, but also the possibility that the violence 
reinforces ethnic ideology in a way that creates the conditions for another genocide in 
the future. 
 
The chapter considered reconciliation as being necessary to address both ethnic 
ideology and the mentioned effects of genocide. Accordingly, a variety of initiatives 
and well-defined efforts to achieve reconciliation were described as a means of 
dealing with the past. The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) 
handles cases involving the architects and implementers of genocide.   
 
In addition to the ICTR, the Rwandan government made use of its own domestic 
judicial system—the Gacaca restorative justice system—that emanates from 
traditional mechanisms of conflict resolution. The chapter maintained that the Gacaca 
courts were not just a way to deliver justice to the huge number of prisoners awaiting 
trial, but also to facilitate the coming together of victims and perpetrators at the 
grassroots and to promote reconciliation amongst them.  
 
Turning to the long-term effects of genocide, the NURC has worked towards healing 
communities, building confidence and establishing reconciliation. The NURC has 
organised many conferences, camps and workshops aimed at helping people better 
understand the roots of genocide, and how to proceed with life in its aftermath. The 
chapter revealed that the achievement of the NURC is designed to stimulate 
reconciliation at the grassroots level and to gradually transfer ownership of the 
reconciliation process to communities. The NURC also initiated the “Ndi 
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Umunyarwanda” (I am a Rwandan) programme, with the ultimate goal of building a 
national identity. This programme aims to undo the effects of colonial rule by creating 
“one Rwanda for all Rwandans.” For this reason the government urges Rwandans to 
no longer see themselves as Hutu, Tutsi or Twa, because ethnicity is an invention that 
was created by Rwanda’s colonizers. For sustainable peace and reconciliation to 
prevail, the“Ndi Umunyarwanda” programme stresses that an ethnic unity that 
Rwanda enjoyed before the coming of the European colonialists must be reaffirmed 
and taught to all Rwandans. 
 
In addition to what the NURC has done, the churches in Rwanda, particularly the 
Presbyterian Church, have effectively engaged in reconciliation processes and 
addressed the short-term effects of genocide by caring for the widows, orphans, 
victims and perpetrators. However, looking at the bigger picture, these churches have 
not dealt with the long-term causes and effects of ethnic ideology. There is still the 
need for a theological rationale, which can deconstruct ethnic ideology in a similar 
way to what the “Ndi Umunyarwanda” programme is attempting to accomplish. In the 
light of the above findings, the following chapter will ask: If reconciliation is a 
necessity in the Rwandan context, and as such, is biblically and theologically based, 
then (1) why should the church, on theological grounds, participate in the ministry of 
reconciliation? And, if it should, (2) how may it, once again on theological grounds, 
do so? This in turn lays the foundation for chapter six, which focuses on evaluating 
how reconciliation initiatives and programmes fostered by the Presbyterian Church in 
Rwanda address ethnic ideology and respond to the post-genocide effects. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
EVALUATING THE MINISTRY OF RECONCILIATION IN THE 
PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH IN RWANDA 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
Reflecting back on the previous chapters, chapter 1 set the stage as an overview and 
introduction to the study. Chapter 2 provided a conceptual analysis of the term 
reconciliation, with specific reference to its sociological and biblical-theological 
meanings. The dimensional approach to reconciliation and its implications were also 
discussed. Chapter 2 ended stating the following: “reconciliation revealed the heart of 
a theology of mission” (Langmead, 2008:6). It also indicated that reconciliation is 
both a “process and the goal of mission” (Huyse, 2003). Furthermore, from a 
theological and biblical perspective, reconciliation was shown to be God’s work and 
human beings are His agents in the ministry of reconciliation. Chapter 3 presented the 
broad historical context of Rwanda and asked how colonial authorities, in 
collaboration with Rwandan elites, constructed the ethnic ideology that resulted in 
genocide. Chapter 4 reviewed the historical background of mission in Africa, as well 
the Rwandan church’s response to ethnic ideology and its participation in the 
genocide. Moreover, the Rwandan church was accused of being actively involved in 
the violence through its close relationship with the government. However, Rwandans 
continue to look toward the same Christian church and governmental institutions for 
guidance during the reconciliation process. These institutions have a large role to play 
here, as was discussed in chapter 5. 
 
Given the extent of the Rwandan genocide, chapter 6 returns to the Rwandan context 
and asks whether and how the Presbyterian Church in Rwanda has been or is engaged 
in addressing ethnic ideology and promoting reconciliation.Being a realist evaluation 
study, this chapter employs the realistic evaluation with it context–mechanisms–
outcomes (CMO) approach, which sets out to understand why a programme works, 
for whom it works, and under what circumstances it works. Therefore, the CMO is 
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employed to evaluate how and whether the ministry of reconciliation in the 
Presbyterian Church has addressed ethnic ideology and responded to the challenges 
and consequences of the 1994 genocide. This chapter critically analyses the content, 
processes and outcomes in the EPR’s documents and literature, as well as evaluates 
expectations of reconciliation by clarifying explicit and implicit suppositions of how 
and why things will change because of reconciliation. 
 
The current chapter comprises five sections. Section 6.2briefly presents the historical 
background of the Presbyterian Church in Rwanda and its mission activities. In 
reference to the research questions of the study (stated in section 1.3), section 6.3 
answers the question, which theology of reconciliation and theology of mission have 
informed the current practices and processes of the Church in Rwanda. This question 
bring us to section 6.4 which describes the role of the Presbyterian Church in Rwanda 
(EPR) and discusses in details four main activities in which the EPR addresses the 
effects of genocide and promotes reconciliation. Section 6.5 evaluates whether these 
programs led to significant impacts and changes in attitudes and behaviours, 
particularly in relation to the existence of ethnic ideology, taking into account the four 
dimensions of reconciliation proposed in section 2.5. Section 6.6 focuses on the 
question of whether the Church is an effective instrument through which to address 
ethnic ideology and respond to the effects of genocide in Rwanda. 
 
It is important to be reminded that the research aim of this study is to investigate the 
ministry of reconciliation as a response to ethnic ideology and genocide and 
theologically evaluate the role played by the EPR. This chapter therefore discusses 
research findings from church documents and archives in line with other literatures. 
This involves testing three sets of research key questions mentioned in chapter one 
(see 1.4): 
 
 Which theologies of reconciliation and theology of mission has informed the 
current practices and processes of the Church in Rwanda to undo ethnic 
ideology? 
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 Is the Church an ‘effective’ body and instrument through which to address 
ethnic ideology and respond to effects of genocide and promote reconciliation 
in Rwanda? 
 To what extent is the EPR involved in the ministry of reconciliation in the 
country and, if this involvement exists, is it effective and what theological 
guidelines inform or may inform its involvement? 
 
6.2 The historical background of the Presbyterian Church in Rwanda 
 
In 1900, a team of German missionaries led by Pastor Ernest Johanssen came to 
Rwanda via Bukoba, Tanzania. On July 22 1907, Johanssen went to see King 
Musinga and asked him for permission to work in Rwanda. From that meeting, he 
was allowed to build the first mission at Zinga in Gisaka (Rwamagana District, 
Eastern Province). Pastor Johanssen was granted the privilege of building a house in 
Kigali and also built a second mission in Kirinda on the 28
th
of August 1907.  
 
From 1916 to 1921, there were no missionaries situated in these mission stations 
because war had broken out between Germany and Belgium. At the same time, 
Rwanda was experiencing a devastating famine. This harmful situation slowed the 
progress of the evangelisation campaign. After the war, Rwanda fell under the 
colonial administration of the Belgians, and so the Belgian state asked the Belgian 
Protestant Mission Society to send missionaries from the Congo to Rwanda to carry 
out the evangelisation campaign started by the German missionaries. 
 
In 1956, the first synod took place with the purpose of gathering the three mission 
stations at Kirinda, Rubengera and Remera into one church. In 1959, the Belgian 
Protestant Mission Society decided to hand the church leadership over to the synod, 
and from that time onwards, the church became independent (Gatwa & Karamaga, 
1990:42). All congregations and church programmes are accountable to their 
presbyteries. The presbyteries are in turn accountable to the general synod, which is 
the leading organ of the church and coordinated by the president of the church 
assisted by the vice president. The Presbyterian Church in Rwanda maintains a close 
partnership with its traditional partners including Belgium, Switzerland, Germany, 
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and the Netherlands, and remains an active member in many ecumenical 
organisations in and outside Rwanda. 
 
After it became autonomous in 1959, the new church became known as the 
Evangelical Presbyterian Church in Rwanda (Eglise Evangelique Presbyterienne au 
Rwanda, ‘EEPR’ in French). Later on, the name was changed to the Presbyterian 
Church in Rwanda [Eglise Presbyterienne au Rwanda (EPR)]. For the EPR, the title 
“evangelical” seemed too narrow because of their ecumenical involvement. The 
Presbyterian Church in Rwanda focuses on both evangelism and social work through 
its health, education and development projects, with its main aim being to respond to 
the dire needs of misery, poverty, hunger, illness and ignorance. The EPR’s 
understanding of evangelism is related to the teaching of a transformative gospel, 
especially in a context where the newer Christian denominations stress prosperity and 
salvation, ignoring the daily realities of everyday life.
35
These ideas are well captured 
in Bevans and Schroeder (2004:8) who state that mission of the church is not 
expansion, but integrating men and women into a community as an expression of God 
in the world through preaching, serving, and witnessing. In this respect, the mission of 
EPR is fulfilled through saying (proclamation) and doing (action) that involves the 
social reality and meets a person’s life at a particular point of need. 
 
David Bosch’s understanding of a missional church provides a helpful way of 
thinking about the mission of EPR. For Bosch (1991), a missional ecclesiology entails 
that the church engage with and challenge the world. This is implies that service, 
mission and evangelism are stressed. Neither focus should ever be at the expense of 
the other; rather, they stand in each other’s service (Bosch, 1991:385). Accordingly, 
the vision of EPR is “to be a strong Church, whose members are spiritually mature, 
social environment fully blossomed and able to testify of God’s Kingdom in the 
world” (Nsengimana, 2015:72).In order to fulfil its vision, the EPR mission on the 
one hand entails “evangelisation through the proclamation of the love and the 
salvation offered by God in Jesus Christ, and on the other hand manifesting the love 
of God through concrete actions of social and human development” (Nsengimana, 
2015:72). The EPR achieves its mission by focusing on three main pillars, namely, 
                                                          
35
Viewed from: www.vemission.org. [Date accessed: 2 September 2015]. 
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“preaching the Word of God, promoting the socio-economic welfare of Church 
members in particular and the whole Rwandan community in general, and promoting 
peace, unity, tolerance and reconciliation” (Nsengimana, 2015:72).It is clear that the 
mission of the EPR is to be relevant and contribute to the common good of people in 
society. 
 
Even though the aim of this chapter is to evaluate the ministry of reconciliation 
achieved by the EPR in the aftermath of genocide, it is important to be reminded that 
throughout history the EPR was not immune to the development of ethnic ideology 
that culminated in the 1994 genocide. As indicated in chapter 4, like the White 
Fathers, Protestant missionaries could not escape the racial and ethnic theories that 
were widespread in Europe and the social divisions of the societies in which they had 
grown up and studied (Benda, 2012:69).In the case of Rwanda, Gatwa states that the 
protestant missionary societies did not challenge the notion  of the superiority of the 
Tutsi above other ethnic groups; rather, they also promoted and propagated the 
ideology of a ‘pure race’(Gatwa, 2005:76). With regards to socio-political and 
cultural life, Pastor Johanssen of the Bethel Mission expressed an opinion which 
suggested a belief in the superiority of the ‘pastoral race’ when he wrote:  
 
The population of Rwanda comprises organically three races: the Watutsi, the 
Bahutu and the Batwa. The Watutsi are a clan of Hamitic pastoralist origin who, 
by their stature, their colour and their intellectual possibilities, differ 
fundamentally from the two other races which it has subjected under domination 
though it represents less than ten percent of population…. The Hamitic 
pastoralist clans did not only introduce the hump bovine from Asia, but also 
intellectual values of a different nature. Where they succeeded to   establish their 
domination through their legend and graduations, they exerted an influence on 
the cult, even the spiritual life of the population (quoted by Gatwa, 2005:78). 
 
According to Gatwa (2005:81), the Bethel missionaries were admirers of the Tutsi 
and their structure of society. They believed in the supremacy of the Tutsi. In the 
post-colonial period, Gatwa explains that, like their Catholic counterparts, the 
Protestant hierarchy adhered to the government’s policies. In the case of the 
Protestants, this adhesion can be traced to the regime of Habyarimana (Gatwa, 
2005:136). 
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With regards to the position of the EPR, Gatwa affirms that the EPR endorsed all the 
forms of pressure and repression utilized by the Habyarimana regime and his MRND 
party (Gatwa, 2005:141).The President (moderator) of the Presbyterian Church, for 
example, served on the regional committee of the ruling party (MRND) in his home 
region. The cooperation between the church and state was not only at the level of 
high-ranking church leaders but also at the local level of the 
congregations.Consequently, local pastors and priests were often closely allied with 
local burgomasters and communal councillors (Longman, 2001:166, 171). 
 
For example, Longman (1995) wrote an article titled: ‘Genocide and Socio-Political 
Change: Massacres in Two Rwandan Villages’. It encompasses his research 
conducted in Rwanda, especially concerning the Kirinda and Biguhu Presbyterian 
Church parishes. Longman (1995:19) rightly concludes that the elite in Kirinda 
almost universally remained loyal to President Habyarimana’s party. They benefitted 
from the status quo and considered it in their interest to oppose a transfer of power. 
Longman recalls how, in 1992, one of the pastors, the high school principal of the 
Presbyterian school, and a leading businessman secretly formed a local chapter of the 
Coalition pour la Defense de la Republique (CDR), an extreme anti-Tutsi political 
group. In this case, this close link between the church leaders and the state led to the 
involvement of the same church leaders in the 1994 genocide. More than a week after 
the massacres began in Kigali, the local Hutu elite, including the burgomaster and 
some church leaders, organized a mob to kill Kirinda’s Tutsi (Longman, 1995:19). 
This is but one example; there were many pastors in different congregations of the 
EPR who held the same view of ethnic ideology.  
 
The starting point of the EPR’s work on reconciliation therefore involved its public 
confession. Indeed, Gatwa (2005:227) explains that during the 36
th
 General Synod 
held at Kigali from 10-15 December 1996, the EPR became the first church to repent 
before God and the whole nation of Rwanda for its failure to prevent and denounce 
the preparation or the execution of the 1994 genocide. The message of confession and 
repentance as Gatwa puts it, is also addressed to all Christians around the world to 
denounce and oppose murder of any kind and to resist ethnicism:  
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Dear Rwandans and Christians, the time has come to proceed with self-criticism 
because the Church of God is ashamed of having been incapable of opposing or 
denouncing the planning and execution of the genocide. As God servant 
Nehemiah did (Neh. 1:5-11), so, we the Synod, in the name of the members of 
the Presbyterian Church of Rwanda, repent and ask forgiveness before God and 
the nation for our weakness and lack of courage when these were needed. The 
Synod asks the people of Rwanda and the world-wide Christian family to oppose 
every rejection of God’s will for his creatures, to denounce and resist strongly 
ethnicity, regionalism and religious divisions. For God, there is no Jew, Greek, 
Hutu, Tutsi nor Twa. We are all one in Christ (Gatwa, 2005:227-228). 
 
This historical background of the EPR brings us to the next section that discusses the 
theology of reconciliation, which has informed the current practices and processes of 
the Church in Rwanda. 
 
6.3 Theology of reconciliation: Practices and processes of the church in Rwanda 
 
This section argues that reflecting on a theology of reconciliation is necessary for the 
church to achieve their full potential of promoting reconciliation in Rwanda. On the 
one hand, this section shows that in the aftermath of the genocide, there was no 
systematic and cohesive reflection on the theology of reconciliation. On the other 
hand, theology of reconciliation was not entirely absent from the Rwandan churches. 
As such, theology of reconciliation was contextual (Bosch, 1991), as it focused on 
understanding the mechanisms of reconciliation, from the way individuals 
comprehend their realities. 
 
In the post-genocide era, the terms “ubumwe” (unity) and “ubwiyunge” 
(reconciliation) are often heard and used. For Rwandans, ‘unity’ and ‘reconciliation’ 
are the two cornerstones of Rwanda’s future, because there is no future without unity 
and no unity without reconciliation (Benda, 2012:221). Nonetheless, Benda 
challenges churches in Rwanda by suggesting that Christians have been as sluggish in 
addressing reconciliation as they were in denouncing ethnic ideology. Christian 
leaders failed to critically offer clear guidelines on how believers should negotiate the 
genocide’s aftermath. Also, Christian leaders and thinkers delayed a necessary and 
urgent reflection on the possibilities of reconciliation. Therefore, Benda concludes 
that there is no clearly articulated Christian theology of or even a cohesive reflection 
on reconciliation (Benda, 2012:221).  
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In this assessment, Benda is both right and wrong. He is wrong in the sense that a 
theology of reconciliation was not entirely absent from the Rwandan churches. These 
churches, including the EPR, clearly understood the work of reconciliation to be part 
of their mission in post-genocide Rwanda, and as we shall see, undertook a number of 
programmes to address trauma and material devastation. At the same time, Benda is 
correct in the sense that these acts of reconciliation were not conceived under a 
systematic, theological understanding of reconciliation. As such, there may be 
elements of reconciliation that the Rwandan churches have overlooked. In this regard, 
it is argued here that the element of reconciliation most often overlooked is the need 
to deconstruct ethnic ideology. 
 
However, there is the possible danger that a more cohesive theology of reconciliation 
will be imposed from the top down. Ethnic ideology must be addressed by Christian 
theology, especially because it still has an impact on the lives of Rwandans at ground 
level. In this case, the Rwandan church leaders’ theologies fall under Bosch’s 
proposal that all missions should be contextually defined. For Bosch, contextual 
theology is theology from below, from the “underside of history,” its main 
interlocutor is the poor or the culturally marginalised. The emphasis is on the priority 
of praxis (Bosch, 1991:423). To put it differently, contextual theology should be 
based on the experience, understanding and perspective of individuals and groups in 
the congregations. Based on Bosch’s argument, it therefore holds that a missiological-
theological study could be developed from the Rwandans own understanding of 
reconciliation mechanisms, from the way they comprehend the reality of ethnic 
ideology, genocide and reconciliation within their context. Such engagement of 
theology with those who suffer will hold great implications for the transformation and 
construction of a new world (Bosch, 1991:424).  
 
In accordance with Bosch’s viewpoint of contextual theology, Isaak (2001:325) also 
says: 
 
A missional church understands its participation in Missio Dei as contextual, 
addressing faithfully the challenges of ever changing and complex contexts, and 
thus, in comprehensive and holistic ways. Mission is contextual with regard to 
its aim, practice, and location. Its aim encompasses the whole of creation 
(ecological concerns), the whole of life (spiritual, social, political, economic, and 
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cultural), and the whole human being (soul and body). Its practice calls for the 
participation of the whole church, women and men, young and old.  Being 
contextual, the church seeks and works for reconciliation and healing. That is the 
being-ness and the sent-ness of the church. 
 
According to Bate (1998:4), contextual theology therefore means “…the attempt to 
reflect upon the experience of faith which is lived in a particular context. It is the 
lived experience of faith within the community. Contextual theology is by its very 
nature communitarian”. In the context of Rwanda, Benda refers to Grey (2007) who 
suggests that reconciliation can only come out of strong Christian communities where 
structural and generational sins are confessed. A Rwandan theology of reconciliation 
will have to be a public liberation theology, which is (1) in dialogue with Rwandan 
history, culture, tradition and religious rituals, (2) in dialogue with other world 
religions; and most importantly, (3) a public theology from the periphery that allows 
the victim and the theologian to speak and bring God back to the centre of humanity’s 
affairs in Rwanda (Benda, 2012:231). 
 
In the aftermath of the 1994 genocide, the EPR was informed by a theology of 
reconstruction, and then only later on adopted a theology of reconciliation. The 
question to be asked then is: “What does a theology of reconstruction entail in the 
EPR?” As was indicated in chapter 5, the effect of the 1994 genocide on the Tutsi was 
enormous. Nsengimana (2015:18-9) states, “Besides the great loss of human lives, 
physical and psychological injuries, hopelessness and uncertainty about the future, the 
Rwandan social fabric was destroyed and the infrastructure and environment were 
critically damaged. The 1994 genocide against Tutsis left more or less 300,000 
survivors. Among them werewidows, orphans and disabled people who were deeply 
affected both psychologically and physically”. 
 
To that end, André Karamaga, the first president of the EPR after 1994, called for the 
reconstruction of the damaged country. He saw the church and Rwandan society like 
a valley of bones
36
 (Ezekiel 37:3-6). Karamaga’s hope, however, lay in the fact that 
the church has a mandate and obligation to ‘construct’ a new future of hope and 
                                                          
36
Karamaga’ Speech during the 36th General Synod of EPR held in Kigali from 10th to 15th December 
1996. Dr. André Karamaga is a Presbyterian theologian and minister, he served as President of EPR 
after the genocide. Currently, he is a General Secretary of All African conference of churches (AACC). 
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harmony. He argued that a better future for Rwanda would depend on how the church 
will engage in the process of reconstruction. This is why, during the 1996 General 
Synod of the EPR, the proposed biblical theme was ‘Let us rise up and build,’ from 
the book of Nehemiah 2:18. This theme was suggested as a motto for all 
Presbyterians. Songs and sermons in all congregations were composed around the 
theme. The theme played an important role in the theology of reconstruction because 
it called people to work together for the reconstruction of a new Rwanda. The theme 
also called all church members to participate in the rebuilding of the country. 
However, it is important to bear in mind that the idea of reconstruction is different to 
the well-known “theology of reconstruction” found among scholars in the field of 
theology. In the aftermath of the genocide, the idea of reconstruction was related to 
the numerous effects of genocide that destroyed the lives of people and their 
properties. 
 
The first place where the theological challenge of genocide manifested itself in the 
life of the EPR was in theological education. For this reason, Elisée Musemakweli
37
 
was called in 1995 from Belgium to serve as a teacher of theology. On his arrival, 
Musemakweli (2014:2) lamented, “The school had been in operation before the 
genocide but some students had been killed and lecturers fled, everything was 
destroyed, so we had to start from scratch”. ‘Starting from scratch’ had a new 
meaning in a post-genocide Rwanda. Those who wanted to learn and grow their faith 
had new kinds of questions and a new kind of world view. As Musemakweli (2014:2) 
said, “It was not easy to teach to the same way and theological ideas we did before the 
genocide”, He adds, “I remember the first student who asked me a very tough 
question. He said, ‘You’re going to teach theology but we know that before the 
genocide that theology was taught in this school. We know that many ministers have 
been involved in the genocide – (and they are supposed to be) serving God in this 
country. Now, what kind of theology are you going to teach us?’” Part of this section 
is aimed at answering this student’s complex question. 
 
                                                          
37
This is from an interview with Dr. Elisée Musemakweli, who from the theology college as a teacher 
became President of the Presbyterian Church of Rwanda, with Rev. Debbie Braaksma, African Area 
Coordinator for the Presbyterian Mission Agency  PCUSA (March 6, 2014). Viewed from: 
www.pcusa.org news/]. Rwanda 20 years later. [Date accessed: 19 February 2016]. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
  
 
 
205 
Musemakweli (2014:2) commented that he had to reflect on what had changed and 
what kind of lessons must be taught. Musemakweli (2014:2) said his answer was 
found in his faith. “I knew we needed a message from the Bible, from God, to these 
people who are suffering. We had to understand the meaning of God in the Rwandan 
context. What is the meaning of Christ? What is the meaning of faith in this kind of 
situation?” Within scripture he found texts relating to reconciliation. He said the story 
of Joseph became very meaningful and was relevant to what many had gone through 
during the genocide. He also used books related to examining the reconciliation 
process. Students read these and discussed them, learning how to facilitate healing 
between people. In this regard, Rutayisire (2012:78) explains, “The Church in 
Rwanda has been led to rediscover the gospel of reconciliation in its components of 
repentance and confession as well as healing and forgiveness, which both lead to real 
reconciliation”. Benda also uses Rutayisire’s (2010) idea when he maintains that the 
flourishing of the Rwandan church in the aftermath of the events of 1994 is related to 
the rediscovering of the gospel of reconciliation. This rediscovery came in the shape 
of six important themes: (1) a new perspective on sin and alienation, (2) the power of 
preaching Christ crucified, (3) a new perspective on identity, (4) a new perspective on 
the gospel of reconciliation, (5) a new perspective on social relationships, and (6) a 
new perspective on the power of unity
38
 (cited by Benda, 2012:222). 
 
Rutayisire (2010) adds that for the majority of Christians, reconciliation is inseparable 
from soteriology; Rwandans cannot enter into reconciliation without a strong faith. 
Only faith can empower them to initiate the process and possibly see it through. For 
Rutayisire, the answer is to bring the grace of the Lord to these people through the 
preaching of the logos of reconciliation, intentionally and repeatedly, until 
reconciliation becomes a lifestyle and not a mission or program (cited by Benda, 
2012:223).  
 
                                                          
38
For Rutayisire, rediscovering in this new perspective means: (1) sin is seen as the dividing factor 
among Rwandans, (2) Christ is the pain-bearer as well as sin-bearer, (3) identity is rooted in Christ 
rather than ethnicity, (4) the church is the depository of reconciliation, (5) it is not Hutu or Tutsi but a 
‘holy nation’ unto God, and (6) unity entails a life of discipleship.  
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The Christian methodology of reconciliation takes its cue solely from this theological 
stance: the gospel is the only possible source of reconciliation. The majority of 
Christian churches and organisations working in the area of reconciliation have 
adopted this way in practice. The difference is in the channels that the gospel travels 
through. Churches privilege sermons, biblical studies and prayer meetings. 
Organisations such as African Evangelism Enterprise (AEE), Catholic Relief Service, 
Norwegian Church Aid, Solace Ministry, and others, use seminars, conferences, 
workshops, short films, plays and radio programmes (Benda, 2012:224).  
 
For Gatwa (2007), as suggested by Benda (2012:231), a theology of reconciliation is 
structured around at least seven themes. These are: (1) repentance, (2) justice, (3) a 
pedagogy of peace that focuses on young generations, (4) mediating between the three 
Rwandan communities through a revisiting of the whole spectrum of Rwandan 
fundamental values, (5) restoring relational harmony through an ‘ecclesiology of 
listening’, (6) the healing of memories by telling stories of suffering and violence, and 
(7) interpreting suffering with an appropriate hermeneutics. 
 
From the perspective of the themes used by the General Synod of the EPR as 
mentioned earlier, and the views of Musemakweli, Rutayisire and Gatwa, I propose 
that after the 1994 genocide the church mainly based its theology of reconciliation on 
a biblical framework, focusing on rediscovering the gospel of reconciliation and 
interpreting suffering with an appropriate hermeneutics. This is well captured in 
Bazuin (2013:143), when he argues that religious explanations for suffering have 
been a comfort to many Rwandan people. Biblical stories and characters inspired 
them to find strength in the face of suffering and adversity. Similarly, people were 
inspired by stories, for instance, about Ruth and Naomi, and Jonah, but more 
especially, by stories where God provided protection to those facing adversity and 
trials, eventually blessing them. These Rwandans found meaning in their own 
suffering (and, for some, the suffering of their country) by applying similar principles: 
God saw them through the genocide, even if they did not emerge unscathed, and they 
hope for future blessings. Many other people cited the suffering of Job as their 
archetypal model for perseverance. For some Rwandans, going to church includes 
hearing these types of stories, reinforcing beliefs that God will satisfy their needs. 
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6.4 The role of the Presbyterian Church in Rwanda in the process of 
reconciliation 
 
This section looks at the mechanisms by which the Presbyterian Church in Rwanda 
has promoted reconciliation. This section maintains that the EPR strongly involved 
itself in addressing some crucial issues related to the effects of genocide. The EPR has 
also undertaken various initiatives to promote reconciliation in the country. In order to 
share information, reconciliation aims to spur activities at multiple levels of the 
church. This means that reconciliation does not remain an activity of the elite; instead, 
it involves grass root actors, as well as high-level influential leaders. Multi-level 
engagement aims to establish a base network of people who act to address the root 
causes of genocide and its effect on the Rwandan society.  
 
To this, the EPR added to its confession made by the synod of the EPR in 1996, 
conveying a message to all Rwandans showing the position and commitment of the 
EPR towards the ministry of reconciliation: 
 
The EPR supports and is engaged in the process of reconciliation. 
 
Reconciliation is the only way to help Rwandans to recover the social cohesion.  
 
Reconciliation can only be achieved when there is: justice, truth-telling, 
repentance and forgiveness. 
 
The EPR is committed to care and support survivors of the 1994 genocide. 
 
In each parish, a club will be formed composed of people with integrity to 
follow up the reconciliation process carried out amongst the communities 
 
In December 1999 another EPR General Synod took place at Kigali. The leading 
theme was from Colossians 3:15, where Paul says: “The peace that Christ gives is to 
guide you in the decisions you make. For it is to this peace that God has called you to 
gather in the one body and be thankful”. This statement was adapted as follows: “We 
have been called to form one body”.39The EPR’s vision of reconciliation reflects its 
role in raising awareness of reconciliation among the people and its desire to build a 
country in which all Rwandans can live in unity and peace with one another.  
                                                          
39
From the proceedings of the General Synod of the EPR held at Kigali in December 1999. 
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The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows: four main activities related to 
the ministry of reconciliation done by the EPR are discussed in section 6.4. These 
include:(1) The Centre for Formation and Documentation (CFD) program and 
reconciliation, (2)Holistic missions and reconciliation, (3)Promoting a missiological 
perspective of the ministry of reconciliation by taking into account story-telling, 
listening and social services in the reconciliation process, and (4)Commemoration of 
the 1994 genocide in relation to reconciliation. Furthermore, these abovementioned 
activities are evaluated in section 6.5 according to the four dimensions of 
reconciliation as mentioned in chapter 2 (section 2.5), namely: relationship-building, 
forgiveness, truth-telling and healing. 
 
6.4.1 The Centre for Formation and Documentation (CFD) program and 
reconciliation 
Reconciliation in the post-genocide era requires building the capacity of people in 
order to respond to their needs and to build new relationships. Capacity-building 
incorporates a range of skills, such as the comprehension of the development of ethnic 
ideology throughout the history of Rwanda, peace building, conflict resolution and 
violence prevention. These skills are generally passed down through intensive 
training, seminars and conferences where the basic concepts are provided and applied. 
In this section, I examine how the EPR is contributing to reconciliation efforts via 
CFD training. 
 
The CFD is one program of the EPR. The program’s main focus is to unite the faith 
traditions of Rwanda in a mission of reconciliation. Why is the EPR interested in 
involving other denominations? The pastors seem to be determined that the church of 
the future should transcend denominationalism. Rev. Aaron Mugemera
40
said, “How 
can we talk to our people about reconciliation when we are divided?” (Cited in 
McCullum, 1995:74). For this reason, the Presbyterian Church started the CFD 
                                                          
40
Pastor Aaron Mugemera is alone. His entire family, all six of his children including his wife, were 
butchered by militias before his eyes. He was in hiding when the Interahamwe burst into the house 
where they had fled for safety. As he watched, unable to do anything, the seven members of his family 
were hacked to death. To add to his pain, the killers were members of his congregation, some of whom 
he had baptized. His sad eyes reflect his loneliness and pain.  
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program acknowledging that if they are to preach reconciliation to their members, 
then they also needed to be united with other confessions and denominations.  
 
The EPR decided that there is a need to study the Bible and other key texts to see how 
to respond to the genocide to promote unity and reconciliation. From this effort came 
official statements supporting Christian work for peace and reconciliation. In 
addition, the CFD also produced written documents
41
 (books and booklets) outlining 
the newly developed reconciliation theology, and a two-year training programme for 
pastors and lay leaders in their local churches. It is important to note that these books 
are used not only in EPR congregations but also in other denominations, including the 
Anglican Church in Rwanda (EER), the Free Methodist in Rwanda (EMRL), and the 
Baptist Church in Rwanda (UEBR). 
 
Reconciliation conferences organised by the CFD are typically held in church 
guesthouses as well as in institutions of learning. They are organised around the 
theme of, ‘The role of the religions in fostering unity and reconciliation of the people 
of Rwanda.’ These conferences are facilitated by an interreligious team made up of a 
Catholic priest, a Protestant minister, a Muslim leader, and a Presbyterian minister 
(who serves as the coordinator and presents the objectives of the programme). The 
Protestant minister and Catholic priest discuss the role of religion in Rwanda as being 
to address the causes and effects of the 1994 genocide and to describe their vision in 
the process of reconciliation, whereas the Muslim leader comments on the importance 
of Islamic teachings on unity and reconciliation.
42
 
 
The CFD program promotes not only reconciliation but also inter-faith dialogue and 
inter-denominational relationships.According to Neufeldt (2011:358), interfaith 
dialogue from a peace building perspective aims at correcting attitudes and 
                                                          
41
 For example: in the book entitled Christian life written in 2009, topics of reconciliation are 
emphasised, among them: 1) the work of reconciliation, 2) what does the bible says about 
reconciliation, 3) justice and forgiveness, 4) understanding forgiveness from the biblical perspective, 5) 
justice and forgiveness as reconciliation, 6) reconciliation and development and 7) the church as agent 
of mission of reconciliation) source of real. (In Duhugurane, amahugugwa y’ibanze mu bya theolojiya: 
Imibereho y’umukristo. Umwaka wa kabiri, 2009). 
42
Interreligious dialogue in Rwanda, interreligious organizations in Rwanda: Program for Muslim-
Christian relation in Rwanda. Viewed from: www.Africamission-mafri.org/interreligious dialogue-
Rwanda). [Date accessed: 6 October 2015].  
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perceptions of the ‘other’. At the same time, negative stereotypes and dehumanization 
of the ‘other’ are to be eliminated. The participation of peace building and 
reconciliation will help to develop a joint platform to address the root causes of the 
conflict as well as its consequences. Benda (2012:220) clearly affirms that Muslim 
leadership in Rwanda, for example, has taken an important practical step by being 
actively involved in different interreligious initiatives whose main objective is 
reconciliation. Different Muftis
43
of Rwanda have been active in the creation and 
leadership of inter-faith initiatives with the purpose of addressing major issues 
affecting Rwandan society at large, such as reconciliation, HIV-AIDS, poverty and 
education. In most of the inter-faith bodies interested in reconciliation, a Muslim 
leader is either the chairperson or the deputy chairperson. For instance, in one meeting 
of such bodies, Sheikh Harelimana Saleh delivered a keynote speech and encouraged 
all faith groups to work together in order to streamline reconciliation activities 
towards achieving effective reconciliation for the good of the nation.Together, these 
confessions engaged in promoting unity and reconciliation as well as training, 
focusing particularly on reconciliation workshops. 
 
Training the trainers of community workers and leaders of groups has proved to be 
effective in promoting healing and reconciliation in post-genocide Rwanda. This is 
because staff, working from various perspectives in multiple settings, could integrate 
into their ongoing work (Staub et el., 2005:303). In this respect, the EPR sees 
reconciliation seminar programs as important in the reconciliation process. Church 
administrators working in the central office of the EPR under the leadership of the 
president of the church, conducts seminars teaching the Christian concepts of 
forgiveness and reconciliation in congregations across the country. The goal of the 
office is to reach each of its congregations in the country and train other local trainers. 
The curriculum is based upon biblical precepts of reconciliation and other documents 
related to unity and reconciliation. The main topics addressed in these seminars are 
the Christian understanding of love, forgiveness, peace and reconciliation. The 
Presbyterian Church targets a wide range of individuals for these seminars with the 
intention of bringing divided groups together. 
 
                                                          
43
A Mutif is a Muslim leader. 
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After the training, some pastors felt it was necessary to deliver messages promoting 
peaceful coexistence. Some were involved in more concrete actions such as 
reconciling people during eruptions of conflict, sensitising perpetrators to plead 
guilty, and seek forgiveness from the victims and their families, encouraging youth to 
form clubs, and encouraging Christians to help orphaned survivors of genocide. 
Others also mobilised Christians to tell the truth in Gacaca, to help orphans of the 
genocide, and where possible, to get involved in mediation and peaceful conflict 
resolution. Other actions included preaching in prisons, especially raising the 
awareness of prisoners towards truth-telling, caring for traumatised people and 
fighting against the growth of ethnic ideology, particularly among the youth. 
 
6.4.2. Holistic missions and reconciliation 
The EPR is convinced that evangelisation and preaching the Word of God will have a 
definite impact on the living conditions of the addressees. Through evangelisation, 
church leaders and ministers do their best to make the EPR a church characterized in 
the following two ways: In the first way, the EPR focuses on evangelisation, since 
preaching the Good News is the core of mission. By evangelisation, the EPR refers to 
Bosch (2011:11) who states, “Evangelism is the proclamation of salvation in Christ to 
those who do not believe him, calling them to repentance and conversion, announcing 
forgiveness of sin, and inviting them to become living members of Christ’s earthly 
community and to begin a life of service to others in the power of the Holy Spirit”. 
 
In the second way, the EPR focuses on holistic mission, which includes all activities 
that are meant to improve social welfare among Rwandans in general. As part of its 
holistic mission, the EPR promoted constructive engagement, which has improved 
people’s lives and their community as a whole. As such, at the grassroots of the 
reconciliation programme, the EPR initiated activities that responded specifically to 
community needs, such as developing small income generation projects.  
 
The context of the EPR’s social activities is to consider all aspects of people’s lives. 
The EPR is involved in several activities such as educational and developmental 
programmes, especially in rural areas, since over 80% of its church members live in 
rural settlements. The EPR is also involved in the medical and health sector. Part of 
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the programme is dedicated to fighting HIV/AIDS and also providing charity work to 
some of its members who are deprived. 
 
As indicated in section 3.10.5, extreme poverty and economic constraints contributed 
to hardening the ethnic ideology that resulted in the 1994 genocide. Thus, the EPR 
also identified economic factors as a source of division in Rwanda. For this reason, it 
has created economic development seminars to combat economic inequalities in and 
around their congregations. The EPR thought that the message of reconciliation 
would go unheard if people were suffering from a relative deprivation of material 
resources. This is why the EPR is now providing educational seminars on how to 
improve agriculture and farming, family planning and HIV/AIDS prevention. The 
EPR also initiated activities of associations for church members; these involve income 
generation, small businesses, sensitization, and the promotion of reconciliation. 
 
In its mission, the Presbyterian Church in Rwanda focuses on holistic salvation. Thus, 
a successful economic project, for instance, can help contribute to the well-being of 
the people. Similarly, failed economic projects can destroy people’s self-confidence. 
The theme of the 40
th
synod held at Kibuye in December 2001 was: ‘life in 
abundance’ taken from John 10:10. This is why the church continues to encourage its 
members in their parishes to work together in association and cooperative 
development. It also creates awareness of the need to save money in the bank, with 
the aim of reducing poverty.  
 
As has been indicated in this study, throughout the history of Rwanda, social, 
economic and political ideologies have been considered as contributing to the 
genocide. For this reason, the Rwandan government sees the unity and reconciliation 
of the Rwandan people as the basis for defeating these issues. In post-genocide 
Rwanda, victims and perpetrators live peacefully in the same villages and 
communities. However, some victims are still traumatised whenever they remember 
the terrible acts of torture they faced, which has affected their social and economic 
livelihoods. In this regard, the primary focus of reconciliation programmes conducted 
by the EPR is to overcome discrimination, division and economic inequality.  
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6.4.3. Promoting a missiological perspective in the ministry of reconciliation 
This section focuses on how the EPR played a significant role in the reconciliation 
process, and in its mission of caring for the community. This is owing to the fact that 
in the case of Rwanda, both the perpetrators of the genocide and the survivors attend 
the same church. This means that the pastoral role of the ministry of the EPR is to 
serve as a healing place for both victims and perpetrators. 
 
There is a Rwandan proverb that reads as follows: “amarira y’umugabo atemba ajya 
mu nda.” Which literally means “the tears of a man flow into his stomach”. It reflects 
the cultural norm that pain should be kept inside. But the prevailing ‘model’ of 
reconciliation, as Trimikliniotis (2012:245) puts it, is “the need to address past 
violence, oppressions and divisions by connecting to an accepted narrative of ‘truth’ 
about the past violence”. For him, reconciliation is also seen as “breaking the silence 
about the past via the recognition of ‘the truth’; acknowledging the wrongdoing is as 
much about the future as it is about memory” (Trimikliniotis, 2012:247). In this 
respect, the role of the EPR would be to provide spaces and opportunities for 
individuals to tell their painful stories related to the 1994 experience. 
 
6.4.3.1 Story-telling in the reconciliation process 
In post-genocide Rwanda, trauma and post-traumatic stress disorders are some of the 
main issues that have impacted on the health of individuals, and their potential for 
development and social change. Hence, effective recovery and trauma healing 
programmes were necessary to balance the emotions and thoughts of traumatized 
individuals, as a way of re-integrating them back into society and promoting their 
holistic development (Mukabera, 2012:101). At the same time, “reconciliation must 
find ways to address the past without getting locked into a vicious cycle of mutual 
exclusiveness inherent in the past. In the reconciliation process, people need 
opportunity and space to express to and with one another the trauma of loss, their 
grief at that loss, and the anger that accompanies the pain and the memory of injustice 
experienced” (Lederach, 1997:26) 
 
Many scholars consider storytelling a key component in the healing and reconciliation 
process. De Gruchy (2002:22, 23), for example, emphasises the necessity of 
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storytelling in the process of reconciliation by proposing that, “the best way to speak 
about reconciliation is through story-telling rather than through systematic expositions 
of dogma. Story-telling is, in fact, the most appropriate genre for introducing the 
Christian understanding of reconciliation; it was also a primary form discourse at the 
TRC”. Furthermore, de Gruchy (2002:23) believes that “for many victims, their 
stories related to the Christian narrative of salvation history. Their stories were 
personalised cameos of lives shaped by faith, forgiveness and hope derived from the 
Gospel but lived out amidst the social and political traumas of their time”. 
 
For victims, sharing their stories is seen by some as a powerful way to redefine the 
past, reimagine the future and affect social change. It is also a way to re-establish 
commonly shared values and a shared past. Sverrisson (2006:11) observes that 
“…reinterpretation is the key word, enabling the survivor to ‘re-humanise’ the 
perpetrators. The facts can’t be changed, but the meaning given to them and the 
perceptions can be altered by gathering and introducing credible account of the 
events”. This is the central issue concerning reconciliation is described by Lederach 
(1997:27, 26) in the following excerpt: 
 
Reconciliation, in essence, represents a place, the point of encounter where 
concerns about the past and the future can meet. Reconciliation-as-encounter 
suggests that space for acknowledging the past and envisioning the future is the 
necessary ingredient for reframing the present. For this to happen, people must 
find ways to encounter themselves and their enemies, their hopes and their fears. 
Acknowledgement through hearing one another’s stories validates experience 
and represents the first step toward restoration of the person and the relationship. 
 
For this reason, the EPR advocated storytelling in its congregations. It provided 
victims and perpetrators with a safe space to tell their stories and dialogue with one 
another. During the liturgical service, there is an open time called “gutanganga 
ubuhamya,” which means ‘giving testimony’. This opportunity helped church 
members to open up and tell their stories, hear one another, and testify to God’s 
power in terrible situations. This has facilitated the healing of their wounds caused by 
the 1994 genocide. Boers (1992:88) also supports the notion of storytelling when he 
states: “Victims need to know that they have been heard and that their experience is 
recognised as significant. Victims need someone to listen to them. They must have 
opportunities to tell their story and to vent their feelings, perhaps over and over. They 
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must tell their truth. And they need others to suffer with them, to lament with them 
the evil that has been done”.  
 
6.4.3.2 Counselling, listening and social services 
Counselling has been another strategy to promote reconciliation in the EPR, 
especially at the level of the local congregation. The successful results of 
reconciliation in the parishes are due to the involvement of pastors because they were 
well-equipped and trained in conflict resolution and trauma counselling. Pastors offer 
counselling by listening to both victims and perpetrators, focusing on the importance 
of helping both groups through the trauma they experienced. The main function of 
pastoral care and counselling is on sustaining, empowering, guiding, reconciling, 
nurturing and healing people in need of psychological and spiritual care (Nagaju, 
2013:91). 
 
In Rwanda, churches were understood as civil society organisations best situated to 
provide immediate and direct services at the grassroots level. The church in mission is 
obligated to help the needy in society. In the EPR congregations, through diaconal 
service, pastors, evangelists, elders and deacons are aware of the needs of their church 
members and surrounding community. They are also better able to mobilise members 
when the need arises in the community. The deacons were faced with a huge task 
after the genocide. There were many vulnerable people. The EPR has been sensitising 
deacons so as to launch charity projects to improve the conditions of the vulnerable. 
For children from poor families, orphans, or child-headed households, deacons and 
church members have the moral obligation to help them obtain school fees. The EPR 
also helps street children. There were several children roaming the streets of Kigali, as 
they had no families with sufficient means to support them. Therefore, in response to 
the consequences of genocide, the EPR created a centre to take care of these children 
whose future otherwise seems bleak.  
 
Huyse (2003:54) maintains, “Victims are at the heart of all dimensions of the 
reconciliation process in societies emerging from violent conflict. It is crucially 
important that policy makers and civil society leaders are aware of the many faces of 
victimhood. This awareness must guide the search for adequate victim programs”. 
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This idea of victims being at the center of the reconciliation process justifies the 
reason why the EPR gives special attention to victims. 
 
Services provided to the victims. Among the survivors of the Rwandan genocide 
were thousands of widows and orphans. Richters and Van Brakel (2008:26) point out 
that after seeing all the problems that orphans face, many programmes were set up 
nationwide to protect orphans; these included both government and private initiatives. 
The national programme was called “Ijisho ry’umuturanyi,” meaning “the eye of a 
neighbour” or “take a child as yours”. This means, if you see a child of a neighbour 
with a problem you intervene as though that child was yours. This national initiative 
was put forward by Rwanda’s First Lady to help orphans, but also to protect all 
Rwandan children in general. The EPR has played a part in this by assisting orphans 
and street children.   
 
The EPR supports the needs of Rwandan genocide survivors by providing financial 
assistance, building houses, providing medical and psychological assistance, and 
paying school fees. In this regard, Bazuin (2013:170) affirms that churches have 
historically been and still are significant economic actors in Rwandan society. After 
the genocide, they have mobilised large amounts of material and economic resources 
to build houses and pay school fees for survivors, and to a lesser extent, assist families 
where the main breadwinner has been imprisoned. Both social support and economic 
resources are important components.  
 
Services provided to perpetrators. Like victims, perpetrators also command our 
attention in the reconciliation process. According to Volf (2006:66),“The wrongdoers 
would need to accept “the consequences of their misdeeds, repent, and provide 
restitution as far as possible the wronged would need to nurse their wounds and 
restore a measure of wholeness to their self, forgive those who have offended them, 
and seek to mend broken relationships with their offenders” In this regard, 
reconciliation seeks to rebuild social relations and helps both victim and perpetrator to 
live together, peacefully without hatred, fear or bitterness. Perpetrators were not 
excluded from the EPR’s reconciliation programmes. 
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The ministry to prisoners is seen as an important way of promoting the process of 
reconciliation among perpetrators who are still in prison. Therefore, the visitation of 
genocide perpetrators by pastors, elders and Christians in prison helped them to 
confess their crimes and reconcile with their victims. The church also taught them the 
necessary steps to meet survivors, tell the truth, and confess the wrong they have 
done.  
 
6.4.4 Commemoration of the 1994 genocide in relation to reconciliation 
In his book, The end of Memory: Remembering rightly in a violent world, Miroslav 
Volf (2006) understands that to remember a wrongdoing is to struggle against it. For 
Volf, the central question is how to remember rightly. He (2006:11-12) claims that 
“…remembering rightly the abuse I suffered is not a private affair even when it 
happens in the seclusion of my mind. Since others are always remembering abuse is 
of public significance”. This implies that remembering does not only help the 
individual but also for the wrongdoer and the community at large. Along the same 
vein, Schreiter (1989:66) reminds us, “To urge the forgetting of painful memories and 
events is to trivialize the events themselves. To urge victims to forget is to victimize 
them once again, saying that they could not possibly be as hurt as they claim to be. 
We cannot forget what happened to us. To erase part of our memory is to erase part of 
our very identity as persons”. 
 
It is worth quoting Volf (2006:204) again who correctly stresses that, “The obligation 
to remember is an extension of the obligation to attend to the wrongs committed. 
Sometimes no more will be possible than to offer victims ‘the most elementary 
compensation’ which is to give them a voice, the voice that was denied to them”. For 
victims, remembering is then part of the pursuit of justice. For Christians, we 
remember so that we can forgive and reconcile. Volf reminds us that non-
remembrance of an offense is even less a unilateral act. It makes sense only after the 
victim has been redeemed, the perpetrator transformed, and after a relationship 
between them has been redefined through reconciliation (Volf, 2006:205). 
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André Karamaga
44
 (n. d.) claims that the mission of reconciliation is imperative for 
the EPR. For him, Rwandan people should avoid taking a short cut and denying the 
reality of the past. In this regard, the EPR initiated a memorial for its pastors and 
church members who were killed in the 1994 genocide. A Rwandan theologian, Jean 
Gakwandi (2008:18), affirms that the Presbyterian Church in Rwanda is the only 
Church in Rwanda that has managed to build memorial sites where the bodies of the 
victims who were identified were buried. Three genocide memorials have been built, 
one at Remera-Rukoma where pastors, their families, church members and other 
Tutsis were killed, and two at Kirinda respectively, one near Kirinda hospital and the 
other near the river of Nyabarongo where the bodies of those killed were thrown. 
Annual commemoration events are held at these mentioned sites. It is also important 
to note that the EPR has suggested an annual commemoration of the genocide 
perpetrated against the Tutsi that happened in 1994 within all congregations and other 
institutions of the church such as schools and hospitals. 
 
In the aftermath of the 1994 genocide, the survivors were severely traumatised by the 
fact that many of their loved ones had been brutally massacred, and also because their 
remains were treated disrespectfully. This is because in most cases, the genocidaires 
(the killers) left the bodies of their victims wherever they had been murdered, leaving 
churches, schools, government buildings, forests and swamps alike littered with 
human remains. In other instances, “the genocidaires dumped the bodies of their 
victims in pit latrines, caves, ravines and shallow mass graves in order to hide the 
smell of decomposition and to prevent the spread of disease” (Des Forges, 1999:216).  
 
Commemoration of the 1994 genocide is important and has helped people in the 
process of reconciliation. The act of reburying survivors’ family members with 
respect provided enormous comfort. Commemoration serves as a reminder to 
Rwandans of the atrocities committed during the genocide, while also teaching the 
younger generation about the history of the nation. The youth need to know how the 
genocide was prepared and carried out in order to make long-lasting strategies to 
prevent genocide forever. It shows survivors that they are not alone but that we grieve 
                                                          
44
Kramaga (n.d). The statement mentioned here is found in his paper titled, ‘Aucune mort ne doit etre 
gratuite: En memoire de victims du genocide de 1994’. 
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together. It reinforces the commitment to make sure genocide does not happen again 
(Nagaju, 2013:95). 
 
Archbishop Desmond Tutu shares the same idea of remembering what happened in 
the past. He states, “In forgiving, people are not asked to forget. On the contrary, it is 
important to remember, so that we should not let such atrocities happen again” (Tutu, 
1999:271). 
 
Commemoration day is observed nationally on the 7
th
 of April each year. In the 
beginning, some people thought that commemoration was a matter for survivors. In 
this regard, Musemakweli reminds us of the standpoint of church members of the 
EPR towards the commemoration. He explains that when the EPR initiated the 
commemoration, only the survivors attended. While othersstated, “It is not our 
business”. But later on, as commemoration continued year after year, then more and 
more began to join in on the ceremony and gradually take part. Musemakweli claims 
that the focus of the EPR is based on the message of God during the ceremonies of 
remembrance. Speakers and preachers emphasize forgiveness and repentance because 
what happened in 1994 was a shame and needs to be corrected. Musemakweli also 
emphasises that if the church failed to prevent genocide and to speak against ethnic 
ideology, now is our time as Christians to correct our failure. During the event of 
remembering the 1994 genocide, church leaders and governmental officials place an 
emphasis on the message of repentance, forgiveness, love, truth-telling, unity and 
reconciliation.  
 
In short, Schreiter (2008) stresses the importance of remembering as a tool for the 
healing of memories. He adds, “For societies to suppress memory can make them 
dangerously explosive, especially when those suppressed memories burst forth in a 
displaced manner, cut off from their original source”. Therefore, he affirms, “In 
forgiving we do not forget, for how we could forget something that has so irrevocably 
changed our lives without diminishing ourselves and undervaluing the loss we have 
incurred? To forgive is not to forget, as the old saying goes, but to remember in a 
different way. Healing does not mean forgetting, for to urge victims simply to forget 
is to make them victims yet another time” (Schreiter, 2008:9-10). 
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The purpose of this section has been to outline the various efforts of the EPR in 
pursuing reconciliation. Within the context of the CMO framework, the focus here 
has been on the mechanisms that led to the desired outcomes of reconciliation. Table 
1 below summarises the abovementioned activities and their outcomes.  
 
Table 1. Summary of the four main activities/initiatives done by the EPR with regards to the 
ministry of reconciliation, indicating its impact and outcomes. 
Context/resources (EPR’s 
activities) 
Mechanisms/Responses Outcomes 
Centre for training and 
documentations (CFD). 
Conferences, seminars and training. 
 
 To train church leaders how to 
approach the concept of peace, 
unity and reconciliation. 
 To organise trainings and other 
activities that bring people 
together to discuss and promote 
reconciliation. 
 To organize seminars and 
workshops to deal with conflict 
prevention and resolution 
within parishes and 
communities. 
 To bring together survivors and 
perpetrators, to undergo 
teachings and training about 
reconciliation in order to 
promote a real reconciliation. 
 
 Sensitising perpetrators to 
plead guilty to their crimes and 
asking victims to forgive. 
 Promoting positive attitudes 
towards government policies 
related to reconciliation and 
participation in Gacaca courts. 
 Helping individuals to repent, 
forgive, fellowship and restore 
broken relationship. 
 Helping people to reduce, solve 
and prevent conflicts, heal 
emotional wounds, have peace 
of mind. 
 Help control negative feelings 
such as anger, grief, 
hopelessness, hatred, and 
division. 
 Being together, strengthening 
each other, sharing the Word of 
God without hypocrisy, love 
and fellowship is seen among 
Hutu and Tutsi as brothers and 
sisters in Christ. 
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 Economic and development 
cooperatives/associations 
 To work together in 
associations and cooperatives 
and create awareness of the 
necessity to save money with 
the aim ofeconomic 
development and poverty 
reduction. 
 To overcome divisions, 
discrimination and economic 
inequality.  
 To bring people together in a 
community where they can 
build interdependent social and 
economic relationships.  
Economic and development and 
reconciliation helped: 
 To bring together survivors and 
perpetrators, re-creating trust 
and peace in the community 
and improving their social 
welfare. 
 To support each other. 
 It is when trust and peace is 
restored that coexistence and 
lasting reconciliation can be 
attained.  
 
Pastoral approach, pastoral care, 
counselling and social services 
 To provide social assistance 
towards vulnerable people such 
as orphans, widows, refugees, 
repatriated people, survivors of 
genocide and prisoners. 
 To engage trauma healing in 
relation with reconciliation 
 To mobilize people for 
effective participation in 
Gacaca courts. 
 Social cohesion such as 
religious conversions, Sunday 
worship, prayer meetings, and 
social gatherings had an impact 
on interpersonal change and 
intergroup relationship-
building. 
 Reconciliation, peace, unity, 
truth-telling, repentance, 
forgiveness, the process of 
trauma-recovery and healing. 
 
Remembering and commemorating 
the 1994 genocide against the Tutsi 
 The EPR appointed a 
commission to address unity, 
reconciliation, fighting against 
genocide and its ideology.  
 To relive the past and to learn 
from the history of Rwanda 
and to prepare for a bright 
future. 
 To make sure genocide like the 
1994 Rwandan genocide never 
happens again, “Never again!”  
 Healing memories. 
 The younger generation learn 
about the 1994 genocide and its 
effects to Rwanda. 
 Remembering victims has 
shown survivors that they are 
not alone but we grieve 
together, we suffer with them, 
we support them to improve 
their social welfare. People 
relate to the past in such a way 
that it becomes the source of 
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 To provide a safe space to 
remember and express 
traumatic feelings. 
 To bury bodies of victims in 
dignity and promote truth-
telling. 
 
building a new life. 
 Lighting kindles called 
“urumuri rw’icyizere” means 
“light of hope” for the future 
Rwanda. 
 
6.5 How do people speak about and understand reconciliation: the example of 
Remera Parish 
 
It has been argued in this dissertation that a theology of reconciliation in Rwanda 
must address the problem of ethnic ideology. In order to make sure that the EPR’s 
efforts to achieve reconciliation are contextually relevant, it is important to consider 
how reconciliation and ethnic ideology are being understood at the congregational 
level. For this reason, even though this study is not an empirical one, I have chosen to 
use some examples from an empirical study conducted in Remera
45
 Presbyterian 
congregation during my master’s studies. The purpose is not only to show the impact 
and outcome of reconciliation activities amongst people in local communities, but 
also to analyse words and content from their narratives.  
 
The choice of Remera parish is not arbitrary. The Remera congregation was severely 
impacted by the 1994 genocide against the Tutsi. One hundred and thirty eight church 
members and pastors as well as other people in surrounding areas were killed. This 
negative impact has disrupted relationships and social cohesion. Hence, there was a 
dire need for reconciliation in Remera parish.  
 
                                                          
45
Remera parish is located in Kamonyi District, Rukoma sector, Remera cell, Kabande village. It is 10 
km away from Kamonyi centre and 34 km away from Kigali, the capital city of Rwanda. Remera 
parish was one of the mission stations founded by missionaries. Remera parish has 4 sub-parishes and 
15 chapels (congregations). It has currently 85 church elders, 85 deacons, five thousand eight hundred 
forty six (5846) church members and 40 choirs ministering in all sub-parishes. (Archives: ‘Presbyterian 
Church Remera Parish, 1912-2012, jubilee of century’, pp. 13, 39). 
 
All information quoted in this study concerning Remera parish can be found in the research conducted 
by Nagaju Muke (2013) for her MTH degree at Tumaini University Makumira (TUMA) in Tanzania. 
The title of the thesis was, ‘The contribution of the Presbyterian Church in Rwanda towards mission of 
reconciliation after the 1994 genocide against the Tutsi: A case study of Remera parish (2002-2012)’. 
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A theology of reconciliation that is truly contextual will need to consider how 
ordinary Christians in congregations speak and act toward one another. This section 
will look at particular examples from the Remera parish in order to see how the 
communities perceive the contribution of the EPR in their ministry of reconciliation. 
The ministry of the EPR will be evaluated along the four dimensions of reconciliation 
mentioned in section2.5. However, the standard by which these ministries will be 
evaluated is not merely whether they are effective in achieving their proposed 
outcomes, but whether they are effective in deconstructing ethnic ideology. There 
have been many valuable efforts initiated by the government and churches aimed at 
addressing the issues arising from the 1994 genocide. The argument of this thesis, 
however, is that such efforts, no matter how worthwhile, are too narrowly focused if 
they do not understand the 1994 genocide in its historical context. Understood in light 
of Rwandan history, reconciliation requires a much deeper and broader attempt to 
help Hutu and Tutsi see their differences as an artificial inheritance from the colonial 
era. This section will focus on the EPR’s efforts in Remera, but in light of Rwandan 
history, asking in what way the ministry of reconciliation might deconstruct the 
effects of ethnic ideology. 
 
6.5.1 Relationship-building 
The 1994 genocide caused a serious ethnic divide that is evident in its aftermath. The 
social fabric of society was completely ripped apart. Fear and mistrust abound 
between victims and perpetrators. The goal of this section is to show how the EPR 
contributed and responded to the challenge of these broken relationships. 
Reconciliation means “finding a way to live alongside former enemies, to coexist with 
them, to develop the degree of cooperation necessary to share our society with them, 
so that we all have better lives together than we have had separately” (Bloomfield, 
2003:13).  
 
As noted in chapter five, shattered relationships, broken threads in the social fabric, 
and intense distrust were part of the effects of the 1994 genocide, and were clearly 
visible among the people. The EPR introduced “Itorero ry’ibanze,” which literary 
means “basic church” or referred to as the “house fellowships”. Here ten to twenty 
families of Presbyterian members gather for prayer and Bible study once a week. This 
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strategy of house fellowship worked not only as a new way of doing mission and 
evangelism but also as a strategy of reconciliation, as it helps people to reduce their 
prejudices, fear and facilitates the restoration of relationships. The EPR provided a 
booklet that contained teaching guidelines for the year; the theme of reconciliation 
was included in it. The aim of the EPR is to help its members grasp a biblical 
understanding of reconciliation and thereby facilitate reconciliation. 
 
Impact and outcome of reconciliation 
People in Remera understand reconciliation as relationship building. The ministry of 
reconciliation started in 2002, and was led by Rev. Jerome Bizimana, the minister in 
charge.He is currently the president of Remera Presbytery in the Presbyterian Church 
in Rwanda, and serves as chaplain at the Remera Rukoma Secondary School. He has 
been instrumental in initiating and training a peace making group working to heal the 
wounds of the genocide, including groups composed of genocide perpetrators released 
from prison and the people whose family members were slaughtered in the attacks. 
The seminar of reconciliation is held on Friday every week; the gathering is made up 
of people of all different ages, both male and female. The study revealed that the 
situation today in terms of relationships and social-cohesion has changed compared to 
the situation before the programme of reconciliation was initiated. Respondents whom 
I interviewed during my master’s studies in 2013 stated that social-cohesion and 
relationships among people before reconciliation seminars were characterised by 
feelings of “fear to meet others, hatred and anger, loss of happiness, loneliness, 
divisions and ethnicity, refusal of forgiving, conflicts with others, fear of being killed, 
mistrust, guilt and trauma”. 
 
The question that comes to the fore here is: “How and in what way will the effects of 
reconciliation will contribute to social change?” First, participants of training and 
seminars are strategically chosen based upon an analysis of groups identified as 
victims and perpetrators. The purpose is to develop relationships and an 
understanding of the “other”. This involves a transformation of one’s own attitude 
while encountering someone of another ethnic group, which leads to social cohesion. 
After the training and seminars, relationships were characterised by the fact that 
people: “Fellowship together, work together, support each other and engage in 
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sharing. There are no divisions or conflicts among the people, all are united. There is 
a sense of freedom and trust, and relationships are peaceful, loving and good. Feel 
free, trust each other, and have peace, love and good relationships”. After the 
reconciliation seminars were carried out at Remera parish, the level of trust improved 
to the point that an association had been formed between survivors and perpetrators. 
They visited each other in their homes and supported each other in their daily life and 
social problems (Nagaju, 2013:99). 
 
Below follows the testimony of one of the respondents whose name is Nyirahabimana 
Esperance: 
 
I had fear when I saw a person released from the prison and I did not trust the 
person. I felt that I cannot talk to him and that I have nothing to share with him. 
This because when I saw the person (my offender), I remembered what 
happened to me during the 1994 genocide and I felt that it was not easy to 
forgive and reconcile with people who killed our relatives. But through 
reconciliation seminars and trainings, the church helped us to reconcile and to 
build new relations with them. After reconciling to each other, my offender 
became my friend whom we share our daily activities and even God’ work. I 
trust him at the point he is the one who helps me to farm my cows (cited in 
Nagaju, 2013:87). 
 
The ministry of reconciliation in the abovementioned parish helped both survivors 
and perpetrators of the genocide come together in search of sustainable peace. This 
helped the two parties to restore amicable relations between them. Ndatimana 
Emmanuel, in his testimony, stated the following: 
 
Before the program of reconciliation, I saw all survivors as my enemies. But 
after participating in reconciliation seminars, our relationship has been 
transformed to the level I decided to marry a woman who is Tutsi survivor (cited 
in Nagaju, 2013:88). 
 
It is clear according to the abovementioned statements that reconciliation in the EPR, 
as it was captured in Remera parish, led to positive changes and a transformation in 
the attitudes of people towards members of the ‘other’ group. However, statements 
such as “I marry a Tutsi woman,” shows that they still see each other in terms of 
ethnic categories. For this reason, this study suggests that despite the good work 
achieved by the EPR concerning the reconciliation process, the issue of ethnic 
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ideology must be given serious attention at the same time. In this regard, André 
Kamaraga during the general synod stated: “We had continuous teachings aimed at 
making people understand that the blood of Jesus Christ is beyond the blood of ethnic 
groups, that the human being has been created in the image of God, so that we are 
brothers and sisters; when we will be able to manifest that brotherhood within the 
church, we will be able to teach other Rwandans” (cited in Nsengimana, 2015:75).The 
EPR, therefore, should provide a clear theology of a shared identity, which will help 
its church members and other Rwandans to overcome any division related to 
ethnicity. 
 
6.5.2 Truth-telling 
Many people in Rwanda affirmed that after the 1994 genocide, fear and mistrust were 
key issues for both parties. They also argue that it was not possible for them to come 
together for any activity. This section therefore maintains that in the context of post-
genocide Rwanda, where fear, anger and mistrust prevail among the people, truth-
telling has been considered a viable response to these issues.Truth-telling is related to 
trauma healing programmes for the individual; the nation cannot deal with the crimes 
of the past and move forward to create a better future unless those crimes are named 
and identified. There can be no trust between warring parties unless the history 
between them is made known. However, truth-telling also has the possibility of 
creating cognitive dissonance, as people’s assumptions and perceptions about their 
enemies are revealed to be untrue, thereby provoking reassessments of the basis of 
their relationships. Truth-telling can happen between individuals in programmes 
based on the intergroup contact hypothesis (Bazuin, 2013:30). Truth-telling about 
what happened in 1994 is one approach used in the reconciliation process. 
 
Impact and outcome of reconciliation  
Reconciliation was based on the social reality of Rwanda, where groups are mixed 
and live together, and have to support each other. For example, a survivor may get ill 
and be helped to the hospital by close neighbours deemed as perpetrators, or may 
need support for other daily or social living problems (Mukabera, 2012:111). The 
study conducted in the Remera parish has shown that some cultural values were 
destroyed by the 1994 genocide. The reconciliation process helped both survivors and 
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perpetrators to reconstruct these cultural values. They live in peace and support each 
other during different ceremonies such as weddings, burials, etc. Respondents in 
Remera parish expressed and recognised the positive results of trust and relationship 
building among the people. They stated that people in villages now sit together and 
eat together. Inter-marriage is seen among our youth (Nagaju, 2013).  
 
Chapter 3 reminded us that in pre-colonial Rwanda, the categories of ‘Hutu’ and 
‘Tutsi’ were not based on ethnic lines because they all shared the same language, 
religion and culture. It is helpful to note that in the reconciliation process, the 
reconstruction of these cultural values (i.e. sharing their painful past and telling the 
truth of what happened to them in 1994) is the response to which the Presbyterian 
Church helps the two groups (Hutu and Tutsi) address the ethnic ideology that divided 
them. It is in fact a means of de-mythologizing and undoing the ethnic myth 
constructed by both colonialists and missionaries.  
 
6.5.3 Forgiveness 
As mentioned earlier, reconciliation seminars and training are one of the most 
important strategies used by the EPR to implement the reconciliation initiatives 
proposed by the general synod. The pastors in charge of the congregations conduct 
seminars, teaching the Christian concepts of forgiveness that lead to reconciliation. In 
most cases, the church identifies the victims and perpetrators of the genocide along 
the ethnic divide of Hutu and Tutsi. The seminars invite individuals from both sides 
of these groups, as well as from the parish and surrounding communities. The 
seminars are designed to rebuild relationships and create a safe space where both 
survivors and released perpetrators learn about Christian reconciliation and 
forgiveness. 
 
As I see it, the church emphasises reconciliation centered on forgiveness. 
Nevertheless, de Gruchy (2002:171) reminds us of the following, 
 
Forgiveness is a word that easily falls from our tongues, especially if we are not 
victims of oppression and injustice. It is easy for us who are not victims to tell 
them to forgive their enemies; it is also relatively easy for oppressors to ask for 
forgiveness. The problem is that forgiveness can be manipulated by the 
dominant in such a way that it strengthens their position and weakens that of the 
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victim. Forgiveness thus becomes a tool in the manipulation of power relations, 
making the oppressed even more a victim of injustice.  
 
De Gruchy points out that genuine forgiveness does not mean brushing the past aside 
and regarding injustice lightly. Forgiveness arises out of a deep awareness of the evil 
that has been perpetrated, but knows how to deal with that evil in a way that leads to 
healing (de Gruchy, 2002:178). 
 
As many Rwandans say, there is moral obligation to forgive and reconcile, since 
victims and perpetrators (the ex-prisoners) have to live together as neighbours again. 
However, according to Kubai (2007a:62), “The pain and human suffering as a result 
of the genocide are deep and this has certain implications for reconciliation. It is 
necessary to acknowledge that it is not humanly possible for a deeply pained and 
traumatised survivor of genocide to forgive and forget while he or she continues to 
suffer the pain and trauma of genocide”.In the case of churches in Rwanda, the 
challenging issue is that some people still think that reconciliation is about teaching 
survivors to forgive. However, in my view, forgiveness is not the issue of survivors 
only but it is a concern for both survivors in terms of forgiving and perpetrators in 
terms of repentance. This understanding is similar to that highlighted by Boers 
(1992:91): 
 
Real forgiveness is in fact an act of empowerment and healing. But forgiveness 
may take time. It must come in its own time and cannot be forced. And real 
forgiveness is possible only through the work of the Spirit. 
 
Despite the fact that forgiveness helps survivors to heal, it should be acknowledged 
that forgiveness is not an easy thing and it should not be imposed or forced on 
survivors. In my view, forgiveness can happen when perpetrators acknowledge their 
wrong and repent. Tutu (1999:278) also observes, “The most effective way would be 
for the perpetrators or their descendants to acknowledge the awfulness of what 
happened and the descendants of the victims to respond by granting forgiveness”. 
 
The EPR during its general synod held at Kigali in the year 2005 created the 
commission of unity and reconciliation to fight against genocide and its ideology. One 
of the key leading questions of the commission was: “Can a Christian forgive without 
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forgetting what happened”? The members of the commission affirmed that 
forgiveness does not mean forgetting what happened during the tragedy of the 1994 
genocide; a serious offense cannot, and perhaps should not, be completely forgotten. 
For them, it is important to remember the past in order to build a bright future. 
 
 In this regard, Desmond Tutu in his book No Future without Forgiveness clearly 
states:  
 
True forgiveness deals with the past, to make the future possible. We cannot go 
on nursing grudges even vicariously for those who cannot speak for themselves 
any longer. We have to accept that what we do, we do for generations past, 
present and yet to come. That is what makes a community a community or a 
people a people (Tutu, 1999:279). 
 
This implies that victims should not be forced to forgive; rather, forgiveness helps to 
acknowledge the past in order to build a future of hope based on God’s own 
forgiveness. 
 
Beside seminars, preaching is effective for spreading the message of reconciliation, 
knowing that the church has the mission and the mandate to reconcile people with 
God and humans with humans. Preaching is very important because the minister 
speaks with a moral authority not found in secular reconciliation work. This can have 
a positive impact on the reconciliation process because of the large numbers of people 
who attend church regularly.  
 
In addition to preaching, a book of liturgy is used in all congregations of the EPR. 
Among many prayers, confession of sin related to the genocide is found in the liturgy. 
As a Presbyterian theologian minister, Nsengimana indicated that the prayer is 
formulated as follows: 
 
God our Lord, in the name of Jesus Christ our saviour, you gave a beautiful 
country to Rwandans. We are in your presence with sorrow because we did not 
consider the legacy of unity you provide us [....] we have promoted divisions 
among us instead of joining our force for the best of our country. We have 
fostered identity based discrimination, our common language as a symbol of that 
unity has been used for disputes, cursing each other, and other dishonoured 
actions instead of using it for mutual help hand by hand and sharing straggles. 
Our arms did not help those who were suffering, we did not use wisely what you 
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gave us, we have not been true witnesses of your Word, we have not observed 
your commandment [...] Oh, God, we are ashamed and regretting because of our 
sins, we could not be allowed to open our months in your presence, but because 
of the blood of Jesus Christ who has reconciled us to you, we dare to come to 
you, asking to heal injured hearts, full of sorrow, hate and revenge spirit, for we 
need to regain the unity as you and Christ Jesus you are united forever, Amen 
(Nsengimana, 2015:82-83). 
 
It is clear that in this prayer, confession of sins is mentioned and underlines a public 
confession of the wrongs committed during the 1994 Rwandan genocide against the 
Tutsi. It calls for unity and reconciliation, continued resistance against the ideology of 
division and discrimination, assistance for vulnerable people, and the implementation 
of values provided by the Word of God. 
 
For some people religious ritual takes on increased salience in post-genocide Rwanda. 
These rituals, particularly confession and asking forgiveness, are focused primarily on 
human relationships with God, but people report that they spill over into their 
relationships with each other. On the one hand, Catholic, Anglican and Lutheran 
churches in Rwanda have formalised confession and asking for forgiveness as part of 
their standard liturgies, they are fundamentally private: the member might privately 
confess to a priest or privately ask forgiveness from God. On the other hand, 
Evangelical Protestants do not have formal liturgies in the same way as Catholic and 
mainline denominations, but incorporate more informal opportunities for members to 
confess their sins and ask for forgiveness (Bazuin, 2013:154). 
 
Impact and outcome of reconciliation  
The respondents in Remera parish found that the reconciliation and forgiveness 
seminars taught them to: be patient, repent, forgive, love, instil hope and build self-
esteem. It helped them to find fellowship with others and respect them. Seminars also 
helped them to reduce, solve and prevent conflict. It also helped them to support each 
other. It healed the wounds in the heart, provided peace of mind and allowed them to 
live joyful lives. Here is the testimony of Mukamudenge Ancile, one of the 
respondents in Remera: 
 
Before reconciliation process, I spent sleepless nights because of people who 
killed my relatives, I had no   peace, I felt miserable and I remained hurt by the 
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offender. Forgiveness released me, I feel free and I have peace in my heart (cited 
in Nagaju, 2013:86).  
 
According to Rev. Jerome Bizimana, key themes included: forgiveness, repentance, 
acceptance and love for one another. He indicated that reconciliation programmes in 
his parish had a spiritual impact and helped to control negative feelings such as anger, 
grief, hopelessness, hatred and division by facilitating peace. In addition, participants 
of seminars at Remera parish witnessed the following: 
 
We pray together, strengthen each other, share the Word of God without 
hypocrisy, love and fellowship is seen among us. Hutu and Tutsi feel that we are 
one people and brothers and sisters in Christ (cited in Nagaju, 2013:98). 
 
Despite these successful stories of forgiveness, the EPR should go beyond the event 
of 1994, taking into account of the whole history of Rwanda. How does truth-telling, 
relationship building and forgiveness in the context of a hundred years of history help 
Rwandans to heal their past wounds?   
 
6.5.4 Healing 
Reconciliation is a profoundly difficult challenge, especially after such a great 
violence as genocide. However, healing from psychological wounds—the trauma 
resulting from victimization—is important because it prevents the defensive attitudes 
of survivors from turning into thoughts of revenge. Healing and reconciliation are 
essential both to improve the quality of life of wounded people and to make renewed 
violence less likely (Staub et al., 2003:288-9). 
 
In Rwanda, according to Lala et al., (2014:451), memorial sites across the country 
present physical displays that serve as reminders of the genocide, while also drawing 
on traditional storytelling and narrative traditions. Major annual genocide 
commemorations in Rwanda encourage public remembrance and mourning. These 
activities and installations serve a valuable role in encouraging remembrance, 
ensuring that events and testimonies are preserved for historical records, and 
promoting the search for truth and justice. However, memorialisation and testimony 
also have the potential for harm if not balanced by measures that highlight positive 
characteristics of people and communities. This is because survivors can experience a 
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deep-seated psychological anguish that involves a loss of identity, beliefs and values, 
and that turn them into something resembling the “walking dead” (Lala et al., 
2014:451). 
 
In order for survivors to cope with overcome negative feelings during remembrance 
periods, an initiative called “Messages of Hope” commenced in partnership with 
Ibuka (the peak survivors’ organisation in Rwanda), the Kigali Genocide Memorial 
Centre (KGM), and an interdisciplinary team that includes social and clinical 
psychologists, and media and communications researchers from Murdoch University. 
The project aims to provide a practical framework through which Rwandans can tell 
their own personal stories of healing and hope for the future (Lalaet al., 2014:452).  
 
Messages of Hope focuses on the stories of ordinary Rwandan citizens who have 
recovered from their experiences of trauma and loss. The messages are comprised of 
testimonies in which the survivor tells the story of his/her personal journey since the 
genocide, and relays hopeful feelings for their own and the country’s future. The 
majority of messages are delivered by people who were present in Rwanda during the 
genocide. However, messages have also been created by Rwandans who were outside 
of the country or who were not yet born, but whose families were directly affected by 
the genocide (Lalaet al., 2014:452).  
 
Messengers are encouraged to tell their stories in their own words and to talk about 
aspects in their own life that inspired hope. For example, survivors frequently 
mention the importance of recovery as a means to honour those who were killed. The 
role of education in transforming lives is another common theme, as is the need for 
community support, reconciliation and healing. While acknowledging the reality of 
harmful experiences during the genocide, survivors’ messages of hope have focused 
on their own efforts to recover and rebuild, and includes advice and encouragement 
for other survivors that acknowledge suffering but celebrate resilience.  
 
To that end, Schreiter proposes that the church as a community of memory is 
concerned with truthful memory and creates safe places where memories can be 
spoken out aloud in order to prevent anger that can poison any possibilities for the 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
  
 
 
233 
future. Living in the memory of what Christ has gone through — suffering and death, 
yet not forgotten and indeed raised up by God — is the source of our hope (Schreiter, 
2005:4-5). 
 
Impact and outcome of reconciliation  
The experience of the Remera parish shows the importance of bringing people from 
two conflicting parties into “reconciliation as encounter,” which helps them to express 
their painful feelings by telling their story, which is a path that leads to healing. 
During reconciliation meetings, both victims and perpetrators receive an opportunity 
to express anger, fear and pain. Talking about the pain of their past makes them feel 
better, not worse. Boers (1992:12) supports the viewpoint of equal opportunity for 
both victims and perpetrators. For him, both victims and offenders merit attention. 
This dual emphasis is clearly biblical. In the Bible’s first recorded crime, God 
empathises deeply with the victim, Abel. “Listen; your brother’s blood is crying out to 
me from the ground” (Genesis 4:10b). At the same time God protects Cain the 
offender from capital punishment (Genesis 4:15). God’s concern is for both the victim 
and offender, and we must do the same.  
 
6.6 The Church: an ‘effective’ instrument through which to address ethnic 
ideology and promote reconciliation 
 
The next crucial question to answer in this section is whether the EPR church is an 
‘effective’ body and instrument through which to address ethnic ideology, respond to 
the effects of genocide, and promote reconciliation in Rwanda? To recap, the focal 
questions in the previous sections (6.4 and 6.5) were:  
 
 Has the Presbyterian Church in Rwanda been engaged in addressing ethnic 
ideology and promoting reconciliation? And if so, how? 
 Have these reconciliation programmes produced any significant impact and/or 
changes in the attitudes and behaviours of individuals and groups regarding 
reconciliation? 
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It was argued in this chapter that the EPR’s training had a significant impact on the 
actions of pastors. Most of the pastors understood that sensitising the guilty to admit 
their crimes and seek forgiveness is part of their duty. Prior to their training, many 
perceived genocide related issues as being the responsibility of the government, and 
not for the church.  
 
Moreover, pastors who participated in the training understood that their uniting 
message of salvation was hardily received and understood when they were in front of 
a divided community. In this context, the involvement of the trained pastors in 
sensitising Christians towards reconciliation increased significantly after the training. 
Pastors who benefited from the EPR’s training promoted a positive attitude towards 
government policies related to reconciliation and participation in Gacaca courts.  
 
These statements below indicate that reconciliation programmes produce positive 
results, and help to illustrate the impact of reconciliation on the lives of both victims 
and perpetrators:  
 
When I got out of prison, I felt that I was completely left out and did not fit in 
my community. Nobody trusted me; even my own family did not understand me. 
I had bitter talks with all people. I was always in a bad mood. My heart was 
heavy; I was interested in nothing. I was also always scared, and I was 
suspicious of everyone, especially the survivors. Indeed, they were pointing at 
me every time I met them in the street. I could never think a survivor could 
forgive a killer. I thought they always wanted revenge, even if they did not say it 
openly. I hated them, thinking I was only answering the hatred they had of me. I 
isolated myself and felt lonely. My life had no peace and expected no better 
future. The reconciliation seminars in my church helped me understand the root 
causes of genocide, its effects on Rwandans lives, and the necessity of 
reconciliation. I understood the source of my pain and the suffering of others 
around me especially survivors. The church helped us make a step towards 
reconciliation process
46
 (cited in Nagaju, 2013:98-100).  
 
Again, a survivor/victim of the genocide gave the following testimony: 
 
The genocide took my entire family. Life after the genocide was unthinkable to 
me. I found no interest in anything. I lived my life in solitude. I had no trust in 
people around me. I isolated myself in fear and hatred. I had a lot of prejudices 
against ex-prisoners, and Hutus generally. I did not know that they, too, had 
                                                          
46
Testimony of an ex-prisoner who did not want to disclose his name: 27/03/2013. 
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suffered from the genocide. The training given by my church helped me accept 
myself and to meet other people again. During Reconciliation seminars, we were 
taught the topics related to the analysis of causes of the 1994 genocide. 
Surprisingly, we have discovered that the ethnic differences which have been so 
much magnified in the past are not the real differences affecting us. So I started 
to live in peace with all the people around me and I have new and good 
relationships because I decided to forgive the culprits of my family’s killing. I 
even accepted working with the killers of my family. Today, we have an 
association of survivors and perpetrators which is in Remera parish, we have 
activities which bring us money, and we trust each other and share the vision of 
building our future
47
 (cited in Nagaju, 2013:100). 
 
As was indicated in chapter 5, Rwandans are now discovering that the 1994 genocide 
affected almost every citizen of the country in one way or another. Reversing these 
effects requires a change in attitude that cannot be achieved overnight. Therefore, this 
chapter shows that the Presbyterian Church in Rwanda has opted for a strategic 
approach that aims at: building relationships, forgiveness, truth-telling and healing in 
the communities. When the truth is told and relationships are restored, then healing 
and lasting reconciliation can be attained.  
 
In conclusion, a significant impact and outcome of the EPR’s initiatives related to 
reconciliationis evident in the change of attitude and improved relationship between 
individuals and groups. Furthermore, the EPR also helped to identify the harm of 
division and ethnic ideology on the social cohesion of Christians and all citizens in 
general. Furthermore, the EPR also stressed the importance of seeking forgiveness 
among church members in order to live a meaningful Christian life.  
 
However, it is important to be reminded that despite some of the church leaders’ 
noble intentions and activities, not all pastors have the same degree of dynamism and 
involvement in resolving conflict and promoting reconciliation. This is due to a 
number of factors, including the hypocrisy of some church leaders who display good 
intentions in public but privately discourage sincere reconciliation. Others did nothing 
to deter false testimonies in Gacaca or held ideological positions that compromised 
their impartiality to resolve conflicts. Other pastors had a limited awareness of the 
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Testimony of a genocide survivor who wished to remain anonymous: 27/03/2013 
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impact of social conflict on the Christian life, or they simply lacked technical 
competence to deal with conflicts, especially related to the genocide.
48
 
 
There is no doubt that the EPR has strongly involved itself in responding to the effects 
and consequences of the genocide. The EPR also has undertaken various initiatives to 
promote reconciliation in the country. However, Elisée Musemakweli’s (2014:3) view 
reminds us that even if the ministry of reconciliation is part of the EPR’s mission, 
there are difficulties and challenges related to the process of reconciliation:  
 
Not only were people physically wounded but they were traumatized and we 
were not well prepared to face this situation of reconciliation. But we have to do 
it. We have to help people to learn to live together again because they are 
together in the church; they are together in the villages; they are together, so we 
need to take some steps in the direction of harmony and reconciliation. That’s 
why we tried to focus on the Biblical passages of reconciliation — not only 
during worship but during our bible studies and by sitting with the people in 
their homes. Not only is it a tough path to walk; it is a long one.  
 
Musemakweli’s hope is that future generations will move past the pain. He comments 
that he is confident the country is on the right path, and by means of the EPR with the 
help of many other Christian organisations, churches, and even the government itself, 
the people of Rwanda will someday be reconciled. Again, Musemakweli (2014:3) 
said:  “We have some examples of people living together and living in harmony”. He 
adds: “This is really encouraging. That’s why we keep struggling — to make our 
people happy and live in security”.  
 
Even though the EPR has done considerable work to reconcile Rwandans, the 
problem of ethnic ideology remains unsolved. As noted in section 5.2, a hateful ethnic 
ideology still persists in some parts of Rwanda, even after the genocide. This is why 
“those who either developed or implemented the 1994 genocide continues to 
disseminate ethnic ideology openly between individuals or among groups. This is 
highlighted by the proliferation of writings aimed at denying, delegitimizing or 
trivializing the genocide” (Mafeza, 2013:3). In response to ethnic ideology, the 
                                                          
48
 CPR Report, (n. d). ‘The impact of the Rwandan Protestant Council: Training program on peace and 
reconciliation’, pp, 24-25. 
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government of Rwanda has initiated the “Ndi Umunyarwanda” (I am a Rwandan) 
programme as a good strategy employed by NURC to eradicate, undo and deconstruct 
ethnic ideology (cf. section 5.4.1.2). However, despite successful efforts and 
achievements done by the EPR, there is a gap due to the lack of programme such as 
“Ndi Umunyarwanda”. To put it differently, what is the EPR’s version of “Ndi 
Umunyarwanda” from a theological perspective? How and what must be done?  
 
In his doctoral study entitled, ‘The test of faith: Christians and Muslims in the 
Rwandan genocide,’ Benda (2012) echoes the same viewpoint when he emphasises 
that it is time for Rwandan faith communities to come out with a systematic 
framework for reconciliation that combines theory and practice. Furthermore, he 
refers to a faith-based initiative of reconciliation that provides a clear ‘theology of 
ethnicity’ that deconstructs and demythologises Rwandan identity binaries. To him, 
the removal of ethnic criteria from identity cards is desirable. Unfortunately, it did not 
and could not lead to the erasure of an ethnic mentality that has been engraved in the 
psyche of Rwandans for almost a century (Benda, 2012:226-27). It has been stated in 
this study (4.6) that the most critical issue of the Rwandan church was the failure to 
address the problem of ethnic ideology. One factor, however, as Ferdinando 
(2009:56) pointed out, was the failure to grapple with theological perspectives of 
ethnicity. This being so, the EPR is therefore called to provide a theological guideline 
on how ethnic ideology can be addressed and deconstructed among the Rwandan 
people. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
7.1 Introduction 
 
This study aimed to investigate how the ministry of reconciliation in the Presbyterian 
Church in Rwanda has addressed the issue of ethnic ideology and responded to the 
challenges of a post-genocide Rwandan context. It also identified the contextual and 
identity factors that contributed to the 1994 genocide in Rwanda and the post-
genocide effects thereof. Of particular interest was the role played by the Rwandan 
Church. In this respect, this study seeks to contribute to the existing literature on the 
Rwandan genocide by bringing together two areas of research that have previously 
been disengaged: The first area of research relates to the causes of the 1994 genocide. 
The second area of research concerns the strategies for reconciliation in post-genocide 
Rwanda. This study has argued that reconciliation is only possible to the extent that 
we understand and address the root causes of the genocide. Thus, drawing particularly 
on scholars like Gatwa (2005) and Shyaka (2005), it was argued that ethnic ideology 
perpetuates the cycle of violence in Rwanda. What is unique to this research is the 
attempt to evaluate a particular church—the Presbyterian Church of Rwanda—as it 
attempts deconstruct and eradicate ethnic ideology as part of its effort to promote 
reconciliation. The intention of this evaluation is to establish suggestions for future 
reconciliation efforts, taking into account the issue of ethnic ideology that continues 
to persist in contemporary Rwanda. 
 
This study sought to answer the following two questions: 
1) What has the Presbyterian Church in Rwanda done with regards to 
reconciliation after the 1994 genocide?  
2) What are the possible theological guidelines and strategies for the Presbyterian 
Church in Rwanda to promote reconciliation in the Rwandan society? 
 
This final chapter comprises two main parts. The first part summarizes the arguments 
presented in this study; it also outlines the findings of the research and proposes 
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answers to the research questions. In the second part, some recommendations are 
made to the EPR to initiate effective actions and promote reconciliation. 
 
7.2 Summary of arguments and research findings 
 
This study intended to offer a realist evaluation of the Rwandan situation. The CMO 
(context-mechanisms-outcomes) configuration framework, as suggested by Pawson 
and Tilley (1997, 2004), was used in this regard. The CMO methodology was used as 
to identify and evaluate the “cause-effect” from the viewpoint of contexts, 
mechanisms and outcomes. It answered the questions of how and why the people of 
Rwanda and church leaders responded to ethnic ideology, as well as the how and why 
of the contextual phenomenon of reconciliation in post-genocide Rwanda. The realist 
approach and its CMO method directed a deeper investigation of the Rwandan 
context in which mechanisms of reconciliation are implemented. This study moved 
beyond a mere evaluation of interventions by suggesting that the context of post-
genocide Rwanda must be understood in light of the history of ethnic ideology. A 
fresh understanding of the Rwandan context thus demands new kinds of mechanisms: 
reconciliation efforts that will attempt to deconstruct ethnic ideology. The “Ndi 
Umunyarwanda” programme was highlighted as an example of this new kind of 
mechanism. However, the focus of this study shifted to the Presbyterian Church, 
seeking a theological and missiological basis for reconciliation to address the ethnic 
ideology. Once further mechanisms are put in place, they can be analysed according 
to their outcomes. In this sense, the CMO methodology served as a theoretical 
framework for this study, even if this dissertation did not conduct a CMO analysis for 
a particular programme.  
 
The study was divided into seven chapters each with their own emphasis. Some 
conclusions also listed below: 
 
Chapter one served as an introduction to the dissertation. In addition, it presented the 
aims of the study, the research problem and the research questions. It is an 
interdisciplinary research study informed by the social sciences, but still falls within 
the ambit of theology and missiology.  
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Chapter two provided a conceptual framework for reconciliation. It described the 
various dimensions of reconciliation, using social theories to inform biblical and 
theological reflections. Based on the views of scholars like Schreiter, Okure and de 
Gruchy, it was argued that the ministry of reconciliation is a divine work that is 
initiated by God Himself, with human beings as agents of that ministry. It was 
discovered that from a Christian theological perspective, reconciliation constitutes a 
paradigm for mission. This means that mission of reconciliation is based on the missio 
Dei, and reconciliation has become an essential part of the church’s mission. By 
understanding reconciliation as a new emerging paradigm for mission, reconciliation 
is considered both a process and a goal. In other words, the activity of reconciliation 
is a process, not a state to be achieved or a goal to be reached, but it is an on-going 
process aimed at building relationships between individuals, groups and societies. The 
chapter suggested that relationship building, truth-telling, forgiveness and healing are 
dimensions for the theological evaluation of reconciliation. All four of these 
dimensions relate to the operational definition of this study, which implies that from 
the contextual reality of Rwanda, the definition of reconciliation means that “victims 
and perpetrators do not see the past as defining the future, but rather come to see the 
humanity of one another, accept each other, and see the possibility of restoring a 
damaged relationship” (Staub, 2006:868). 
 
Chapter three outlined the historical context of the Rwandan genocide. The chapter 
reviewed and examined the development of the Rwandan crisis before and after 
independence, and described the genesis of the social construction of ethnic ideology 
that led to genocide in 1994. The study found that before the introduction of 
colonialism, Rwanda had been a peaceful land, where values such as friendship, 
brotherhood, solidarity, love and patriotism were the basis of social education and 
moral responsibility. National unity was made easier by the fact that Rwandan people 
have always shared the same culture and one common language. The chapter showed 
that the issue of ethnic ideology, which led to the 1994 genocide, was artificially 
constructed by colonial authorities and later hardened by Rwandan elites in order to 
maintain their political power. However, other factors that contributed to the 
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Rwandan genocide include identity-based conflict, colonial ideology based on the 
Hamite theory, myth-making, political ideology, and economic ideology. 
 
Chapter four explored Christian mission and ethnic ideology in the Rwandan church, 
taking into account the ties between the church and the state. The chapter revealed 
that Europeans had become obsessed with race, and this had a negative impact on the 
lives of the indigenous people in African countries such as South Africa and Rwanda. 
From the time of their arrival in Rwanda, missionaries played a vital role in sowing 
the seeds of an ethnic ideology by introducing a racist ideology derived from the 
Hamitic race theory. During the colonial period, missionaries contributed to the 
consolidation of Tutsi power and the replacement of the king. Post-independence, 
they played an important part in the consolidation of Hutu power. The church 
changed its dominant loyalty from Tutsi to Hutu, and overtly engaged in ethnic 
politics. The study indicated that the Rwandan Christian church has been accused of 
active complicity in violence through its close relationship with the government. 
Churches in Rwanda were also challenged for their failure to raise a prophetic voice 
against the discrimination, violence and killing of Tutsi committed by both the first 
and the second Republic of Rwanda.    
 
Chapter five provided a description of Rwanda’s current position. It was indicated 
that the process of unity and reconciliation has already commenced since the 
genocide. It also requires the participation of Rwandans themselves. Furthermore, 
there have been many achievements made in terms of reconciliation by both the 
Rwandan government and NGOs, including the churches. In this sense, the role of the 
National Unity and Reconciliation Commission (NURC) has been crucial, as it has 
responded to the effects of genocide and sought to address the long-term effects of 
ethnic ideology that still persists among many. It has provided a new identity for all 
Rwandans, as is reflected in the “Ndi Umunyarwanda” (I am a Rwandan) programme. 
For the NURC, the concepts of ‘unity’ and ‘reconciliation’ must not only focus on the 
context of genocide, but on all the causes of Rwandan evil by considering the 
historical and ideological frameworks. In fact, it concerns the reconstruction of the 
national identity and reconciliation of the Rwandan with himself/herself and with 
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his/her nation. Furthermore, in order to reconcile Rwandans, they are to reconcile 
with their history (Shyaka, 2005:36). 
 
Another mechanism for unity and reconciliation was the restorative Gacaca courts. 
On one hand, their objective was to reveal the truth of what happened during the 
genocide, and on the other hand, to punish the culprits and release and rehabilitate 
innocent prisoners. It was highlighted that only after fair justice is administered would 
reconciliation and unity become possible. Reconstructing post-genocide Rwanda has 
obliged various stakeholders to devise strategies that contribute to the restoration of 
relationships and trust.  
 
Chapter six reflected on theological strategies, activities and programmes regarding 
the promotion of reconciliation achieved by of the Presbyterian Church in Rwanda. 
Being a realist evaluation based on CMO configuration framework, this chapter also 
explored whether the programme led to any significant impact or outcome, taking into 
account the four dimensions of reconciliation, as proposed in chapter two. The study 
showed that different strategies were used by the Presbyterian Church to achieve 
reconciliation. Counselling and social services were provided to both victims and 
perpetrators during group meetings, while getting to know each other and work 
together. The study discovered that reconciliation in the Presbyterian Church is 
sometimes related to dialogue between survivors and perpetrators. The researcher also 
noticed that the meeting of survivors (Tutsi) and perpetrators is similar to what Boers 
(1992:90) calls the ‘face-to-face programme’. This helps the offenders to understand 
the consequences and impact of their deeds.  
 
Overall, the study found that the Presbyterian Church in Rwanda has made significant 
achievements. They developed a permanent programme for dialogue sessions, which 
has inspired its members to express their views on unity, reconciliation and conflict 
resolution. Moreover, the study found the 1994 genocide to be overwhelmingly 
depressing because of the way it destroyed the sense of control people had over their 
lives. One of the main challenges to building constructive human relations in Rwanda 
is because of the long and difficult recovery process. In addition, the effect of the 
psychological damage runs very deep. For this reason, the church is helping its 
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members and the communities to heal these wounds that continue to inflict such 
tremendous pain. The church, through teaching, preaching and counselling, provides 
psychological therapies, which have helped foster compassion, acceptance and 
forgiveness. 
 
In light of the above, a few brief recommendations follow. These are based on the 
literature as well as the researcher’s own observations.  
 
7.3 Recommendations 
 
Bosch (1991:393-401) emphasises that mission as mediating salvation implies that 
missions must be holistic, so that salvation is not only limited to the individual’s 
relationship with Christ. It must also see the hatred, injustice, oppression, violence 
and other forms of suffering in the world. Furthermore, Bosch maintains that mission 
as a quest for justice must deal with the relationship between the evangelistic and 
societal dimensions of Christian mission, which constitutes one of the thorniest areas 
in the theology and practice of mission. This implies that the church is viewed as an 
instrument for mission. To participate in mission is to participate in the movement of 
God’s love toward people. Thus, the primary purpose of the missiones ecclesiae 
cannot simply be the planting of churches or the saving of souls, but rather, it has to 
be service to the missio Dei.  
 
Based on the fundamental theological and biblical mandate of being given “the 
ministry of reconciliation” and being entrusted with “the message of reconciliation” 
(2 Cor 5:18-19), the EPR must therefore take action regarding the issues of ethnic 
ideology and the effects of genocide, which continue to cause severe suffering to 
Rwandans. This reality places the issue of ethnic ideology and the consequences of 
genocide directly before the church’s leaders and members, demanding an appropriate 
response from them. These issues can only be responded to by applying clear biblical 
and theological reflections and guidelines. 
 
The study also showed that the “Ndi Umunyarwanda” programme has been an 
efficient tool of reconciliation, which addresses and deconstructs genocide ideology 
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among Rwandans. However, theologically speaking, “Ndi Umunyarwanda” still 
excludes other people who are not Rwandans, which is problematic theologically and 
missiologically. This is why it is recommended that the Presbyterian Church in 
Rwanda, based on theological grounds, must provide Christian values, guideline and 
principles to eradicate and deconstruct ethnic ideology by promoting a common 
Christian identity which is inclusive and open to the “other”. In this respect, we may 
say that the EPR reconciliation initiatives posited reconciliation as a way to address 
the effects of genocide. However, it was unable to address ethnic ideology. 
 
With regards to the Rwandan context, Barton (2012:238) understands that 
reconciliation as a Christian mission transcends ethnic categories. For him, mission 
envisions the redemption of relationships, the elimination of enmity and the 
establishment of a welcoming, embracing communion between former enemies. 
Furthermore, Barton uses Katongole’s (2009) idea when he calls for a revision of our 
understanding of mission and missions. What should Christian missions look like 
after the Rwandan genocide? For Katongole, the prophetic role of the church is 
mostly directed toward challenging the racialized ideas of ethnic identity and the 
opposition that enabled the 1994 genocide. The church, he rightly reasons, should 
oppose the rigid colonial structures of ethnic division and create a space for people to 
move past those oppositions and experience solidarity (cited by Barton, 2012:238). In 
light of all of this, I argue that in a contemporary society like Rwanda, where ethnic 
ideology and genocide effects are clearly visible, the Christian church is called to the 
ministry of reconciliation. In other words, reconciliation is therefore part of the 
church’s mission and the ministry of every Christian. 
 
Building on the above theological recommendations, four areas are listed below 
where, on a practical level, the EPR may help to improve its engagement towards the 
ministry of reconciliation with regards to ethnic ideology and genocide:  
 
Continuing the work of reconciliation to address the effects and consequences of 
genocide. Although the Presbyterian Church has successfully achieved many of its 
objectives in its ministry of reconciliation, it still faces the challenge of providing 
social services to genocide survivors due to financial constraints. Social services like 
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education, medical care, and diaconal services in the Presbyterian Church in Rwanda 
have been used as part of its mission work since the Church started. However, more 
effort must be done to address the social needs created by the genocide and its 
consequences, ensuring that social provision responds to these specific needs. Policies 
in terms of health, education, housing or economic development must continue to 
strengthen the mainstreaming of specific care for people affected by the genocide.  
 
Healing the trauma of victims, or even achieving forgiveness, does not mean that 
things return to how they were before the conflict or the trauma arose. In terms of 
both healing and forgiveness, the victim and the wrongdoer find themselves in a new 
place—a place they could not have anticipated.  
 
The church is also under the mandate to remind all people of the worth that offenders 
have in the eyes of God. It does so by ministering in whatever way it can to those who 
have violated the laws of the society and now find themselves removed from that 
society. It also does so by looking for better ways to prevent crime of all kinds, 
seeking more efficient ways to deal with offenders than our current system employs, 
and by showing concern for the victim as well as for the offender. The church should 
embody the Good News, that love has conquered hate in the person of Jesus Christ 
(Boers, 1992:101). In the Rwandan context, many ex-prisoners developed 
problems/issues related to the situation in which they lived while incarcerated. For 
instance, some came back with diseases, handicaps, and ailments such as 
stomachaches, tuberculosis, swollen legs, etc. When they returned to their homes, 
many discovered new and complicated problems, for example, their wives had 
remarried or given birth to children from other men. These problems compounded 
their sadness, grudges, fears, and shame, which traumatised them even more (Richters 
& Van Brakel, 2008:53). Therefore, it is recommended that the Presbyterian Church 
in Rwanda must continue its prison ministry. It must continue preaching the Gospel of 
repentance to perpetrators who are still in prison. It must create programmes for 
successful reintegration into society once released from prison. 
 
Specific care should be also taken to address the trauma affecting specific groups. 
Psychological support should be mainstreamed. “Telling the story of suffering must 
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be one of several solutions to help Christians overcome the genocide trauma. To let 
people tell the story of their suffering is more important than preaching to them every 
day about reconciliation and forgiveness. Dedicating a space for telling stories of 
suffering, in ritual that is called ubuhamya in Kinyarwanda (testimony) could be 
considered” (Rutayisire, 2012:82). Thus, all parishes of the Presbyterian Church in 
Rwanda should create a safe space and allocate sufficient time for people to tell 
stories of their suffering because these personal stories instil hope in those who 
questioned whether God had abandoned their country during the genocide. 
 
Extension of reconciliation ministry within the existing programmes in all parishes. 
The Rwandan context does not merely demand social and humanitarian services, but 
requires transforming the entire society to achieve genuine reconciliation throughout 
the country, moving beyond ethnic ideology, mistrust, hatred and enmity that may 
cause further violence in the future. The EPR is therefore called to shape and 
articulate its theology according to the context. In this respect, it is recommended that 
the contextual theology of reconciliation must serve as a guideline for future 
programmes. These programmes should not be limited to Presbyterian Church 
members only, but also extended to people of other denominations and other faiths, 
because reconciliation concerns all Rwandans.  
 
Creating awareness and empowerment of congregations. It is recommended that the 
Presbyterian Church in Rwanda, particularly at the national level, should bring it to 
the attention of all congregations that the biblical mandate given to the church is to be 
agents of reconciliation. The Presbyterian Church in Rwanda should continue to 
support reconciliation efforts carried out in different parishes aimed at the 
rehabilitation of people affected by the genocide, their reintegration, as well as 
initiatives that are geared towards the long-term reconciliation and social cohesion of 
society. Lessons learned from different congregations should be shared and examples 
of successful approaches should be exchanged among congregations to improve 
reconciliation programmes.  
 
Christian education to younger generation as a source of societal change. One of the 
most important tasks of the church is to interpret the Word of God to each new 
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generation, since God is a God-for-people. In this regard, the mission of the 
Presbyterian Church in Rwanda should be related to specific times and places, as well 
as to the particular needs of people. Thus, it is recommended that the younger 
generation must be helped so that they may discover the power of forgiveness and be 
freed from hatred and the spirit of revenge while growing up. Children and youth 
should be protected, cared for, educated, taught to resist ethnic ideology, spiritually 
nourished and given the opportunity to reach their full potential and grow up in an 
environment that is favourable to their moral, intellectual and physical development. 
 
7.4 Suggestion for further research 
 
In view of the perspectives of Yip (2013) and others who use critical realism and a 
realist approach in Missiology, it is hoped that this study will contribute substantially 
to the effort to reconcile the people of Rwanda. The proposed ‘post-postmodern 
anthropology’ and ‘post-postmodern missiology’ of Yip shows where some of the 
contributions of the dissertation are and possibilities for further research in 
missiology. He indicates that, “A number of questions need to be answered. In a 
context where there is an insider movement, what are the specific culture, structure, 
and history of that group? What is the situation of power (both hidden and 
manifested) in that group? ” (Yip 2013:11).  
 
Yip explains the relevancy of critical realism as a philosophical foundation of religion 
and culture in anthropology and missiology and the development of a ‘post-
postmodern anthropology’ and ‘post-postmodern missiology. The disciplines have 
challenged understandings and approaches to culture and religion on different levels 
since the 1960s: “A number of factors from the 1960s onward have led to a serious 
challenge to the traditional anthropology and hence the need of a new missiology. 
These include post-modern anthropology and globalization” (Yip, 2013:5-6). For 
example, post-modern or post-colonial scholarship in various disciplines and 
frameworks converge around the following themes: the need to move from mere 
description of language and symbols to issues of (mis)representation of ‘others’ and 
‘other’ cultures and religions; consider the dynamics of ideology and power; 
construction of meaning and knowledge from different cultural and religious realities; 
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focus on the ‘preferential option of the poor’ and other marginal groups; develop 
knowledge which is largely based on the experiences and contexts of marginal 
groups.  
 
However, according to Yip, a ‘positivist view’, a standard cause and effect logic (as 
used in old and new expressions of subjectivism or objectivism, idealism or 
instrumentalism) continues to inform and influence post-modern anthropology and 
post-modern/ecumenical missiology and mission practices. This logic is also part of 
and influence theological contextualization - ‘mission as contextualization’ in 
contexts of poverty and inequality - and mission practices, for example mission 
outreaches to the so-called ‘unreached peoples’ (Yip, 2013:6). Therefore, a critical 
realist approach in missiology or, according to Yip, ‘a post post-modern missiology’ 
is an attempt to address this problem by asking,  
 
How do we contextualize in view of the large intra-cultural variations?...Rather 
than postulating a set of cultural qualities (or themes or symbols) as shared by a 
(unverified) ‘majority’ of a society and contextualizing on that basis, it is better 
to use progressive [a radical or revolutionary emergent] contextualization to 
study the social actions (including so-called exceptions) of a subgroup, the 
consequences, the inner states of the group members, all in the proper contexts, 
and making generalizations cautiously without making them general laws or 
norms. Missiological application then proceeds based on this generalization…. 
(Yip, 2013:11).  
 
Yip builds on the original and basic realist perspective and parameters of missionary 
anthropologist Paul Hiebert and develops them with reference to the critical realism 
of Ortner in post-modern anthropology. He rephrases and applies the parameters of 
Hiebert to concepts and contexts of marginal groups - the poor and the so-called 
‘unreached peoples’ as understood in two broad traditions of mission. Whether 
mission as evangelization of ‘un-reached people’ groups or mission as 
contextualization is used, understandings and identifications of the worlds and 
contexts of ‘others’ by middle or upper middle class people remain limited and 
problematic. The critical realist approach and proposed post-postmodern 
anthropology and post-post-modern missiology of Yip promote self-critical 
perspectives: how we read and acquire the knowledge from the worlds and contexts of 
marginal groups and ‘unreached peoples’ and for what purpose; how our processes 
and practices of (re-)discovering the worlds and contexts converge with and diverge 
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from the experiences, self-understandings and self-identifications of marginalized 
groups and ‘‘unreached peoples’ as insiders to their contexts (Yip, 2013; Hiebert 
1991, cited in Yip). 
 
How our approaches to individuals and groups from communities on the margins and 
‘unreached peoples’ link agency, identity, identification and power in cultures and 
structures culture in theories and theologies which focus on the processes, practices 
and outcomes of reconciliation in and through the encounters.  
 
It has been said repeatedly that reconciliation is a complex issue and a long-term 
process that requires united efforts to promote it. The EPR has a theological duty to 
perform and to eradicate ethnic ideology so that Rwandans may live in a peaceful and 
harmonious country.  
 
In its attempt to re-consider the ministry of the EPR, this study has faced a few 
limitations. First of all, this study has taken the form of a literature study. Thus, the 
evaluation of the ministry of reconciliation in the EPR has primarily been based on a 
scrutiny of church documents. A closer empirical analysis of the work of the EPR at 
the congregational level might reveal more detailed information on the effects of 
reconciliation. Secondly, the literature analysis has revealed that reconciliation in the 
EPR is not generally conceived of in terms of ethnic ideology. Thus, there are no 
programmes in place that primarily focus on deconstructing ethnic ideology. It is 
therefore not possible to evaluate that which does not exist. Once further mechanisms 
are put in place to achieve reconciliation by addressing ethnic ideology, it will be 
possible to conduct a fuller evaluation of the EPR.  
 
Future research should seek to fill these gaps. Further in-depth research on the role of 
the church in reconciliation should be undertaken to provide more information that 
will guide future interventions and inform policymakers on major trends and issues 
that can lead to policy changes in the area of peace and reconciliation. The researcher 
also suggests that there is a need for additional studies to be done on the theological 
response to ethnic ideology. The study may propose how and what must be done, and 
how to create a new national identity for Rwandans from a theological perspective.  
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